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Abstract 
System transformation is a process that has its beginning and flow, and gradually 
arrives at the closing stages, that are likely to bring into being the intended 
system, though no system is safe from rolling back. Notwithstanding the 
considerable achievements of Kosovo democracy on system transformation, 
above all on the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system, the 
consolidation phase has so far proved to be overly long and compromised, 
making the future and end results of the process highly unpredictable. Along with 
other internal and external multilevel actors determining developments on the 
consolidation phase within the complexity of the system transformation process, 
political parties are, generally regarded as irreplaceable institutions in a 
representative democracy. Their position at the second level of democracy 
consolidation, influencing the other three levels of the democracy consolidation 
structure, sets the consolidation process decisively dependent on them. The way 
and extent to which political parties perform their expected functions: 
representation; integration; legitimation; innovation; and governing, have a 
determining effect on democracy consolidation prospects. Indisputably, their 
short-term poor performance, impedes, and later makes the rolling back of the 
consolidation process more likely. The impact political parties have on the 
democracy consolidation process is amplified as it takes place in an environment 
of  high-level state and society party-driven politicisation, as currently is the case 
in Kosovo. Usually, the consolidation of internationally sponsored democracies 
entails democracy domestication, a process where parties are unavoidable to 
teach and inculcate democracy among and within society. Yet, since parties as 
the major institutions and driving forces within the process of democracy 
consolidation, fail to perform their normatively expected functions, there is no one 
to replace them particularly in a highly politicised society offering little space and 
opportunity for other substitution actors. Likewise, they destructively affect the 
prospects of the process. Political parties in Kosovo are found to perform their 
functions poorly, consequently ailing the democracy consolidation process at the 
current level of visual negative consolidation, with highly unpredicted prospects.    
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Introduction  
Dealing with something formless, being developed, consistently changing, and 
with unpredictable outcomes, it is not an easy task but a pretty challenging one. 
This is the best way to describe our research and possible challenges associated 
with it. The Kosovo party system and its political parties in general have not yet 
taken their final and stable form. It is characterised by changes on a daily basis 
with not a foreseeable, straightforward future. The democratization process in 
Kosovo, particularly the consolidation stage is still highly fluid, standing mostly on 
foreign legs. Observing, studying, and theorising such currently amorphous 
processes and phenomena, is very much challenging by itself. Of course, 
studying and conceptualising stable and already formed phenomena is much 
simpler. However, intending to shed a piece of light on the process of 
consolidation of democracy that Kosovo is currently undergoing , and the role 
political parties play in this process, I decided to undertake a scientific study to 
discover the relationship between political parties and the democracy 
consolidation process in Kosovo. Finding out the actual role parties are 
performing within the process brings out possible workable solutions to thrust 
forward the consolidation, hitherto appearing not to have given effect.     
 
As a field of study in general, it still lacks sufficient theoretical development. On 
the other side, as a contextualised case of study, it is, up to now fully unexplored. 
In this regard, the research is very important for scientific development in 
general, furthering the growth of theories and adding to scientific knowledge 
about the role of political parties in democracy consolidation, though 
contextualised particularly for the process in Kosovo. The field of political parties 
in general have been researched a lot, even if in terms of meta theories, still not 
sufficiently. Moreover, democratization as a process and how democracy shapes 
political parties has also been to a large extent explored. Yet, concerning the role 
of parties in the consolidation of democracy, it is more to be expected. The 
theoretical emptiness and vagueness in the field of study, makes the research 
more challenging, demanding, but also encouraging. Nevertheless, challenges 
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should be considered as the main thrust to development. It is just one more 
reason that made up my mind to undertake such a scientific journey into the 
realm of the role political parties might and do have into democracy consolidation 
process.   
 
Hopefully, the study will add to scientific knowledge and contribute to moving 
forward the actual stand of theoretical advancement on the issue in question. 
Furthermore, the study will help policy makers, and especially political parties 
themselves, to reconsider their role and contribution on the process of 
democracy consolidation. It provides an opportunity to better understand their 
place in the democracy consolidation process and structure, orient themselves to 
find ways to, and do their best to, inculcate democracy within society and 
smoothen the consolidation process in general. If irreplaceable institutions such 
as parties fail to do so, then substituting institutions are hardly able to push 
forward democracy consolidation. Nevertheless, since being the first study on 
political parties and democracy consolidation in Kosovo, it will serve as a point of 
reference as well for international political scientists interested on the issue. It will 
certainly provide a little knowledge to the younger generation in Kosovo, with 
currently the majority of them found shut out of the political process, a purer 
picture of the undergoing system transformation and where Kosovo stands in this 
regard.    
 
Transplanting theories developed in other contexts is not a wise or doable task. 
The same applies to theories of political parties. Therefore, they need 
contextualisation. In our research, the same is applied for available theories 
developed in other socio-political and economic contexts, referring to them but 
properly contextualised.  
  
The research is not immune to possible deficiencies that might be associated 
with it. Firstly, as it is not a highly explored specific area of study, it is hard to find 
models of research usable that fit our purpose of study. Secondly, there is poor 
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theoretical development on the relationship of variables, the role of political 
parties on the one hand, and democracy consolidation on the other, pertaining to 
insufficient literature on the issue. The subject of analysis if very much fluid and 
formless, additionally complicates its theorising. Moreover, it is highly challenging 
to get the information from political parties, usually closed within themselves, 
especially in terms of valid and reliable data.  
 
Nonetheless, despite many challenges the research is carried out, starting from 
considering the theories of democracy, then theories of political parties, followed 
by theories of system transformation and democratisation in general, and lastly 
trying to theorise the relationship between the role of political parties and the 
democracy consolidation process. After setting the theoretical groundwork, the 
study is embodied by the empirical part of the research, comprised of choosing 
data, collection, analysing, and drawing up the results. Due to the causal 
relationship between democracy and political parties, I firstly focused on the 
theories of democracies in general, exploring them and finding the different 
places and roles political parties have in varieties of democracies. Such 
consideration facilitated in proceeding to theories of political parties, in order to 
get a comprehensible view of varieties of theories and approaches in studying 
political parties and party systems in general. On the other side, it helped to 
deepen the insight into the theories and approaches of system transformation in 
general and the democracy consolidation process in particular, though quite 
varied and requiring to be contextualised in time and space. In this way, the 
research narrowed down to the theoretical framework of our study, building up a 
theoretical relationship between the political parties as an independent variable 
and democracy consolidation as a dependent one. Subsequently, after a 
thorough and in depth study of the theories and study approaches at all three 
above-mentioned fields of study, the actor oriented synthesising approach of 
consolidation structure developed by Merkel (1999) is found to be very useful for 
our case study. It offers enough space to make an empirically measurable 
correlation between the role of political parties and the democracy consolidation 
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process. On the other hand, since the research focus is on the role of parties in 
this process, we were certain to focus on the functionalist approach of political 
parties.  
 
After drawing up the theoretical framework to measure the role of parties on the 
democracy consolidation process in Kosovo, the research initially moved on with 
explaining the Kosovo socio-political and economic context, its general 
description and particularities it has as a political system, trying to find out how it 
fits into such a theoretical framework. It avoids possible mistakes in using and 
misusing theories not proper to the Kosovo context. Before going to an in depth 
empirical research to measure the role of political parties in democracy 
consolidation, a general chapter on the historical development of parties in 
Kosovo is drawn. In this regard, we shed light upon the historical development of 
the Kosovo party system, its causes, stability, and future development. Despite 
the fact that Kosovo counts around 50 parties, it was decided to deal with only 
five major parliamentary parties of the Albanian community, since they count for 
90% of the population, within the time span after the 1999 war, and superficially 
recalling into the pre-war period.  
 
Relying on the established theoretical framework, after the general picture of the 
context parties operate, and their historical development, it opened the way to dig 
out into the empirical part to measuring parties’ functions and their impact on the 
democracy consolidation prospects. For each particular party function there is a 
single chapter measuring empirically all indicators of each function. The chapter 
on future prospects of such a relationship based on the actual trends of 
development, and a concluding chapter summarising overall the research 
findings.  
 
The empirical part of the research relies on qualitative research. The interviews, 
document analysis, and content analysis are the three main research methods 
used. The expert interview is realised through interviewing political party 
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representatives, civil society activists, and distinguished students of political 
sciences familiar with the issues. The document analysis and content analysis 
are used to collect and analyse the data based on the categories and 
subcategories built on the theoretical framework. In addition to data collected 
from interviews, party documents such as: statutes, programmes, electoral 
platforms, and declarations are the primary data on which the thesis research 
relies. Moreover, media reports, international organisations reports, etc., are 
used as secondary data. Data collection was not an easy issue, especially 
conducting interviews. Some party representatives hesitated to respond in the 
name of parties, while some others agreed to it on conditions of anonymity due to 
security reasons if information for closed door decision making bodies were to be 
offered. However, party representatives actually interviewed have offered 
sufficient information on the issues required. Often the compatibility between the 
party documents such as party statutes, programmes, and electoral platforms, 
with the actual functioning of parties appeared unmatched. To omit such a 
discrepancy, the mentioned documents were related, as well as compared and 
contrasted, to the parties’ inner and outer reality and data collected from 
interviews. In this regard, most of the time also party declarations were hardly to 
be found corresponding to the real faces of parties.   
 
Optimistically, the thesis has achieved the attempted aim and it offers a modest 
contribution to scientific knowledge on the role of political parties in the 
consolidation of the democracy process. The study is context oriented, but as a 
model it might be useful, of course with modification, for similar studies 
conducted in different contexts of time and space designed to measure the role 
of parties in the democracy consolidation process. Just as our research relied on 
the research models used for some African democracies, by modifying and 
making them useable for our case study.      
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Chapter 1 
1. Theoretical Framework  
1.1. Theories of democracy 
Political parties are considered an indistinguishable and irreplaceable part of 
democracy. Parties and democracy are interdependent. It is unimaginable to talk 
of political parties without taking into account modern democracy, which is in turn 
enabled and designed to function through political parties. Democracies and 
political parties influence and shape each other. It is almost impossible to study 
political parties without getting an insight into the democracy, serving as their 
working and functioning bed. Modern democracies are the environments from 
which political parties emerge, develop, and are shaped. Both influence and 
shape each other. Parties affect their environment as much as their 
environments affect them. Different models of modern representative democracy 
offer various space and opportunity to political parties, as political parties 
influence modern representative democracy in a different way.  
 
Hence, in order to understand political parties it is wise from the outset to explore 
the diversity of theories on democracy. Studying democracy is an intricate task, 
due to the obscurities some democracies have. The incompatibility between ideal 
world and complex realities has resulted in varieties of systems and ideologies. 
As an illustration, it happened with communism. Once encountered with the 
realities of different worlds, it ended up in communism types of Maoism, 
Stalinism, Enverism, Titoism, and so on. The more spread an ideology is, in more 
diverse realities, the more likely it is to derivate its forms of varieties.  The same 
experience applies to democracy development. The disparities between the 
intended ideal democracy and the reality democracy, a transformation that took 
place throughout history in different political, economic and social settings, 
resulted in having many and various democracies. Subsequently, diversity of 
democracies implied the developments of varieties of theories of democracy 
(Schmidt 2000). The emergence of such democracy diversity is best illustrated 
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by the study of Collier and Levitsky (1996). Taking into account the large number 
of democracies, its growth and expansion with the subsequent waves of 
democratisation, and the persistent danger that due to such transformation and 
diversity, the concept of democracy itself might deviate from the root bases, 
Collier and Levitsky (1996) have developed a concept of democracy with 
adjectives. The adjectives are designed to highlight the possible features that 
assortments of democracies in different contexts have, while preserving the very 
substance of the basic concept of democracy to be shared among them. Such 
diversity and variety of democracies is also to be found in the recent wave of 
democratization that is our concern here, especially a half-way house progress of 
democracies.  
 
Democracy as a system contains within itself the overall political institutional 
structure based on social, cultural, and economic conditions. As with each 
political system, it has its multidimensional aspects presenting complexity in its 
nature, being, functioning, and structure. Thus, different approaches in studying 
democracy have so far been set forth, based on what one considers and takes 
as the focus, be it social bases, cultural prerequisites, constitutional setting, the 
economic system of the overall political setting, or even the actors inside the 
institutional structures.  
 
Despite horizontal diversity of democracies, the level of vertical development in 
democratisation has resulted in the establishment of the minimalist and 
maximalist scale approach in conceptualising democracy (Collier & Levitsky 
1996), placing most current democracies within this scale. Minimalist 
democracies are considered less demanding, whilst a maximalist one is 
expected to fulfil a higher democratic standard. Minimalist democracies are 
conceptualised as an electoralist one, whereas maximalist democracies are high 
demanding, performing better in terms of protection of citizens’ interests.  The 
label of an electoralist democracy covers mainly the presence of a fair, free and 
competitive election. Its proponents are Schumpeter (1947); Vanhane (1990); 
  Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo          
 
14 
 
Fukuyama (1993); etc.. The experience of democracy, especially the failure to 
give its intended effect in some countries, pushed scholars such as O’Donnell 
and Schmitter (1986); Diamond, Linz, Lipset (1989); Zakaria (1997); and others, 
to broaden the label of democracy, including other features of a democratic 
system such as basic civil liberties, freedom of speech, assembly and 
association. In this way, creating another extended concept of democracy with 
higher requirements constituting what is known as the procedural minimum 
democracy. Later on, due to the experience of some democracies in certain parts 
of the world, particularly in Latin America, Turkey, etc., challenged by powerful 
veto players, or as Valenzuela (1990) calls it tutelary power, raised a need to 
expand further the concept of democracy by involving the principle that 
democratically elected governments ought to have effective power to govern. It 
brought up the expanded procedural minimum democracy. The proponents of 
this conceptualization are Karl & Schmitter (1991); Huntington (1991); 
Valenzuela (1992); etc.. Another concept of democracy that characterises 
democracies in established industrial countries (including associated political, 
social, and economic features) is the prototypical conception of established 
industrial democracies. It is close to the maximalist conception of democracy 
counting additional criteria such as socioeconomic equality, and high levels of 
popular participation in economic, social and political institutions. The last type of 
democracy is more of an ideal, rather than a type of democracy and is barely 
evident even in the most developed and oldest democracies.  
 
The main reason for considering different theories of democracy here is that with 
different types of democracy theories and systems there are different positions, 
focuses, and levels of importance to the inner and outer actors within the 
institutional structure of democracy consolidation. In our case, the core concern 
are political parties, not ignoring the importance of other actors but trying to 
isolate them as much as possible, prioritising political parties compared to the 
other potential and actual actors influencing democracy and democratization as a 
process, and above all the consolidation phase. Therefore, exploring theories of 
  Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo          
 
15 
 
democracies facilitates the insight into the specific position, role, and functions of 
parties within the consolidation structure. 
 
In our case study, it would be a fuzzy decision to rely on the electoralist - 
minimalist conception of democracy, since parties are only implicitly among the 
major actors within the consolidation structure. The conduct of free and partly fair 
elections is to some extent also a result of the presence of outer actors – the 
international community in Kosovo, pushing forward democracy advancement, 
and so it is not exclusively because of the attitudes and behaviours of inner 
political actors. If that was the case, according to minimalist requirements, 
Kosovo could already be classified as a consolidated democracy, since three 
periodic national elections and  peaceful change of governments have already 
taken place. Actually, there are many democracy deficiencies, or as Merkel 
(2004) calls it, “defects” to be found, especially in terms of citizenship rights, civil 
liberties, election fraud, and so on. In other words, Kosovo democracy has failed 
so far to give effect in terms of protection of citizens’ interests.  
 
Moreover, despite minimalist and maximalist conceptualisations of democracy, 
taking into account different focuses within democracy, various scholars have 
placed democracies under a range of labels. In order to find out the party 
positions within democracy, presented in the following are different types of 
democracies, categorised based on the points of views and focuses of the 
scholars theorising them.  
 
One of the most well-known and often cited minimalist conceptualization of 
representative democracy is Dahl`s Polyrachie. According to him, a system is 
valued as a democratic one if it fulfils two major elements essential for 
democratic order: political competition and participation. The fulfilment of these 
two elements is dependent on establishment and functioning of eight necessary 
institutions: freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, the 
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right to vote, eligibility for public office, the right of political leaders to compete for 
support and votes, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, 
institutions for making government policies dependent on votes, and other 
expressions of preferences (Dahl 1971, 3). Dahl`s polyarchie is mainly 
considered with institutional and procedural objectives and not an end result 
definition of democracy, as Schmidt (2000, 395) puts it. Looking from the 
perspective of Lincoln’s famous notion of democracy, it focuses mostly on 
‘government of the people’, and ‘by the people’ dimensions, but not  explicitly ‘for 
the people’. In other words, polyarchie deals more with the input rather than the 
output side of the political system. In this regard, it constitutes a procedural and 
not a substantive definition of democracy. The political parties in polyarchie, 
though not explicitly highlighted, are implicitly considered as irreplaceable 
institutions. The elections are at the centre point, and parties in this regard are 
important actors, but no explicit arrangement for the measurement of their role in 
the democratisation process is offered, making operational and measurable 
correlation between parties and democracy consolidation quite difficult and 
hardly attainable.       
 
Pluralist democracy is another type of representative democracy, derived from 
general theories of pluralism. In a pluralist democracy the political and social 
heterogeneity, their representation, and guarantee of such diversity of interests, 
is of vital importance. One of the key values of representative democracy is the 
representation of plural interest of different groups of society through different 
organisations including political parties. Parties in this case unify, aggregate, and 
represent the diverse interests arising from the existence of various groups. The 
preservation and sustainability of pluralism is of primary importance for 
democracy. Thus, parties in a pluralist democracy are largely supposed to form 
the integration and representation functions, assessed as the intermediary 
institutions, around which heterogeneity of interests in a pluralist society is 
organised. Pluralist democracy is a result of a diversity of interests available 
within a society. The key purpose of a representative democracy is to ensure that 
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decision-making processes represent, and it is an end result of such 
heterogeneity. Regarding the representation in a pluralist democracy, Neumann 
(1986, 133, cited from Schmidt 2000, 229) considers pluralist democracy as the 
representation of voters through accountable and responsible representatives. 
Among the proponents of these theories are Robert Dahl (1971), Ernst Fraenkel 
(1991), Anthony Downs (1957), etc..   
 
The apprehension is that representative democracy has enabled the 
concentration of great and uncontrollable power to the elite, and as such 
softened the virtues of democracy; this has led to the emergence of the ideas 
and theories of modern participatory democracy. It is believed that due to the  
democratic transformation from a direct to a representative one, less opportunity 
for people to participate in the decision-making process is offered, which in turn 
has alienated citizens from the decision making process. Therefore, modern 
democracy requires that intermediary institutions be much more democratic and 
open to citizens to ensure opportunities for participation. The goal here is to 
provide more chances and opportunities for participation and to increase the 
democratic values through democratic ways of organising participation. In 
addition, the extension of the democratic ways of organisation should not be 
confined just to political, but also embrace other social organizations, developing 
the best way to ensure the chances of participation and maintain democratic 
principles.  
 
Despite obvious scepticism on the ability and readiness of the masses to 
participate in decision-making, there is a wide belief that the masses are 
sufficiently skilful and able to participate, and that the opportunity to participate 
should be offered to them permanently. The role of parties in a participatory 
democracy is the transmission one featured by the bottom up approach as a 
model of organization. Schumpeter (1942) doubts the readiness and capacity of 
people to participate. However, many have refuted such doubts. Among them 
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Scharpf (1970) supports the idea of participatory democracy on the grounds 
(though not everyone will participate) that having chances to participate and 
more participation is better rather than not having it at all. Regarding the role of 
parties in a participatory democracy, the inner party organization builds the 
necessary requirements to ensure and expand participatory democracy. The lack 
of inner party democracy damages representative democracy itself in general, 
since people’s voice in the decision-making process is less heard, questioning 
the very reason of democracy. In young and not yet consolidated democracies, 
and in democracies based on societies with little experience with democratic 
norms and values, the inner party democracy is an indispensable requirement for 
democracy, in order for it to be taught and inculcated among and within society, 
and socialise society with democratic values and norms in general. The 
relationship between inner party democracy and participatory democracy is 
articulated well by Poguntke (1994) while he considers the organizational 
structure of Greens in Germany, their original intention to create a party 
organisation based on the participatory principles of democracy and challenges 
encountered on their way to achieve initially intended objectives.  
 
The economic theory of democracy, from the name itself makes it clear that it is 
highly influenced by economic theories transplanted and applied on the theories 
of democracy. The main proponent of this theory is Schumpeter (1942), who 
emphasises the relationship between economics and politics, and in particular 
the relationship between economic and political actors. Here political parties are 
considered as a means, and democracy as a method, to arrive at political 
decisions. In this regard, it is also important to mention his sceptical view about 
the capacity of the masses to govern, stressing more the elite’s functions and 
competition on the democratic government, and their behaviour as being decisive 
for democracy. Compared to theories of participatory democracy, there is no 
need for participatory opportunities since the masses have no capacity to 
participate and govern. The theory utilises the concept of a ‘rational actor’ used in 
economic theories.. Downs (1957) develops further the theory, conceptualising 
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politics as a market, political parties as profit-oriented enterprises struggling to 
get their votes, and voters as rational customers. The theory has its implications 
on the theory in democracy, particularly on the way parties are organised and 
function (Schmidt 2000), since voters are considered rather as social than 
rational (economic) beings,  
 
By focusing explicitly on actors rather than structures, this theory takes into 
account political parties as rational actors trying to get into office by maximizing 
votes through offering the best (products) policies to voters and making them 
choose what is best for them, making them too rational actors. In this regard, 
Downs (1957, 25) defines parties as: “…a team of men seeking to control the 
governing apparatus by gaining office in duly constituted elections”. The main 
criticism directed to economic theories of democracy is related to difficulties in 
presenting parties as a unitary actor, ignoring the possible heterogeneity and 
many interests that different individuals and factions inside the party might have. 
Parties, even extremely ideological ones, are hardly likely to possess only a 
single interest, particularly personalistic parties where the only source of party 
cohesion remains the loyalty and to some extent servility toward the party leader. 
In addition, the voters cannot always be rational, as often they lack information 
on what exactly structures their political preferences. The place of political parties 
on this theory of democracy is stated implicitly, the elite’s competition for votes is 
organised through political parties. Yet, in democracies with poor competition in 
terms of the ideas and programmes that parties offer, it is difficult for citizens to 
benefit. Furthermore, if the elite’s behaviour does not substantially reflect the 
democratic values, it is meaningless to expect fulfilment of democratic criteria 
from political parties. Moreover, if the masses are not able to take part in the 
decision-making process, it brings us to the question of how far they are able to 
decide what the best offering is for them from political parties. As a theory it 
excludes possible developments within democratic society, lacks the dynamic 
and transformable dimension, and their implications into the durability and 
sustainability of democracy itself if such a setting lasts for long. It is possible for 
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society at a certain stage of its development still to have a lack of necessary 
information needed for participation, but as a society develops, they could attain 
this smoothing participation. If such a transformation is possible, then among the 
major actors of social and political developments are political parties, depending 
on which direction in general, they choose to take society. 
 
Another model of democracy is Elitist Democracy, developed by Michel Roberts, 
Pareto, Mosca, etc.. They contest the very substance of a modern representative 
democracy as being inevitably an elitist one, with everything concentrated on the 
elites preventing real representation to take place. Elites are in possession of the 
means needed to manipulate the masses, who are usually ill informed, powerless 
and excluded from the decision-making process. For that reason, modern 
democracy in the substantial meaning of the term is no democracy at all. Michel’s 
prominent and widely cited iron law of oligarchy demonstrates best such concern. 
As a theory of political parties it is in fact among the few of meta level, and quite 
unchallenged up to date. According to them, since such an exploitative 
arrangement between the masses and the elites is static and inescapable, it is 
hard to expect any contribution to democracy from political parties. Parties 
themselves through their organisation and functioning create and sustain a 
system disenchanted from society elitism. 
 
Different from above mentioned theories of democracies, the ‘system theories’ of 
democracies have at their heart the system of democracy in general. With the 
system analytical democratic theory, the name associated, among others, is  that 
of Niklas Luhmanns (1970). He conceptualises society as a whole, a system 
made up of different parts or subsystems, organised and functioning within the 
system. Political parties or the party system within the system in general, is 
legitimised and located between politics and society, whose main role is to 
stabilise the political system. Among the criticism made to this theory is its highly 
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normative approach, ignoring the complex reality characterising political systems 
especially in transition or a period of flux.  
 
On the other side, the critic theories of democracy, while criticising democracy, 
as their starting point emphasize their concern that a number of citizens are not 
well informed and able to make judgements about politics. Among the well-
known proponents of this theory are Jürgen Habermas (1992) and Claus Offe 
(1984). Habermas’ idea is that through deliberative debates people can learn 
democracy and become more active citizens, able to make judgements about 
politics, and decide for themselves and by themselves. The deliberative type of 
democracy can be best applied in a representative democracy through inner 
party democracy, facilitated through political parties. Nevertheless, Offe focuses 
on the inability of everyone in a democracy to organize and protect their interest, 
a thing that hinders the real relevance of democracy where interests of all 
citizens are supposed to be upheld and protected. Hence, the majority principle 
of democracy, in terms of the wide extent of citizens’ interest protection, places 
democracy as better than all other systems, compared to other systems where 
the interest of the majority is taken into account (Dahl 1989). Such appraisal of 
democracy compared to other systems, if referred to the participation opportunity 
in decision-making, is also supported by Mill’s (1861(1958)) argument that the 
best way to protect ones interest is for themselves to take part in the decision-
making. A thing that is not easily implemented in a representative democracy. 
Offe goes further criticising parties as being concerned mainly with policies that 
bring re-election and not long term society objectives. 
 
Taking into consideration the variety of theories on democracy, and trying to 
understand the role and place of parties within different democratic settings, in 
order to theorise the role of parties within the democratisation process, there is a 
need to look at theories of democratisation as well. As observed above, political 
parties have different roles and positions in different democracy theories; from 
being implicitly referred to, to explicitly conditioning democracy developments 
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and prospects. Yet, regardless of the focus of theories of democracy, be it at 
system level; the masses or the elite level; the institutional level; or at the output 
or input level; etc., it can be concluded that apart from the priority of political 
parties, representative democracy is hardly thinkable without political parties. 
However, since our concern are parties at the system transformation process, 
not democracy as a stable consolidated system, we should further our research 
on the role and place of parties in the democracy consolidation process. What is 
their role in this process?  
1.2. Theories of democratisation 
The near future of the last years of the communist era in Eastern Europe was 
surprisingly unpredictable for many scholars. Huntington (1984, 217) foresaw the 
chances of regime change in Eastern Europe – former socialist Europe - being 
equal to zero. Nonetheless, it took just a couple of years until the snowball, 
contagion effect of transition throughout the former “red” Europe started. 
However, it should be pointed out that the snowball of regime change, is not 
actually matching the snowball of regime consolidation. Despite uniformity in 
transition in terms of time it happened, the consolidation phase throughout the 
region is marked by diversity. Huntington argued that such regime transformation 
was wholly dependent on external factors, particularly requiring the fall of the 
Soviet empire, from where socialism in Eastern Europe mainly derived its 
legitimacy. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union and the communist ideology were 
unable to deal with internal problems and challenges experienced, happened to 
be defied by its satellites – former socialist European states whose legitimacy 
was wholly dependent on the Soviet Union that imposed such regime. The 
development marked the beginning of the new era for this part of Europe, the 
second phase of the third wave of democratization, part of which is the 
democratization process of Kosovo as well. That is our concern here. 
 
The regime transformation in Kosovo is part of the third wave of democratization. 
In his often cited work, Huntington (1991, 15) defined the wave of 
democratization as “a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic 
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regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly 
outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time”. 
Several scholars, including Huntington himself (1991, 44), claim that transition 
(that is our concern here) belongs to the second period of the third wave, which 
started in 1974 with the fall of the dictatorial regime in Spain. The Kosovo 
transition is a part of the third wave, also because there was no reverse wave in 
between as was the case with the first and second wave; something that is 
required according to the definition of the wave of democratisation. Nonetheless, 
others like von Beyme (1994) considers it to be the fourth wave of 
democratization due to its specifics in terms of the causes of change and the way 
the change takes place, thus distinguishing it from the third wave. Throughout 
our research, aiming to mitigate any possible conceptual confusion, our case 
study is considered part of the third wave.  
 
On the other hand, scholars divided the regime change within the same wave in 
different phases. Valenzuela (1990) and O’Donnell (1993), among others, 
conceptualise the second phase within system transformation in the third wave 
as the second transition. The first phase of transition is the process of installing 
the democratic institutions, followed by the second, whereby the system is 
expected to take roots and be consolidated once the democratic institutions are 
settled. Merkel (1999) goes further by dividing the transition, or as he calls 
system transformation, into three phases: the first one is the beginning of and the 
collapse of authoritarian regime, followed by the installation of the democratic 
institutions, and finalised by the last phase known as the consolidation. 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that there exists no clear-cut division 
between the two (three) phases, they overlap and influence each other. In our 
research the third phase of regime transformation will be considered , the 
consolidation phase. 
 
Moreover, there is no consensus among scholars on the conceptual definition of 
democracy consolidation as is the case with the definition of democracy itself. 
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There is a difference in terms of both time span and the level of democracy 
development for a regime to be recognised as a democratic and consolidated 
one. The consolidation of a new (democratic) regime1, , is a process where 
democratic institutions once settled are supposed to be stable and function 
according to democratic standards. Based on the time frame of development, as 
mentioned above, some consider it as the third phase, with the first one being the 
breakdown of the authoritarian regime, and the second the installation of the 
democratic institutions (Merkel 1999), depending how one counts and what’s 
taken into consideration while counting. The heterogeneity on conceptualisations 
of democratisations is primarily due to complexities the process is characterised 
with, in terms of time, space and extent. In addition, the diversity of 
contextualised experiences of the overall system transformation adds to the 
plurality of the conceptualisation of democratization. However, such 
heterogeneity is more an opportunity rather than a limitation. Otherwise, inflexible 
and rigid concepts provide  teething troubles while applying static and non-
contextualiseable concepts, developed in other time and space contexts and not 
fit for other cases of research. There have been many studies on democratization 
undertaken so far, with various approaches and for different parts of the world 
during diverse waves, which of course due to their own peculiarities affect the 
process itself on their own way. In order to highlight such scientific progress in 
the field of democratisation, try to make use of it and even contribute to that 
through this research, in the following some of the major approaches are 
considered.  
 
The regime change from a non-democratic to a democratic one, starting from the 
types of non-democratic regimes to the regime consolidation, as an area of study 
it has been researched a lot though not sufficiently. Scholars of democratisation 
are concerned with the causes of system transformation, the process of 
transition, up to consolidation as the end result of such a system transformation. 
                                                 
1 Regime is defined as the overall structure of procedures, institutions, and principles constituting the political system, 
determining the relationship between rulers and the ruled.  
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The types of non-democratic regimes, where the system transformation starts off, 
and takes place with the collapse of the regime are divided into: totalitarian, 
authoritarian, military, post-sultanist and the other forms this has (Linz & Stepan 
1996). On the other side, Merkel (1999) conceptualizes all of them under the 
umbrella of authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, a range of concepts have been 
coupled with the process of transformation. The one all-encompassing and 
synthesising concept is developed by Merkel (1999). He conceptualizes the 
overall process as a system transformation comprising all the three phases, 
beginning the shift from a non-democratic to consolidation of a democratic 
regime. It embraces the system change - necessary leading to democracy, and 
the transition process, up to the consolidation as the last stage within the 
process. Our concern here is the last phase. 
 
Despite many theoretical approaches used in studying democratization, with the 
following b focusing on a variety of them, emphasising different issues and 
consideration, including the consolidation requirements and particularly the place 
and role of political parties within the process. Such exploration eases progress 
toward an empirical model for measurement of the role of political parties on the 
process of democracy consolidation in the context of Kosovo.  
1.2.1. Socio-cultural theoretical approach 
One of the important theoretical approaches of democracy consolidation is the 
socio-cultural approach (Dahl 1971, Huber 1997). This theoretical approach 
deems the social capital as a cultural requirement for a society to be a safe bed 
for democracy, as Putnam (1993) argues referring to the pioneering and widely 
known work of Tocqueville (1835 (1976)). According to this theory, the 
consolidated democracy entails cultural change. Yet, cultural change in turn 
takes longer, even generational periods, but once consolidated it is for the long 
term and is resilient to any number of crises. Based on that, it may be concluded 
that the most stable and relaxed democracies are these that have already fulfilled 
the cultural prerequisites. In the model given by Merkel, this type of consolidation 
is labelled as a consolidation of civil society or cultural consolidation. Culture in 
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general and the political culture in particular provides the safe and fertile 
environment on which democracy relies and flourishes. In other words, the focal 
point here is on the overall cultural settings as a precondition for democracy to 
expand and deepen its roots, ensuring stability. 
 
In our case study, the necessary culture transformation is far from being attained. 
The culture of Kosovo society lacks historical experience with democracy. During 
the previous authoritarian regime, it was shaped to fit this regime. In addition, the 
current trends of development are less promising due to overextension and 
delays during the transition process, even at an institutional level, which is in turn 
reflected in cultural transformation prospects. If cultural transformation requires 
generational changes, then Kosovo society will wait for decades to grow a 
sustainable culture deeply enrooting democracy and making it immune to 
possible crises. Kosovo democracy is not yet immune to potential crisis, which 
would certainly endanger and seriously damage it. The cultural consolidation is 
quite broad, the role of parties is implicitly evident, as long as parties are 
considered social institutions, coming out of society and influencing it decidedly 
through their way of organisations, functions, and ideological orientations. In this 
way, parties do lend a hand at cultural transformation by means of teaching and 
spreading democratic values in society, deepening its roots through their 
organisation and behaviour, nowadays predominantly reflected in the course of 
the governing level. Parties also help cultural consolidation through the function 
of integration, socialising society with democracy.  
 
Nevertheless, the direct, operationalisable and scientifically measurable, 
correlation between parties and consolidation democracy prospects is tricky to 
build, since the focus of the socio-cultural theoretical approach is principally 
concerned with the cultural prerequisites of democracy consolidation. To some 
extent, it might be obvious how far parties put into a democracy consolidation or 
whether they present an obstacle to it, through their behaviours and attitudes. In 
the sense of whether they are generating, cultivating and upholding democratic 
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or non-democratic values in society, to facilitate cultural change taking place, 
towards development of democratic civic society. In the case of cultural changes, 
parties are perceived as socialization agents, socializing people with democratic 
values. Such a function makes parties exclusively social actors, and for the 
research to rely exclusively on this perception, might confuse other requirements 
for democratization. In addition, as a theoretical approach it offers no 
scientifically measureable model for the role of parties on the democracy 
consolidation process, in particular today where parties even in established 
democracies are perceived more as political rather than social actors (Katz & 
Mair 1994). Among the most famous works on political culture is that of Almond 
and Verba and their concept on civic culture (1989, 1-45). In our case study, this 
theoretical approach is not helpful because no direct empirically measurable link 
can be established between political culture and parties, and between culture 
and democratisation in the process of democracy consolidation.  
1.2.2. System theoretical approach 
A different widespread approach in studying democracy consolidation is the 
system theoretical approach, having at its heart essentially socio-economic 
conditions as a necessity for democracy consolidation. The approach covers also 
modernization theories concerned with the level of economic development and 
literacy rate, and their relations to democratization (Lipset 1993, Diamond 
1992,…). The higher the level of economic development and literacy rate the 
greater the chances for democracy consolidation. Yet, as a theory it has 
sometimes been undermined, in the case of some wealthy countries failing to be 
democracies or with some having large democracy deficits, for instance the case 
of Singapore or an even more authoritarian regime like Saudi Arabia, or the 
survival of Indian democracy without a strong economy.  Albania during the 
communist regime under the Enver Hoxha totalitarian rule, had an illiteracy rate 
equal almost to zero, yet it is regarded as having been one of the cruellest 
regimes in the world at that time. After regime change Albania is still among 
countries in the region performing least well on the democratisation process. It is 
a good example to show the weaknesses of the modernisation theories of 
  Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo          
 
28 
 
democratisation. Political parties in this theoretical approach are not of primary 
focus, which is why considering such an approach in our case study would not be 
a wise choice. Among the well-known proponents of system theories of 
democratization is Luhmann with his system theories. His argument is that the 
sub-system making up the larger system as whole are differentiated, interrelated, 
irreplaceable, autonomous, and no subsystem can play the function of the other. 
Referring to the failure of the communist system in trying to control social, 
political, and economic subsystems, due to a scarcity of resources was unable to 
control them. What is more, as a result it prevented them from functioning and 
growing properly, consequently leading to the collapse of the overall 
system.(Merkel 1999, 81). The model of Merkel on democratization has taken a 
lot from Luhmann’s model. The Party system within the general political system 
is considered as a subsystem as well.  
1.2.3. Structural theoretical approach 
The centre of attention of this approach is to class relations and international 
influences shaping the nature of process of democracy consolidation (Starr 1991, 
Robinson 1996, Whitehead 1996,…). The case of Kosovo democratisation, 
mainly internationally sponsored, could suite the use of a structural theoretical 
approach due to its concern with the role of international influences. However, 
that is not our concern here, but rather it is the role of inner actors within the 
system: political parties in the process of democracy consolidation. In addition, 
within the approach much consideration has been given to the institutional 
structure of the political system itself, such as presidential or parliamentary 
systems, and whether these systems make democracy consolidation or 
democracy breakdown more likely (Przeworski et.al. 1996, …). Compared to the 
two above-mentioned approaches that refer mainly to the society and social 
system as a whole, it pays attention also to the structure of political institutions in 
the system (Reuschemeyer 1992). Yet, not much attention has been given to 
intra state-society structures; though looking at intermediary institutions 
supposed to bind or at least bridge society and political system, is of pivotal 
importance to get insight on democracy consolidation. 
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1.2.4. The actor oriented theoretical approach (Micro level)  
Most of the above mentioned theoretical approaches of democracy consolidation 
are of a macro level, dealing with social and system requirements for 
democratization in general. In other words, they tackle the overall building of the 
democratization, without going into finer details of where most of creation, 
maintenance, demonstration, and reflection of values and behaviour crucial for 
democracy consolidation takes place. In the case of Kosovo, regarding the way 
democratization is taking place, the role of the international community is not 
dissimilar to that of the fire brigade, only interfering inside the building under 
exceptional and grave circumstances, in this instance, when there is a significant 
break in the rules of democracy. The inner-workings of the ‘building’, namely 
democracy and democratisation are best approached by actor-oriented theories. 
It covers also parties as among the most important actors to be studied in order 
to get a clear picture of where the democratization and democracy consolidation 
is and is heading to, its defects and shortcomings needed to be omitted and 
move forward. The role of parties amplifies where there is a high level of state 
and society politicization, particularly if parties themselves drive and maintain 
politicisation.  
 
The actor oriented approach is of micro level, it offers space to penetrate inside 
the structure and institutions concerned in the system, crucial in exploring their 
specific role and measure it in the process of democracy consolidation. Closely 
connected with this theoretical approach is the rational choice paradigm, 
whereby the actors involved commit to the democratization process based on the 
cost-benefit logic.  
 
In the process of system transformation from authoritarian to democratic moving 
to democracy consolidation, involves a number of actors whose importance to 
democratization varies from wave to wave, from phase to phase, and from 
country to country. Aside from other institutions, the role of political parties during 
the system transformation on the first wave of democratization was of primary 
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significance. Parties were the main driving forces for democratization, around 
whom the classes’ interests were mobilised. During the second wave, 
international influence was crucial with the importance of political parties being 
secondary to this influence. Then during the transition from authoritarian regime 
to a democratic one on the recent wave of democratization, parties are not the 
key motion setters (Lewis 2001). Yet, the consolidation stage in this wave is 
directly dependent on the political parties, the way and extent they perform their 
functions, the way they are organised, the objectives they pursue, the way they 
behave, their identity, and party system as a whole in general. The role of the 
international community in the case of Kosovo democratisation seems to have 
softened the role of parties, though it is hard to expect a stable democracy 
without an active role by political parties. The international community can offer 
and provide merely external conditions for democracy consolidation. There are 
inner-structure institutions expected to domesticate democracy, among the most 
important of these are political parties, particularly in a highly politicised context 
at all levels with different degrees. Hence, understanding political parties helps 
us to see the actual position of the democracy consolidation process and its 
prospects. The commitments of the international community to sponsor and push 
democratisation forward are not sufficient, if such political will is not present in 
inner structural institutions. In such cases, the likely results might be the freezing 
up of the consolidation process and overextension of the transition phase. 
Nevertheless, overextension of transition and the inability to move forward with 
consolidation, if it lasts for too long may possibly end up in a very unpredictable 
future for democracy, easily making a reverse process likely. In this manner, 
inner institutions might also ail the internationally sponsored democratisation 
process currently taking place in Kosovo.    
 
Amongst the theoretical approaches mentioned above, the actor oriented one is 
more suitable for our case study, since we are dealing particularly with political 
parties as actors in the process of democracy consolidation, their role in such 
process, and the extent they enhance or diminish the likelihood of consolidation. 
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Being at the heart of political system, the role of parties in the consolidation of 
democracy (within the system itself) is of crucial importance and irrefutable. It is 
unimaginable to have a self-perpetual and sustainable democracy merely relying 
on the legs of international actors, without having democratic institutions, 
especially democratic parties, capable of domesticating and enrooting 
democracy to ensure consolidation.    
1.3. Defining consolidation of democracy 
From the very beginning, it should be obvious that there is no consensus on the 
definition of democracy consolidation. As realised previously, there exists no 
single conceptualisation even for democracy itself, leading to variation among 
scholars on the concept of democracy consolidation as well. As highlighted 
above, the transformation as a whole is a wide process containing different 
phases starting from the collapse of the non-democratic regime, transition and 
then consolidation as the final step. There is no clear-cut division among stages, 
they are interdependent and overlap with each other. Moreover, the democracy 
consolidation process is also context based, whose prospects vary from case to 
case with different socio-political settings, type and causes of transition, cultural 
and economic peculiarities of political systems, etc.. It complicates further the 
defining boundaries between them. This illustrates another reason for varieties in 
conceptualization of democracy consolidation in terms of scope, time span, 
levels, requirements, and so on. Perceiving consolidation from different points of 
view resulted in such a flexible and vague conceptualization and naming as: 
institutionalization; stabilization; perpetuation; negative and positive 
consolidation; and so on.  
 
In the following, several definitions of the concept of democracy consolidation are 
presented, indicating different point of view, prioritizing different aspects of 
democratization and democratization as a process or as an endpoint. Similar to 
the definition of democracy, there are also minimalist and maximalist 
conceptualisations of democracy consolidation. Along with other proponents of a 
minimalist definition of consolidation, Przeworski (1991, 26) argues that 
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democracy in a political system is consolidated when “… it becomes the only 
game in town…”, no significant actor considers using anything other than 
democratic  ways to achieve the political objectives. Even those losing elections 
try to win again through democratic mechanisms, adds Przeworski. Turning to 
our case of research, this conceptualisation seems very broad and generalised, 
difficult to be operationalised for empirical measurement of developments within 
the process itself, to what extent democracy has been consolidated, where it has 
fallen short, etc.. Furthermore, it does not provide an analytical framework for our 
research case to find out the specific role of parties as important actors in this 
process. The conceptualisation is very wide and generalised, without specifying 
the actual and potential actors within the game, and the specific functions of each 
player. Therefore, this minimalist conceptualisation is regarded as a poor 
analytical conceptualisation, offering no specifications for analytic measurements 
of a comprehensible correlation between an actor and the process, in our case 
parties and democracy consolidation.   
 
Unlike Przeworski’s definition, Linz and Stepan (1996, 16) conceptualise 
democracy consolidation in a more specified manner, perceiving it as a process 
that takes place over three levels of the political system. The first level is 
consolidation of behaviour at the elite level, meaning the extent of the elite’s 
behaviour compliance with the democratic norms, procedures, and rules of the 
democracy game in general. The second level includes the society dimension, 
the values of citizens towards democracy. Usually consolidation at this level 
takes longer than consolidation at the first level, because it implies socio-cultural 
changes, yet once consolidated it is more capable of enduring and resisting any 
possible threat it might face. Lastly, the third structural level of consolidation 
entails bringing into democratic accountability the veto players like military or 
other powerful actors (in case of Balkans, where Kosovo belongs, as stated by 
Merkel (2007) it covers: the authoritarian tendencies of executives, organised 
crime, mafia, …) unwilling to allow the democratic process to take place. Such a 
conceptualisation implicitly places parties at the three levels: the elite, the social, 
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and even at the veto players’ level in the case of the Balkans. However, 
apparently it does not offer specific outlines to distinguish empirically the role of 
parties within the structure at the three levels of consolidation. The majority of the 
elite, above all the political elite, come from political parties. On the other side, 
parties are supposed to emerge from and be based upon society. In addition, 
veto players might come from influence, and be influenced by, parties, 
particularly in states with a high level of corruption in politics. Thus, such a 
relationship is barely ever empirically measurable on all levels, and as a 
conceptualization it is of little relevance nor a useful model for our case, since 
parties are of no explicit consideration. The concept has no explicit and specific 
reference to parties.  
 
In addition to the above mentioned definitions, Gunther, Diamandouros, and 
Puhle (1995, 7) regard consolidation of democracy as an end result that “…all 
politically significant groups regard the key democratic political institutions as the 
only legitimate framework of political contestation and adhere to democratic rules 
of the game”. It includes attitudinal and behavioural dimensions. The former is 
the positioning of significant political groups toward a democratic institution, while 
the latter implies their compliance with the democratic norms and procedures. 
The focus point is the elite, which although might be the most important actor 
within parties, they constitute just an important component of parties and not 
parties as a whole. Such reflection determines perceiving parties merely as 
political actors and not social actors also. The elitist orientated concept of 
democratisation passes over democratisation at other levels, particularly cultural 
consolidation as a precondition for a long-term democracy consolidation. 
However, it might be argued that the elite is also reflected at a societal level 
through their behaviour and attitude, but long-term consolidation requires society 
level integration in the process. Therefore, the definition in question ends up with 
the elite level, excluding society from the process of consolidation. Such a 
conceptualisation minimizes the parties as actors, and relying on this for 
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research might jeopardise getting the true picture of the role of parties in the 
democratization process. 
 
Furthermore, another conceptualization divides democratic consolidation into two 
types: negative and positive consolidation. The former refers to the removal of 
prospects of non-democratic alternatives to a democratic system, while the latter 
to a democratic system operationally settled, with established credibility and 
giving effect (Pridham 1995, 168; Pridham & Lewis 1996). Applying it to the case 
of Kosovo democracy, the negative consolidation is no less than it looks, being 
developed at a snail's pace due to the heavy presence and democracy 
commitment of the international community in Kosovo, as well as broad regional 
support from the Zeit Geist on European integration. Therefore, even non-
democratic actors that on the surface might offer alternatives to democracy, have 
to conceal this fact, and be heard to echo democracy. Along with the 
international influence, European integration should also be mentioned, and that 
one of the main criteria for membership is democracy. In this way, currently 
international actors have moved to neutralise any possible alternative to 
democracy, at least apparently. It is at least perceived this way, keeping in mind 
the non-democratic attitudes and behaviour of actual top state figures, the 
current president of Kosovo parliament, one of the leading figures of the largest 
political party, holding and uprising the statue of former totalitarian communist 
Enver Hoxha, is among many examples. Such attitudes are not just possible 
alternatives to democracy, but are more than that; they are a direct threat to 
democracy, particularly if no international actors guarding democratisation were 
to be present. Hence, it can be concluded that currently the highest state of 
democracy development in Kosovo is a visual negative democracy consolidation. 
As far as positive consolidation is concerned, it is directly dependent on domestic 
institutions, expected to domesticate and inculcate democracy within the society.      
 
Moreover, Rustow (1970, 385) offers a very generalised conceptualisation of 
democracy consolidation, identifying it with a habituation phase, a degree of 
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democracy development whereby political elites and the public employ 
democratic methods and became used to them, with this reflecting on their 
attitudes, behaviour and their way of thinking. As a concept, it is very broad and 
hardly useful for specific arrangements, when looking specifically at certain 
actors within the process of democracy consolidation. Usually, habituation as an 
attitude and behaviour takes longer, especially at the societal level, though it is 
the stabilised form of consolidation. The habituation enables automatic and full 
implementation of democratic norms and procedures are supposed to be, without 
contest on the ground.     
 
Having considered the aforementioned conceptualisations of democracy 
consolidation, it has become obvious that the most useful conceptualization of 
democracy consolidation, applicable and operationalisable for our case study is 
the developmental and synthesising conceptualization given by Merkel (1999, 
143 - 169). His model is actor oriented, providing opportunity for specific-actor 
focus. He divides the process of democracy consolidation into four levels, each 
of them consolidated on its own, and as they overlap, potentially helping or 
impeding each other’s consolidation. In terms of time requirement, the first level 
of consolidation is the quickest while the last one takes the longest time. The first 
level is known as constitutional consolidation (orig. konstitutionelle 
Konsolidierung) and is categorised as macro-level consolidation. It covers 
constitutional and other major democratic institutional settlements, such as the 
parliament, judiciary, and so on. This level of consolidation is followed by the 
middle level, called representative consolidation (orig. repräsentative 
Konsolidierung). At this point, the intermediary institutions such as political 
parties, social movements, and interest organizations, are the main actors 
intermediating and binding together state and society. The good performance of 
parties increases directly the legitimation of the first level as well as the 
consolidation of other levels. This level lies exclusively at the heart of our 
research, particularly political parties and their role in the democracy 
consolidation process, and whether they are developing or stagnating it. Their 
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position at the centre of the consolidation structure increases their relevance. 
Since the four levels overlap into each other, parties are to be found, in different 
degrees, at all levels from the first to the last , but at the second level of the 
consolidation structure they constitute the main actors.  
 
The behavioural consolidation (orig. Verhaltenskonsolidierung) is the third level in 
the consolidation structure. Comprised of veto power actors from military and 
economic fields, and whose attitude and behaviour to democratic values causes 
particular concern. The level is considered consolidated once they behave 
according to democratic norms and procedures. In this regard, it is of importance 
to add that Merkel (2007, 420) has said the system transformation in former 
socialist Europe, in particular Balkans, has experienced a triple (in case of 
Kosovo even quadruple – including state-building) transition. Yet, the military as 
in the case of some Latin American countries or Turkey for example, does not 
count as a veto player, but rather actors such as organized crime have infiltrated 
the government structures of some countries in this region, developing and 
maintaining authoritarian tendencies for executives. The last level of 
consolidation structure is the civic society consolidation, different from the other 
three levels, which focus on the elite, it has at its hub, society and culture. It is 
widely believed that change at the societal level takes longer than the other three 
levels. Such consolidation is the most secure one, since logically to reverse the 
change takes time. Democracy is immune to artificial and short time crises that 
might challenge the political system. Nevertheless, it should be highlighted that 
no political system is immune of breakdown, but the more democracy is 
consolidated the more it is resistant to breakdown.   
 
During our research, we might sometimes consider society while dealing with 
parties, because parties are socio-political and not just pure political actors (elite 
level). Therefore, sometimes we need to delve into the societal level, despite 
Merkel’s consideration of this level as an elite one. As Lawson (1994) adds, 
parties have no clear-cut boundaries, I would add that parties have no clear cut 
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horizontal and vertical boundaries - it is difficult to see where a certain level of 
party organization ends and the other level starts. It would be rather messy to 
consider the level of parties as just an elite one.  
 
The conceptualisation of democracy consolidation given by Merkel provides a 
very applicable and operational model to study empirically the role of political 
parties in the process of democracy consolidation, in our case study in Kosovo. 
The model matches the objective of our study.  
 
Nevertheless, before moving on we have to look at the theories of parties as well 
and try to find out a theoretical relation between the role of parties and 
democracy consolidation, to see if there is such a theoretical correlation, and if 
not, try to create one. Merkel’s conceptualisation provides broad space to 
measure the role of parties within the consolidation structure. The second level, 
aside from other possible intermediary institutions, is dedicated mostly to parties. 
The interdependence of all four levels within the structure, confer to the second 
level – dominated by political parties, an irreplaceable role on the process of 
democracy consolidation. From such a position, a party’s role in the consolidation 
of democracy can be measured by exclusive focus on studying parties, 
respectively parties’ functions. In the case of Kosovo democracy, the importance 
of parties in the process of democracy consolidation is disproportionately large, 
due to the high level of party driven and maintained politicisation. Comparing the 
role of the second level with the other three levels, the role of parties dominates, 
influencing heavily consolidation prospects of other levels. Therefore, our study 
will be based on this correlation, trying to find out and shed light on the parties’ 
functions and such impact on consolidation prospects. Understanding political 
parties eases the insight into  the democracy consolidation process. 
1.4. Theoretical approaches in studying Political Parties 
The best illustration on the state of the theoretical development of political parties 
is done by Duverger (1957, xiii) in his classical work on political parties. Even half 
a century later, his statement still persists and is nowadays realised. According to 
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him, “the theory building process on parties is in a vicious cycle. Theory 
formulation should be based upon empirical research, and undertaking of such 
empirical research should be guided by theories”. Despite many studies on 
parties – about 11 000 publications (Montero & Gunther 2003), no sufficient 
middle-range theories have been developed to capture political parties as a 
whole in different socio-political settings. Most studies tackle different aspects of 
parties, from different point of view, and different settings. Some are concerned 
with organisational aspects of parties, while others with party functions, party 
origins, parties as political institutions, parties as social institutions, and so on.  
Furthermore, most research on political parties leading to considerable, though 
not sufficient theories, concerned with different aspects of parties, is largely 
based on the experience and particularities of parties and party systems in the 
North-Western part of the world – already consolidated industrial democracies. 
This is primarily due to their more established experience with parties, because 
of a longer experience with democracies compared to other parts of the world. 
However, applying these theories to other parts of the world with different socio, 
economic and political settings is often not wise, not applicable, and of limited or 
no use at all. Most of the theories on political parties and party systems, before 
being applied to different parts of the world need to be contextualised. In relation 
to that, it should be highlighted that political parties in north-western parts of the 
world should be taken as a reference point, since compared to other parts of the 
world they have performed quite well in their democracies and largely deserve to 
be taken as a model.   
 
Looking from another dimension, parties have continuously experienced 
changes, declines, and transformations in general terms. The causes of such 
changes are of a multidimensional nature, starting from inner forces and outer 
party, social, political and economic developments. Likewise, it is widely 
perceived that parties at present, due to several reasons, are not as they used to 
be in terms of their organizational structure, ideological loyalties and preferences, 
identity, strategies used to mobilise supporters and voters, their attitude and 
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behaviour, and the functions they perform. In spite of that, such party 
transformation is to be qualified more as a party change rather than a party 
decline (Montero & Gunther 2003, 3-30). In addition, Mair (1994, 1-22) believes 
that we cannot talk of party decline, rather of party change, as parties are coming 
closer to the state, or relating to what we stated earlier, parties are becoming less 
social and more political institutions.  
 
Among the approaches of political science in general applied to study parties, is 
the traditional inductive approach, applied even today by many studies, which is 
relatively empirical-findings orientated. On the other hand, from the deductive 
methods of inquiry, the model-orientated approach is used through paradigms of 
structural-functionalist and rational-choice theory (Schumpeter 1942; Downs 
1957) – respectively ‘soft’ rational choice. Hence, despite their achievements on 
the study of parties, they are characterised with different shortcomings as well 
(Schlesinger, 1991). The rational choice approach has been criticised for its one-
dimensional nature compared to the multidimensional, complex nature of parties, 
providing the means to grasp just a little but insufficient sight of parties. The 
approach is perceived to have employed strictly economic concepts in politics. It 
considers parties as rational actors pursuing their own monolithic interests, 
excluding possibilities of there existing, in reality, heterogeneous actors within 
parties, each one pursuing its own interests. The usefulness of this approach to 
some extent has been enhanced by undermining the one-dimensionality of pure 
rational choice theories with the introduction of the ‘soft’ rational approach by 
Strøm (1990) on his studies on political parties.    
 
On the other side, the structural-functionalist approach as one of the main 
theoretical approach in political sciences during the 1960s has been borrowed 
from anthropology and sociology. One of its famous proponents is Easton (1957) 
with his theory of political system. As an approach in political sciences, its major 
focus is on the functions the system as a whole have. Thus, in the case of 
studying parties, it looks at the functions parties are supposed to fulfil within the 
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overall political system. However, as is the case with almost every approach, due 
to the deficiencies it has, structural-functionalism is not safe from criticism. It 
overemphasises system equilibrium and stability, featured with tautological 
ambiguity and ethnocentrism, inadequate in conducting cross-national studies, 
leaving aside other important features of vital interest of and to parties, and it is 
known as a highly static approach. Nevertheless, since our research is not a 
cross national research, but a single case study dealing with a specific political 
system, concerned with the role parties play in the consolidation of democracy, 
the functionalist approach is found to be very useful for empirical measurement 
of such a relationship. Furthermore, it does not mean that other features of 
parties in Kosovo, aside from party functions, are going to be outside the 
coverage of our study. In order to better understand functions, party structures 
should also be considered, the objectives they pursue, the ideologies they follow, 
the way they compete with each other, the way they are organised, their identity 
– whereby most of parties in Kosovo actually have identity crisis, their attitude 
and behaviour, and so on. All of the previously mentioned dimensions of parties 
present an operational framework for political parties. They offer parties 
opportunities and constraints in performing their functions, in our case of the 
democratization process. That is why observing them lend a hand in finding out 
the causes and consequences of the performance of functions by parties.    
 
The importance, necessity and indispensability of parties and parties’ role on 
democracy consolidation is historically and empirically proved, as well as 
theoretically grounded. In his famous assertion of his classical work Rossiter 
(1960, 1) reasserts the importance of parties in modern democracies “…, no 
democracy without politics, and no politics without parties”. In addition, there is 
the often cited Schattschneider’s (1942, 1) fervour regarding the role of parties in 
democracy supports the position that “modern democracy is unthinkable save in 
terms of parties”. On the other side, Sartori (1976, ix) in his classical work on 
political parties praises the importance of parties in modern democracy by 
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considering them as the central intermediary structures between society and 
government.  
1.4.1. Definition of political party 
The development of democracy throughout history resulted in the establishment 
of representative democracy, as a modern and applicable model of democracy, 
fitting into the nation-state institutional structure scale. This development and 
transformation of democracy to a representative one has been shaped by 
different historical experiences, cultures, ideologies, and institutional structures of 
different political systems, resulting in a variety of models of democracy (Schmidt 
2000). Hence, the close relationship between democracy and parties, particularly 
the development of various models of democracy, has led also to varieties of 
parties and conceptualisations of parties in turn, as diverse as models of modern 
democracy itself. The attributes given to and expectations from parties differ from 
one type of democracy to another. For instance, as stated earlier in the 
participatory type of democracy, parties are expected to involve themselves in 
society as much as in the governing role, differing form the elitist theory of 
democracy that associates parties exclusively with governing functions. 
Minimalist or maximalist definitions of democracy have also affected party 
definitions, implying the differing substance of properties parties have, from very 
minimalist to maximalist. .   
 
On the other hand, considering parties from different point of view, depending on 
the focus on parties, has also led to a divergence in party definitions. Some 
consider the way they are organised, or objectives they pursue, some others 
consider them as political or as social actors, while the rest engage themselves 
with party functions. Nonetheless, in order to grasp a full picture of political 
parties, as Wiesendahl (1980) argues, defining political parties in four 
dimensions,  the objective, functional, structural, and behaviour dimensions 
should be taken into account. Such implication offers a possibility for a better and 
all-capturing conceptualisation in terms of features of parties covered. However, 
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the need for contextualisation of theories on political parties often also 
necessitates contextualisation of party definitions.   
 
In the following, some of the numerous definitions of political parties are included, 
emphasising definitions’ relation to our research case, since one of the 
determinants in the conceptualisation of parties is also what the objective of the 
study is about. Here we are concerned with the role of parties in democracy 
consolidation. We should try to theorise on this relationship - parties as an 
independent and democracy consolidation as a dependent variable on this 
correlation. In this respect, firstly we should come with an operational definition of 
political parties.  
 
After a thorough examination of the definitions of democracy and democracy 
consolidation, follows the endeavour for a conceptualization of parties. It should 
be pointed out that despite many definitions of parties, some of them are 
considered in order to find out the most suitable one for our research, or at the 
end to construct an operational definition that suits our research purpose here. 
To illustrate the complexity in defining parties White (2006) opens the chapter on 
party definition by referring to the Bible “’but who do you say I am’ Jesus Christ to 
his disciples, Mathew 16: 15” (cited from Katz & Crotty 2006, 6)-  in this way he 
points out the wide range of possibilities one has while trying to define parties. 
Nevertheless, such wide flexibility also offers opportunities for varieties of 
conceptualisation, depending on what one wants to focus on, often even implying 
subjectivity as well. According to Edmund Burke (1770) “a party is a body of men 
united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some 
particular principles on which they are all agreed”. Sartori (1976, 63) defines 
parties “as any political group identified by an official label that presents at 
elections (free or nonfree), and is capable of placing through elections 
candidates for public office”.  
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Different from above mentioned minimalist definitions of parties, a more 
maximalist definition is offered by Sorauf (1964, 13). To him a political party “is 
an agency for the organisation of political power characterised by exclusively 
political functions, by a stable structure and inclusive membership, and by the 
ability to dominate the contesting of elections”. The last definition, compared to 
these stated earlier, is related explicitly to the functions.  Parties’ functions in 
terms of types and degree of performance might be exposed to changes from 
time to time and from place to place.  
 
Party definition relying only on what parties are is a relatively minimalist 
definition. Yet, adding what parties do, extends the range of issues to be 
considered while defining parties, especially in our case study trying to measure 
the role of parties as expected to influence, and to some extent also determine, 
the democracy consolidation process. In the case of Kosovo, political parties 
might otherwise slow and freeze the democratisation process, but in the short 
and medium term, the reverse transformation is not to be expected due to heavy 
international influence, particularly European integration. Any alternative system 
to democracy is currently inconceivable. The failure of parties to invest in 
democracy consolidation process, might result in a slowing down of the process, 
freezing it, and later also ailing it.  
 
Thus, considering both dimensions while conceptualising parties - what parties 
are and what they do - would complete and complement each other. To grasp a 
picture of what a party can do, first we need to know what a party is. The types of 
party in terms of organization structure, objectives they pursue, and their identity 
also determine the functions party intends and subsequently actually performs 
(Schmitter, 2001). 
 
Since there is no consensus on party definition, and there always exists the 
possibility of conceptualising in a normative sense, for the purpose of our 
research political party operationally is defined “as a group of men/women 
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sharing ideological orientations, organised in socio-political institutions, 
integrate them into political process, transmit and represent their interests 
through governing of political system, and consequently make them feel 
part of the system”. As an operational definition it suites our research case, 
offering space to measure the direct role of parties by looking at the extent to 
which parties perform their explicit functions, making democratic consolidation 
prospects directly dependent on political parties. Such conceptualisation, among 
other things normatively presents parties to be the shadow of society, reflecting 
the social pluralism into political system.  
1.4.2. Functionalist theory of political parties 
This theoretical approach is going to be explored in detail, because it is the basis 
for our research. The functionalist theory of political parties has been developed 
out of a general system approach in political sciences, at whose heart rests the 
system as a whole and its interrelated parts expected to fulfil their functions 
making the system able to persist. Regarding the expected functions to be 
fulfilled by each part of the system, there is a distinction between the 
consolidated and non-consolidated systems. In a consolidated, highly 
institutionalised system, there is a well-entrenched division of labour, with 
predictable functional expectations to be performed by each institution. On the 
other hand, such clear-cut expectation does not exist in systems with a poor level 
of institutionalisation, lacking pure division of responsibilities and capabilities in 
performing their own particular functions.  
 
In this regard, political parties and the party system are considered as a part and 
a subsystem inside political system as a whole, expected to perform their 
functions to enable the system to survive and function properly, and in the case 
of democracy consolidation, to enable democracy to become deeply rooted. 
Parties’ functions as part of the overall system, do not simply sustain the system 
but also consolidate it. Referring to the classical approach of system theories, the 
proper function of systems’ parts ensures the endurance and self-perpetuation of 
the system. Later considerations of system theories, such as Systemzielmodel – 
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the objective oriented model of system (Pollack 1990) endeavours to make the 
approach more dynamic as such, applying it to system transformation, using the 
significance of functional performance on the flux state of affairs, and not only on 
the stable and well defined system. He applied the theoretical approach also to 
explain the collapse of the socialist regime. In our case parties’ and the party 
system’s (as a subsystem) performance on their functions ensures the arrival of 
objectives of the system, predominantly democracy consolidation in the Kosovo 
political system.  
 
However, as mentioned earlier, dealing with functions of parties also means 
knowing the types of parties, which to some extent determines their possible 
functional performance, differing in terms of how it was supposed to be, though 
not necessary matching actual performance. However, with the functionalist 
approach the functions of parties will be of primary importance and other 
considerations will help to grasp better clarification of party functions’ 
performance.  
 
Referring to shortcomings of the functionalist approach (mentioned earlier), I 
believe that in our case study there is a way out of it. The tautological obstacles 
can be avoided by operationally defining the concepts used. The definition is 
more easily achievable in a single case study rather than in cases of cross-
national research. Defining the parties’ expected and actual functions highlights 
the possible distinction between the normative and real dimensions. It also pays 
attention to the possible distinction that in reality exists between parties in 
consolidated and fragile democracies while defining them, but always referring to 
parties in consolidated democracies as an intended model. Accordingly, 
confining ourselves within the framework of these definitions closes the 
ambiguities with concepts, that otherwise would hamper and diminish the study 
based on the functionalist approach.  
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The other shortcomings such as ethnocentrism and difficulties in making cross-
national studies, in our case are of no relevance since we are not doing a cross-
national comparative study but focusing exclusively within a specific socio -
political settings – Kosovo. The issue of overemphasizing in system equilibrium 
and the balance of system - static approach, often associated with the 
functionalist approach has its relativity. This approach, as mentioned above, is 
also used in studying system break up as well (Pollack 1990), or in our case, 
system consolidation or formation, and democracy consolidation. Having said 
that, it justifies the practicability of functionalist approaches in conducting our 
research, since there are functions attributed to parties in democratisation 
particularly the democracy consolidation process.  
 
Political scientists dealing with the functions of political parties in a normative 
sense, place different importance on different functions depending on the 
considerations they adhere to - socio-political settings, the way they perceive 
parties, and what the expectations are from parties. Some focus on the party 
system functions while others on the parties’ functions. Making a distinction 
between parties and party system functions is not an easy task. What 
complicates the models of functions more are also the diverse functions 
performed by different parties in different countries (Helms 1995). Some focus 
strictly on normative actions while some take more of an empirical and pragmatic 
stand and adopt the type of functions to the system they have in consideration. 
To reduce complexity, the possibility of modifications in a normative sense, 
allows us to emphasize on analytical practicability of parties and party system 
functions, taking into account recent developments inside parties and party 
systems and peculiarities of political systems dealt with.  
 
Before we proceed with our conceptualisation of party functions and draw our 
own normative model that suits best our case study, we should look at some 
studies done on this issue, so that we can have a better picture of the diversity of 
importance attached to party functions and variety of functions’ 
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conceptualisations. Among reasons of such divergence from scholars is the way 
they name them, some putting within the same label, different functions, while 
other scholars dividing into separate labels. However, considering them helps 
produce the list of functions through which we can measure and operationalise 
the role of parties in the process of democracy consolidation.  
 
While considering parties’ functions, great concern is given to the party changes 
and transformations, because ignoring this might bring us skewed results, not 
presenting the actual knowledge, information and clarification about the issue we 
are concerned with, expected to be the outcome of our research. For example, it 
should not be expected that the parties’ role is the same as that undertaken 
during the first wave of democratization, since today there are different social, 
economic and political settings, not necessarily requiring parties to handle certain 
issues that earlier in the process they may have been expected to. Furthermore, 
nowadays parties are conceived more as political rather than social actors, found 
more at governmental rather than at societal level.  
 
It is of vital importance to consider also the distinction between parties in 
consolidated democracies, that have undergone different changes at all levels (of 
society, politics, and economics) and parties in a political system that has no 
history of having political parties – or rather no experience with democracy. 
Nowadays there are parties to be found in other parts of the world, quite similar 
in terms of their functions to parties currently existing in the north-western part of 
the world. What does such difference mean for fragile democracies, like Kosovo, 
to have less society driven parties, where there is just a ten-year history of 
political parties and democratic institutions? The parties that in times gone by 
have played a vital role to legitimise what today are called consolidated 
democracies, are nowadays being transformed into parties more detached from 
society. Hence, having parties so detached from society in new democracies that 
still have crises of legitimacy, might cause problems to the entrenching of 
democracy, especially if other representative institutions (such as interest groups 
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or other social movements) expected to supplement the role of parties, are very 
weak and highly politicised, or do not function at all. Additionally, even if 
governing is a greater function of parties in our time, if not performed as 
expected, then at which level and who is going to legitimize democracy then? 
How is this related to the democracy consolidation prospects? These are among 
numerous questions we are going to shed light on.  
 
Emminghaus (2003) has constructed a model on party functions, trying to 
measure the role of parties in the democratization process in Africa. I find this 
model very useful, operationalisable and quite related to my field of research, 
though it is applied to other political systems. Therefore, after consulting (see 
below) some other party functions concerned, I decided to modify and adapt the 
Emminghaus’ model, for my case study and use it as a general framework for my 
own analytical model, based on which, I will conduct my research. The model 
has scientific and empirical values as long as it offers the possibility for empirical 
measurement of the role parties play in the consolidation process, in our case in 
Kosovo. It should be stressed also that the model is modified and adapted for our 
research purpose, taking into account differences between Africa and south-
eastern Europe, where Kosovo belongs. In the following, studies of different 
scholars on party functions are presented starting by Emminghuas.  
 
Party functions according to Emminghaus  
Emminghaus, dealing with parties in Africa and their role in the democratization 
process, builds up a scientific schema of party functions. He details and makes it 
operationalisable, for each function, highlighting the method used and the 
required data to measure each function’s indicators. On the (modified)2 table are 
presented the functions and indicators of each function according to him. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 It is my own translation from the original German language to English.  
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Function Indicators Procedure Data 
Representation 
1. Position of parties 
along social cleavages 
1. Programme 
differences among parties 
- Analysis of party 
programmes  
- Analysis of cleavage 
structure on party system 
-Qualitative Interviews 
-Party programmes 
-Election campaign 
observance  
- Media analysis   
Integration 
1. Relationship of 
party to its social structure 
2. Social support of 
parties 
    3. Individual party     
linkages  
- comparing party 
programmes with the 
preferences of their 
supporters 
- Analysis of individual 
trust on political parties  
- analysis of electoral 
results 
- Representative 
questionnaires 
- Election data 
- Party programmes  
- Volatility data 
Legitimation 
1.Personal    Recruitment  
2. Policy making 
3. Competition  
- analysis of candidate 
nomination 
- analysis of programme 
formulation 
- analysis of election 
campaign  relations 
- Party statute 
- Media reports 
-Qualitative interviews 
 
Elites recruitment 
1.Political Elite fluctuation 
2.Gender structure of 
political elites 
3.Ethnical cooperation of 
political elites  
-analysis of parliaments 
composition 
- analysis of social 
structure of political Elites 
- Election data 
- Media Reports  
- Demographic data 
 
 
Table 1. Party functions according to Emminghaus  
 
Party functions according to Schmitter 
Philippe C. Schmitter (1999, 475-495) on the other hand, distinguishes four 
functions of parties as follows. Though he offers no clear indicators for the four 
functions he focuses on, I have tried to identify them from the discussion he 
makes in his paper.  
 
1. Structuring electoral competition is one of the distinct political functions of 
parties. Political parties structure the electoral process by nominating candidates 
for political positions and programmes around whom the elections are conducted.  
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                        Function                         Indicators 
 
Structuring Electoral Competition 
- are there supraparty candidates, informal elite 
arrangements undermine the importance of parties 
in structuring the electoral process 
- electoral volatility due to loose couplings between 
parties their candidates and their platforms, 
independent citizen reactions decrease the 
importance of parties in this process  
 
Table 2.1. Function of structuring electoral competition, Schmitter  
 
2. Providing symbolic identity is another function that determines the capacity 
of parties to use symbols and memories helping individuals identify with the 
party.  
 
                           Function                            Indicators 
 
 
 
        Providing Symbolic Identity 
 
- card carrying members  
- due paying members  
- party newspapers 
- substitution of voluntary by paid campaign 
- decline of attendance at party congress 
- penetration of parties in associations and 
movements 
- electoral volatility 
 
Table 2.2. Providing Symbolic Identity, Schmitter 
  
3. Forming Governments is a distinctive function and one that parties do not 
share with other intermediary actors. Parties are expected to have the capacity to 
fill up political offices and implement policies based on their programmes. 
Otherwise, it is difficult to consider their role as agents of democratization.  
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                     Function                           Indicators 
 
 
Forming Governments 
- patronage 
- clientelism 
- use of government contracts and jobs as a rewards 
(there is a problem collecting exact data for them)  
 
Table 2.3. Forming governments, Schmitter  
 
4. Aggregating interests and passion is a function in a normative sense 
whereby parties offer a programme made up of aggregated interests and 
passions of a larger part of society. It reflects the will of the public as a whole, 
and not just of a single group. However, this function in real terms is performed 
differently from time to time and from place to place. 
                    Function                     Indicators 
 
 
    Aggregating Interests and Passions  
- relation of parties with other groups  
- channels of communication: media or party 
structure 
- shifts in technology of electoral politics, increased 
reliance upon opinion surveys 
 
Table 2.4. Aggregating interests and passions, Schmitter  
 
It should be pointed out, that functions identified by Schmitter have no explicit 
indicators. The above-mentioned indicators highlighted are an interpretation of 
the context of his paper.  
 
Party Functions according to Steffani 
Steffani (1988) in his study identifies four main functions of parties found in four 
sectors of party analysis. 
 
1. Transmission Function, “Ausdruck sozialer Kräfte sowie ideologischer 
und/oder programmatischer Ziele“. In the first sector Steffani (1988, 551) focuses 
mainly on the relationship between ideological differences among society and 
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their reflection in the parties’ programmes, and to what extent the programmes of 
parties are built upon the divisions of society.    
 
2. Governing Function, “Parteien als Herrschaftsinstrumente“ (Steffani 1988, 
554-557). The second function of parties is that of governing. Political parties are 
considered as vessels to winning elections, forming the government (or part of it, 
in coalition) and exercising power through this government. However, this 
function is dependent on the type of political system, electoral system, and so on. 
There is to be a distinction, depending on the purpose of taking over the 
government – to implement policies or make use of public goods for private ends. 
In our model, special attention is given to that, because it is a common feature of 
all Kosovo parties and has an implication on democracy consolidation prospects.  
 
3. Legitimating Function, “Parteien als Vermittler demokratischer Legitimation” 
(Steffani 1988, 557-559). The focus here is the extent to which parties legitimize 
a democratic system, not only through the way they govern but also through their 
inner democracy.  
 
4. Recruitment Function, “Parteien als Interessengruppe und Karrierevehikel” 
(Steffani 1988, 559-560). The fourth analytical sector is concerned with 
pursuance of the interest of the party,  the interests inside the party, and the 
possibilities it offers for the active party members and functionaries to enhance 
their career. 
The four above-mentioned functions offer a clear image of normative party 
functions, but they lack actual indicators through which one can measure the 
level of fulfilment of their functions.  
 
Party Functions according to Helms 
Different form Steffani whose concern is mainly on parties (Helms 1995, 642-
657), Helms refers more to functions of party systems and tries to offer a 
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measurable model by highlighting the indicators for each function. In other words, 
his model is more empirical.   
 
1. Representation Function is conceptualised by Helms as a reflection and 
projection of the social conflict at the political system. The indicators showing the 
level of representation function are as follows. 
 
                         Function                             Indicators 
 
 
                       Representation 
 
- What is the position of parties to their social 
structures 
- What is the relationship of parties to interest 
groups  
- Does the party system respond to new social 
cleavages 
 
Table 3.1. Representation, Helms 
 
2. Legitimating Function is the second function whereby parties are expected 
to legitimise the political system through their inner democracy.  
 
                       Function                             Indicators 
                     
                      Legitimating 
 
- Is there a participation and decision-making 
possibility through inner democracy  
 
Table 3.2. Legitimating, Helms 
 
3. Recruitment Function includes the elite in politics and other spheres of 
society. 
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                         Function                           Indicators 
                  
 
                    
 
                 Elite recruitment  
 
- How long and what is the position in parliament 
and government for non-party politicians 
-  Is there a relationship between the head of 
government and the chiefs of parties 
- What percentage of ministers have a place at the 
same time on the Chairmanship of parties   
 
Table 3.3. Elite recruitment, Helms 
 
4. Integration Function is conceptualised with linking citizens with political 
system in general.  
 
                        Function                         Indicators 
                             
                       Integration 
 
- Development in election participation 
- Development in party membership 
 
 
Table 3.4. Integration, Helms 
 
5. Innovation Function is the ability of a system to deal with new challenges. 
 
                      Function                      Indicators 
                              
                   Innovation  
 
- Structural division of power within systems 
- The level of difference between objectives of 
programmes 
- Planning ability of governing parties  
 
Table 3.5. Innovation, Helms 
 
After exploring some of the studies on party and party system functions and on 
democracy consolidation, I will try to build up a scientific relationship between 
parties as independent, and democracy consolidation as dependent variables on 
political parties. In this way, we will construct our own model synthesised and 
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modified from the above highlighted models, measuring the role of parties in 
democracy consolidation, in our case in Kosovo.   
1.5. Theorising correlation between political parties and 
democracy consolidation 
After exploring theories of democracy, system transformation, democracy 
consolidation, political parties, and outlining the context (see next chap.), we 
proceed with theorising the relationship between two variables: political parties 
and democracy consolidation in Kosovo (with its particulars as a political 
system). A democracy is hardly classified as a consolidated one, if its 
sustainability and persistence relies mostly on international support, a sponsored 
democracy by the international community, endangered once they decide to 
leave. Yet, such fragility and dependency on the international community in a 
democracy has its deficiencies. The heavy international presence in turn has its 
negative impact on the democracy consolidation process and prospects. The 
paternalistic, tutoring presence of the international community principally brings 
into question the very fundamentals of democracy itself. Yet, taking into account 
the role of international actors in the democratisation process, especially during 
the second wave of democratisation, and since the tutors in question happen to 
be among the most consolidated democracies in the world, it leaves no room for 
scepticism in whether democracy will last indefinitely, if it does not mean that 
they have to be there forever. It provides a good opportunity in terms of 
preserving the overall democracy framework, since its domestic features have 
many deficiencies. The incompatibility between the behaviour and attitude of 
domestic actors with the substantial democratic norms and values, to some 
extent could be covered by a façade of democracy due to the heavy presence of 
the international community here.   
 
It is clear that the international presence in Kosovo provides a general framework 
for democracy ‘building’ and reduces the possibility, at least visually, of any 
alternative regimes to democracy coming into being. Nonetheless, it is up to 
domestic institutions to arrange the inner life of the system, adapting democratic 
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values and standards, so not requiring the international community to guard 
democracy indefinitely. If such a position cannot be reached, there would be no 
one to ensure democracy consolidation and prevent the reversibility of the 
transformation. Political parties are the major actors influencing and being 
influenced by almost all other domestic actors inside the building of democratic 
consolidation. Our research will put a focus within the structure of this building, 
aiming to find out the role parties have in domesticating and stabilising 
democracy among society, in other words in consolidating democracy.  
 
If we refer to the aforementioned conceptualisation of negative and positive 
consolidation and apply that to the current developments in Kosovo, it is clear 
that Kosovo democracy is currently in the phase of negative consolidation, 
apparently having no viable alternative to democratic regime. However, this is 
owed predominantly to the commitment of the international community in 
Kosovo, considered as guardians of democracy in terms of making any other 
alternative regime obsolete. In this respect, it should also not be forgotten the 
carrot of European integration as one the main driving forces of democratisation. 
Nevertheless, the actual international influence constitutes the most achievable 
results in the case of democracy consolidation in Kosovo, and no further 
advancement in the process is expected without the will of domestic institutions, 
primarily political parties as major socio-political institutions in a party-driven 
politicisation of the system, as it is the case with Kosovo.  
 
If negative consolidation is due to international community presence, positive 
consolidation is dependent largely on domestic actors. At the level of positive 
consolidation, democracy is expected to give effect, and cannot be ensured 
without domestic democracy-purposive actors, particularly parties, as the major 
domestic institutional actors found at all levels within the system structure. 
However, if the attainment of positive consolidation is prolonged and delayed it 
will dry out the negative consolidation also, making the reverse of the process 
unavoidable. In the case of Kosovo, negative consolidation in the short term is 
  Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo          
 
57 
 
somewhat guaranteed by the international community, but no one can be sure of 
the future developments within the international community itself, which might be 
reflected in their role here, or whether they may become fed up with stubborn 
political leaders in Kosovo. 
  
The claim that the international community might also push for positive 
consolidation is refutable, because it is unlikely without the support of domestic 
institutions. The sphere covered by international intervention barely touches 
areas covered by the process of positive consolidation. If they try to interfere so 
deeply, they in turn endanger self-governing - the fundamental principle of 
democracy, making positive consolidation less likely. Moreover, such interfering 
increases the probability of the degree of informalities, widening the gap between 
formal institutions and informal behaviour (at least at the elite level) turning 
politics, or at least micro politics, into something less predictable. This 
relationship is best described as a vicious cycle. Lesser domestic democratic 
institutions (political parties in our case), results in more international interference 
required. The higher the international actors’ influence, the further the breach of 
fundamentals of democracy, and the less likelihood of positive democracy 
consolidation.  Unless we have domestic democracy-purposive actors (parties), 
no sustainable, self-perpetual and a non-paternalistic democracy can be 
established, as it is the case nowadays.  
 
The focus of this research is to find out the irreplaceable role of parties in this 
process. Parties’ positioning alongside society and government atitudes, makes 
positive consolidation dependent on political parties – the functions they perform, 
their way of organisation, identity and ideological profile, and the way they 
compete and cooperate with each other is more related to the party system itself 
(Sartori, 1978). Political parties give meaning to and enable the very existence 
and functioning of modern democracy (stable democracy), democracy 
consolidation as a process, with especially positive consolidation being 
unthinkable without democratic parties. Their central position, as the main actors 
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of the political system, and as binders of state and society, means that if not 
among the main drivers, they are otherwise obstacles to democratization. In this 
regard, LaPalombara and Weiner in their classic edition (1966) and repeatedly in 
the 40th anniversary edition, praise parties as the main social and political actors 
in the political system, due to their role on political development.  something that 
is restated by Dalton & McAllister (2007), Moreover, they signify the role parties 
have within the political system on the process of democratization. In addition, 
Dalton and McAllister (2007) reaffirm such assertions, that despite parties’ 
diminishing institutionalization and expansion in new democracies, they are 
crucial to a stable democracy. Adding to the argument, Mainwaring (1995) 
referring to political parties as institutions, believes that it is impossible to have a 
consolidated democracy without having democratic institutions. Moreover, Lewis 
(2001) avows such a role of parties on the third wave of democratization, if not 
during the first phase of transition, but especially on the second (third) one - 
predominantly the consolidation phase.  
 
As observed from much consideration on political parties, on their crucial role in 
the democracy consolidation process, we assert that the objective of democracy 
consolidation in Kosovo will be nothing more than wishful thinking if political 
parties continue to interrogate and ail the democratisation process, failing to 
perform their necessary and required functions for positive consolidation to take 
place. Turning to the specifics of the Kosovo political system, we will add that 
such role at the stage of positive consolidation is directly dependent on political 
parties. Our research is an endeavour to shed light upon this correlation.  
 
As long as negative consolidation remains the result of the international 
community’s presence here, the role of parties in the phase of positive 
consolidation is incontestable, unique and irreplaceable. The role of parties in 
consolidation is amplified due to real and heavy politicisation taking place in 
Kosovo. Along these lines, parties are found everywhere to a different degree, 
trying to extend and deepen their control as much as possible.  It is the position 
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of parties in between state and society that requires such responsibility to 
domesticate and advance democratic norms, values, and methods and socialise 
firstly themselves and then society as a whole with them. Such a role, of parties 
being vital for democracy consolidation prospects, can be best measured through 
the model of party functions, finding out to what extent parties perform their 
functions, since (not) fulfilling such functions either ensures or impedes 
democracy consolidation.  
 
From literature review on the subject, it is obvious that not much is done in the 
way of scientific exploration of relationships between the two variables, political 
parties as an independent variable and democracy consolidation as a dependent 
variable. Most studies deal with electoral volatility and system stabilisation or 
consolidation (Morlino 1995; Toka 1997, etc. ), while some others approach 
parties as a dependent variable on democracy (Diamond & Gunther 2001; 
Gunther, et al. 2002, etc.), and so on. I have found the most suitable theoretical 
relationship to be the model developed by Emminghaus (2003). He tried to 
construct a theoretical relationship between both variables - parties as 
independent and democracy consolidation as dependent variables, based on the 
functionalist approach considered by some earlier studies on party functions (see 
above). The strength of this model is that it is scientifically operationalisable, and 
offers space for empirical measurement of such correlation. Nevertheless, we will 
employ the adapted and modified version of the same model to measure the role 
of parties in democracy consolidation in Kosovo, by evaluating the performance 
of party functions. In order to carry out such a measurement and get a complete 
picture, party typology in Kosovo, parties’ organizations should also be explored; 
along with their identity, objectives they pursue, as well as competition and 
cooperation within the party system and their reflection on democracy 
consolidation process. 
 
The problems of creating meta-theories on political parties are widely accepted 
among scholars. Yet, our theorising is contextualised to a single case-specific 
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political system level, based on the measurement of parties’ functions in the 
system in question. The theoretical relationship between the two variables, 
democracy consolidation being dependent and political parties being 
independent variables, is within the consolidation structure of the aforementioned 
synthesized model of democracy consolidation developed by Merkel (1999). Of 
course, the very isolation of an independent variable – political parties in our 
case, is quite challenging due to the amorphous form of political parties 
themselves. Yet, such shortcomings are common in social sciences, because of 
scientific values and the level of science among social sciences, compared to the 
exact sciences. The democratic consolidation prospects are measured through 
the performance of parties’ functions. 
 
The actor-oriented model of Merkel, despite others being focused on the system 
and structural requirements, permits the prioritising of the role of parties in the 
democracy consolidation process; the relativity of importance of the four levels of 
context based consolidation structure. In a highly politicised society, the 
dependence of democracy consolidation on political parties is increased, making 
all other three levels more and more influenced by the second level.  Among the 
four levels of the consolidation structure, at the heart of our research lies the 
second level (Represäntative Konsolidierung), built up predominantly by political 
parties as the main actors at this level. Regarding the first level (see next chap.), 
Kosovo finally has the status of an independent state as well as its own 
constitution, since 15 of July 2008. After the war, up to the declaration of 
independence, although it lacked the clear political status of being independent, 
Kosovo has had a constitutional framework regulating the institutional structure of 
the Kosovo political system, with the exception of international monitoring of the 
overall functioning of the system, it was set to have a democratically orientated 
institutional framework. However, such political status did not entirely prevent 
Kosovo democracy from being consolidated. All the same, as Tansey (2007) 
divided the concept of stateness into three dimensions, Kosovo institutions have 
gradually gained effective power to govern themselves in a larger number of 
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areas. The four levels of the consolidation structure are interrelated and overlap 
into each other, assisting or impeding each other on the way to consolidation, the 
success or failure of one level is reflected into others. For instance, well-
established democratic orientated constitutional structure eases the consolidation 
for the other levels. It provides a general framework setting the overall guidelines 
and orientations of the democracy consolidation process. On the other side, poor 
performance of political parties at the second level affects the democratic 
constitutional structure at the first level, empowering non-democratic veto 
players, and delaying consolidation at the society level in terms of producing and 
spreading  expected democratic norms and values. In particular, the first level is 
the most sensitive level, because it covers the overall outer skeleton of 
democracy. In the case of Kosovo, the first level of consolidation is in reality 
deeply based on international actors. The constitutional consolidation in Kosovo 
is merely arranged and guarded by the international community, though more so 
before the independence, than after. However, the three levels are directly 
dependent on political parties. The first one in terms of its long-term presence 
and effect, placing a complete reliance on foreign actors, is not a durable 
solution. In the long term, it firstly alienates democracy from the other three 
levels, and later makes its own permanence questionable. At the beginning, such 
a level of tutored democracy might be reasonable, but later it might turn 
counterproductive, because it does not provide sufficient space for the breathing 
space that growth would require.  More or less, it appears normal for children in 
their early life to have a carer, but it will not be effective for caring to last beyond 
a certain stage, unless the child was not to grow-up. As children grow, they have 
a need for more space to develop freely. Depriving them of this space and 
freedom can ultimately become detrimental. 
 
As an illustration of interdependence among the four levels of the consolidation 
structure, the Kosovo constitution is praised for the democratic and liberal values 
it comprises. Yet, Kosovo has often been blamed for a lack of rule of law (EU 
Commission Report on Kosovo Progress 2009). The incompatibility between the 
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written rules and their implementation best reflects the interdependence among 
the levels of the consolidation structure, and obstacles of the written rules - 
created mostly by international mentors, in the face of the implementation 
process. Nonetheless, the Kulturelle Konsolidierung is also directly linked to 
parties -is their behaviour domesticating, cultivating, and generating democratic 
or other values disturbing democracy at the society level. The fusion between 
parties, organised crime and a mafia, as well as the authoritarian tendencies of 
the executive branch of government coming out of political parties, demonstrates 
best the interdependence between the second and the third level (Merkel 2007). 
Throughout our research, we will explore the second level of the democracy 
consolidation structure. However, focusing exclusively at the second level does 
not mean that it will prevent us from getting a complete picture of democracy 
consolidation. In a highly party-driven politicisation context, the influence of the 
second level at the other levels augments, conveying best the consolidation 
prospects in general.  
 
While applying the model given by Merkel, it is also important to highlight that it 
does not provide details within the second level of consolidation, how it 
specifically looks like, the process within, or indicators used for measurement of 
consolidation of the level. In this way, such flexibility gives us a room and 
opportunity to adapt it for our case study, of course within the contours of the 
consolidation structure, using the functionalist approach, to measure party 
functions and their contributions in the democracy consolidation process. 
Furthermore, what makes the functionalist approach easier to use at the second 
level of consolidation is that the model itself relies on the system approach. 
Democracy consolidation is dependent on parties’ functions’ level of 
performance. the more competently these functions are completed, the greater 
the prospects of democracy consolidation. Otherwise, the failure to do so is 
reflected in consolidation possibilities. The longer the consolidation process 
takes, the more the tutoring by the international community is prolonged, and the 
formal alienation of delegated representation from the people is higher. If the 
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international community is to have a role here forever, it puts the very 
fundamental principles of democracy at risk. Nevertheless, the international 
community is not going to leave as long as they are convinced that there is a 
compatibility of values and norms of democracy with values as well as with the 
norms, behaviour and attitude of domestic actors, making the effects of 
democracy touchable. In turn, such democracy development requires real and 
workable democratic domestic institutions. If democratic intermediary institutions 
– political parties, fail also to establish a self-perpetuating internal democratic 
consolidated system in need of no external help, there is no one else to 
guarantee its inner self functioning. The concern of our research is the 
measurement of functions of the most important actors at the second level, 
pinching directly democracy consolidation prospects.  
 
The democracy consolidation process, despite currently being characterised as 
heavily internationally guarded, is directly dependent on domestic institutions, 
particularly political parties. Through getting a bright picture of political parties, 
especially the extent to which political parties perform their functions, we can 
grasp a clear image of the likelihood of democracy consolidation. The better the 
performance from political parties the faster and healthier the prospects are for 
consolidation. If there is a weak and deficient consolidation at the second level 
(political parties) of the democracy consolidation structure, it will affect negatively 
other levels that otherwise due to the role of other actors could do better.  
Weaknesses at the second level decreases the space and opportunity for 
consolidation of other levels. Likewise, political parties have the capability to 
damage and bring into question the democracy consolidation process. I argue 
that such a theoretical correlation in democracy consolidation is viable - in 
political parties’ studies in particular and political sciences in general. In addition, 
the model used to measure such theoretical correlation fulfils scientific criteria 
grounded on social science methodology.     
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Moreover, the model on party functions developed by Emminghaus (2003) that 
we are applying to measure the party functions (at the second level within the 
model of democracy consolidation structure) developed by Merkel, has been 
adapted appropriately for our case study. The modifications done include the 
adding of some new functions based on the peculiarities of the context we are 
dealing with, while changing and omitting some indicators of certain particular 
functions. The table below shows the model I am going to use throughout the 
research. 
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Function Indicators Procedure Data 
  
R
ep
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
1. Position of parties along 
social cleavages 
 
2. Programme differences 
among parties 
§ Analysis of party 
programmes  
 
§ Analysis of cleavage 
structure on party system 
§ Qualitative 
Interviews 
 
§ Party programmes 
 
§ Election campaign 
observance  
 
§ Media analysis   
  
In
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 
1. Anchoring of citizens by 
political parties  
 
2. Orientation of citizens 
toward policy options  
 
3. Making citizens feel part 
of the collective process 
 
§ Analysing individual 
party linkages 
 
§ Looking at relation 
between actual integration 
and modernisation process 
 
§ Analysing movements of 
party elites from one party to 
another 
 
§ Analysing electoral 
volatility 
 
§ Looking at relation of 
parties to their social 
structure 
 
§ Analysing voter turnout  
 
§ Election data 
 
§ Party programmes, 
electoral platforms 
 
§ Volatility data 
 
§ Party membership 
registers  
 
§ Party statute 
 
§ Qualitative 
interviews 
 
§ Media reports 
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L
eg
it
im
at
io
n
 
1. Inner democracy  
 
2. Policy making 
 
3. Competition  
§ Analysing party 
organisation and inner 
decision-making: 
institutionalization 
(Panebianco), inclusiveness, 
centralisation,  
 
§ Analysis of selectorate 
 
§ Analysis of programme 
formulation 
 
§ Analysis of election 
campaign  relations among 
parties 
§ Party statute 
 
§ Regulations 
 
§ Media reports 
 
§ Qualitative 
interviews 
 
      
   
 
In
n
o
va
ti
o
n
 
1. Ability of parties to deal 
with the current national 
problems 
 
2.  Planning ability of 
governing parties 
§ Analysing party 
programmes, electoral 
platforms 
 
§ Analysing stands of 
parties on the pending 
national issues  
 
§ The quality of governing 
programmes 
§ Party programmes, 
electoral platforms 
 
§ Qualitative 
interviews 
 
§ Media reports 
 
§ Government 
programmes 
  
G
o
ve
rn
in
g
 
 
1. State politicisation 
 
2. State exploitation  
 
3. Establishing party 
patronage, clientelism,  
corruption, clans, nepotism 
 
§ Analysing the use of 
state resources for 
particularistic exchanges: 
employment in public 
administration, government 
contracts, privatisation 
process 
 
§ Analysing politicisation of 
rule of law  
 
§ Analysing party finances 
 
§ Analysing budget 
allocations 
 
§ Qualitative 
interviews 
 
§ Employment 
documents in public 
administration 
 
§ Privatisation and 
contract documents 
 
§ Media reports  
 
§ Annual European 
Commission reports 
 
§ Other annual 
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development reports, 
ICG, Transparency 
International , etc. 
 
Table 4. The adapted and modified model of party functions 
 
1.  Representation function  
The representative model of modern democracy is hardy imaginable without 
political parties. They give meaning to and make a representative democracy 
workable through the representation function they perform. Political parties as 
intermediary institutions constituting the party system in general reflect  society 
as whole, or different parties represent a plurality of society based on class, 
ethnicity, religion, or any other group distinguished by socio-political cleavages. 
At different socio-political contexts, representation is conceptualised and applied 
differently, leading to a variety of definitions related to the representation function 
of parties. Parties are supposed to represent various social groups, either 
symbolically or in advancing specific interests (Gunther and Diamond 2000). Due 
to the impossibility of the whole society to take part in governing activity, one of 
the main raison d’être of parties in modern democracies is to represent society at 
the governing level.  Helms (1995, 647) among others, offers a very useful 
conceptualisation of the representation function as “the durable reflection of 
relevant social conflicts (like ethnic, religious, or of economic nature) in party 
system and their projection in political system”3.  
 
It should be pointed out that representation as a function is also performed by 
other intermediary institutions, such as interest groups, social movements etc.. 
Yet, usually the most important representative institutions, the political parties, 
represent the well-entrenched and durable divisions within society. Based on the 
above mentioned definition, in order to measure the representation function of 
                                                 
3 It is my own translation from German language: “die dauerhafte Widerspiegelung relevanter gesellschaftlicher Konflikte 
(etwa ethnischer, konfessioneller oder ökonmischer Art) im Parteiensystem und ihre Projektion in das politische System 
verstand wärden”.  
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parties, first the main cleavages within society should be identified, and to try to 
find out their reflection on the party system, and their representation on the 
political system in general, to a large extent through the governing activity of 
political parties. The identity of parties that constitute the party system in Kosovo 
reflects best how far they represent the social cleavages within society. In this 
regard, it should also be investigated the positions of parties are along such long 
term social divisions. After finding this out, we have to relate it and try to measure 
any relationship between parties and the cleavage structure. If party system is 
the embodiment of social cleavages and governing activity takes place based on 
the wants, needs, and preferences of the represented parts of society, it can be 
concluded that parties do perform their representative function well. To what 
extent parties do represent certain social groups organised on social cleavages, 
is best manifested by party programmes, electoral platforms, and interviews with 
members of the parties’ leadership, as well as by media and election campaign 
analysis. Therefore, measurement will take place by analysing the indicators 
through data collected from the party documents, interviews, media reports, and 
so on.    
 
2. Integration function  
In addition to representation, political parties make citizens feel part of the 
political process and system in general. Parties integrate society into the political 
process preventing apathy, which would not be healthy for democracy, 
particularly during the democracy consolidation process. Usually such 
responsibility is dedicated above all others to political parties. The very existence 
of parties implies the bridging and binding role in two ways, bottom-up and top-
down. Integration as a function of political parties is context based and variously 
defined. For example, Schmitter (1999, 477) defines the integration function of 
parties as “providing most citizens with a stable and distinctive set of ideas and 
goals (symbols) which anchor their expectations about democracy, orient them in 
a general way toward policy options and make them feel part of the process of 
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collective choice”. The research on the integration function of parties is based on 
this conceptualisation.   
 
The measurement of integration function relies on three dimensions: the 
anchoring of citizens by political parties, the extent to which parties orient citizens 
in policy options, and how far parties make citizens consider themselves and feel 
part of the collective decision-making process. Exploration of the function is 
going to be based upon following indicators: relationship of a party to its social 
structure, individual – party linkages, movement of the elite from one party to 
another, electoral volatility, voter turnout, and so on. The data will be collected 
from party programmes, electoral platforms, volatility data, election results, 
qualitative interviews, media reports, and so on.  
 
3. Legitimation function  
Democracy consolidation entails legitimation from citizens’. Political parties are 
acknowledged as agents of legitimation within the democratisation process. The 
democratic legitimation is best achieved through transparency and an open 
decision-making process offering opportunity for participation to citizens. 
Otherwise, it makes no sense to talk of democracy consolidation if democracy in 
the eyes and minds of the people is not legitimised, or if intermediary channels 
for citizens to participate in the political system are closed and monopolised by 
ruling elites within parties. In such suspicious circumstances, it is apparently 
difficult to expect democracy to give effect – in terms of citizens’ advantages. The 
issue is more sensitive with young democracies where citizens do not distinguish 
the ruling elite from the institutions and the regime as a whole, or politicians from 
institutions (Dalton 2002). People identify the behaviour and attitude of leaders 
with the democracy itself.  
 
This function is unavoidable and very much important for the democratisation 
process to be successful. Political parties as key inner actors are excepted to 
legitimise democracy among society. They cultivate, produce, and inculcate 
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democratic norms and values, by means of following procedures prescribed by 
such norms and values firstly themselves, pursuing the collective instead of 
narrow interests, and consequently convincing, society-wide that democracy is 
best for them. In this way, parties makes democracy tangible to citizens, through 
benefits that democracy usually offers. Consequently, legitimation strengthens 
and ensures the consolidation process. The legitimation function is explored 
through subsequent indicators: inner party democracy, policymaking, and 
competition among parties. The measurement of these indicators is going to take 
place empirically looking at: inclusiveness, centralisation, inner institutionalization 
(Panebianco, 1988), selectorate (Rahat and Hazan 2001), party programmes, 
electoral platforms, party statues, media reports, and so on. Such examination 
will shed light into the democracy consolidation process, since legitimation 
directly touches on the process, making it directly dependent.  
 
4. Innovation function 
The process of democratization in Kosovo has been associated with the process 
of state and nation building, whereby parties have often been the object of 
criticism for the lack of vision in how to solve issues that either only recently been 
solved, or are in fact still outstanding in Kosovo, regarding political, social, and 
economic systems. The innovation function illustrates best the creativity of 
parties to handle issues reflected directly and indirectly in the democracy 
consolidation process. Therefore, it is considered among the functions performed 
by parties  relevant in the consolidation process. The measurement of the 
innovation function will begin by looking at the planning ability and party 
commitment to deal with current national problems. The indicators will be 
measured through analysing party programmes and electoral platforms, 
analysing the position of parties on pending national issues, analysing the quality 
of governing programmes made by governing parties (including the long-term 
strategies). The data are collected from party programmes and electoral 
platforms, qualitative interviews, reports of organisations, and media reports.  
 
  Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo          
 
71 
 
5. Governing function  
This is the most important party function in democracy that belongs exclusively to 
parties - it is not shared with other intermediary actors. Since our focus is 
reflecting on the governing function done by parties on the democracy 
consolidation process, we are concerned essentially on widespread 
characteristics of the way in which they govern and currently reflect on the 
consolidation prospects. Due to the operationalisability of this function,  the 
centre of attention should be narrowed, highlighting several indicators appearing 
to spoil the democratization process, such as: state exploitation (Grzymala-
Busse 2003, 2007), state and society wide politicisation, behaviour producing 
party patronage, clientelism, corruption, nepotism, and clans (Kopecky, Scherlis, 
Spirova 2008; Müller 2006; Marcus & Ratsimbaharison 2005; Fox 1994). Citizens 
perceive such vices of the governing behaviour of parties as the way the political 
elite exploit the state for narrow and particularistic benefits. The ability to perform 
the governing function  is reflected in parties’ abilities to perform other functions, 
such as representation, legitimation and integration.   
 
The process for measurement is mainly done by finding out data on party 
finances, civil servants employment, government contracts – are they used for 
particularistic benefits, the privatization process, media reports, different reports 
on Kosovo,  qualitative interviews, etc. 
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Chapter 2 
2. Political System of Kosovo 
2.1. Historical background up to 1998-99 War  
Kosovo has a long and diverse history. Throughout history, as a political (sub) 
system, it has been part of a range of political systems. Located in the Balkans 
where many civilizations have clashed throughout history, it was inescapable for 
Kosovo to be exposed to such sword crossings and bombs. These historical 
developments meant Kosovo has at times been the interest of others (Malcolm 
1999). This historical background has obviously had an impact on  Kosovo, with 
there sometimes being home-run political systems, and other times externally 
governed systems. However, Kosovo history is not our concern here and we will 
not dig into it. All that we will cover here, is an overview of Kosovo history with 
particular emphasis on the current political system, serving as a bed to the 
democratization process that is taking place, with political parties operating inside 
of this.  
 
The current population in Kosovo is 90% Albanian, believed to be the 
descendants of ancient Dardans - an ancient Illyrian tribe. Beyond Albanians, 
mainly Slavs, that in the 7th century AD penetrated into traditionally Illyrian 
inhabited territory, as well as some other minorities, inhabit the rest of Kosovo: 
Turks, Bosnians, Roma, Egyptian, Ashkali, Gorans, etc.. The main political 
structure of Albanians was traditionally by tribe. Kosovo as a territory firstly 
belonged to Illyrian tribes until the occupation by the Romans. Later on, part of it 
was conquered by the Serbs due to Slavic migration in the 7th century to the 
Balkans. Afterwards, Kosovo was part of the Bulgarian empire from 850 to 1018 
until the empire waned. For the following two centuries, the region was under the 
Byzantine Empire. The Ottoman Empire invasion then included the territory 
within itself, with the declaration of independence of Albania in 1912, as the 
Ottoman Empire was being deconstructed. Among the many organised 
resistances during the ottoman period, the Lidhja e Prizrenit (League of Prizren) 
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should be mentioned. Kosovo was annexed by Serbia, and later with the 
formation of Yugoslavia, it became part of this. Since Kosovo annexed by Serbia, 
at the end of the Ottoman Empire, Kosovo has consistently, with different 
intensities and means, and at different periods, struggled to get its independence 
(Bugajski 2002). On the other side, Serbia has continuously applied policies 
expelling particular groups, changing the ethnic structure of the demographic 
composition of Kosovo, with the intention of increasing the number of Serb 
settlers. During the first Yugoslavia after World War I, largely known as Serbian 
driven and dominated, Kosovo was incorporated into it, and the majority of the 
Albanian population was heavily discriminated. In 1941, during World War II, 
Kosovo was divided, occupied by Bulgaria, Germany, and Italy. Later on, 
together with Albania it was occupied entirely by Germany, but this lasted for only 
a short period of time (Vickers 1998). After the end of the Second World War, 
Kosovo was a province of the former Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, 
without the equal status of the other six republics constituting the federal state. 
With the constitutional change of 1974, the position of Kosovo was improved due 
to the extension of autonomous rule and more rights to Kosovo people, 
especially ethnic Albanians, making it an autonomous province (The constitution 
of Yugoslavia 1974).  
 
In 1989 under pressure from the Serbian government to modify the Yugoslav 
constitution of 1974, Kosovo’s status diminished. The autonomy was revoked, 
incorporating Kosovo into Serbia (at that time one of six Republics of the 
Federation), changing the Kosovo position within the federation, severing it from 
the Yugoslavia federation and forcing it to be completely dependent on Serbia 
(The constitution of Yugoslavia 1989).  
 
The constitutional amendments, though legally made, was approved by the then 
puppet Assembly of Kosovo (filled up with members of the only existing 
communist party at that time, loyal to The Communist Party at the federal level 
and not really representing the people of Kosovo) highlighting the existing 
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legitimacy crisis. The people of Kosovo did not welcome this.. It opened the way 
for other modes of change, and pushed them to organise themselves into a 
peaceful resistance to boycott it. Such occurrences marked also the end of the 
one party system (during communist time, there were also a few other parties, 
but usually small and mainly secret organizations with mixed nationalist-
communist ideologies – cell parties). The eve of social mobilization was 
associated with developments inside and outside Yugoslavia, the wave of 
democratization throughout the region, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the 
beginning of the break-up of Yugoslavia. The elite of the communist party in 
Kosovo, together with the communist ideology and socialist system itself was 
totally discredited. New parties emerged, around whom the boycott and 
resistance was organised. The largest party, some considering it as a social 
movement, was LDK – Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves (Democratic League of 
Kosovo) established in 1989, under the leadership of the charismatic Ibrahim 
Rugova. LDK was a centre of mobilisation for the majority of people of Kosovo, 
organising their resistance to Serbia and their struggle for independence. It 
should be pointed out, that there were also some other smaller parties such as: 
Partia Parlamentare (Parliamentary Party) - taking a more radical position on 
national issues compared to LDK. Some other small parties, like LPK – Levizja 
Popullore e Kosoves (People’s Movement of Kosovo), later on constituted the 
first cells of the KLA. A number of parties were established even earlier, during 
Yugoslav communist regime, but due to the monist nature of the regime, were 
forced to organise themselves illegally, taking the form of cell parties.  
 
This development is coupled with the democratic wind of change blowing 
throughout former communist Europe. In the case of Kosovo, external changes 
all over former Eastern Europe encouraged the hope of a pluralist way for 
political organisations. Nonetheless, such an environment was perceived 
internally as more of an opportunity for mobilisation on a nationalist basis, for 
independence from Serbia and Yugoslavia, rather than a direct opportunity for 
democracy. This attitude was widespread among the political elite. Such an 
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assertion is evident even nowadays, by the incompatibility of attitudes and 
behaviours of most of the former strugglers for independence with democratic 
norms and values.  Yet, to separate the will for democracy from the will for 
independence is almost not viable. The unbearable pressure from Serbia and the 
unfamiliarity of democracy within the population, having no experience of 
democracy throughout history, made the resistance and striving for 
independence a priority. After some years, the peaceful resistance started to lose 
meaning and popular support, because it was stuck with no intended objectives. 
Many started to perceive it with suspicion, perceiving it as a fruitless way of 
organization on the way to independence. Subsequently the first armed groups 
emerged, looking to achieve independence by other than peaceful means. The 
Kosovo Liberation Army was established in 1996 and was at first forced to 
operate by secret means, sporadically attacking the Serbian forces wherever 
possible. Later on, they expanded across most of the territory, increasing their 
political support linearly throughout the war that started in 1998. The war 
casualties persuaded NATO to undertake military air strikes against Serbia in 
1999, in order to stop the ethnic cleansing that was taking place in Kosovo, 
exercised by Serbian forces.   
2.2. Political development after the war and constitutional 
structure 
In 1999, with end of war,  a political system based on UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (UN Security Council Resolution 1244, S/RES/1244, 10 June 
1999) was established in Kosovo. Based on that, The Administration of Kosovo 
was put under the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK), headed by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General 
(SRSG) – nominated and changed by the UN Secretary General, serving as 
head of the political system in charge of decreeing laws among other executive 
and supervisory functions. Aiming to ensure the withdrawal of Serbian troops 
from Kosovo and to provide a secure environment, the UNSC Resolution 1244 
mandated the KFOR, under the leadership of NATO, to be in charge of that.  
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Referring to the classification of interim international regimes done by Doyle 
(2003), UNMIK at the early beginning had a Supervisory Authority, then later 
softened and transformed into an Executive Authority sharing the legislative and 
executive power with domestic actors. The power of UNMIK4 has been gradually 
and consistently decreased based on the capacity and developments of 
provisional Kosovo institutions, helping them to gradually develop and over time 
endorsing power, though always preserving the ultimate authority for themselves. 
Kosovo was governed according to the Constitutional Framework that was 
approved and entered into force on the 15th of May 2001 after being signed by 
the SRSG (it provided the general institutional structure of the Kosovo political 
system). According to the Constitution Framework, the highest authority was 
reserved for the SRSG, and Kosovo had its provisional legislative and 
government institutions as well as a judiciary, but all of them under UNMIK 
supervision. The competences and responsibilities were  gradually extended to 
the domestic institutions, based on institutional capacity developments. 
 
The vacuum of political power in Kosovo after the war, was filled partially by 
UNMIK on one side, with the Interim Administrative Council, composed of 
                                                 
4 Hereby is provided the structure of the UNMIK divided into four pillars structuring the fields of responsibility. 
http://www.unmikonline.org/constframework.htm/05.02.2007
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predominantly both dominating political forces after the war (LDK and PDK), on 
the other. Both political forces had an antagonistic approach to each other, PDK 
accusing LDK of not supporting the KLA during the war – from which the PDK 
emerged. Such a conflicting attitude and behaviour was adopted by the masses 
as well, although currently this adoption has been decreased considerably, due 
in part to militancy depletion among party organisations in Kosovo.  
 
The first elections to take place after the war were the local elections, which took 
place on 20th October 2000. Among many other small parties, LDK won 58%, 
PDK 27.3 %, while AAK won 7.7%. The results reconfirmed the shaken support 
that LDK had before and immediately after the war. Besides, as the international 
community was very much interested, power for former KLA commanders 
became unattainable. On 17th on November 20015 the first election for the 
Kosovo assembly took place, under UNMIK supervision. LDK won the biggest 
share - 47 (46.29%) out 120 seats, needing only a small number of seats from 
other parties to form the government. It was followed by the PDK who won just 
26 seats (25.54%), AAK got 7.8% of votes - 8 seats, and the coalition of Serb 
parties, under Povratak (Return) polled 10.96%, equating to 20 parliamentary 
seats. In order to keep a balance of political forces and to avoid any possible civil 
warfare, the international community asked that both major parties form a grand 
coalition. In the next parliamentary elections in 2004, LDK achieved almost the 
same result, with 45.42% (47 seats), while PDK marked a slight increase to 
28.85% (30 seats), and AAK 8.39% (9 seats). It should be mentioned that there 
was almost the same outcome, except that voter turnout was decreased from 
83% in 2001 to 53.57% in 2004. 
 
The November 2007 elections brought many changes to the Kosovo party 
system, electoral results, and power relations. The government formation was led 
by the former main opposition party PDK, winning the  biggest share with 34.3% 
of the vote (37 seats), followed by the LDK, who for the first time in the LDK’s 
                                                 
5 OSCE mission in Kosovo. 
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history  became a losing party, experiencing a significant drop to only 22.6% of 
the vote (25 seats), and AAK 9.6% of the vote (10 seats). Two new parties 
performed quite well, despite contesting elections for the first time. AKR as a 
newly formed party, under the leadership of known businessman Pacolli, won 
12.3% of the vote (13 seats), and LDD - in coalition with PSHDK, as a party 
coming out of the last LDK split at the sixth Congress, which ended up in them 
physically beating each other up. It evolved as a party created inside the LDK 
headed by Daci, formerly considered as the second man after Rugova in LDK. 
LDD got 10% of the vote (11 seats). Moreover, very low voter turnout 
characterised the 2007 elections. According to OSCE (mission in Kosovo) data, it 
comprised only 40.10%. Some believe that turnout could be even lower, but due 
to the sensitivity of the process that Kosovo is currently undergoing, the number 
of voters participation was a little inflated6. Yet again, with the insistence of the 
international community, the governing grand coalition was again formed during 
this mandate.  
 
On the other hand, the relationship between UNMIK and domestic authorities has 
often featured disagreements. The former tried to some extent to fulfil its mission 
based on Resolution 1244, providing the self-governing autonomy to Kosovo 
under the de jure Serbian (at times Yugoslavian) sovereignty. However, it stood 
contrary to ambitions and objectives for the independence of Albanians in 
Kosovo. In fact, during the UNMIK rule, Serbia had no de facto sovereignty. Later 
on, the international community trying to build peace and reconcile Albanians and 
Serbs, and also find a solution for the final political status of Kosovo, enabled a 
negotiation process between Belgrade and Pristina under the auspices of former 
Finnish President Mr. Ahtisaari. Both parties in the conflict considered 
negotiations as a zero sum game, making it difficult for any possible compromise 
by either party. The outcome of the long negotiation process was the well-known 
                                                 
6 According to the quantitative research that were organized by the students of political sciences at Fama College, with 
1100 respondents, only 38% voted on 2007 and in the coming election the turn out is expected to go down to no more 
than 32%.  
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Ahtisaari’s Plan (UNOSEK), a draft solution for the final status of Kosovo. Serbia 
rejected it, while Kosovars accepted as a doable and real solution. However, the 
UN Security Council, due to a Russian Veto supporting the Serbian stance on the 
issue, did not recognise the proposal.   
 
Nevertheless, other attempts also proved fruitless, and no compromise was 
achieved. On the other side, the pressure from the Albanians in Kosovo for 
independence was increased, making things unmanageable. As a result, the 
Kosovo provisional government, coordinating with the USA, Great Britain, and 
some other Western European allies on 17th of February 2008 declared 
independence, which was quickly recognised by USA and many other states 
(mainly from EU members and some other countries). After that, Kosovo drafted 
a democratic Constitution which entered into force on 15-th of June 2008.  
 
Nonetheless, that is not the end of the story on the status of Kosovo. Even 
though Kosovo declared its independence, some ambiguities regarding authority 
remain, as do some not yet settled issues, making the status issue on-going, 
though not the grand priority it used to be. Most of recognitions of sovereignty are 
granted due to the independence being declared in accordance with the 
Ahtisaari’s proposal (though not approved by the UN Security Council). This 
proposal offers to the Serbian community in Kosovo, which since the end of war 
has mostly lived in small enclaves, with a high degree of autonomy and self-
governing on many issues, ensuring their direct link to Belgrade (Ahtisaari’s 
Proposal)7. This is one of the reasons that this plan created some sort of 
empirical international legitimacy following the declaration of independence. Due 
to little development on ethnic reconciliation, there was obvious fear from the 
international community, that if Kosovo became independent, it might result in 
new ethnic violence. However, Ahtisaari’s proposal ensured that such a thing is 
unlikely, because of the high level of minority rights it offers on one side, and the 
extension of the monitoring role of the international community on the other. In 
                                                 
7 http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html / 12.11.2007 
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addition, Ahtisaari’s plan provides some provisional institutions through which the 
international community ensures the implementation of the plan and makes 
Kosovo a functional state.  
 
The International Civil Office (ICO) has such a monitoring responsibility. On the 
other hand, EULEX, an EU rule of law mission has the duty to help Kosovo 
functionalise the rule of law and security sector. The KFOR mission was 
prolonged because despite the declaration of independence, the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244 is still valid, and is also mentioned on the Independence 
Declaration itself. However, in the case of KFOR, its mission is unchallenged and 
will be here as long as there is a need, as its general commanders have 
repeatedly stated. The Kosovo institutions have to share power8 with the above-
mentioned international institutions, and up to now, (while I am writing) EULEX 
and ICO have been contested by Serbia and the majority of Serbians in Kosovo, 
particularly in the northern part of Kosovo. They see them as implementing 
Ahtisaari’s Plan and therefore do not recognise it. The effective functioning of 
EULEX is still expected to mark its beginning. There are negotiations for that are 
going on between Brussels – New York- and Belgrade, with few outcomes so far.  
 
As it can be observed thus far, the institutional structure in Kosovo is still very 
much in flux, constituting a direct challenge to democratization itself, which is our 
concern here. Furthermore, Kosovo authorities have not yet extended their 
authority to most of the Serb enclaves, especially in the Northern part on the 
border with Serbia, divided since the end of war at the Iber Bridge.  
 
                                                 
8 There has been a brilliant explanation of the role of ICO in Kosovo by an ICO representative taking part on a public 
debate on Privatisation in Kosovo, held on 08.11.2008. He declared that the ICO won’t interfere, in this case on 
privatisation affairs but it can be related to other issues as well, as long as things go according to procedures, otherwise 
we have to intervene. It shows that the presence of the international community is very much and mostly dependent on 
the way of governance of Kosovo leadership, that comes out of parties. In other words, the presence of the international 
community in Kosovo will prevent the Kosovo authorities from having effective power to govern, but that is due to bad 
governance of Kosovo itself, and in turn by such way of governing they push the interference of the international 
community on governing affairs and consequently delaying the consolidation of democracy in Kosovo.   
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This is the actual institutional structure of the political system in Kosovo, which by 
the constitution is a parliamentary republic, and has its own single chamber 
parliament (120 seats) since the first elections after the war. It is a unitary system 
with high levels of decentralization, especially in parts populated by the Serbian 
ethnicity. However, as stated above, the Serb minority still challenges the 
authority of Kosovo, with just a few of them joining Kosovo institutions. Although 
the majority of them boycott Kosovo institutions, they have reserved seats in 
parliament, the executive branch as well as in other institutions. Such 
developments bring out the many current challenges during the state-building 
process, highlighting that Kosovo has undergone many transitions, aside from 
authoritarian to democracy, theoretically creating a challenge to the 
democratization process as well (Berg-Schlosser 2004). 
2.3. Kosovo electoral system 
Taking into account the sensitivity of minority issues, in order to guarantee that 
all entities in Kosovo are provided with equal opportunity of representation in 
government, Kosovo has adopted a proportional electoral system with a single 
electoral district. The minority issue and the pressure of the international 
community are considered the main reasons why Kosovo has chosen a 
proportional electoral system. Until the 2007 elections, the country had used a 
closed list proportional electoral system, while in more recent elections, there 
was a change in the electoral rules and candidate lists were opened, with the 
intention of stimulating a closer relationship between voters and candidates, as 
dictated by the UNMIK regulations9. However, that proved to be unsuccessful, 
because voters could choose 10 candidates on the list. In this way, it was hard 
for a voter to find out of the ten candidates is really representing him. As a result, 
this was changed later, with it now possible to choose just one candidate listed.  
 
                                                 
9 http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/index.htm 
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Recently, the electoral law10, legislated by the Kosovo Parliament and entered 
into force in 2008, has changed some of the rules (local elections) but not the 
electoral system as a whole. Kosovo still has a proportional system, with a single 
electoral district. Yet, it will not now be possible to vote for ten candidates but just 
for one. The reasoning for this is that it is difficult as a voter to seek responsibility 
from ten people, for whom he might have voted.  The law has further empowered 
party leaders, whereby the first on the list gets the votes of the party 
automatically, without needing to enter into competition with others inside the 
party. It is usual (although not obligatory) for party leaders to take this privileged 
position.  
2.4. Kosovo context in theories of democratisation 
Having introduced the Kosovo political system, it brings us to several theoretical 
challenges regarding the democratization of Kosovo. Most of the theories and 
conventional knowledge on democratization refer to states, excluding other 
political systems. The Kosovo political system, even after the independence 
declarations, still lacks many components to make it fully sovereign and 
independent. One of the major components of a democratic system is the 
effective power of those elected to govern, not sharing governing power with any 
non-elected actor. Hence, as stated earlier that is not the case in Kosovo yet. 
Gunther, Diamandours, Puhle (1995, 6) very clearly point out that in order for a 
country to be considered a democracy, first of all it should not have any policy 
under the authority of unelected officials, because in such circumstances they fail 
to be accountable to the citizens. Moreover, Linz & Stepan (1996) among many 
others concerned with the democratization as a process and conditions required 
for it, include stateness as a precondition for the consolidation of democracy to 
take place. Therefore, in the case of Kosovo, democracy consolidation might 
encounter theoretical shortcomings, because its political status still lacks such a 
prerequisite.  
 
                                                 
10 Law on Election 
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Nonetheless, the experience of some not-entirely state actors with 
democratisation has necessitated that theories on democratisation to be 
reconsidered and re-conceptualised to also include political systems lacking full 
stateness, or not meant to be states at all. Taking into account democratization in 
some non-state actors such as Taiwan or the EU for example, opens up the way 
for a feasible approach to democratization comprising the Kosovo political 
system as well, if not as the end-product at least as a process. Therefore, it is 
more a shortcoming on the side of theories of democratization excluding non-
state political systems, rather than with not being able to apply theories of 
democratization to non-states. It necessitates development and a stretching of 
theories of democratisation, covering also the democratisation of other political 
systems that aren’t states. Since democratization is perceived as a process, it 
enables the measurement of developments within that process, though in a more 
complicated way due to the increase of the number of actors, particularly outer 
actors, involved in the process.  
 
Referring to the aforementioned contested theoretical issue, Whitehead (2005) 
highlights this deficiency and calls for theoretical revision, to swell their 
applicability to non-state systems already undergoing the democratization 
process. In an attempt to overcome such a theoretical limitation, Tansey (2007) 
while dealing with the democratization process in Kosovo, chewed over the 
concept of the state from its root meaning, dividing it into three essential 
dimensions: capacity, cohesion, and international recognition. Although Kosovo 
(which up to now is recognised by 64 states) before the independence 
declaration lacked more than what is now limited to the element of international 
recognition, and even today still experiences a fragile cohesion. Regarding the 
capacity dimension, this was very much in place and increased consistently, 
particularly after independence, for the most part at the hands of Kosovo political 
parties. This specific conceptualization puts into focus the existence of a degree 
of stateness despite being short of full stateness. The capacity dimension has 
been continuously augmented with the incessant power transfer from UNMIK to 
  Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo          
 
84 
 
Kosovo provisional institutions. Even though, the full effective power of domestic 
institutions to govern at all sectors is still missing, their governing responsibility is 
extended to most policy areas.  
 
The settlement of a democratic institutional structure, as a division point between 
transition and consolidation, Kosovo has passed the transition phase from an 
authoritarian to a democratic regime and it is in the phase of democracy 
consolidation (though as mentioned earlier it should not be ignored the heavy 
presence of the international community, in the long term increasing democratic 
deficiency). Referring to Merkel`s (1999) model, Kosovo has almost passed the 
constitutional consolidation, the first level of consolidation, or if we refer to 
Pridham`s (1995) conceptualisation there is already a negative consolidation, at 
least visually, because no alternative to a democratic regime seems viable at the 
moment.  
 
The Kosovo political system actually finds itself within the process of democracy 
consolidation, with not yet clear prospects of future democratic developments. 
During our research, we will measure the likelihood of democracy consolidation 
in the Kosovo political system, by looking at the role of parties in this process. 
Overcoming the theoretical limitations, the models of democratisation studies 
used for state actors can also be applied to not fully state settings, as is the case 
with Kosovo.   
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Chapter 3 
3. Research Methodology 
The literature review on the field of study brought out the stage of theory and 
study development, enabling the construction of the research design. The 
research principally relied on qualitative empirical research methods, primarily 
deductive orientated but often accompanied by an inductive way of research. 
Nevertheless, the research design is based on two types of data, largely primary, 
supplemented by secondary data as well. In order to shed light on the research 
methods and instruments used in the thesis, in this chapter are elaborated the 
methods, instruments, techniques used, the data chosen, the collection of this 
data, working through this and finally analysing it to draw up the results has been 
elaborated. In other words, here, described thoroughly, is the research process 
of the thesis. Additionally, it includes a critical point of view, looking at the 
possible shortcomings, as well as advantages of the methods and instruments 
used in the research process. 
3.1. The case of study 
The case  for study in our dissertation thesis is a single case study, within the 
Kosovo cultural, political and socio-economic context. Usually, the case study is 
not chosen by chance, force, or by accident, but mostly it is the researcher’s 
interest that dictates what he is going to focus on (Detlef 2006, 321). In addition, 
the relevance of the case study and the degree it has been explored has a 
determining effect on the case selection. The researcher’s decisive role in the 
case study selection might possibly influence the research process in terms of 
the units of analysis, methods and instruments used to collect the data, data 
processing and analysis, as well as the research results. Yet, though the 
researcher comes from the Kosovo context making up the case study in 
question, as much possible effort, at least consciously, has been made to ensure 
objectivity and a scientific approach rather than being subjective. As Detlef 
(2006, 336) points out, such an impact by the researcher on the research is 
possible, due also to ethnocentrism, and as theories themselves to a large extent 
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colour the outcomes and methods themselves, in our case study that has not 
been the case. Subjectivity in our thesis research has been avoided as much 
possible. 
 
The difference from comparable case studies, is that this single case is more 
isolated, lacking prior experimental variance, and having uncontrollable external 
variance, unable to ensure the external reliability. In order to prevent a possible 
shift from the level of scientific research, the research design is built primarily 
based on the applied theories to the case study. The advantages of single case 
studies are their strategy for explorative studies, and enabling an intensive 
discussion of ideas, hypotheses, and empirical evidences. Moreover, different 
from other research strategies, single cases are context specific, based on 
historical and cultural features, they allow better interpretation and possible 
multiple causation (Detlef 2006, 321). On the other hand, such a research 
strategy has its disadvantages as well. It has no prior experimental variance, or a 
controlled external and error variance. Moreover, it has limitations in terms of 
generalisation possibilities, due to its focus on a specific case, no scientific 
criteria exists for making the results valid when applied to other case studies.  
 
Within the context of this single case study, the specific number of parties to be 
included in our study has been defined. Despite the fact that Kosovo is home to 
around fifty political parties, most of them are very small and irrelevant, while 
some others are ethnic-based parties covering less than 8% of the total 
population. Hence, the research has been narrowed to the study of the five major 
Kosovo parties, currently major parliamentary parties. In this regard, in a single 
chapter the trend of parties’ size and development since 1989 is described, in 
order to get a picture of trends and the scale of party development, though our 
research focuses just on the major five, measuring their performance and 
consequent impact on the democracy consolidation process in Kosovo. Being the 
most important parties, their impact on the democracy consolidation process is 
key compared to other small, irrelevant, or ethnic parties. The research 
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measures the performance of political parties’ functions and their impact into 
democracy consolidation, through exploring the current five major parties.  
 
Regarding the time scale and the period covered within the research, it includes 
the period after the war in 1999 up to the present time. The reason for this time 
scale is that most of the major parties, except LDK, emerged after the war. In 
addition, the period before the war was mainly concerned with the independence 
issue, heavily shadowing the democracy consolidation prospects.  
 
The five key party functions measured in the research are as follows: 
representation, integration, legitimation, innovation, and governing. Herewith, 
they are operationally conceptualised, within their definitions not distorting their 
substantial meaning, ensuring the measurability of indicators to explain the level 
of functions fulfilment. From each conceptualisation of the function there are 
indicators drawn through which is measured the performance of parties on the 
function in question, built as categories and sub categories.   
3.2. Research model 
After the decision on the case study, it opened the way to find out the current 
state of affairs on the theories and work on the issue, and in fact, the extent to 
which it has been explored.  In deciding, a thorough brainstorming was needed to 
research extensively on the literature review on political parties and democracy in 
general and with democracy consolidation in particular, the different regions of 
the world and the different waves of democratisation. The thorough examination 
of the literature revealed the issue to be generally unexplored, particularly the 
relationship between political parties and democracy consolidation, and the role 
of political parties in the process of democracy consolidation in the third wave of 
democratisation. Moreover, the issue within the single case study, the context of 
our concern, has not been explored at all.   
 
After the literature review, before moving to the empirical part of the thesis to 
measure the relationship of the role of parties in the democracy consolidation 
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process in the Kosovo context, there was a need to draw up a model of research 
that enables such measurement to take place scientifically. In order to come up 
with such a model, initially there was a need to start up with theories of 
democracy placing parties within diverse models of democracy. Subsequently, 
narrowing down to theories of the democratisation process, system 
transformation theories in general, regime change and transition, and 
consolidation in particular taking into account the research focus. Along these 
lines, various theories and conceptualisations of democratisations built upon the 
contexts of different parts of the world and for different waves of democratisation 
were explored. Among them, the more applicable and operationalisable theory, 
with drawing up the framework of the research model in general, and explicitly 
referring to political parties within the general structure of democracy 
consolidation, is found to be in Merkel’s (1999) model. It is broad and offers 
enough space and opportunity to construct within the skeleton of the empirical 
research model, the ability to measure the role of parties on the democracy 
consolidation process. Obviously, the framework model is contextualised for our 
case study. Bearing in mind the inner and international actors influencing the 
democracy consolidation process, they were isolated as much as possible.  
 
The research moves down to theories of parties and party systems. From the 
literature review, it is found that the majority of the theories on political parties are 
based on the experience of political parties in north-western parts of the 
hemisphere. Therefore, their application necessitated contextualisation. After a 
thorough review of different approaches in studying political parties and party 
systems, the functionalist approach was perceived as suitable to measure 
political parties’ performance, to the extent of what parties perform their 
functions, without alleviating other party features. Nonetheless, the approach is 
not free from deficiencies: tautological ambiguity - while conceptualising party 
functions, its static nature, or the inappropriateness in doing cross national 
research. In order to avoid the shortcomings of the approach used, eliminating 
the tautological ambiguity of the concepts of party functions, after looking at 
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different conceptualisations of party functions done by several students of 
political parties, appropriate and operational definitions were chosen. In this way, 
operational definitions of the concepts of party functions limit and even steer 
clear of the possible tautological ambiguity. The static nature of the functionalist 
approach is to lighten and soften up as much as possible through analysing the 
actual state of affairs and predicting the future prospects, preventing the 
normative standpoint from overshadowing the existing developments. While the 
inappropriateness of the approach in doing cross-national research does not hold 
relevance as long as our research is a single case-based research. Moreover, 
the literature review shows that the functionalist approach is used on some 
studies on the role of parties in the democracy consolidation of some African 
countries (Emminghaus 2003). The modified and adapted model of this study is 
operationalisable and fits within the aforementioned general model of democracy 
consolidation. It enables the measurement of the role of political parties in 
democracy consolidation in Kosovo. The main reason for using the functionalist 
approach to study political parties and their role in the consolidation process, 
through the model of democracy consolidation offered by Merkel (1999), is that it 
offers the possibility for empirical operational measurement of the role parties 
have in the democracy consolidation structure and process. Their role is 
particularly at the second level of democracy consolidation structure – the 
representation level, which obviously influences the other three levels of the 
structure. Exploring the degree of party performance in terms of the extent they 
fulfil functions, facilitates the working out  of how far parties contribute directly to 
the second level of the democracy consolidation structure, and indirectly to the 
other three levels.  
 
On the other hand, after a normative conceptualisation and prioritisation of party 
functions, five main functions are decisively selected and operationally defined, 
enabling empirical measurement to find out how far parties fulfil their functions. 
However, it does not mean that other aspects of political parties are neglected 
from concern. In order to understand what parties do, we need to know first what 
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parties are, and before getting to know what parties are and do, we have to be 
aware of what parties are supposed to be and do.  
 
Moving further from the literature review, and above the general framework of the 
research model, in order to operationalise the research, we moved into the 
practical steps of the empirical research process: choosing the data, collecting it, 
working through it, and analysing it in order to draw up research results.    
3.2.1. Choosing the data 
Before progressing to the step of data collection within the research process, first 
it needed to be decided what sources of information were necessary for the 
research. The case study itself, to a considerable extent, implies the source of 
information. Despite that, there is still space to choose from various sources, 
based on the availability of information, the possibility of having access to it, the 
validity of information, usefulness, as well as the likelihood of processing. In 
order to have a brighter and more diverse range of views, it was considered 
important to focus on data from a variety of sources: political parties themselves, 
civil society activists, the academic community, various organisations linked with 
the case study (or having interest in the field of study), the media, as well as 
earlier researches related in one way or another to our study. Political parties 
themselves are the major sources of data and provide the insiders’ perspectives - 
how are they organised, work and function, their attitudes, behaviours, and 
values, reflecting a sort of self-evaluation. Such data is considered of vital and 
primary importance, on which relies the research. On the other hand, civil society 
activists from an outsiders’ perspective have an attractive and important position 
within society, follow the issues that impact and are impacted on by parties. They 
offer more or less a critical outsider position, and have a critical role on the 
overall political process, including the consolidation of democracy. Furthermore, 
science milieu on the field of study are also a supportive source of data. They 
have specific knowledge on political parties and democracy consolidation, and 
most importantly they are objective. Additional sources, such as various 
organisations dealing with parties, are supplementary to the main sources of 
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data. They have frequently drawn reports and analysis on the issues that are our 
object of study. Moreover, the media is a rich field of information, highlighting 
parties’ positions, attitudes, behaviours, policies so on. Previous research related 
to any of the points within our focus of study is helpful and offers useful data 
indeed. 
 
However, deciding on the sources of data in general requires a specification. The 
question remains as to what and whom within parties, which civil society 
activists, whom from the scientific community, which organisations and 
institutions, which media for what specific period of time? It is considered useful 
to interview people as high up in the party hierarchy as possible. They have the 
deepest and most guarded information, though often will not be willing to reveal 
it. Despite the intention to interview party leaders, due to their timetables it was 
impossible to arrange interviews. Instead, from the five major parties interviews 
were arranged with members of parties’ chairmanships, normally close to the 
party leader, having inner information and being a possible substitution to parties’ 
leaders. Moreover, party documents are considered a reliable and valid source of 
information on party organisations, functions, behaviours, and attitudes. The 
party statute is the highest legal act within the party and discloses the normative 
way of how a party is supposed to be organised and function. Therefore, party 
statute is considered as one of the major sources of data within the party. In 
addition, the party programme reveals party ideological orientation, mission, and 
vision, through which party objectives, values, and attitudes are normally made 
public. Furthermore, party programmes offer important data for the research. 
Besides, with electoral platforms being more specific, they provide more dynamic 
data about party policies, priorities, emphasis, and so on. Based on that, it was 
decided that the above-mentioned sources of data within the parties would be 
used. The data from party documents might not necessary paint a real life picture 
of parties, but when compared and contrasted with party representatives’ 
interviews their validity and reliability can be enhanced, even if not fully ensured. 
Contexts, like Kosovo in our case, are known for a high level of informality, 
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reflected by political parties and to some extent they also cause this. Hence, the 
rules and regulations specified on party statute are not always followed by party 
structures, neither are the objectives set out by parties. From the insider point of 
view, such a gap within the party data can be minimised, though not closed. The 
aforementioned sources of data are considered to be the most important within 
the parties.  
 
On the other hand, from the civil society activists, representing important sources 
of data from the outsider perspective, it was decided to interview some of them 
known to have reflected the political process positively, being active and 
conscious about political developments, including parties’ activities, behaviours, 
and attitudes within the democratisation process. Civil society activists being 
close to or in the service of parties or government, intentionally are not selected, 
since the information abstracted from them might be tainted with bias towards 
one or another party that they support. Different from the insider point of view 
from parties, civil society activists see things from another angle, enriching the 
data and putting more light into the thesis’s research.   
 
Nevertheless, people form the political science community in Kosovo were also 
selected for interviews. They have knowledge and expected objectivity on the 
case study. Yet, it should be pointed out that Kosovo has no specific specialists 
on political parties or democratisation. Notwithstanding, it was decided to select 
some distinguished students, doing their PhD on political sciences overseas.  
 
Furthermore, other supplementary sources of data used are media reports, from 
all daily newspapers, with the major focus, but not exclusively, on the election 
campaign at national elections. Some newspapers are supporters of certain 
parties, therefore I decided to rely on all and not just few of them, and compare 
them among themselves. Additionally, the three national TV stations were also 
used as a source of data. The election data needed was merely taken from CEC 
and OSCE missions in Kosovo. Kosovo laws, UNMIK regulations, and CEC 
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regulations are utilised as supplementary data. Furthermore, reports from 
international organisations and institutions such as: European Commission 
annual progress reports, OSCE mission in Kosovo, ICG, TI, and so on, are 
considered as supplementary data.  
3.2.2. Data collection 
The various methods in qualitative research used in data collection are: 
observation, interviewing, and document analysis. The data collection, as one of 
the main steps within the research process, is based on two major methods: 
interviews and document analysis.   
  
Interviews 
Following the research model construction, and decision on the data selection, is 
the stage of data collection, which primarily needs the choosing of methods and 
instruments to collect the data from the already decided sources. The type of 
research, being quantitative or qualitative, often determines the methods and 
instruments used. Our thesis research is exclusively qualitative research, 
providing the space to choose among the methods and instruments appropriate 
for qualitative research. One of the major methods used to collect the data is 
interview, and the interview schedule as an instrument of research (Kumar 1999, 
109). The type of interview used to collect the data is the open ended structured 
interview schedule. The interview schedule is considered a written list of 
questions, open ended or  closed, prepared for the interviewer, in a person to 
person interaction (face to face, by telephone, or by other electronic media) 
(Kumar 1999, 109). Though unstructured interviews offer more opportunity to 
penetrate deeply into the interviewees’ thoughts and ideas about the issue 
discussed, there is always a danger of shifting to an uncontrolled interview, 
moving away from the topic he is being interviewed on. However, the structured 
and open-ended interview gives sufficient opportunity to the interviewee to 
express himself, while still being within the order of the questions specified on the 
interview schedule. Moreover, different from the unstructured interview it does 
not require much knowledge from the interviewer. 
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Interviewing as the research method of data gathering has its advantages and 
disadvantages compared to other methods. It is a very useful instrument to gain 
in-depth data, and the interviewer can complement the information taken by other 
methods. In addition, if required, the interviewer has the possibility to offer 
supplementary information to the interviewee. Furthermore, it enables the 
research to be conducted with any type of person. However, it is considered 
expensive and time consuming, while often the quality of data is affected by the 
quality of interaction. The quality of data may also vary if many interviewers are 
involved, as the interviewer might introduce a bias. 
 
Among the different types of interviews, in our case study, the type of expert 
interview is used. One of the features of this type of interview is that the 
interviewee’s personality is not at the centre of the interview, but his knowledge 
(for example due to his profession, career, or position he has) about the issue on 
which the interview is conducted. In this type of interview, the interviewee is 
considered as a provider of knowledge (Westle 2009). There are no clear-cut 
rules for the conduct of expert interviews, and some see it as easier due to the 
knowledge the interviewee has. Nonetheless, there are difficulties associated 
with it as well, such as the blocking of theme by the expert, while he does not 
want to offer some insider information, or if he does not feel competent to do that 
– therefore moving away from the topic. In a single case study then he should be 
pressed just at the explorative level. The interviewer should show competence as 
well in order to be accepted so by the interviewee. Often they might come to a 
contradiction, as not distinguishing between knowledge, knowing, experience, 
and opinion. 
 
The schedule expert interview, as an instrument used to collect data in our 
research, is constructed based on the five main party functions meant to be 
measured. For each particular function open-ended questions are drawn based 
on the theories, concepts, and sub concepts building up the party functions into 
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question, used as categories and sub–categories. Some of the questions were 
also constructed from an inductive way of research, intended to collect data to 
measure the party function performance. The concepts and sub concepts within 
a party function, based on which interview questions were drawn, are used also 
as categories and sub-categories on data analysis. The expert interviews for 
political parties, civil society activists, and political scientists, have similarities but 
also differ on some points, since they are perceived as two different sources of 
information, the former an insider while the later as an outsider source of 
information. Moreover, there are differences on some questions to government 
and opposition parties, since some parties studied have never been in 
government. Yet, regardless of their differences, all interviewee schedules are 
structured with party functions as the main categories, and their indicators as sub 
categories.  
 
The expert is considered to be someone that possesses certain specific 
knowledge on the issue because they hold a certain position within an 
organisation or institution (Meuser & Nagel 1991). Moreover, as experts they can 
be valued in one way or another to the issue studied, as was the case with two of 
interviewees in our case: Gezim Krasniqi and Gezim Selaci, currently doing their 
PhD on political sciences overseas. Based on that, the interviewees are 
considered experts since they are either members of the party chairmanship, 
activists within civil society, or people merely having interest in the issue, or 
students of the topics researched. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes (the 
shortest), to two and a half hours (the longest).  Four of the interviews were 
conducted by email, also considered as an acceptable form of interviewing (Bortz 
& Doering 2006). Two of the interviewees, Gezim Krasniqi and Gezim Selaci, are 
currently studying overseas, and the only way for them to interview was by email. 
Halil Matoshi expressed his willingness to respond by email, as he wanted more 
time to think about the questions asked. While Jetullah Aliu from the Kosovo 
Agency against corruption also asked to be interviewed by email, though he 
answered just a few questions, arguing that the agency does not deal directly 
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with parties, though the interview schedule comprises questions also indirectly 
related to parties, and touch upon issues dealt with by the agency. During all 
face-to-face interviews notes were taken on the responses, and later turned into 
a transcript. Moreover, the interviewees were informed and ensured that the 
information derived from interviews would be used for academic/scientific rather 
than journalistic purposes..  
 
Document analysis  
Furthermore, despite interviews being the method of data collection, in our 
research an additional method, supplementary to the expert interview, known as 
document analysis (Westle 2009, 325-334) was used. The document analysis 
method is one of the two main research methods used in our research, in the 
data collection stage, complemented by content analysis on the phase of data 
analysis in the research. The primary data collected by the document analysis 
method are party documents: party programmes, statutes, and party electoral 
platforms. The party statute is a normative description type of the document, 
specifying the overall inner party organisation. The statutes analysed are the 
most recent ones, despite the fact that parties often keep changing statute 
depositions from one party congress to another. Party programmes and electoral 
platforms express the orientation of a party’s values, while electoral platform is 
more specific in nature. The parties’ documents were collected from parties 
themselves, or downloaded from parties’ websites, most of them published in a 
form of booklet ensuring their authenticity. The data collected from party 
documents offer static information, but are very useful when compared and 
contrasted with the data collected from expert interviews, being more dynamic, 
improving the validity through the triangulation method (Westle 2006, 259). Laws, 
UNMIK, CEC, and OSCE regulations and other information, were collected from 
internet, from their respective webpage. The laws were downloaded from the 
electronic Kosovo Parliament official journal, while UNMIK regulations are from 
the official journal of the UNMIK. The CEC regulations are downloadable from 
  Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo          
 
97 
 
CEC official website. The same applies to OSCE regulations and other election 
data.   
 
The newspaper articles as another unit of analysis were borrowed from the 
archive of the city library of Ferizaj, a city in Kosovo. The archived newspapers 
are the daily national newspapers from the year 2000 up to the beginning of 
2010. The newspapers are considered as a substantial field of information about 
political parties. Due to the large number of newspapers for quite long period of 
time, the newspaper articles dealing with any of the issues and sub issues of our 
research were considered and selected, and also categorised based on the 
categories of the research. The specific and exclusive focus is drawn during the 
periods of the electoral campaign of the three periodic national elections from 
2001, 2004, and 2007. In addition, the national TV stations provide sufficient 
information on parties. The data from three national TV stations were selected as 
on the consideration of importance and relation to the issues of the study, 
especially news and other reports of interest for our case study. Moreover, 
various organisations’ reports about Kosovo, are used as secondary data, such 
as: ICG reports from 2000 to 2009, European Commission annual progress 
reports for Kosovo starting from 2005 to 2009, TI reports including Kosovo, and 
so on. Hereby, the data are collected from their respective official webpage, 
particularly the published reports in question. Their authenticity in our research is 
based on their reference,  of information from their webpages and their 
publications.  
 
To sum up, interviews and document analysis are the two main methods of data 
collection used in our research process. 
3.2.3. Data working through  
After their collection, the data was worked through to purify, arrange, and then 
clean it up. The interviews were made into transcripts. Excluding the four 
interviews conducted through e-mail, the rest of the interviews were written 
down, but not recorded by any electronic mean.. Usually, it is not a rule that the 
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transcript is left unedited, and it is up to the researcher which part should be 
transcribed, paraphrased, cited, or not to considered at all, based on the 
relevance of data (Meuser/Nagel 1991, 455). The main consistent parts of 
interviewees’ responses for each question were written down, though not fully 
and not word for word. Therefore, during working through the data there was a 
need to arrange it, recalling information, checking if anything is missing and 
whether it can be retrieved from the interviews. Since open-ended interview 
questions are structured based on the categories and subcategories of the 
variables and concepts used, they were already grouped into topics of research. 
Such arrangement was very helpful for comparing and contrasting the data, 
looking at similarities and differences, as well as for analysing it.     
 
Additionally, the other primary data collected by the method of document 
analysis, was read thoroughly. After the first reading, they were further 
categorised based on the structure of the thesis - party functions as categories, 
and their indicators as sub categories, and prepared for the step of data analysis. 
The data from the documents were grouped into these categories, particularly 
the main themes of the documents compared to the research categories and 
subcategories. The newspaper articles and the data taken from TV stations were 
categorised based on the indicators of the variables. The reports of the above 
mentioned organisations were thoroughly read and checked to establish which of 
them and which parts are relevant to our research, in other words which deal with 
Kosovo parties and are related to the concepts we use in our research. The 
same categorisation was applied to these relevant parts of the reports.  
3.2.4. Data analysis 
The primary and secondary data on which our research relies was collected 
through interviews and document analysis (as the main methods of data 
collection). Then after working through the data and arranging it to prepare for 
analysis, the content analysis method is used to analyse the data collected. The 
content analyses in general is known as the systematic, ordered, and inter 
subjective description of communication contents (Westle 2009, 334). As a 
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research method, it is not used just as a data collection method, but rather, also 
as a data analysis research method. At the heart of the content analysis relies 
the categorisation process, and coding for the process of ordering the category to 
the units of analysis. In order to alleviate an initial possible conceptual 
misunderstanding and then deviation, the categories and sub categories used 
are well defined. The category schema in our research is built in a mixed from, 
dominated by deductive and supplemented on a winning streak by inductive 
means of categorisation. Most of the categories are built from the theories 
constructing the research, but often within the research process categories are 
also introduced at some point in the exploration process. The category schema 
was developed prior to data collection, based on the theories channelling the 
research (see Table 4). Such categorisation has guided the structuring of the 
interview schedule. The questions put forward were based on the categories and 
subcategories coming out the concepts and sub-concepts deduced from the 
theories used on the research.  
 
To analyse the texts of the data in our case of research the summarising 
technique (that relies merely on the systematic paraphrasing of the text within the 
data) was used. However, often parts of the texts, wherever considered as 
making sense, are also quoted. The conceptual parts of the texts are related to 
the categories and subcategories. Following that, the empirical findings from the 
data collected by the methods and instruments mentioned above, are related to 
the categories and sub categories within the research, confronting them with 
theories. The interpretation of the materials is done based on the data, in order to 
come out with the results of analysis. Moreover, it should also be mentioned that 
no computer programme was used to analyse the data, and the researcher has 
done the whole work manually.    
3.3. Validity and reliability issue  
Validity is defined as the degree to which the researcher has measured what he 
has set out to measure (Smith 1991, 106). In the case of the instrument used, it 
implies whether the instrument measures the intended measurement. In case of 
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the interview as a method of data collection, the thesis has a content validity 
(Kumar 1999, 138) based upon a logical link between the questions of the 
interview schedule and the objectives of the study. The large and extensive 
number of open-ended questions in the structured interview schedule, 
constructed based on the concepts and sub concepts comprising the study, 
offers plenty of space for a close relationship between the instruments used and 
the objectives of the study. Each party function, from the central five functions 
structuring the empirical part of the research, is highly and extensively 
represented on the interview schedule. The questions are divided for each 
particular function, and are meant to exhaust and explore deeply the functions in 
question. However, the content validity itself suffers through weaknesses. Such 
judgments might be based on subjective logic. Various people may perceive the  
content validity of an instrument differently. In addition, the extent of variance of 
questions from the objectives of the study might be noticeable, as the selection of 
questions themselves might influence the research validity.  
 
On the other side, dealing with the external reliability in the single case study is 
not an easy issue, due to an inability to test the measurement. Reliability requires 
re-measurement of the case study, which in reality, in social sciences and in 
single cases of study often implies measuring two different things, that are 
unable to provide the same results. A measurement is reliable to the extent that it 
gives the same result repeatedly if the measurement is repeated (Schively 1998, 
41). The inability of applying the research done in a single case to other cases 
and expecting the same results is one of the weaknesses of the single case 
study research model.   
 
However, in order to increase the validity and reliability of our research in general 
the known technique of triangulation is used: the data and the methods 
triangulation (Denzin 1978). By combining multiple methods and empirical data 
sources, a researcher can hope to overcome the weakness, intrinsic biases and 
the problems that arise from a single research method and single data sources. 
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Triangulation does not necessary imply the same results (Westle 2006), but at 
least enriches the research through various points of view from diverse angles, 
offering a more detailed and balanced picture of the issue. The methods of 
triangulation in our research process is ensured through various methods used, 
as mentioned above, for the data collection, the interviews, and document 
analysis, and as for data analysis, the content analysis method. On the other 
hand, various aforementioned sources of data, including a variety of primary and 
secondary data, enables the data triangulation. The triangulation technique was 
applied to improve the validity, reliability, and credibility of our research in 
general. 
3.4. Criticism 
The research is not safe from possible criticism, ranging from the context, the 
research design and process, to the possibility of drawing up generalisations. 
The research is conducted within the context of where the researcher himself 
belongs, implying possible subjectivism. Yet, the researcher has tried 
consciously to be objective and value free as much as possible. However, one 
the most difficult limitations to our research is the case study itself. The case 
study’s focus is very much in flux making the theorising process quite difficult. 
The democracy consolidation process and political parties in the Kosovo context, 
are still being developed, and have not yet taken their final and stable form. 
Theorising on an evolving thing is quite challenging. 
 
Regarding the choice of data to be collected, the interviewees were selected 
from the same positions within the party hierarchy, excluding party leaders, 
choosing those more willing to be interviewed, which might to some extent imply 
non-systematic selection. The data taken from TV stations include only the time 
period when the research started, form the beginning of the research up until the 
end, but not earlier.  
 
During the data collection process, there were some shortcomings 
accompanying the process. Some responses provided by interviewees were too 
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short, and some theoretical issues of interview schedules were left unanswered 
by the position of daily politics, providing difficulties for some to respond properly 
to some questions, despite the possibility offered by the interview method for a 
further explanation to the interviewees. Moreover, some interviewees did not 
respond to all questions. Perhaps, also the large number of questions in the 
interview, discouraged interviewees from completing. Despite that, it has not 
distorted our research. Perhaps using specific computer programs such as 
NVIVO, or others, could ensure greater accuracy in the data.  
 
Lastly, the single case of research suffers from one of the main weaknesses, the  
impossibility of generalisation. The findings and theories of the single case study 
cannot be generalised and applied to other cases studies, as the research is so 
context based.  
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Chapter 4 
4. Historical Development of Political Parties in Kosovo 
4.1. Introduction 
The origin of parties in non-single party-state systems is usually accompanied by 
democracy expansion, specifically, a representative democracy. The origin of 
parties in different parts of the world is very much context related, varying in 
terms of space and time. Regarding the origins of political parties, among others 
LaPalombara and Weiner (1990, 25-31), referring to western European party 
systems, theorise the origins of political parties. From the indicators of the origins 
of parties offered by the authors, two of them can be used for the case of 
Kosovo- democratisation and ideology as the main driving forces and impetus for 
party origins and developments.  
 
Kosovo tradition is of a one party system - the lonely unchallenged communist 
party, which dates back to the Second World War, as being part of the former 
Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav communist party extended itself all over former 
Yugoslavia, enjoying flattering forced integration. Those not loyal to the 
communist party were discriminated against, and if they tried to challenge it, 
could be forced into isolation, or even executed.  Parties in a democratic context 
in Kosovo are something new. Their origin is associated with the beginning of a 
snowball effect of the third wave of democratisation throughout the former 
socialist bloc of Europe and the former Soviet Union, marked by the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the beginning of the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and 
the former Yugoslavia of which Kosovo was a part. Such development is coupled 
with independence ambitions flamed by nationalist ideology borne out of Serbian 
repression, unfair treatment of Kosovo during the time of Yugoslavia, and the 
belief of Kosovo people that they should not belong to Yugoslavia and Serbia.  
 
The democratisation process opened up the door of pluralism that was not 
allowed during the socialist Yugoslavia. No party was allowed to contest the 
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ruling of the Yugoslav communist party. However, by late 80’s it came to an end 
as the domino effect of the democratisation proceeded through former socialist 
Europe. For the Albanian majority population in Kosovo, pluralism offered a 
chance to form other parties separate from the already discredited communist 
party. It has been usual for the masses consistently to treat the communist party 
with suspicion - as a foreign body imposed on them, but were forced to follow 
and had no alternative but to do so.  
 
At the same time, the democratisation process apart from opening the door to 
pluralism, the opportunity opened up for political parties to organise the political 
process in a democratic manner.  It also provided the opportunity for Kosovo 
Albanians to rise-up and openly organise their ambitions for freedom, outlining 
efforts to get independence. The winds of democratisation raised ambitions in 
almost all nations belonging to the artificial multi-nation state called Yugoslavia. 
Hence, the process also marked the beginning of the break-up of Yugoslavia.  
 
Parties in Kosovo emerged11 on the commencement of the democratisation 
process and were primarily nationalist-driven. The pluralist system provided the 
space and opportunity to feed and mobilise ambitions for independence through 
political parties. It should be clear that such ambitions did not appear at the same 
time as the start of the democratisation process. They were continuously present 
to the Kosovo Albanians, time and after manifesting themselves, as in the 1968 
protests, then in 1981 with more widely known demonstrations, having in one 
way or another  an ideological, nationalist orientation. Pluralism brought just a 
possibility to organise more openly (though not fully), through political parties, in 
a pluralist way.  
 
                                                 
11 It should be mentioned that prior to formation of parties by the end of 80’s as a result of democratization process, in 
Kosovo there were illegal movements mainly nationalist driven. They are not considered as parties but movements, 
mainly marginalized from society, acting illegally, not allowed due to their programme for Kosovo independence or to join 
together the Albanian territories as a whole.  As an example of such is LPK – Levizja Popullore e Kosoves (People’s 
movement of Kosovo), ….   
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The two main driving forces for the creation of parties and developments in 
pluralist Kosovo were the democratisation process, and nationalism as an 
ideology. Which one has prevailed over the other is a matter of time and priority. 
Democratisation was a good opportunity for nationalism. After the nationalist 
ambitions were somewhat fulfilled, with the withdrawal of Serbia’s troops from 
Kosovo in 1999 and then the declaration of independence in February 2008, the 
completion of the time for democratisation process (in terms of consolidation), 
should have taken priority. This has not however  entirely taken place. It remains 
to be seen as to what extent Kosovo society, and in particular, parties, believe in 
democratic values, whether democracy was used merely as a means to achieve 
nationalist ambitions.   
 
Besides the two above-mentioned reasons for party emergence in the Kosovo 
party system, there are also individual ambitions of several politicians as another 
impetus for the increase in the number of parties, like mushrooms after the rain. 
Many current mostly small party leaders, formed parties purely to become 
leaders. However, the electoral threshold of 5% fixed later, largely challenged 
their existence. The order of parties placed in this chapter is based on the year 
they were established, and does not hinge on the importance or relevance of 
parties at all. 
4.2. Chronological development of parties in Kosovo party 
system 
In the following, the emergence of all parties in Kosovo starting from 1981 up to 
now will be superficially introduced.. The chapter will help us to grasp a picture of 
party system development in Kosovo. There is no deep consideration, because 
our research focus is predominantly on the five largest parties in Kosovo. 
However, it provides a general knowledge about how a huge number of parties 
appeared at the beginning within a political context of around a population of 2 
million.  
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LPK – Lëvizja Popullore  e Kosoves (Peoples’ Movement of Kosovo) 
Following the 1981 demonstration in Kosovo (considered the first one following 
1968), asking for more freedom and equal status for Kosovo inside Yugoslavia, 
LPK was founded on the 17th February 1982. LPK was characterised primarily 
with nationalism and communism together, identified with and highly influenced 
by Enverism, as a version of communism. The government of former Yugoslavia 
accused them of being against the constitution, and their closeness to Albania’s 
communist rule, was seen as an irredentist ambition - a chance to unite territories 
populated by Albanian ethnicity creating a greater Albania. Such a worldview and 
ambition forced them to function in an underground manner, in a form of cell 
organisation. 
 
The clandestine way of organisation made it impossible for LPK to be a massive 
party. In addition, they had a widely spread structure of organisation, in places 
such as Switzerland, from hounded out people of the Yugoslav regime. Their 
stand on the national issue made them nationalist hardliners. During the 90’s 
when the Kosovo Albanian peaceful resistance was organised, they would not 
conform to that, and saw the armed resistance as the correct solution. Moreover, 
LPK is known for organising the first cells of the KLA, while during the war, it was 
not present on the political scene, and some of its members formed and joined 
other parties.     
 
In the 2001 as in the 2004 elections, LPK won a single seat at the Kosovo 
Assembly. In 2007 they joined the PDK electoral list  and got a single seat in 
parliament. One of the figures of LPK is Bajrush Xhemajli, a former prisoner and 
one of the deputy administrators of KLA. In 2009, LPK was transformed into the 
socialist party of Kosovo (PSK), however it would be more accurate to say that 
the party merely changed its name.  
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LDK – Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves (Democratic League of Kosovo) 
Pushed by the democratisation wave and motivated by nationalist ideology, a 
group of intellectuals under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova decided to form a 
political party, holding its first establishing congress on the 23rd December 1989. 
Since then the party has been called LDK - Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves 
(Democratic League of Kosovo). Very quickly, the LDK expanded all over Kosovo 
and became the largest and most popular party in Kosovo. Due to its mass 
support, some consider it as a mass movement. However, contesting elections 
defined it as a party. LDK became the main political force and party to handle the 
nationalist issue, around which, the majority of Kosovo Albanians mobilised 
themselves in the struggle for independence. However, the danger of that time 
often forced LDK leaders to hide the independence agenda, turning to issues for 
more rights within Yugoslavia, though the desire for independence as the main 
objective prevailed.  LDK became what Schmitter (1999) calls a forum party, like 
Solidarnost in Poland for instance. Identified as a party of independence, and a 
single objective party, it largely lost its relevance once the intended objective was 
attained. 
 
Looking from Janda’s (1980) conception of party institutionalisation, the 
reification, a massive party like LDK was highly institutionalised, due to a large 
support from the masses. Its leader Ibrahim Rugova soon became the leader of 
those masses as well.   
 
LDK up to the eve of war 1998 was a mega party in Kosovo. Its main policy was 
peaceful resistance, for which they got a lot of criticism and pushed many 
intellectuals into leaving and forming or joining other parties. Afterwards, the 
aggressiveness of parties coming out of the KLA, pressured the position of LDK, 
which diminished during the war. In the 2001 election, LDK again got almost half 
of the votes. Since then it has started to decline, especially with the death of its 
leader Ibrahim Rugova in 2006. The split into two, by forming LDD out of it in 
2007, led LDK to lose the elections for the first time in its history. 
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SDAK – Stranka Demokratske Akcije Kosova (Party of Democratic Action 
for Kosovo) 
SDAK is a party of the Bosnian minority in Kosovo and southern Serbia founded 
in 1989 by Numan Balic. The party strives to improve the condition of Bosnian 
minority. Since the war, it has been an ever-present part of the Kosovo 
parliament and at times part of the government.  
 
PPK – Partia Parlamentare e Kosoves (Parliamentary Party of Kosovo) 
PPK was founded in 1990 as an alternative party to LDK, holding a more hard-
line position. It was composed of a group of active intellectuals and youths in 
politics. Its position put it between the pacifist LDK and extreme hardliners, also 
striving for Kosovo independence. PPK could not enjoy massive support as LDK 
did, but was one of the alternatives to it. However, as a party it did not take part 
in armed resistance. One of its main leaders Adem Demaci left the party and 
became a spokesperson for the KLA for a short while. PPK later joined LDB, and 
after the war in 2001, it merged into AAK. Hence, it appears that it has lost its 
identity, as it has for a long time been under the umbrella of AAK.   
 
PFK – Partia Fshatare e Kosoves (Peasants Party of Kosovo) 
It was established at the beginning of pluralism in 1990, as a party that strived to 
protect the interest of peasants in Kosovo. One of the main economic potentials 
in Kosovo is agriculture, employing a considerable number of peasants. In the 
1991 parliamentary elections, it got seven seats, a small party, compared to the 
86 seats of LDK. Since the 1998 elections and the beginning of the war, PFK 
decided not to contest elections and to freeze activity. The party no longer exists.  
 
PRK – Partia Republikane e Kosoves (Republikan Party of Kosovo) 
PRK was established in 1990 with the intention of creating an alternative to 
peaceful resistance. It also promoted the idea of an armed resistance. PRK could 
not spread activity across Kosovo due to its objectives, but was made up of a 
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small number of intellectuals having a more radical stand. In 1998, PRK with 
some other parties merged into LBD. PRK ceased as an autonomous party, 
following the merger into LBD. 
 
PSDK – Partia Social Demokratike e Kosoves (Social Democratic Party of 
Kosovo) 
PSDK was formed in 1990, based on the social democratic ideology. Its 
leadership was composed mainly of former communist party members (such as 
its leader Kaqusha Jashari), who were part of the Kosovo government during 
communist times. However, PSDK was and continues to be a marginalised party 
in terms of votes they get and the influence they have on the Kosovo party 
system. In the 2007 election, they got a seat in parliament by joining the PDK list. 
 
The main reasons why PSDK, although ideologically oriented, could not establish 
itself into an influential party, are as follows. They did not extract and offer a 
practical programme to deal with current issues in Kosovo from the social 
democracy perspective. It would not be sufficient just to mention social 
democracy and try to legitimise itself by simply referring to successes the social 
democratic mega parties such as SPD in Germany has achieved. PSDK up to 
now has not offered any convincing programme. Furthermore, the Kosovo 
political scene was concerned more with the issue of nationalism, and dominated 
by parties directly dealing and identified with that. On the other hand, Kosovo has 
countless social problems, but they are not handled as they should be. Moreover, 
PSDK was headed mostly by people of the former regime, perceived by the eyes 
of the people, with scepticism. In 2008, former Kosovo prime minister Çeku came 
to chair the party. Nothing seems to have changed so far, except that party holds 
press media conferences more often. Currently, it is identified more as Çeku’s 
party rather than a social-democratic one. 
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PSHDK – Partia Shqiptare Demokristiane e Kosoves (Albanian Christian 
Democratic Party of Kosovo) 
PSHDK12 was established in 1990. It is a party based on Christian-Democratic 
ideologies. Since the composition of the Kosovo population is just few a percent 
Christian13, it always remained a minor party, never getting more than 2% of the 
vots. It is also a nationalist party, since it includes only Albanian Christians. 
Usually it was a strong supporter of LDK and most of time they were in coalition 
with LDK. It should be mentioned that PSHDK as a party has a stable electorate 
since it represents those belonging to the Catholic Church..  
 
Unable to shake off the chairmanship dilemma, as a result of the struggle for 
leadership among party leaders, in 2007 it split into two parties, PSHDK and 
PDKI.  
 
BSDAK – Bošnjačka Stranka Demokratske Akcije Kosova (Bosnian Party of 
Democratic Action of Kosovo) 
It is another ethnic party of the Bosnian minority in Kosovo, founded at the 
beginning of pluralism in Kosovo in 1990. The difference of BSDAK from another 
Bosnian party established a year earlier - SDAK, is that the former is chaired by a 
different person - Hilmo Kandič. The main purpose of the party is also the 
protection and development of Bosnian interests in Kosovo.  
 
KDTP – Kosovo Demokratik Türk Partisi (Kosovo Democratic Turkish 
Party) 
KDTP is a party of the Turkish minority living in Kosovo, established in 1990. The 
key objective of KDTP is protection of Turkish ethnicity interests in Kosovo. Due 
to the Kosovo constitutional framework during UNMIK time, and now under the 
Kosovo constitution, KDTP is a part of the parliament and has always been in 
                                                 
12 www.pshdk-ks.org /16.05.2009 
13 The Christians in Kosovo belonging to Albanian ethnicity are mainly Catholics. The orthodox in Kosovo are mainly 
Kosovo Serbs.   
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government, even with a ministerial position. Its HQ is in the city of Prizren where 
the majority of the Turkish minority live.  
 
PPSH - Partia Popullore Shqiptare (Albanian People’s Party) 
It was founded in 1991 under the leadership of Milaim Kadriu. Different from 
LDK, they had a more radical approach. It usually remained a small party, with 
mostly clandestine activity in the region of Llapi. Besides, PPSH was very much 
identified with its leader, and in 1998 PPSH joined LBD, and afterwards it ceased 
to exist.  
 
PLK – Partia Liberale e Kosoves (Liberal Party of Kosovo) 
It was founded in 1991, as its leader came out of PSHDK. The party is based on 
liberal ideology. At the beginning, it used to be called PLSH (Albanian Liberal 
Party), strongly supporting the LDK. PLK has always remained a small party in 
terms of the number of followers it has. In addition, it is associated completely 
with its leader, somehow damaging its reputation as a liberal party. Among other 
reasons why PLK could not penetrate deeply into society, is the high level of 
tradition among society, and also the inability of the party to offer a real workable 
programme. In 1998 it joined LBD, and it now functions again as PLK.  
 
UNIKOMB – Partia e Unitetit Kombetar Shqipetar (Albanian Party of 
National Unity) 
Not being happy with LDK’s policies and internal organization, another party with 
more hard-line nationalist ideology was created in May 1991. UNIKOMB had a 
mainly nationalist ideology and was determined to struggle for the unification of 
Albanians into a single state. One of its leaders was the well-known imprisoned 
(and one among many still missing from the war) Ukshin Hoti. Most of the party’s 
activities were carried out in a clandestine manner, and in Diaspora. After the 
war, they joined AAK only to leave it in 2002. Currently, it seems the party is not 
active anymore, since its actual leader has joined other parties.  
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BK – Balli Kombetar (National Front) 
BK was created as a political party in October 1991. It is the successor to the 
National Front established at the beginning of Second World War in 1939. Its 
main guiding ideology was nationalism, with the objective to protect the Albanian 
population persecuted by the more hard-line nationalist Serb forces during the 
Second World War. As such, during the war they were separated from the 
partisan forces fighting against occupiers. The reason behind this was the ill 
treatment of the Albanian population by Serb forces during the war. The end of 
the war and the victory of partisan forces meant it became difficult for BK to exist 
any longer. Therefore, since then they operated underground and could never 
reach the masses. Most of its followers were located at rural traditional areas. 
 
Up until now, BK have not been able to get a seat in parliament, but they try at 
least to create opinion and spread the idea through their activities and debates. 
However, their main purpose remains the creation of a greater Albania. It can be 
categorised as an anti-system party, looking forward not just to changing the 
government but also the system, by unifying Kosovo and Albania into a single 
state.   
 
PGJK – Partia e te Gjelberve te Kosoves (Green Party of Kosovo) 
PGJK is an environmentalist party concerned with environment protection. PGJK 
was established in 1991 and is still active, though it has always been among the 
marginalised parties of Kosovo. Environmental protection was not considered a 
priority compared to other issues. PGJK was not successful in developing society 
awareness on environmental protection issues, and the lack of power sharing 
within the party, are among the explanations why PGJK remains a very small 
party in such a polluted environment. If one looks at the party’s webpage14 from 
Google’s search engine, there are just a few photos of the party leader. In other 
words, the party could not get away from the personalistic domination of the 
party. Consequently, another environmentalist party was created in 2007, 
                                                 
14 www.pgjk.org/01.04.2009 
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unfortunately bringing no changes, and with the same concern of a leader-
dominated image.  
 
PNDSH – Partia Nacionale Demokratike Shqiptare (Albanian National 
Democratic Party) 
PNDSH was established on the 3rd May 1992, as an offshoot of the Albanian 
National Democratic Movement – functioning for more than 50 years. The 
movement was mainly organised based on nationalist ideology, but different from 
PLK, insofar as it is not inspired by communism. The only way for them to exist 
as a nationalist movement during Yugoslavia era was by clandestine means.  
 
PNDSH considers themselves as a right wing party. It has never got a seat in the 
Kosovo parliament and it is ranked among the small parties.   
 
LKÇK – Levizja Kombetare per Çlirimin e Kosoves (National Movement for 
the Liberation of Kosovo 
LKÇK was established in 1993. As the main purpose was the liberation of 
Kosovo, it operated underground. LKÇK did not see the pacifist resistance 
(followed by LDK) as a proper way to Kosovo independence. Therefore, they 
founded LKÇK as a clandestine way to mobilise the masses, through pamphlets, 
and to organise armed forces to liberation. During the war, LKÇK was a strong 
supporter of the KLA. After the end of war, as supporters of the KLA, the 
provisional government under the leadership of Thaqi, offered them two seats.   
 
LKÇK in itself has a more hard-line nationalist ideology. It could not spread into a 
mass ideology, but usually included members highly committed to the national 
issue. In 2008, it changed its name to LBI.15 
                                                 
15 It very interesting, how many small hard-line nationalist parties emerged in Kosovo. It is believed that if they could 
function as a single party they could be more effective and efficient. But, it seems that the main reason why they could not 
join together was the leadership issue, who is going to be the leader. Therefore, an intellectual with strong belief in 
nationalism collected few others around him and established a party. So, it sounds that they were more concerned with 
themselves to be leaders than to push the national issue forward. 
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UShDK – Unioni Shqiptare Demokristian (Albanian Union of Christian 
Democrats) 
It was formed in 1995 as an ideological unification between PSHDK of Kosovo 
and Demo Christians of Albania. Later on, they joined LBD.  
 
LDSH – Levizja Demokratike Shqiptare (Albanian Democratic Movement)  
It was founded in June 1998 under the leadership of Rexhep Qosja, trying to 
form a new LDK because of not agreeing with the pacifist policies of LDK. On the 
establishing congress of the party, the openness of LDSH to be joined by other 
parties or individuals from inside the LDK, that were not happy with it, was 
highlighted.16  
 
LBD – Levizja e Bashkuar Demokratike (United Democratic Movement) 
LDB was formed in 1998 as a joining of several parties under the leadership of 
Qosja: LDSH, PPK, UNIKOMB, PLSH (PLK), UShDK, PGJK, PRSH, PPSH.  
They were not happy with the LDK’s stance toward the KLA and the war. Headed 
by the well-known academic Rexhep Qosja, it attracted several intellectuals and 
former prisoners that during communist Yugoslavia left LDK, among them the 
well-known Mehmet Hajrizi and Hidajet Hyseni. LBD was a strong supporter of 
armed resistance and the KLA17.  
 
PBD – Partia e Bashkimit Demokratike (Democratic Union Party) 
PBD was established in June 1999 as a successor to the KLA. Its leaders were 
Bardhyl Mahmuti, Jakup Krasniqi, and most of its followers were from LPK as 
well.  
 
                                                 
16 www.kosova.com/12.03.2009 
17 ICG Balkan Report NR. 76, www.icg.org/15.05.2009 
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PPDK (PDK) – Partia e Progresit Demokratik e Kosoves – PDK - Partia 
Demokratike e Kosoves (Party of Democratic Progress of Kosovo – 
Democratic Party of Kosovo)  
Not all former KLA members that joined politics became part of PBD, therefore 
PBD decided to unite with Thaqi’s supporters and some LPK activists, being 
active in Switzerland. In September 1999 they formed PPDK and Thaqi became 
the chairman of the party, Mahmuti was vice chairman but later resigned. PPDK 
was soon renamed PDK. After the war the PDK became the main political force 
on the Kosovo political scene, aside from LDK. It represented the entire 
succession and transformation of the KLA into politics, until the AAK emerged, 
and identified with theKLA in the Dukagjini region.  
 
SPO – Srpski Pokret Otpora (Serbian Resistance Movement) 
The Serb community in Kosovo, since the beginning of pluralism in former 
Yugoslavia, was organised mainly into political parties, acting as a snap-shot of 
parties in Serbia, such as: SPS – Socialisticka Partija Srbije (Socialist Party of 
Serbia), SPO – Srpski Porkret Obnove (Serbian Revival Movement), SRS – 
Srpska Radikalna Stranka (Radical Party of Serbia), among the largest parties. 
The Serb community in Kosovo were organised into parties, as an extension of 
parties in Serbia. In addition, their stand toward Kosovo and Kosovo Albanians 
was very similar to that among these parties in Serbia. 
  
With the end of the war, many Serbs left Kosovo, with some of them returning 
later. As a result, the political organisation of the Serbian community, to some 
extent started to be organised in other ways. Some of the snap-shot parties were 
disbanded. The Serbian community in Kosovo after the war had other priorities. 
They were mainly concerned with the issue of the return of the fled Serbs, and 
the free and secured movements and integration of Serbs in Kosovo institutions, 
or opposing the withdrawal of Serbs from Kosovo, through boycotting Kosovo 
institutions. Consequently, many other new political parties from the Serbian 
community were created. Among the parties that survived after 1999 were SPO – 
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Srpski Pokret Otpora, but its main concern became the return of Serbs to 
Kosovo.         
 
PD – Partia e Drejtesise (Justice Party) 
PD was founded in September 1999. Culturally it belongs to conservative parties, 
having a large focus on the religion of Islam. Most of its followers are religious 
people, or at least mosque goers. Although themajority of the population are 
Muslims it could not get a large base of support, because the middle-ground are 
not concerned with religious issues. In the first and second national election they 
managed to get a seat in parliament, but in 2007 could not pass the electoral 
threshold. Its characteristic is that it has a small but stable electorate, usually 
those more concerned with religious issues. Nonetheless, it should be mentioned 
that they stand for a moderate and not extreme form of Islam, or as some call it 
European Islam.18     
 
PREBK – Partia Rome e Bashkuar e Kosoves (United Roma party of 
Kosovo) 
With the end of the war in 1999, many communities in Kosovo decided to choose 
for their future. Heavy influence from the international community in Kosovo set 
out the objectives also including the concern of communities’ rights. Therefore, 
the Roma community found a very fruitful environment to establish an ethnic 
party, in order to uphold the interests of its own community. It started as an NGO 
and in 2000 PREBK19 established itself into a political party. Based on 
community rights in Kosovo, they have always been represented in the Kosovo 
parliament. The Roma community in Kosovo makes up around 1% of the total 
population. 
 
 
                                                 
18 www.drejtesia.org/27.03.2009 
19 Disscussion with chairman of PREBK Mr. Haxhi Zylfi Merxha / 10.09.2009 
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PDAK – Partia Demokratike e Ashkalinjeve te Kosoves (Democratic Ashkali  
Party of Kosovo) 
They started political activity as an association in 1996, but immediately after the 
war in 1999, when the conditions for the political organisations were set, they 
decided to establish themselves into a political party. The party is the Ashkali 
ethnic party. Its HQ is in Ferizaj where most of the community lives. They are 
part of the parliament based on  
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minority rights in Kosovo. PDAK’s objectives are to strengthen the position of the 
Ashkali community in Kosovo. The community currently counts approximately for 
less than 1% of the total population.  
 
PQLK – Partia Liberale e Qendres e Kosoves (Liberal Centre Party of 
Kosovo)  
It was founded in 2000, by the former KLA commander Naim Maloku. As with the 
majority of other small parties it was personalistic, identified with its founder. The 
party was short lived, because in 2001 it joined the formation of AAK. It has now 
merged into AAK and PQLK does not seem to exist anymore as a party. Its 
leader is well comforted in a high position in AAK. Normally, the fate of such 
small personal parties depends on the fate of the leader in politics. If he is well 
accommodated in another party, the objectives of the party established seems to 
have been fulfilled.  
 
AAK – Aleanca per Ardhmerine e Kosoves (Alliance for the Future of 
Kosovo)  
AAK has its genesis routed in the entrance of Ramush Haranidaj from the KLA 
(through KPC) to politics. He was a former commander of the KLA for the 
Dukagjini20 region. Primarily he formed AQK (Citizens’ Alliance for Kosovo). 
Recognising the impossibility of having success when going it alone, (especially 
with the existence of two mega parties - LDK and PDK) some small parties 
decided to join forces. AAK was founded in April 2001 as a coalition made up of 
AQK, PPK and UShDK, at the beginning it also included LKÇK and LPK, and up 
to 2002 also UNIKOMB. The AAK coalition, except those that left, was soon 
dominated by its leader, and is now a highly personalistic and regional based 
party. In the 2001 election it won 8 seats at the parliamentary election and 
became the third largest party. 
                                                 
20 Dukagjini includes almost one fourth of Kosovo territory in south-western part. KLA during the war is widely known for 
the lack of organizational capacity. It lacked the single commanding chain, and Haradinaj was chief commander for this 
region. While entering into politics he deepened such division and despite acquiring legitimacy from part of KLA also try to 
spread its regional bases.  
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IRDK – Iniciativa e Re Demokratike e Kosoves (New Democratic Initiative of 
Kosovo) 
IRDK is a minority political party, that was established in 2001. Its main objective 
is the highlighting of interests of the Egyptian community in Kosovo. It is the only 
party for the Egyptian community in Kosovo. Having a reserved place at the 
Kosovo Assembly, IRDK has a member at the Kosovo parliament and it has 
been part of the government since the war.  
 
GIG – Građanska Iniciativa Gora (Citizen Initiative Gora)  
GIG was created as a citizen initiative to take part at the 2000 election. In 2002 
they transformed into a political party. It is also a minority party with objectives to 
protect the interests of the Gorani community, mostly  located in the Dragash 
municipality. 
 
PReK – Partia e Re e Kosoves (New Party of Kosovo) 
It was established in April 2002 by Bujar Bukoshi. He was a former LDK member 
and before the war, nominated by President Rugova as the prime minister of 
Kosovo in exile. He was responsible for the widely massive supported financial 
funds known as “3%”, where much mismanagement and loss is evident. 
Furthermore, by the beginning of the war, he started not to recognize the 
authority of Rugova, and as a result left LDK. Returning to Kosovo sometime 
after the war, as a very rich person, he decided to “open up”21 his party known as 
PReK. Since the return of Bukoshi in 2007 to the old family – LDK, PReK seems 
not exist anymore, due to it being created by a single person and for a single 
purpose. It illustrates the fate and practice of such small parties, very much 
known in Kosovo until 2007 when the electoral threshold of 5% was put in place. 
 
 
                                                 
21 I intentionally use the term open up because the end of the 90’s beginning of 2000 it is known as a period where many 
people decided to establish a party with a small number of members, without any particular ideology, with a single selfish 
purpose to be a leader (of course leader of a few people) and be somewhere in power. It should not be forgotten that 
Kosovo has approximately just 1.5 million voters. 
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UD – Unioni Demokratik (Democratic Union) 
In its beginning, it was a local political entity, mostly based in the municipality of 
Gjakova. In 2003, they decided to widen the geographical scope of activity and 
participate at the parliamentary election. However, it remains almost irrelevant in 
terms of the influence it has at national level. Its main concern was to implement 
the idea of integrating into politics many educated people in Gjakova, currently 
out of the political process.  
 
ADK – Alternativa Demokratike e Kosoves (Democratic Alternative of 
Kosovo) 
ADK is another example of a party formed by a few political activists, following 
the initiative of a single person – the party leader. The absence of a possibility to 
formalise factions within a party had its role in the establishment of ADK in 2004. 
Edita Tahiri, unhappy with developments in LDK, decided to leave and form a 
new party under her leadership. Yet, it was not successful and remained as a 
small party, whereby in the 2007 parliamentary election joined the list of PDK 
managing to get a single seat in parliament. Ideologically, with most of parties in 
Kosovo being similar, the party, ideologically does not differ from LDK.  
 
ORA – Iniciativa Qytetare (Citizens Initiative ORA) 
Citizens’ Initiative ORA was formed in 2004, following the decision to take part in 
the 2004 parliamentary elections. Unlike most of the other parties, ORA came out 
of civil society, under the leadership of Veton Surroi. The civil society 
development in Kosovo is at a low level, inescapable from criticism of corruption, 
having a project-sponsored orientation, and often lacking a true belief in 
democratic values. It is perceived to be one of the reasons, why ORA though 
coming out of civil society, could not materialise itself as a real alternative in the 
Kosovo party system. ORA proclaimed itself to be an alternative to other parties, 
identifying itself as a reformist party, in a time of a heavily politically electrified 
party system between major parties PDK and LDK. Despite many expectations 
for an alternative, ORA failed to provide this. In 2004, they achieved in getting 
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seven seats in parliament, but in 2007 could not pass the required 5% electoral 
threshold.  
 
VAKAT – Koalicija VAKAT (Coalition VAKAT) 
VAKAT is a coalition of three parties from Bosnian and Goran communities in 
Kosovo. It was formed in 2004 out of three parties from both communities, mainly 
living in Prizren and Dragash. The parties forming VAKAT are: DSB – 
Democratic Party of Bosnians, DPV – Democratic Party Vatan, and BPK – 
Bosnian Party of Kosovo. It is part of the Kosovo Parliament.  
 
SDSKM – Srpska Demokratska Stranka Kosovo i Metohije (Serbian 
Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohije) 
SDSKM is another Serb minority ethnic party founded at the end of 2004, by Mr. 
Slavisa Petkovic. Its objectives are the protection of Serb minority rights and 
interests. SDSKM had joined Kosovo institutions until Kosovo declared 
independence, which was different from some other parties that had a more 
radical stand, opposing the integration of the Serb community into Kosovo 
institutions. Petkovic was also a Minister of Return and Communities, in the 
government that formed following the 2004 election.   
 
SLS – Samostalna Liberalna Stranka (Independent Liberal Party) 
SLS is an ethnic party, founded in 2006. Its main concern is the protection of 
interests of the Serb community living in Kosovo. In spite of that, SLS is also a 
liberal oriented party. SLS22 is not the only Serb minority party in Kosovo. The 
Serb minority in Kosovo has a plurality of many parties. In other words, no Serb 
party has a monopoly, but there is competition among them to protect Serb 
minority interests.  SLS differs from many other Serb community parties in terms 
of their position toward Kosovo independence, owing mostly to its liberal 
ideology. Moreover, an important impetus from the liberal party of Serbia on the 
                                                 
22 http://sls-ks.org/ 05.05.2009   
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issue of pro-independence is an additional support of the SLS’s stand on the 
Kosovo pro-independence issue. 
  
AKR – Aleanca Kosova e Re (New Kosova Alliance) 
AKR23 was founded in 2006 by a Kosovo Albanian businessman - multi-
millionaire, Behgjet Pacolli. Many considered him as a saviour, because of the 
current high level of poverty in Kosovo, they hoped that his success in business 
could also be translated into politics. Pacolli is very much known for his populist 
approach, In the party’s first election in 2007 they achieved in becoming the third 
party in the Kosovo party system by getting 13 parliamentary seats. Up to now, 
they have not proved themselves an alternative on the Kosovo political scene, as 
many perceived they would do.   
 
LDD – Lidhja Demokratike e Dardanise (Democratic League of Dardania) 
LDD24 was created in 2007 after the split of LDK. The death of LDK leader 
Ibrahim Rugova, who used to enjoy absolute power inside the party, meant the 
creation of a huge power vacuum. A leader of such absolute power means also 
weak power transferring institutions within the party. Nexhat Daci being the 
second person after Rugova, started to be challenged by others. Other parties, 
mainly PDK was very much interested to weaken its largest rival LDK, by splitting 
it. Furthermore, Daci also exchanged few words with the US Ambassador in 
Kosovo at that time, an action that very much lowered the Ambassador’s 
expectations of him. Other members of LDK’s chairmanship decided to change 
the position of Daci, even without first informing him. Daci perceived it as 
unacceptable, which brought the party to a new national congress, which ended 
up with people physically beating each other with chairs. Consequently, Daci with 
his followers, left the party and formed LDD.  
 
                                                 
23 www.akr-ks.com/ 03.05.2009 
24 www.ldd-kosova.org/26.06.2009 
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Both parties look up and refer to president Rugova, claiming to be his successor. 
However, the split was successful in weakening LDK with their vote share 
coming down to just 23% at the 2007 election, with LDD alone getting 10%. LDD 
as a party is highly personalistic, identified closely with its leader.  
 
PDKI – Partia Demokristiane per Integrim (Demochristian Party for 
Integration) 
It was formed in 2007 due to the split that took place in PSHDK. Zef Morina could 
not agree with the leadership by Mark Krasniqi of PSHDK, and decided to form a 
new Demochristian party, by separating part of the PSHDK under his newly 
formed party PDKI. The ideology of the party is the same as PSHDK, based on 
Christian values, with the only difference being the person who chairs it. In 2009, 
a memorandum between both parties to unite has been achieved, but they still 
seem to function separately.  
 
PEK – Partia Ekologjike e Kosoves (Ecologic Party of Kosovo) 
In April 2007, the second environmentalist party in the Kosovo party system was 
established called PEK25. It was founded by one of the former activists of PGJK. 
Like the other environmentalist party, PEK is up to now not very active or 
influential on the Kosovo political scene. In the 2007 election they did not achieve 
successful results.  
 
PDA – Partia Demokratike e Ashkalinjeve (Democratic Party of Ashkali) 
This is also a minority party established as a result of a split that took place in 
PDAK in 2007. Few of the PDAK party leaders, being accused of corruption, and 
under pressure from the majority of the PDAK chairmanship, decided to form a 
new Ashkali party under the leadership of Sabit Rrahmani and Danush Ademi. 
Since then, two parties in rivalry with each other, represent the Ashkali minority.   
 
 
                                                 
25 http://partiaekologjike.net/04.04.2009 
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DRK – Demokracia e Re e Kosoves (New Democracy of Kosovo) 
DRK is among the newest parties on the Kosovo political scene, established on 
the 18th May 2008 by Gojart Lubeniqi. Ideologically it is not much different from 
other parties standing for a market economy. Up to now, it is still a small party. In 
the 2009 local elections they ran candidates for just a single municipality 
compared to the 38 that exist. It remains to be seen how far DRK can penetrate 
into Kosovo society.    
 
LB – Levizja per Bashkim (The Movement for Unification) 
Some former activists of LKÇK and former political prisoners, such as Avni 
Klinaku established LB in May 2008. The party aims for the unification of all 
Albanian territories within a single state. As such, it is categorised as an extreme 
right wing party that could not deepen its roots in society. Most of its followers are 
former activists of parties, sharing similar values with LB26.  
 
LBI – Levizja per Bashkim dhe Integrim (Movement for Unification and 
Integration) 
On its 8th Congress, on 27.09.2008, taking into account the political changes in 
Kosovo, such as Kosovo’s independence, LKÇK decided to change its name and 
transform itself into LBI27. Smajl Latifi chairperson of the former LKÇK remains 
the LBI leader. The unification of Albanian territories within a single state remains 
a major concern of LBI. Ideologically it is almost the same as LB, but due to a 
leadership issue, they cannot join forces. Nevertheless, both remain small and 
marginalised parties.  
 
PSK – Partia Socialiste e Kosoves (Socialist Party of Kosovo)  
In 2009, the Kosovo party system gained a socialist party. Having awful 
experience with the former socialist regime, socialism by name and by attributes 
does not sound easy on the ears of the people of Kosovo. A number of parties 
                                                 
26 www.levizjaperbashkim.com / 13.11.2009 
27 www.lib-ks.org / 15.10.2009 
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with purely socialist leaders hesitate to identify themselves as socialist parties. 
The former LPK changed its name to PSK. It remains to be seen as to what sort 
of socialism they adhere to, a moderated one or the one they used to believe, 
Enverism in Albania.  
 
NCPK – Narodna Crnogorska Partija Kosova (People’s Montenegrins Party 
of Kosovo) 
NCPK is an ethnic minority party of Montenegrins living in Kosovo, established in 
August 2009. It is among the newest parties in Kosovo, aiming to promote the 
interest of the minority they represent. The minority in question is among the 
smallest one in Kosovo in terms of population.   
 
PPK – Partia e Pensionisteve te Kosoves (Party of Pensioners of Kosovo)28 
The drama of new parties’ emergence in Kosovo seems not to be ending. The 
newest party is one of the pensioners of Kosovo, recently founded on 
05.01.2010. Their main objective is to promote the interest of the social class it 
represents. Its prospects are doubtful due to the power the social class in 
question has and the 5% electoral threshold required for parliamentary 
representation. 
4.3. Conclusion 
According to many reports, Kosovo remains the poorest and most 
underdeveloped country in Europe. Yet, casting an eye on the Kosovo party 
system, its development and future prospects, it looks to be the richest one in 
Europe in terms of the number of parties, compared with size of the population. It 
seems that for each 40000 citizens and 30000 voters, there is a party, apparently 
illustrating a very high level of representation. Ironically, it sounds good, but the 
reality confirms the opposite. Despite such a great number of parties in Kosovo 
voter turnout at the last election was just 40% , with some municipalities reporting 
a turnout of less than 20%. 
                                                 
28 PPK has the same abbreviation with previously existing party (see above) in Kosovo (PPK – Partia Parlamentare e 
Kosoves – parliamentary party of Kosovo) but it merged into AAK in 2001, and since then does not exist anymore. 
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There are several driving forces behind the creation of most of the parties in 
Kosovo. The first one is the democratization process all over former Eastern 
Europe, opening the door to pluralism. Secondly, nationalism as an ideology, 
with many of its varieties, from the extreme to a more moderated version, drove 
the creation of parties forward. The last factor that triggered such a huge number 
of parties within a small country like Kosovo, is the personal interest or chiefdom 
issue. Many small parties despite being ideologically the same, were primarily 
created to promote the chiefdom of an individual. The tradition of Kosovo 
Albanians is highly based on the chiefdom, largely being transmitted into political 
parties, as well. Ethnicity was the main driving force for the establishment of 
ethnic parties on the other side. Pluralism within the same ethnicity was driven 
mainly by chiefdom, and in the case of the Serb minority, their stand towards 
Kosovo independence could also be added as a motivation for the creation of 
new parties.  
 
The Kosovo party system seems to be rich in terms of the numbers, emerging 
like mushrooms after rain, but they have proved to be very poor in terms of ideas 
and ideology. Most of Kosovo’s parties are ideologically almost the same, the 
only difference remaining being their physical chiefs.  
 
The party creation in Kosovo took place in three phases. Firstly, parties were 
created at the beginning of pluralism. Among them LDK became a massive party, 
supported by around 90% of Albanians in Kosovo. It took the lead on the 
nationalist movement up to the eve of war in 1998. Some other small parties at 
that time strived to follow a hard-line course on the national issue, but they could 
not achieve support as LDK did. The time before the war is also known for the 
emergence of other parties, especially parties not agreeing with the peaceful 
resistance policies of LDK. The period after the war is also marked with many 
changes within the Kosovo party system. Many parties appeared, among them 
some major parties. Nonetheless, new parties are consistently being created, 
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even after the introduction of the electoral threshold of 5% since 2007. Some of 
new parties, such as AKR, who achieved in getting third place at an election, 
leave behind many older parties.  
 
The issue to be worried about, is that despite the many parties that Kosovo has, 
and many others being created, no alternatives are obvious so far, and even less 
and less people go to vote, and normally with such a huge number of parties it 
would be expected to be the other way around. No party that offers ideas, vision, 
or a programme as to how to solve society’s problems appears to be on the 
ground. The large number of parties for Kosovo’s unconsolidated democracy 
means further instability, vulnerability, and an unpredictable party system.  
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Chapter 5 
5. All but None - the Representation Function of Parties 
in Kosovo 
“Kosovo parties principally do not differ from each other, have the same ideas, 
vision and promises; none of them made it clear how they are going to fulfil them” 
Daily Newspaper Zeri - Editorial, 1 November 2001  
5.1. Introduction  
Even in consolidated democracies, political parties are losing the reputation and 
trust they once used to enjoy from the people (Dalton 2006). Yet, modern 
democracy – representative democracy, except in some mini island states, is 
hardly imaginable without political parties. As it is Impossible to implement a 
system where a whole society  takes part directly in governing activity, this 
necessitates the existence of parties and their main raison d’être in modern 
democracies, facilitating the governing activity, as channels of representation 
reflecting society at the governing level. Political parties as intermediary 
institutions and party system in general, mirrors the composition of society and 
the social structure, embodying long term socio-political cleavages, producing a 
party system which epitomizes the society as a whole. In other words, political 
parties represent the long-term social and political cleavages within society, 
constituting one of the major functions of parties.  
 
The representation function of parties is conceptualised in a variety of ways by 
different students of political parties. The lack of consensus in defining  
representation is also due to inevitability of contextualisation in terms of time and 
location. Gunther and Diamond (2000) conceptualise representation as a 
function of parties to represent various social groups, either symbolically or by 
advancing their specific interests. On the other side, Helms (1995, 647) offers a 
very useful and more empirically measurable conceptualisation of the 
representation function, defining it as the “durable reflection of relevant social 
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conflicts (of an ethnic, religious, or an economic form) in a party system and their 
projection in the political system”29.  
 
This definition is very applicable for our case study. It offers sufficient and precise 
scope to measure the representation function of parties, through examining the 
extent to which the socio-political divisions are reflected in political parties, the 
party system, and the political system in general.  Relying on the definition in 
question initially requires the identification of the main cleavages in the society, 
followed by the assessment of the degree of their reflected presence in the party 
system, reaching the governing activity through political parties. 
 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that representation as a function is 
performed by other institutions as well, such as interest groups, social 
movements, etc.. Normally the representation function of these additional 
institutions is of a supplementary and complementary nature. On the other hand, 
the level and quality of representation through complementary institutions is 
dependent on their level of their development and functionality. For instance in 
the case of Kosovo, these institutions are highly underdeveloped and operate in 
an extremely politicised (by political parties) environment, resulting in most of 
them being influenced and often even dictated to  by the political environment. 
Most of interest groups in Kosovo are extremely dependent on politics. The 
clientelist structure being developed currently narrows the breathing space of 
these organisations, meant to represent primarily the interest of their followers. 
For instance, the actual position and strength the workers organisations and 
syndicates illustrates best the ability of complementary institutions to perform the 
representation function. For the time being, and the near future, their poor 
representation function is not likely to be improved.  Moreover, compared to 
political parties in general, the representation function of these institutions is 
                                                 
29 It is my own translation from German language: “die dauerhafte Widerspiegelung relevanter gesellschaftlicher Konflikte 
(etwa ethnischer, konfessioneller oder ökonmischer Art) im Parteiensystem und ihre Projektion in das politische System 
verstand wärden”.  
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more specific and narrower in substance, time, and breadth.  Up to this point, 
political parties, as the most important representative institutions in modern 
democracy, mainly represent the well-entrenched and durable divisions within 
society.  
 
The identity of the party is the epitome of the segment of society represented by 
the party in question. The elements, characteristics, and attributes, comprising 
the substance of such long-term divisions, generate parties whose identities 
manifest such social groupings. Exploration of the identities of parties that 
constitute the party system, reveals best the relationship between the two sides, 
the social groups within society and their projection onto the party system. In 
turn, it makes obvious the extent of representation in the party system of the 
social conflicts within society. Party identity is dependent on such divisions, and 
influences the projection of such cleavages firstly onto the party system and then 
the political system as a whole. Social pluralism at society level is meant to be 
organised politically through political parties, hence establishing political 
pluralism as well.  
 
The performance of the representation function by parties has a direct impact on 
the democracy consolidation process. If parties function through bunged up 
channels of representation, not reflecting the social composition of the governing 
level, they might bring into question the very meaning of representative 
democracy. How far can we talk of a representative democracy if there is no one 
to represent society? Nonetheless, it is meaningless for parties to exist if they do 
not represent society in the political process. In political systems that have a well-
established institutional structure for possible alternative representation, there is 
the possibility to some extent to supplement the role of parties on this function. 
For non-consolidated democracies, currently experiencing the process of 
consolidation, if parties do not reflect the social composition and do not represent 
society at the governing level, then democracy consolidation is less likely to take 
place, particularly positive consolidation. The governing activity is less likely to be 
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guided by the citizens’ interest, since they do not take part in decision making, 
and there is no one to take their interests into account. Likewise, the political 
process features non-democratic behaviour, not based on collective interests, as 
supposed to be maintained and developed by those representing social 
compositions – political parties. The lack of representation impedes democracy 
to give effect, and democracy consolidation to take root. Unless, democracy is 
developed to the extent that it can give effect in terms of citizens’ benefit, it is 
hard to talk of democracy consolidation. The failure of parties to perform their 
function of representation has a negative impact on the other three levels of the 
consolidation structure. Governing is not based on collective interests, as long as 
the channels to transmit these interests are closed. Consequently, it erodes 
constitutional consolidation leading to an incompatibility between written rules 
based on collective interests, whereas the actual rules fail to reflect this due to 
the lack of representation through political parties. In Kosovo, the international 
community often imposed most of the laws and institutions leading to a kind of 
constitutional consolidation. They do not necessary mirror the behaviour and 
attitudes of the political elite. Political parties at different levels of governing, lead 
the process, or are at least involved, in the implementation of these rules. The 
direct relationship of political parties with institutions at the level of constitutional 
consolidation amplifies the importance of parties in consolidation process. Parties 
are prone to exercise positive influence on institutions, if driven by collective 
interest enabled through open channels of representation. 
 
On the other hand, at society level, no or poor representation means deficiency 
in their representation of interests, having no opportunity to taste the fruits of 
democracy. In this way, the failure of the pillars of democracy to fulfil their 
actions, introduce to society a false image of democracy. As far as the third level 
of the consolidation structure is concerned, poor performance gives opportunity 
to veto players, in the case of Kosovo – organised crime and authoritarian 
leaders, to increase their power into an inconstestable one . If parties do not 
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perform the representation function, society has no mechanism to hold 
authoritarian party leaders accountable. 
 Hence, the representation function of parties has a direct impact on democracy 
consolidation prospects. Right and proper representation helps consolidation, 
and opens the way for democracy to take root and be habituated among society.  
 
The research process of the performance of the representation function of parties 
in Kosovo involves several steps. Initially the social cleavages will be identified, 
principally the long-term cleavages within society in Kosovo. Knowing the actual 
long-term socio-political cleavages makes it possible to find out whether parties 
are created based on such cleavages and whether they reflect such divisions. To 
measure such correlation, the ideological positions of parties should be 
surveyed. Do they happen to be along such socio-political divisions? The 
relationship is observed based on the freezing theory, assessing the relevance of 
the theory in the case of the Kosovo party system. However, since there  has 
been no research conducted on Kosovo social structures after the war, we are 
forced to measure the intensity of social divisions reflected at party system level. 
Parties’ documents and declarations mirror best, what parties actually represent, 
even if it is not clear to parties themselves. Moreover, the link between parties 
and the cleavage structure is best manifested on the ideological positions of 
parties along the left right scale. The values and expectation of social divisions 
within society are present directly in party documents: party programmes, 
electoral platforms, and interviewees from party representatives. Actually, in a 
normative sense these documents should be the embodiment of values and 
interests of the relevant groups represented by parties. Therefore, the research 
of the representation function of parties should primarily rely on the data 
collected from the documents in question. Moreover, the interviews conducted 
with party representatives and political analysts, as well as media and election 
campaign data, broadens the amount and quality of information, particularly 
explaining the dynamic stance of parties on the variety of issues that parties 
identify wih. In addition, the data collected from interviews, and media and other 
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reports, are compared and contrasted with the static data found in party 
documents. It prevents any possible misperception appearing from party 
documents’ data, often not presenting the real faces of parties. If the relationship 
between political parties and long term socio-political cleavages exists and is 
firm, then it can be theorised that Kosovo political parties do represent society, 
and do well in the representation function. 
5.2. ”Freezing Hypothesis” 
Based on the definition of the party representation function given by Helms 
(1995), the party system (Sartori 1976) should reflect plurality involving the long-
term divisions within society. The relationship between society and the party 
system is best illustrated by the theory of Lipset & Rokkan (1967). The widely 
known freezing theory is built on the experience of western European society in 
the late 19th and up to the middle of the second half of the 20th century. The 
theory identifies four long lasting socio-political cleavages: capital-labour, centre-
periphery, religious-secular, and urban-rural. These long-term social cleavages 
helped construct parties and party systems in general. For instance, among 
others the social cleavage between capital and labour resulted in the creation of 
socialist, social democratic and labour parties developing and upholding the 
interests of the working class on one side, and conservative parties on the 
opposite side. Nevertheless, besides the cleavages identified by the founders of 
the freezing theory, the theory does not exclude other possible social divisions. 
They might be more or less short term in nature, and have no capacity for 
transformation into long-term political organisation. Yet, they might crop up and 
then disappear soon after, or be swallowed by any party ideologically closed to 
the issues, by simply extending the number of issues the party stands for. The 
existing parties often expand the range of issues they represent, and cover short-
term cleavages, considering them as sub-cleavages. If this is the case, for each 
short term social cleavage to be organised by a particular political party, would 
result in countless parties, and a very fluid and unstable party system, 
consequently leading to an unstable political system.  
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According to the theory in question political parties are created bottom-up, 
emerging out of long-term social divisions, transforming cleavages from a social 
into a socio-political one. One such relationship between society and the party 
system is its set up; it is frozen and consequently produces a very stable party 
system and political system in general. Based on that, political parties within a 
party system reveal the politically organised major long-term social cleavages. 
Through the representation function, parties represent and transmit the interests 
of each long-term cleavage within society. The structuring of issues is organised 
around cleavages, having decisive effect on the party system. Such party 
systems are valued as being very stable and healthy for democracy. Party 
programmes, platforms, declarations, and activities in general, derive from the 
values and expectations of the social groups represented by the party in 
question. 
 
The theory as such is grounded based on the experiences of Western European 
party systems. It was applicable and unchallenged up to the 1970s, when 
political developments coupled with the emergence of post-materialist values 
(Inglehart 1977), brought to the surface other symbols around whom relevant 
political parties organised, identifying other significant cleavages in addition  to 
those recognized by Lipset & Rokkan. In addition, up to then the party ideological 
profile was mainly one dimensional, based on economic values due to the 
prevalence of the materialist approach after the Second World War up to the 
1970s, whereby also politics was mainly defined as who gets what when and 
how. Starting in the 1970’s, as a result of the development of post-materialist 
values, alongside economic dimension, the cultural dimension of party 
ideological profile also started to a find place , which later established into long-
term cleavages around whom influential parties were organised (Moreno 1999). 
Thus, the frozen theory happened to be contested on time and space terms, 
opening the way to conceptualise it as a melting hypothesis, even in socio-
political contexts from where it appeared as a theory. Later on, the theory lost 
further ground and is now hardly applicable in not western European contexts, 
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such as in Latin America, Africa, Asia, as well as some parts of post-communist 
Europe. 
 
Furthermore, the theory was challenged as a result of the evolution and 
appearance of other types of parties in Western Europe, like the catch all parties 
as described by Kirschheimer (1972). Organisational transformation of parties, 
due to party cartelisation getting closer to the state than to their members, as 
previously was the case, started to sap parties of their members, shaking the 
main root of frozen party systems. The working class, which used to be the 
foremost basis of leftist parties, because of a socio-economic transformation was 
gradually being diminished in number, and was no longer sufficient for large 
parties to rely exclusively on them. Consequently, parties were forced to make 
more and painless ideological compromises, mitigating the cleavage structure 
and getting closer to the centre of an ideological profile dimension, in order to 
survive at the election ‘market’. This development led to the appearance and 
development of catch all parties, challenging the freezing theory as such.  
 
The catch all type of parties, very common in consolidated western democracies, 
if applied to a Kosovo context, it is perceived that the fierce struggle to put the 
state resources under control makes Kosovo parties set out even further - do 
everything what so ever possible, which in turn prevents them from having a 
chance to create a certain ideological profile. Yet, though catch all parties in 
consolidated democracies make ideological compromises, they still stick to their 
own easily distinguishable ideological profile and identity.  
5.3. “Freezing Theory” in Kosovo socio-political context 
Kosovo belongs to a European post-communist context, experiencing a block30 
system transformation. The transition was not an utterly inner driven, but was 
encompassed by the entire regional regime transformation. The snowball effect 
or the so-called domino effect of regime transformation clouded Kosovo as well. 
                                                 
30 Its consequences will be more in details discussed at the chapter on the legitimation function of parties. 
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In this regard, the type of causes of transition have an impact on consolidation in 
terms of time requirements and substance dimensions. Society as such was not 
entirely prepared for the transformation from socialist to free market democracy 
within such a short period of time, using a shock therapy model of transition. The 
classless society objective, aimed for by socialism in former Yugoslavia, in 
economic terms, was to a considerable level achieved.31 With the exception of 
the political level where Kosovo faced discrimination, economically the country 
was doing fairly well compared, for instance, to the present time. System 
transformation also required the transformation of socio-economic and social 
structures, so far not yet perceived to have been crystallised and established. 
Actually, the socio economic transformation is underway, not accomplishing the 
level of a clearly defined social structure, and with the exception of ethnicity as a 
sharp and deep entrenched social cleavage. 
 
Therefore, the prominent freezing hypotheses given by Lipset & Rokkan, is 
hardly applicable in the case of Kosovo, except on the issue of ethnicity as a 
social cleavage, but in our case study we are dealing with the major single 
ethnicity - Albanian parties of Kosovo, comprising the majority of 90% of the 
population. Political parties of other ethnicities are of little significance (excluding 
parties of Serb minority due to the extension of constitutional privileged rights for 
them). The research is not focused on the issue of ethnicity, so far being the only 
clearly drawn long-term cleavage. 
 
Based on studies dealing with ex-communist countries, in particular general 
theories offered by Kitschelt (2000) and Inglehart (1990), it is hard to find 
cleavage based parties in post-communist countries of Eastern Europe. The 
same is valid in the case of Kosovo, implying that freezing theory is hardly found 
in the case of Kosovo. Regarding the level of value developments in Kosovo, at a 
                                                 
31 However, some authors emphasize that Kosovo politically was left aside in terms of political and economic 
development, compared to other parts of former Yugoslavia (Magas 1993). 
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materialist or post-materialist phase, Helen Taylor (1998)32, though concluding 
about some African countries, was right, and such conclusions to a large extend 
are applicable in the case of Kosovo as well. While talking about value system 
developments from materialist to post-materialist values, she conceptualised the 
level of value development in some African countries she was referring to, as 
being at the stage of a pre-materialist value system, heavily traditional and 
featured with tribal, clan, and clientele institutions, dominating over the modern 
institutional structure. Kosovo is also still a heavily traditional society, with a 
considerable degree of legitimacy relying on traditional rather that modern state 
institutions. 
 
Observing the class structure in Kosovo, most of the wealth belongs to a small 
percentage of people, approximately no more than 7%. 48% of the population 
are below the poverty line and 17% below the extreme poverty line (UNDP 
mission in Kosovo 2007, World Bank 2007). Such statistics are not promising in 
terms of the establishment of a middle class, which a stable democracy would 
require. On the other hand, a large percentage of the working class is employed 
in the private sector, most of them having no rights to establish even trade union 
or syndicates. The rest are employed by the government or public sector, both of 
them extremely politicised, icing over any opportunity for workers to organise to 
protect their own rights and interests. Up to now there is even no labour law 
legislated. Most of them constitute the clienteles structure, heavily developed in 
Kosovo and comprising the bases of most of parties in Kosovo, are forced to be 
accountable to their patrons – parties, rather than labour organisations, or at 
most mobilise themselves into labour interests centred around a political party. 
Moreover, it constitutes one of the main reasons why currently labour 
organisations are paralysed and existing just for the cosmetic use of the system 
                                                 
32 Taken from the citation done by Emminghaus (2003). 
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make up. The sterility of such workers organisations is proved by many of their 
attempts to organise protests failing33, either at the start or on the way.34  
 
Such an unstable and highly politicised society is not a safe bed for the 
development of a sound middle class, capable to organise themselves politically. 
The values that the middle class uphold are currently not the centre around 
which the real power in the Kosovo political system is structured. Some of them 
are victims to apathy, considering themselves powerless to make any changes; 
some are forced to be part of a clientele – due to reasons of economic survival, 
and so on. The high level of politicisation driven by actual parties, at almost every 
sphere of activity, starting from universities under direct control of political parties 
of a personalistic type, up to most other institutions, narrows the available space 
for political activity, reflected in turn to other possible areas where the middle 
class belongs.  
 
Nevertheless, though none of the social cleavages identified by Lipset & Rokkan, 
is of primary importance after the recent war in Kosovo, there are other 
cleavages around whom parties and to some extent, by inertia, the electorate 
were also identified. The main cleavage divided those who supported the armed 
war and those sticking to a more peaceful approach to gain independence from 
Serbia. This cleavage seems to be short-term in nature, hence one of the main 
reasons why parties in Kosovo, relying merely on such a short-term cleavage, 
are declining nowadays. Their reliance on the short-term cleavage, the inability to 
transform their loyalty to other long-term cleavages, and the absence of other 
long-term cleavage based parties, are among several reasons for party decline in 
Kosovo.  
 
                                                 
33 See for example the strike of medical workers for better working conditions and payments, September and December 
2008. 
34 Though this is not the issue of our concern here, it is related and puts light on the position of workers in Kosovo and 
their ability to organize themselves as a social class.  
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Two major parties LDK and PDK are organised based on the ideology of 
nationalism. The only difference between them primarily was the level of 
nationalism, LDK having a more moderate approach on the independence 
struggle and the PDK maintaining a more hard-line attitude, since it emerged out 
of former KLA warriors. In addition, within hardliners themselves appeared 
another cleavage, the regional one. In the region called Dukagjini  AAK was 
organised, another party made up of former KLA warriors predominantly from this 
region. Such division started before and during the war, reaching its peak by the 
end of the war. The KLA lacked the single organisation structure in terms of 
chain of command, an organisation structure highly shadowed by the regional 
provincial bases of Kosovo – traditionally maintaining sub-cultural differences. 
This type of political division was used as a mechanism to split up society and 
create cleavages, though it could not be transformed into a symbol around whom 
parties could construct their visions to respond to social needs and develop 
Kosovo after the war. The cleavages of such type, were short-term in nature 
compared to cleavages given by Lipset & Rokkan, and started to decline shortly 
after the war, making no sense at all after independence. The cleavages are 
more or less employed as a working tool to advance the position of parties 
towards the government, although in turn it fuelled hatred among society in 
Kosovo.  
  
These parties are leader-dominated parties, or as Gunther and Diamond (2000) 
call such parties - a personalistic one. They used such political cleavage to 
appeal to voters aiming to extend the range of supporters beyond provincial and 
personal bases that would otherwise be insufficient to dominate the political 
scene. In other words, as Mainwaring (1999) observes for other contexts, but 
quite similar to the case of Kosovo, the political elite established parties to fulfil 
their own ends. Provincial adherence was present also during the war with its 
roots traditionally highly transmitted into political parties as well. Such party 
reliance challenges directly the modernisation process of the Kosovo political 
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system, in need of legitimation as a new state democracy consolidation, as it is in 
Kosovo. 
 
Moving on from society level, looking at social cleavages in Kosovo, to parties 
themselves examining what type of socio-political cleavages they represent, it 
should be commenced by exploring the party level, looking to what extend 
parties reflect various social divisions and cleavages. What values do parties 
represent and stand for, which social cleavages if any identified, manifest inside 
party programmes, electoral platforms, interviews with party representatives and 
others? It helps to understand what parties in Kosovo represent, based on what 
formulates their programmes, electoral platforms, electoral promises, 
declarations, and political positions on particular issues. In addition, the 
ideological profiles of parties reflect best the representation of parties, particularly 
the left-right schema used for Western European party systems. Due to the lack 
of research on social cleavages in Kosovo, the research on the representation 
function of parties in Kosovo takes place only at the party level. The 
representation is illustrated by their programmes, interests and values for various 
parts of society and is reflected by their party programmes and platforms. Whom 
do their programmes represent and is there a difference among them? If there is 
no difference among programmes, then is it because Kosovo society so monist 
with such homogenous interests? If such homogeneity is found, why so many 
similar parties represent the same interests?  
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 Party – Ideological Profile National Issue Decentralisation Multiculturalism 
P 
D 
K 
…PDK is a successor of KLA political 
structures and of the system of national 
political values for freedom, democracy, 
and independence of Kosovo… In this 
phase it is necessary to show our full 
and dignified ability to govern, to build 
democratic state based on law, to build 
democratic institutions, to reconstruct 
political, economic and social life, to 
reconstruct the country and to achieve 
and maintain stability and security in 
Kosovo and region… PDK will support 
all positive efforts of international 
community for creation of conditions to 
settle the final political status of 
Kosovo… PDK shares with people its 
sadness. We should do more. We 
should move forward the process and 
move it faster… 
…To PDK the Kosovo 
independence remain the 
necessary condition for peace 
and stability in the region. 
Kosovo independence is a real 
solution and endangers none. 
PDK takes it as its aim to fulfil 
the civil society aspiration in 
Kosovo to achieve the Kosovo 
independence through 
democratic processes. 
 PDK strives for equality to the law for 
all citizens regardless their 
nationality, religion, and race. PDK 
will protect and guarantee rights and 
freedoms of national minorities that 
live in Kosovo, according to the 
standards of international 
conventions.  
L 
D 
K 
LDK preserves the vision of its founder, 
Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, for Kosovo a 
sovereign, independent, and 
democratic state. LDK is a here grown 
party in Kosovo, a living spring that with 
democracy defeats force.  
… since its establishment its 
main point in the political 
programme is creation of 
independent state of Kosovo. 
… it is a fundamental 
precondition for the existence 
of the people in Kosovo and an 
instrument for the fulfilment of 
its interests.  
 An independent Kosovo fulfils the 
joint interests of Albanians and 
citizens of Kosovo regardless of their 
ethnicity, religion, or social 
background.  
A 
K 
R 
... a group of citizens with liberal-
democratic beliefs are united to form 
New Kosova Alliance. 
... the major motive of us is the 
independent and sovereign 
state of Kosovo, prospered, 
economically developed, and 
integrated into Euro-Atlantic 
structures. 
… bureaucratic barriers 
and state controls can be 
minimised through …, 
decentralisation, …, 
…financial 
decentralisation, 
responsibilities and 
competences of 
communes in local 
taxation. 
Every human being is unique and 
different, deserves equal treatment. 
Multiplicity of diversity of people living 
in Kosovo is a spiritual ,cultural, and 
historic wealth of Kosovo.  
L 
D 
D 
… is a centre-right party, bases its 
activity on political philosophy of 
President Rugova. … includes all strata 
of society…  
... strives for Kosovo an 
independent and sovereign 
state. 
 ... respects ethnic, cultural, religious 
diversity, and strives for full rights of 
minorities in Kosovo according to 
European and international 
standards. 
A … is a centre-rightist party and the 
starting point of its overall activity is the 
Our members and leaders … 
made sacrifices by serving the 
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A 
K 
citizen of Kosovo.  fatherland. Let it be each one a 
lord in its home, its state, also 
the people of Kosovo should be 
the lords of their home. 
 
 Economy Labour policy Welfare policy Fiscal Policy 
P 
D 
K 
PDK strives for private economy in 
Kosovo, based on laws of free market 
economy, open and free, integrated in 
regional and euro-Atlantic institutions… 
will strive for the privatization of public 
property to be done as soon as 
possible… PDK strives for a strong and 
competitive market… PDK will 
stimulate, favours and enables the 
creation of entrepreneurships by 
making lenience and softening 
administrative measures… We will 
decrease the corporate tax… we should 
create a minimal wage for our 
people…PDK has a plan to ensure 
loans with low interest rates for 
businesses… 
…better paid jobs…low interest 
rates loans for businesses that 
guarantee to offer new working 
places…to set the minimum 
wage…  
PDK has first its 
objective to take care of 
poor and middle classes 
of society which mostly 
bear the consequences 
of war … especially 
families of martyrs, 
political prisoners and 
victims of Serb 
aggression… to 
institutionalise new 
welfare spirit compatible 
with creation of equal 
opportunities… 
retirement benefits or all 
retired citizens … 100% 
increase of pensions… a 
programme for medicine 
given to old people… 
… corporate tax reduction … tax 
reduction for contemporary 
technology that does not pollute the 
environment … tax increase for 
companies polluting the environment. 
L 
D 
K 
... we strive for a knowledge based 
society, with a sustainable and 
competitive economy in international 
market. … opening Kosovo to world 
market. … for an economy based on 
private property and entrepreneurship.  
 
… reviewing fiscal policies to 
improve the possibilities for 
employment… employment and 
attracting the foreign capital … 
micro loans for business lees 
developed at the region… 
employment  
... social welfare as 
prerequisite for success 
at other fields.  
… selective decrease of tax norms 
and widening the tax bases.   
A 
K 
R 
... Kosovo economically prospered. … 
free market economy and plurality of 
property. … regulation and monitoring 
economy, and not state intervention, 
except in cases on national interest. 
... also the possibilities of 
regular periodic employment 
overseas. … economy to 
experience growth and 
decrease the number of 
unemployed.  
... social welfare will be 
practiced. Welfare … are 
mission of AKR. … strive 
for useful strategy on 
social policy … with 
focus on marginalised 
parts of society. 
… fiscal policies … to encourage 
investments. Organisation of fiscal 
policy based on middle range interest 
of economy.  
L 
D 
D 
… strives for development of free 
market and free initiative economy, 
using rationally the nation’s wealth 
without endangering renewable 
potential.   
 
 … the elder generations 
to have institutionally 
guaranteed care, to 
empower solidarity, 
humanism, and respect 
among generations.   
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A 
A 
K 
… economic development based on 
free market and private sector. 
Increasing economic activity – 
enhancing the business environment 
and the increasing public investment.  
… strives for further creation of 
conditions for new job places, 
always preserving the flexibility 
of employment market. … 
legislating law of employment, 
…seasonal overseas 
employment, … temporary 
supporting businesses with 
large number of employees, … 
increasing incomes through 
grey economy.  
… formulation of a clear 
strategy … to decrease 
and prevent the poverty 
will be a priority.   
… to apply measured fiscal policy 
based on scientific analysis. … 
oriented on budget revenue and 
budget expenditure.  
 
 Security policy Agriculture  Education Gender Policy 
P 
D 
K 
… we should feel secure at our home. 
… PDK is engaged in securing strong 
leadership ability need for Kosovo to be 
a secured placed to live, work and rise 
up family. … restructuring and 
modernisation of Kosovo defence 
forces, … its integration in euro-Atlantic 
structures… professionalism and 
enhanced defence ability … generically 
oppose any tendency for its 
politicization … its status, place, role 
and material position to be regulated 
systematically and by law.   
PDK will have as its priority 
immediate reconstruction and 
distribution of economic help to 
regions mostly damaged by war 
on the fields such as: …, 
agriculture production, … 
…modernisation of the 
education system in 
Kosovo, its levelling to the 
standards of the western 
democratic states.…special 
attention will be paid to 
spread of primary and 
secondary education as 
obligatory to all citizens of 
Kosovo. …consistent 
improvement of general 
conditions at all levels of 
education – computer 
centre at each school, 
adequate stimulation - a 
salary from which they can 
live and be motivated. 
depoliticisation of education 
system, … for private 
education. We will establish 
a university for high tech of 
21 century. In order to face 
the challenges of new 
century we should educate 
our people.  
… for emancipation in general and 
women emancipation especially. 
PDK highly values the role and 
importance of Albanian  women 
during the war for freedom. … 
equal payment for man and 
woman, and against any 
discrimination. We will take all 
measures including legislative one 
to fight against women trafficking 
and prostitution as deformations of 
modern society.  
L 
D 
K 
Security is required for all other areas of 
development. … creation of overall 
security strategy…, reviewing the 
overall functioning of policy…, founding 
the Kosovo Force, … 
... rational use of land…, 
development of market for 
agricultural products,… 
investing on the infrastructure 
of rural areas, … easier 
mechanisms for loans on 
agribusiness, … 
Education as a priority for 
development, … attracting 
investments, … diversity on 
education …,  a knowledge 
society… 
... supports the equal competition 
of women on representation and 
governing… 
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A 
K 
R 
... Kosovo safe and secured place, … 
security at the state level is possible if 
there exists individual and collective 
security. … legal infrastructure for 
security. 
 ... the more important sector of 
Kosovo economy. … 
subvention of farmers. … better 
loan conditions for farmers. … 
application of economics of 
scale.  
… modern reform at all 
levels of education. … 
obligatory pre-primary 
schooling. … better wages 
for teachers. … 
establishment of new public 
universities. … helping 
students overseas to study. 
Cooperation with overseas 
universities.  
... society based on principles of 
gender equality.  
L 
D 
D 
  … modern education. … 
strives to improve the 
quality of education, … 
public and private 
education, … research and 
scientific development… 
... and women as a special 
category to have institutionally 
guaranteed support for 
participation…  
A 
A 
K 
Security is a fundamental need, … , of 
all citizens of Kosovo. Independent 
Kosovo needs adequate security 
institutions to ensure the rule of law. 
… subsidising the agriculture 
and rural development, …, 
decreasing the import of 
agricultural products, …, 
subsidising farms and food 
industry, …, support bio 
agricultural products.  
… without a modern and 
national education system 
there is economic 
sustainability, consolidation 
of democracy, and regional 
and economic integration.  
… supports the gender integration 
… at all levels of policy-making. 
  
 Environment Energy Policy Culture and Sport Rule of Law and Fighting 
Corruption 
P 
D 
K 
… for quality ecologic environment, … 
we will strive to protect the living 
environment from ecological pollution, 
irresponsible damages, especially the 
forestry. … space and urban planning. 
Tax reduction for modern technology 
that does not pollute the environment 
and tax increasing for those polluting 
the environment.    
 ... protection, cultivation, 
enriching and spreading of 
our national culture. … for 
wide national and 
international cultural 
cooperation at all fields … 
… establishment of state based on 
law, developing of all democratic 
institutions, new law system at all 
levels, … thus, legislative executive 
and judiciary power. 
… we promise an open and 
transparent government. … PDK will 
bring to an end the unending lost, 
cheating, and abuse of people’s 
money and will be a trustful servant 
to the trust of people. 
L 
D 
K 
... to safe, protect, and humanise the 
living environment.  
… securing capacity for 
generation of electricity, … 
strengthening the corporative 
governance of KEK…  
... preserving and 
promoting the cultural 
values, … a party of 
modern and traditional 
values…, promoting and 
presenting the Kosovo 
sports… on the world. 
... zero tolerance against corruption. 
… strengthening the rule of law and 
good governance. 
A ...”green tax” where applicable. … Objective … supplying ... will strive to preserve the … guarantee that everyone is equal 
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K 
R 
environment policy conform 
international standards.  
Kosovo with electricity 
consistently. … Kosovo to 
join the European Charter of 
Energy. … building the 
thermo central with green 
gas… , building the hydro 
central with capacity of 300 
MW. 
cultural diversity in Kosovo. 
… preserve the cultural 
monuments.  
… will strive to develop the 
sport activities.  
to the law. … strive for creation of 
independent and efficient judiciary.  
… There is a need to be established 
a non-corrupted administration.  
L 
D 
D 
… a healthy life and environment … 
according to European standards… 
 … special support for all 
fields of arts and culture, 
… promotion and 
education of young 
actress, … promotion their 
creations internationally.  
... for the rule of law. 
A 
A 
K 
… sustainable development based on: 
…, environmental implications.   
… independence on the 
energy sector is equal to 
independence and 
sovereignty of the state. … 
making use of potential 
energy resources of Kosovo, 
… . … at the regional level … 
ensuring the consume of 
energy for the future. … 
basing on lignite, …, hydro 
systems,   
… strive to create a 
society, that highly values 
culture, artistic creations 
and sports.  
… fully devoted to fight corruption 
and the organised crime by 
developing and building the legal 
mechanism for the rule of law. Law 
implementation – war against 
corruption and organised crime. …, 
zero tolerance principle.   
 
 Human Rights Protection Youth Healthcare Policy Integration Policy 
P 
D 
K 
… rights and freedoms according to 
international standards, UN Universal 
Declaration for the rights and liberties 
and OSCE documents, … coordinating 
individual rights with rights of society 
and spiritual, national and democratic 
values.  
Youth was the main pillar of our 
war of liberation, it will be a 
cohesive force of society in an 
independent and democratic 
Kosovo. … it is necessary to  
support overall the youth in 
education, employment and its 
inclusiveness in political and 
social life. … their 
specialisation, employment and 
professional preparation 
overseas. … stimulation for 
sport and free time activities.    
... health improvement of all 
citizens of Kosovo. … 
healthcare policy will be 
based on healthcare 
planning as a main duty 
toward overall 
reconstruction of healthcare 
system through global 
elaboration and political 
coordination without 
forgetting the priority in 
allocating funds for these 
policies. … PDK will offer to 
doctors the necessary 
means to save lives. … 
fight infant mortality by 
highlighting the importance 
of education  and parental 
… to be part of the EU. … through 
participating in the regional  and 
European integration process to 
achieve the incontestable wide 
national rights.  Being part of 
European continent we strive to 
attain political and economic 
integration. … a Europe that 
respects characteristics of each 
nation. … Integration through  
efforts for democratisation.    
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and mother’s care. … a 
system where everyone 
has a secured health. … 
old people will have special 
treatment with cheaper 
rates…   
L 
D 
K 
... will sign conventions and 
declarations on … human rights 
protection … 
Nothing for youth without the 
youth! 
... to build a unique 
healthcare system, able 
and functional to offer high 
quality services to all 
citizens.  
… EU integration and fulfilment of 
its requirements… 
A 
K 
R 
... we will standardise and guarantee 
human rights protection based on most 
advanced international conventions.  
... facilitates to the youth the 
self actualisation. … youth will 
find the path to prosperity and 
development.  
... radical reforms. … 
establishment of public and 
private healthcare system.   
… strive to fulfil the requirements 
for EU integration.  One of main 
pillars of Kosovo foreign policy is 
integration in NATO. … integration 
in other international 
organisations.  
L 
D 
D 
... full minority rights.  ... youth as a special category 
to have institutionally 
guaranteed support for 
participation… 
… for a decentralized, high 
quality and functional 
healthcare system … 
… integrated in EU, NATO and 
permanent friendship with the 
USA.  
A 
A 
K 
In our country the right to live, equality 
to the law, right of property, right of 
religion, right of using the language, 
right of national identity, right of 
education, right of freedom of speech 
and political activity, the right of free 
association, and other rights coming out 
of the human nature are indispensable 
rights of Kosovo citizens.  
... Youth is not just the future 
but also the present of Kosovo.  
… increasing the public 
funds for healthcare 
system. Decentralisation of 
healthcare system…. . 
Empowering the 
managerial capacity of 
healthcare institutions… . 
… we will work intensively to 
prepare Kosovo, so that by 2014 
to be ready for EU integration, … 
Kosovo will realise the integration 
in NATO and other international 
organisations.  
 
 Development Fighting Poverty Investment Regional Cooperation 
P 
D 
K 
… to make Kosovo a Silicon Valley of  
Western Europe 
... minimal wage policy will offer 
a living standard that can take 
our people out of poverty and 
bring them to a status of a 
country that deserves to be part 
of EU.   
… to make it easy for 
foreign investors to invest in 
Kosovo. … corporate tax 
reduction will send a 
message that Kosovo is 
open to businesses.  
… Kosovo to be in peace and 
democracy with all states of the 
region. …for bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation in all fields 
…, … to build policies of closeness 
and uniqueness with Albanian 
state, nation and international as 
well. … without respecting the 
rights and will of all nations we 
can’t even talk about 
democratisation of Balkans.    
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L 
D 
K 
... economic, political, social and 
cultural development of Kosovo.  
... economic growth reduces 
poverty. 
… stimulating investments, 
…attracting foreign 
investments… 
… integration into regional 
institutions and organisations… 
A 
K 
R 
… economic development and welfare. 
… overall development. … intensive 
and consistent economic development.  
… one of the reasons to found 
AKR is to fight poverty.  
... foreign direct investment, 
public investment on 
infrastructure. Investment 
on energy, … on 
education… .  
... cooperation with neighbour 
countries. … regional roads… .  
L 
D 
D 
... development of free market 
economy. 
  … creating neighbourhood 
relations with all neighbour 
countries in terms of joint 
partnership. … relation with 
Albania at the nation and state 
level… 
A 
A 
K 
Development based on: human 
resources of the nation, natural 
potentials, skills and initiatives of 
Kosovo enterprises. 
As an objective... decreasing 
the poverty.  
… to create conditions for a 
secure an favourable 
environment for foreign 
investments. … legal 
framework for investments, 
physical infrastructure, less 
bureaucratic procedures, 
….    
Kosovo will play its role in creation 
of the peace, security and stability 
in the region and wider. … 
cooperation among nations … .  
 
Table.5 citations from Kosovo parties’ programmes and electoral platforms  
5.4. Ideological orientation of Kosovo parties  
The programmes of parties are usually generated and shaped based on the 
values and interests of the party members and supporters, constituting groups 
within society divided by social cleavages, and organised politically through 
political parties. Each party programme and electoral platform reflects the values 
and interests of the parts of society they represent, guiding their activities and 
behaviour in general. The ideological orientation of parties relies on these values, 
while in turn such orientation develops and sustains them in a cyclical way. 
Political parties themselves reflect the social composition and pluralism at the 
party system level. If the social cleavages constitute the basic orientation of the 
party programme in general and electoral platforms in particular, it can be 
concluded that there is a clear relationship between parties and society, and 
parties exist to represent the divisions within society, organised at the political 
level. However, taking into account party evolution from earlier time, they have 
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been considered purely social actors, emerging exclusively from society. Yet, 
such an attribute of parties in general has been softened somehow, and it would 
be unreasonable to expect a firm and frozen relationship between parties and the 
social groups they represent. Particularly, such expectation in new democracies 
would be disappointing as often parties happen to be created from the top. 
Nevertheless, there should still exist a relationship, though not as it used to be 
earlier, otherwise it would be hard to talk of representation, and consequently 
makes modern democracy senseless. Yet, if some parties emerged from the top, 
if they wish to have long-term sustainability and persistence for themselves, they 
still have to find ways to associate and relate to society.  
 
Party performance on representation is directly linked with the democratisation 
process, since it constitutes one of the fundamental functions, giving meaning to 
democracy in general, needless to say, the influence it has on the other party 
functions is explained in the following chapters. Moreover, as comprising the 
major part of the second level of the consolidation structure, its consolidation has 
a direct impact on all the other levels making the democracy consolidation 
process warded on the representative level. In circumstances of party 
detachment from society, party activities in general are guided by interests other 
than those of citizens, bringing to issue how far democracy can be talked about if 
without citizens. Furthermore, the governing activity is no longer based on these 
expectations, as democracy standards require. It proves that the representative, 
as the most important part of the general structure of the democracy 
consolidation structure, has not yet taken place and does not even have 
promising prospects. If there is no, or a very slight and chaotic relationship 
between parties and society, then it makes no sense to talk of the representation 
function of parties. In other words if parties’ programmes and electoral platforms 
do not illustrate such relationships then the Kosovo party system does not reflect 
the socio-political cleavages, and along with it, is disenchanted from society. 
Such a state of affairs, having no or very poor representation, impinges directly 
on the democracy consolidation process.  
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In this regard, Kosovo parties and the party system in general appears to be 
centre-rightist. Each and every party declares themselves to be moving from the 
centre to the right. Based on such a proclaimed ideological party position, it can 
be concluded that if the Kosovo party system is to reflect society, then Kosovo 
society ideologically seems to be very homogenous and closed to becoming a 
monist society. However, the reality reveals something else: a high level of 
poverty, a high rate of unemployment, a working class with highly restricted rights 
and lacking even a labour law, a state without a healthcare system, and so on. 
All the current characteristics of Kosovo society, during the last ten years, 
demonstrate the urgent need for leftist parties as well, yet there are none among 
the relevant political parties in Kosovo. Every one of the relevant parties (not less 
than five of them), among Kosovo’s population of two million, labels themselves 
either as rightist or centre-rightist.   
 
Looking to what extent the Kosovo party system reflects the social structure and 
pluralism of Kosovo society, it appears that Kosovo parties are ideologically more 
or less similar. The parties’ programmes in substance are the same. Their 
identicalness is best described if we look at the first column of the table 5. (see 
above), cited from parties’ programmes and electoral platforms, stating in general 
terms what parties stand and strive for. The major content of the programmes is 
dominated by highlighting some of the actual key issues, and their attitude 
towards very general and populist ways and commitments. Most of the issues 
mentioned do not include any possible solutions available to them, offered by the 
parties in question. Furthermore, the ideological dimension within the programme 
is not clear and often characterised with ideological clashes, contradictions, and 
ambiguities on different parts of the same programme. For instance, such 
ideological ambiguity is often to be found in the economic dimension (table 5), as 
all parties applaud the free market economy, but in the same programme they 
prioritise a welfare policy to help the needy. It is worth noting here that PDK 
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prioritises the protection of middle-class interests and increasing pensions by 
100% (table 5).  
 
To some extent it is understandable that parties in post-communist European 
countries (in our case including Kosovo parties) had not much alternative to 
choosing between left and right, due to the specifics of the wave of 
democratisation they belong to - covering also market liberalisation, and the 
discredited experience of the former regime associated with leftism, perceived 
exclusively as communism. Therefore, parties themselves often hesitated to 
relate to leftism. In this regard, Zhinipotoku35 adds that currently there is a trend 
for parties to proclaim themselves as rightist, because of society’s awful 
experience with the former leftist regime, usually linked with political 
discrimination. Besides that, looking at the current position of Kosovo society, 
particularly the economic dimension, the leftist parties, on a true meaning of left 
ideological profile, not necessary communism, can best represent a significant 
part of society.  
 
The only popular ideology prevailing on the programmes of all parties is 
nationalism, or as Matoshi36 defines it, an ethno nationalist ideology, due to the 
prevailing ethnic cleavages earlier fought along. Referring to the independence 
issue, it is a common thing for all parties to open and close their programmes 
with echoing commitments to independence. Therefore, nationalism is regarded 
as an ideological orientation common to all parties, though often blind and in a 
populist way. However, up to now it is used as a workable ideology, through 
which all parties tried and managed to infer their legitimacy and extend their 
support from such an appeal. Of course, the independence is a nation-wide 
issue, emotionally enthralling social support. However, if nationalism it is found in 
all parties, why then should there exist so many parties representing this same 
issue of independence? In addition, nationalism, as the only major ideology 
                                                 
35 Enver Zhinipotoku, sociologist and political analyst, interviewed on December 2009.  
36 Halil Matoshi, Kosovo political analyst, interviewed on December 2009. 
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present in all parties illustrates best the sameness of political parties. Looking 
from the perspective of the representation function, there is no need for so many 
actors to represent the same thing. In such a case as this, there are two possible 
scenarios, either an overrepresentation, or a chaotic under representation. 
Apparently, the latter is more likely rather the former.  
 
Under representation is due to the one dimensionality of representation, taking 
into account only a single issue, such as independence. The other current issues 
arising from such acute social and economic needs are hardly tackled. Recently, 
after the declaration of independence, the issue as such started to lose its 
relevance. One dimensional representation is usually a feature of single issue 
parties. Such narrowly oriented parties have difficulties in adjusting themselves, 
once the single issue pursued is attained. Recently, this can be considered as 
one of the reasons why parties in post-independence Kosovo face difficulties to 
appeal to wide social support and consequently are forced to look for reliable 
support by establishing clientelist institutions, implying other structures in the 
power relationship, not healthy for the democracy consolidation process. 
 
Moreover, another shortcoming of one dimensional representation, principally 
since it also involves emotional attachments, as nationalism often does, is that 
the development of accountability structures is hardly to be expected, though 
essential for democracy consolidation. The only indispensable institutions within 
the democratic system, to ensure the protection of citizens’ interests, are the 
functional accountable institutions, as the best instruments to limit otherwise 
uncontrolled power of those mandated to rule. Nationalism as an ideology 
includes within itself a dose of irrationality, in this way citizens do not demand 
from parties’ leadership and do not hold them responsible and accountable, as 
long as they continue to refer, at least declaratively, to independence. Actually, 
most legitimacy and social support that parties have enjoyed, especially LDK at 
the beginning and then later PDK and AAK, is through referring to independence 
and the war for independence issue.   
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Omitting the presence of nationalism as an ideology at parties’ programmes, 
there is no other well-articulated ideology found there. Of course, there are 
elements of different ideologies, but not a crystallised and well-uttered guiding 
ideology to orient the party behaviour at all levels. For instance, all of them 
uphold to a free market economy, without defining and specifying what type of 
capitalism they stand for. Like Kosovo political analyst Maliqi declared (Epoka e 
Re 06.09.2004), Kosovo political parties lack financial capacity and ideas to 
determine themselves for what type of capitalism and social state are they, but 
persist to be huge ideological mishmashes. Such ideological chaos is mirrored in 
parties’ programmes, electoral platforms, declarations, behaviours and policies 
they pursue.  
 
Relying on party programmes is insufficient to place Kosovo parties along a left 
right ideological spectrum, because substantially they have quite similar 
programmes. Such amorphous party identity, illustrates the level of 
disenchantment of parties from society, not existing in line with and not 
representing society, but standing on their own, very much independent and free 
from society, subsequently performing very poorly on the representation function.   
 
Certainly, almost no worldview, value, or action is free of some sort of ideological 
framework, but in order to be considered as ideologically based, it should be 
shaped and guided by the ideology in question, and should not be ideologically at 
odds from time to time. The parties’ programmes, electoral platforms, 
behaviours, attitudes, and activities are supposed to be within ideological 
contours, particularly party programmes usually meant to be more static, rather 
than electoral platforms or declarations often influenced by day-to-day politics.  
Yet, the quandary arises if parties are known to have no clear ideological 
orientations found in their documents, interviews, declarations, activities, 
behaviour and attitudes in general. Political parties in Kosovo are perceived as 
highly chaotic in terms of the ideological orientations they possess. Their 
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ideological mishmash can hardly be expected to produce and reflect the 
orientations of citizens at society level, usually lacking necessary information for 
political decisions. Normally, political parties provide citizens with a compass 
reading, typically entailing a well defined ideological profile, to support them on 
their political decisions, through which citizens could find it easier to acquaint 
themselves within a complex political environment. Yet, such an offer has not 
been seen so far, preventing this sense of the representation function being 
fulfilled. 
 
The high ambiguity of parties’ ideological profile augments, since most 
programmes are used just as a technical and officially required document for 
registration as a political party. Parties do not feed and guide their objectives, 
behaviours, attitudes, and activities based on their programmes. Likewise, it 
obscures citizens’ orientation within the contemporary, already messy 
representation structure. Additionally, it makes the behaviour of parties more 
unpredictable and less controllable from the citizens’ side. Albeit with even 
members of parties’ chairmanships themselves having no clear conception of the 
ideological profile of their respective party. In this regard, there is inner 
ideological chaos and disagreement on whether their party is left to right or 
centre to right. For instance, during the election campaign in the 2001 election, 
the AAK leader Haradinaj was using as the party slogan “neither left nor right, but 
straight”. On the other hand, a study on ideological profiles of the parties in 
Kosovo, conducted by NGO “Qelnaja” (2008), ranks AAK as a rightist party. 
Moreover, AAK spokesman Luma in the interview declared AAK as a centre-right 
party. Likewise, PDK usually used to have close relations with the socialist party 
in Albania, also participating at the socialist international conferences. Its 
closeness to the socialist party of Albania might have incentives other than those 
ideological, such as their relations from pre-war and war-time when the socialist 
party of Albania was in power. The PDK leader during 2004 elections (Lajm 
21.10.2004) declared that  “PDK is neither rightist nor leftist”. One of the 
members of the PDK chairmanship Sabri Kiçmari, in 2008 asserted that PDK is a 
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leftist party. Another PDK chairmanship member  Memli Krasniqi, in the same 
year announced just the opposite, that they are rightists (Qelnaja publication 
2008). Moreover, a PDK’s MP and a member of the party chairmanship Rame 
Buja37 in the interview declared that in Kosovo, parties are not ideologically 
profiled, and PDK as well is one of Kosovo’s parties. Actually, we are discussing 
the party profile, a decision that in the end should be taken by the party 
congress, though we stand for a free market economy, adds Buja, without 
specifying the extent of such freedom. On the same study (Qelnaja publication 
2008), it is mentioned that AKR plans to join the international socialists, while in 
turn they recently became an affiliated member of ELDR. Yet, despite its 
membership at the ELDR, one of its chairmanship members Kelmendi38, in 
interview declared that although we aim to be a centre-right party, due to current 
social problems in Kosovo, for the time being we cannot go for a clear ideological 
profile. LDK on the other hand, is also declared as a centre-right party. Ismet 
Beqiri39 states that they are a centre-right party, but also in the process of 
establishing their own ideological profile, without pointing out how long it may 
take and to what extent it is achievable. The same applies to LDD that emerged 
as a party due to the LDK split. Naser Rugova member of LDD chairmanship, 
asserts that [they] are a centre-right party. Taking into account the above 
mentioned statements and declarations of parties, the Kosovo party system 
seems to be more or less, at least declaratively, as a centre-right party system. 
These are just some of the many examples illustrating the ideological ambiguity, 
chaos, and confusion building up in the Kosovo party system. The ideological 
ambiguity and confusion that Kosovo parties have, is evident even at the high 
rank party leadership level no wonder among to mention ordinary members or 
citizens. Surprisingly, one wonders why there are so many parties declaratively 
standing for the same ideological profile, when no leftist party is perceptible.  
 
                                                 
37 Interviewed on 10th of December 2009 
38 Muhamet Kelmendi AKR chairmanship member, interviewed on December 2009 
39 Ismet Beqiri LDK member of chairmanship, interviewed on January 2010 
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The same applies to electoral platforms. Most of them spell out generalisations, 
covering and mentioning some of society’s problems, but lacking any workable 
and specific solutions to them; they are confusing on ideological orientation, and 
coloured with ideological contradictions. Until the 2007 elections where parties 
started to talk about the economy as well, the independence issue (Electoral 
Platforms 2001, 2004, and 2007) largely dominated electoral platforms. Inside 
electoral platforms, it is hard to find any solutions to these problems. In general, 
they may be described more-or-less as wishful platforms, rather than responses 
to society’s concerns. On the other hand, electoral platforms essentially differ 
little from each other, giving citizens difficulty in perceiving themselves and their 
interests protected and represented by the possible coming governments. On the 
other side, party declarations prove feeble as well, in terms of identifying their 
ideological positions. It is common within the same declaration to find various 
and even contradictory ideological orientations, at the beginning proclaiming pure 
capitalism, and at the same time affirming the priority to increase public sector 
spending, for instance.  
 
On most of the interviews conducted, party representatives declared their party 
to be the party of citizens, presenting a heavy dose of populist attitude among 
them. For example, Naser Rugova40 from LDD stated that [they] are a party of 
citizens, not limited in specific representation, but appealing to all citizens. The 
same is confirmed by the AAK spokesperson, representing and appealing to all 
citizens. The identical applies to other parties as well. Such an attitude is a clear 
indication of the populist stand of parties, trying to appeal and widen their support 
to the electorate through populist jingles. In addition to that, Rame Buja (PDK) 
declared that [they] are a party for the masses and not a party of the elite. 
Moreover, Hajzeraj41 (AKR) admits that though [they] are a centre-rightist party 
[they] have no particular social structure targets, and try to get the support from 
all citizens wherever possible. Such a catch everyone possible behaviour of 
                                                 
40 LLD chairmanship member and LDD MP, interviewed on January 2010. 
41 AKR chairmanship member and AKR MP, interviewed on December 2009. 
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parties articulated by populist avowal is also due to the strategy used by parties 
to get as broad and as much support as possible (Selaci42, Tahiri43).  
 
However, among the main reasons for such an ideological chaos and mishmash 
of political parties in Kosovo, is the political development itself, bringing to the top 
of all priorities the independence agenda. In this way nationalism as an ideology, 
present in one way or another in all Kosovo parties, was able to swallow all other 
possible ideologies, encompassing within parties individuals and groups from the 
extreme left to the extreme right. As a result, the ability of nationalism, during 
particular times, to swallow and put under its shadow other ideologies, created 
the ideological mishmash of parties. Such development is supported by, as 
Krasniqi44 observes, the role of personal interests in politics, causing the 
personalisation of politics to structure the inner party decision-making power 
around a narrow circle and making politics revolve around the interests of a few 
individuals.     
 
Looking from the perspective of citizens as to what extent they are aware of 
being represented by such an ideologically chaotic party system, it is widely 
agreed that such awareness is scarcely to be expected by such undefined 
parties with highly indeterminate and unpredictable politics. Matoshi, Zhinipotoku, 
Selaci and G. Krasniqi are of the opinion that such perception is mostly 
clientelist, regional, and blood based. The rest of society from such a 
representation structure has difficulties identifying the supposed institutional 
representation, since even people within the inner party organisational structure 
are not aware of who and what the ideological terms are, it cannot be expected 
that the masses, usually not informed about such topics, will have any 
consciousness of the issues. Actually, at the policy level there exists a high level 
of disenchantment between policies pursued by political parties and citizens’ 
                                                 
42 Gezim Selaci, political scientist, interviewed on January 2010. 
43 Ramush Tahiri, political scientist and political analyst, interviewed on December 2009. 
44 Gezim Krasniqi, political scientist, interviewed on December 2009. 
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expectations. In relation to that, a study conducted by the Kosovo Democratic 
Institute (2008) proves it empirically, finding a very poor, and mostly by chance, 
accordance between policies pursued and citizens’ expectations. The strongest 
relationship is found between the direct linkage between parties and economic 
actors financing them, often invisible. 
 
Structuring representation on such a chaotic, narrow, and depleted base of 
parties among society implies the exclusion of the majority of society from the 
representation structure. Such omission triggers difficulties on the other party 
functions, necessary for democracy consolidation, such as integration, 
legitimation, innovation, and governing (see the following chapters). 
Consequently, it entails also the depleted modern democracy - representative 
democracy, featured with poor representation performance of parties. 
 
Furthermore, parties  did not specify which groups were consulted while drawing 
their programmes and electoral platforms. Most of them mentioned experts, but 
none any specific organizations or interests groups. They do not take into 
account any specific interests, looking to include everything possible producing a 
so-called mishmash ideological identity.            
 
Regarding the ideological profile, parties admit they lack a clear profile and are 
going to start considering the elucidation of their ideological profile. One of the 
chairmanship members, Ismet Beqiri45 stated that LDK is planning to start 
building its ideological identity. Since independence, parties have been pushed to 
find their place and position on the ideological spectrum. Yet, to what extent 
parties develop interests and have the political will and capacity to do so, 
remains to be seen, and leaves a lot to wish for. The current trajectory of party 
development in this respect is less promising. Parties are in intense competition 
with each other to build up and structure their clientelist support, although this is 
not ideologically driven. Likewise, they arrange representation on other lines, 
                                                 
45 LDK chairmanship member and LDK MP, interviewed on January 2010. 
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thinning it horizontally and vertically, to merely a part of society at the cost of the 
leftover majority.. In addition, such representation is substantially very 
constricted; it includes a pure and simple transaction of political rights with 
support for an immediate (usually economic) compensation, in terms of jobs, 
contracts, or other direct benefits. On the path to democracy consolidation, such 
developments are not compatible with the end-result and process expectations 
run counter to it, challenging and ailing the process as such.  
5.5. Parties floating above the society  
Bearing in mind the system structure, government at the top with society at the 
bottom, and parties in between bridging and often binding both, according to 
freezing theory, parties are supposed to come out of society intermediating 
between government and society structures. On their own, parties have their 
roots within society and reflect society in their organizational structure, governing 
activity, behaviour, attitudes, and documents they rely on. Yet, the experience of 
parties in Kosovo stands out in being poles apart. From parties’ programmes, 
electoral platforms, party declarations, and interviews conducted, it is perceived 
that the Kosovo party system does not reflect social composition, and as such 
society is not projected on the party system. Parties are predominantly alike, all 
of them claiming to be from centre-right to the right on the ideological spectrum, 
akin and untouched by society. Parties are not even shallowly navigating within 
society, but merely seem to fly above, losing the pulse completely. Most of them 
are created from above, in need of finding ways to penetrate into society. Few 
others, such as LDK, a former forum party considered as being created bottom 
up, at its eve up to the beginning of the war used to enjoy broad social support. 
Nonetheless, LDK is continuously and intensely getting shallower roots in 
society, ending up with a very superficial position. The low number of votes they 
got in the 2007 election, and the very low level of electoral turnout, brought LDK 
from a movement party with wide society support based on the independence 
issue, down to a loser in elections. Normally, parties with shallow roots are 
exposed to more dangers as opposed to parties more deeply rooted. The upshot 
of such an on-going process makes the freezing theory in the case of Kosovo 
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parties not viable. Parties are primarily created from above, and have not 
managed to reflect social cleavages. Parties are fairly similar, in general having 
no ideological differences in their programmes, platforms, and their behaviours. 
Along these lines, Kosovo parties seem to represent everyone, but indeed none. 
The detached-from-society party system indicates that parties are floating above 
and have very trivial roots in society. The cleavages they base themselves on are 
short-term. Usually, short-term cleavages remove parties from society very easy, 
as they happen to seal very fast. Despite their resemblance, the only current 
difference among parties that remains viable are the names of their leaders. The 
distinction between leaders remains not on their values, attitudes, and behaviour, 
since all of them more or less share authoritarian values, but rather in their 
names, largely substituted by the province of their origin. 
 
Hence, political parties in Kosovo poorly reflect the social structures in their 
programmes and platforms. Most of that reflection was by the LDK before the 
war, as the major social movement of independence, and then PDK and AAK, 
immediately after the war, as supporters of the war were complemented by 
regional bases. At the moment, with the fulfilment of the objectives that these 
parties were supposedly created for – the independence issue, even the one-
dimensional representation is being alleviated. The majority of the rest of the 
parties, from their very starting point have been flying above and out of touch 
with society. This brings us to two issues. Firstly, who then is going to represent 
society if not parties? Then, what and whom do parties represent?  
 
By definition, if not at organisational level, at least at the governing level, the 
parties are supposed to be the expression of society. The failure of parties to 
mirror society, brings into question representative democracy in itself, if there is 
no one to represent society? As stated earlier, parties in representative 
democracies are valued as the main institutions of representation, despite other 
merely complementary and supplementary intermediary institutions such as 
NGOs, interest groups, social movements, etc.. In the case of Kosovo, most of 
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such organizations are either corrupt, government controlled, or functionally 
weak due to the high level of politicisation produced and maintained by political 
parties. Political parties are not just failing to represent society, in addition they 
are preventing other possible intermediary institutions to play their representation 
function. As an illustration, among many others to mention, is the role of an 
employers’ syndicate on representing the workers’ interests. Most of their 
attempts for protest were neutralised because of parties’ interference. Workers 
syndicates have proved to be unsuccessful at least in raising issues pertaining to 
their interests. The same applies to other civil society organisations, a 
considerable part of them maintained just for cosmetic use to make up the 
system, for the government to claim that they are upholding democratic values.  
 
Without proper representation of society, the democracy consolidation process 
will have teething troubles to move on, because it is coupled essentially with 
undemocratic practices such as poor representation. Consequently, in the short 
term the democratisation process might freeze up, and later even reverse as a 
process, making democratisation politics in Kosovo highly unpredictable. Such a 
state of affairs offers no opportunity for consolidation of the representation 
structure. Democracy finds itself unable to give effect, in deficiency of the 
required pressure exercised from the citizens’ side, and currently disorientated 
within messy politics generated by a chaotic party system. Moreover, it questions 
the very likelihood of citizens’ interests protection, hazing the essential objectives 
of Kosovo democracy. Apparently, personalistic parties might see it as being less 
demanding and trouble-free affording them the platform to pursue objectives 
consistent to such parties, but in the long term, it has an irreversible negative 
impact in general. 
5.6. Conclusion 
The research of the extent to what political parties and the party system of 
Kosovo in general represent society, shows that social composition is barely 
reflected at the party system or political system level. This is best illustrated in 
the content of party documents and the way these are built. Party programmes, 
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electoral platforms, and their behaviours and activities are not grounded in the 
long-term socio-political cleavages. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is 
no such established relationship. Parties’ programmes, electoral platforms, 
attitudes, and behaviours do not reflect the composition of Kosovo society, 
consequently not projecting society in party activities, including also the 
governing level. Moreover, Kosovo parties represent an ideological mishmash, 
and are experiencing an identity crisis, and do puzzle citizens’ awareness of 
which political party specifically does represent them. This is even more 
challenging while all parties declare themselves as having the same ideological 
profile and to substantially have almost similar programmes meant to confine 
parties’ behaviour. It rather brings into being politics and policy making, in terms 
of representing citizens’ interests, as a very unpredictable outcome.  
 
Furthermore, the impossibility for citizens to create their consciousness and be 
oriented on their positions on the party system structure of representation, due to 
a hazy ideological spectrum of party system, diminishes continuously the roots of 
parties within society.  The new parties face snags to make a way into society, 
while the old ones, due to nationalist appeal, used to have reasonably profound, 
though shrinking roots within society.  
 
Political parties are found to perform poorly on the representation function, and 
consequently have a very negative effect on democracy consolidation prospects, 
above all for a democracy having no experience earlier, like the case with 
Kosovo. Constituting the second level of the democracy consolidation structure, it 
affects negatively on the other three levels. Particularly, it thwarts consolidation 
at the fourth level, the cultural consolidation, since society is not oriented toward 
democratisation due to underrepresentation, firstly within parties themselves and 
then at the governing level as well. Poor representation does not ensure the 
protection of citizens’ interests, as an essential element for cultural consolidation. 
Representation opens the door for cultural consolidation, and makes citizens part 
of the process as a necessary requirement, enabling participation as a first step 
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to get citizens used to democratic values and norms, later possibly leading to 
habituation. However, it is meaningless to expect such a thing if initially no 
sufficient representation is actually ensured by the institutions primarily in charge 
of that, political parties.    
 
In the foreseeable future, there is less hope for improvements in these areas.  
Instead of society projection at the political system, the party system through 
party behaviours and governing activities reflects and projects the high level of 
personalisation of politics, constantly fed by the personalistic type of Kosovo 
political parties.   
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Chapter 6 
6. Te l’est mon bon plaisir - The Integration Function of 
Parties in Kosovo 
6.1. Introduction 
The function of parties are left with in a modern democracy is the representation 
function. In addition to the representation of citizens, political parties also make 
citizens feel part of the political process and system in general, integrate them 
into the system and shield them from political alienation and with it apathy. If 
political apathy consumes a large part of society for a considerable period, it 
could destabilise and undermine the self-perpetuation of the system itself. 
Usually, binding citizens into the political process and making them part of 
decision making at a political level is a task dedicated merely to political parties.  
 
The political system that comes out of the human nature of a living community, in 
order to be functional, the participation of those human beings in the political 
process is a necessary requirement. Regardless of the size and type of 
community organisation, those belonging to it have to participate in one way or 
another. Each human being has their own interests, structured on his own needs, 
wants and values, evolving and developing continuously. The best way people 
inside the political system can protect their own interests is through being a part 
of the decision making political process (Mill [1861] 1958). Political decisions in 
one way or another impact their lives, since they are made for the community 
and the people within. Nothing would protect interests better than deciding for 
themselves. Participation is best ensured by the direct participation of citizens. 
Yet, such a mechanism in today’s democracies is hardly applicable or doable. As 
a substitution to that, representative democracy offers the best possible 
opportunity for participation through integration and participation in the political 
process, necessitating intermediation as a viable mechanism and opportunity for 
a willing and pluralist integration. Pluralist integration in turn is different from 
enforced and monist, no choice integration was the case in party state regimes in 
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former socialist Europe, which not much longer than two decades ago, Kosovo 
belonged also. Such a model of integration, in contrast to a forced monist 
integration, offers more space and opportunity for people within the political 
system to organise themselves in various different political and non-political 
organisations, found to be most suitable to their own interests. Moreover, willing 
integration is set to be more productive, given that it is citizen driven, ensuring 
the plurality of integration rooted in the plurality and diversity of human nature 
from which a variety of interests arise and develop. Fulfilment of citizens’ 
interests is pre-eminently guaranteed through being part of the decisions related 
to their interests in one way or another. The more citizens, and the better 
organised the citizens in the decision making process, the higher the chances of 
attaining the targeted objectives – to look after their own interests.  
 
In representative democracies, political parties structure political participation 
through intermediation. Despite party decline, or as Katz & Mair (1995) define it, 
as merely a party transformation not necessary constituting a party decline, 
parties remain the major anchors (among others) of society in the political 
process. Parties offer a great opportunity for society to be organised politically 
and in a plural manner, bringing society closer and making it part of decision 
making in the political process. Likewise, it makes democracy meaningful in itself 
and eases consolidation prospects. The deeper the roots of parties in society, the 
more integrated society would be in the political process. The higher the level of 
integration, the better the chances would be for a qualitative integration. 
However, in new democracies such as Kosovo, parties are merely floating above 
society, because the majority of them are created top-down and have difficulties 
in weaving their way into society. Bottom-up created parties are proved to be 
more successful in the integration function, because they spring up from within 
society, automatically binding citizens in the political process. However, with 
time, even bottom-up created parties’ roots in society may wane, in particular 
single-purpose created parties, unable to widen their scope of objectives after 
their pursued issue is realised. Yet, parties that originated the other way around, 
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and are floating above the society, face more challenges to integrate society into 
the political process, and are suitable illustrations of the low level of social 
integration into the collective decision-making process.  
 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that social integration is complemented 
and supplemented by other non-party organisations as well, such as NGOs, 
social movements, interest groups, and other forms of organisations established 
based on certain shared interests of various groups of society. Compared to the 
integration function previously being largely dominated by political parties,  
nowadays there has been an increase in the role of such organisations in this 
function.  
 
Individuals and groups of society in a democratic system establish new, or join, 
already established parties or other organisations in order to protect their own 
interests in a competitive manner. One of the differences between parties and 
other forms of organisations is that parties cover a wider range of issues, 
sometimes including also the specific issues highlighted by certain organisations. 
Primarily parties in a pluralist democracy integrate society through their 
organised structure, determining the effects and extent of society integration46 
into the political process. Party organisational structure is built up by the manner 
in which the integration takes place. The more massive the organisation 
structure, the higher the integration. Principally in political systems with an 
underdeveloped alternative integration structure made up of NGO-s, social 
movements, or other interest groups, as is the case in Kosovo, parties’ 
organisation structures illustrate best how much opportunity society has of 
integration, and to what extent the society’s interests are being protected, by 
measuring their inclusion in the decision making process. The more integrated 
society, the higher the chances are for the protection of citizens’ interests. On the 
other side, the extent of social integration in the political process has a direct 
                                                 
46 I am always referring to willingly pluralist democratic integration. 
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impact on the consolidation structure. Better integration consequently means 
better chances for democracy consolidation to take place.  
 
The actual transformation of parties is reflected in the integration function as well. 
In this regard, Katz & Mair (1994) conclude that modern parties, even in 
consolidated democracies, are transformed in terms of the state/society 
relationship, getting closer to the state and further from society. Such a 
transformation has a direct impact on the way and extent citizens’ interests are 
protected, different from when previously parties were regarded more as socio-
political institutions, often playing the role of the driving force for even 
revolutionary changes. The anticipation that state-parties suffer from 
cartelisation, implies the protection of social interests largely at the output level, 
has not given the expected effect, principally for new unconsolidated 
democracies that have a fragile institutional structure, and weak accountability 
institutions to ensure that rules and procedures are followed as specified by laws 
and regulations. In addition, institutions holding the government to account are 
very much in their infancy or are institutions that are in fact still only on paper, 
since in a new state with an unconsolidated democracy, such as Kosovo, the 
level of informality means repeatedly bypasses formal institutions.  
 
Cartelisation of parties is one of the major reasons of party shortcomings in 
performing the integration function. Principally, the cartelisation of parties in failed 
states goes even further, parties are not only financed by the state, but are also 
twinned with it and make use of it, habitually perceiving the state as their own 
property. The issue goes downhill and deteriorates in the case of a failed state to 
carteled with personalistic authoritarian parties.  
 
From cartelisation to colonisation of the state by parties 
Katz & Mair (1995) elaborating party transformation throughout the centuries, 
conceptualise that a new model of party has developed since the 1970s, known 
as the cartel party. Although they do not offer a decisive definition of such a 
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model, they specify features classifying a party of cartel type. The key attribute of 
cartel parties is the state-party penetration. The cartel model of the party is 
conceptualised from the experience of parties and party systems in western 
European consolidated democracies. Nevertheless, it does not mean that cartel 
parties are confined only to the context from which they emerged. They are found 
in other socio-political contexts as well. Party-state penetration is present in 
almost all electoral democracies. However, the difference remains in the level 
and type of penetration. In consolidated democracies, it mainly happens through 
a reliance of parties on state finances. Suspicions linger on the issue of parties 
getting closer to the state and mowing away from society, instantaneously 
impairing and weakening the integration function through parties’ roots being 
depleted within society. However, our concern is what happens if such 
penetration is between parties and states categorised as failed states. The 
apprehension in consolidated democracies is that state subsidies on parties 
somehow loosen party links with society. Therefore, nowadays parties are 
conceptualised more as political rather than social institutions, empowering the 
state in its relation to civil society.  
 
Nonetheless, on the case of failed states, the penetration goes even deeper and 
wider, beyond cartelisation to state colonisation. A failed state in general is 
characterised by weak institutions, not able to perform their expected functions. 
Such a state with weak institutions is a great opportunity for parties not only to 
use such weaknesses of the institutions for their subventions from the state, but 
also to use the state in general as much as possible for their own specific 
purposes. Parties in a failed state might not only enter into a cartel relationship 
with the state, but they might also colonise it. State colonisation by parties 
implies parties’ interests in keeping such colonisation, in terms of preventing the 
state to develop its own institutional capacity. The issue is even worse in the 
case of Kosovo who recently celebrated its second anniversary of statehood.  
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The type of party organisation furthers party appetite for state colonization. In 
Western Europe parties use state subvention, in addition to membership fees 
and other possible financial sources to carry on their activity. In the case of 
Kosovo, major parties actually have no membership fees, and to fund their 
activities, they have to pay a heavy price for their clientelistic structures. 
Clientelism as a way of mobilising party support is costly and barely affordable. 
The colonisation of the state by parties – mostly parties in power, provides the 
best solution to pay for their clients, using government subsidies, employment in 
the public sector, contracts, tenders, tax evasion, and so on. In this way, parties 
reimburse the support they get from their clients. The more prosperous parties 
are those that perform well in getting the number of votes, which in turn provides  
more opportunity they have to colonise the state. This is acknowledged as being 
a state exploitation (chap. 9).    
 
State colonisation lowers the prospects for the integration function of parties and 
for the process of democracy consolidation in general. It deludes the first level of 
consolidation, constitutional consolidation largely at the implementation level, 
keeping state institutions underdeveloped and unable to fulfil their constitutionally 
and legally prescribed roles. In this case, informal institutions empowered 
through the state colonisation process, clash with formal legal institutions. As 
long as formal institutions are still in their infancy and informal institutions enjoy 
the actual power, the latter obviously supersedes the former, constantly 
challenging them and warding off the stabilisation and empowerment that would 
enable them to fulfil their prescribed duties and responsibilities.  
 
The ability to integrate citizens through direct reimbursement at the output level is 
not feasible. Colonisation itself does not allow state institutions to develop, which 
in turn undermines the very basis of democracy consolidation. The clients 
benefiting directly through direct reimbursement constitute only a small part of 
society. Such a direct profit by so few relies on the backbone of the rest of 
society, usually comprising the majority. For emerging new parties it is almost 
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impossible for them to establish themselves, because the state resources in 
possession by colonisers – parties in power, makes these parties powerful and 
capable enough to prevent any other new party from challenging them. Thus, 
parties in power are able to quash competition and fair conditions essential to 
democracy.   
 
Parties and other integration actors 
Political parties are not the only actors in the integration structure. They share the 
integration function with other complementary and supplementary institutions to 
integration like NGOs, social movements, interest groups, trade unions, and so 
on. In consolidated democracies, such institutions are fairly well developed, and 
often surpass even parties’ standard of integration function. In new democracies, 
such as Kosovo, the integration structure is less consolidated; the 
complementary and supplementary institutions of integration are not developed. 
Yet, even consolidated democracies have lately been marked by a decline in 
voter turnout and less integration of people through political parties into the 
political process. However, despite such a decline there are other additional 
institutions facilitating participation by means other than voting. In the case of 
Kosovo, such institutions are barely established, most of them politicised by 
existing parties. It implies that there is less alternative space and opportunity to 
organise and protect one’s interest through additional intermediary institutions. 
The soaring level of politicisation leaves space for supplementary participation 
dwindling. The higher the horizontal and vertical level of politicisation, the lesser 
the developments for alternative integration. Moreover, the high level of 
politicisation47 taking place in Kosovo has eroded the issue. Therefore, such little 
level of society integration is a worry, jeopardizing democracy and democracy 
consolidation, unlike in the north-western hemisphere where more room for 
                                                 
47 A very good illustration is the functioning of employees’ syndicates. They tried to organise strikes but government 
parties achieved in dividing them, and make them end the strikes without pursuing their requests. The decision to end 
strikes was done by syndicate leaders without even prior information of syndicate chairmanship. It happened at the strike 
of medical workers by the end of 2008. Such political influence has paralyzed the functioning of other syndicates as well, 
making them just numbers and not institutions able to protect employees interests.   
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participation is institutionally ensured. Furthermore, Kosovo parties are also 
known for the shift of their members from one party to another. Such a 
movement of party members is increasing with the transformation of party 
structures towards the increasing reliance on clientelism. The ICG Report (May 
2005) describing Kosovo parties’ support, among other factors, affirms that voter 
loyalties are largely determined by patronage, clan, and regionalism.  
 
On the other hand, the rules of the electoral system recognising Kosovo as a 
single electoral district does not offer space for a direct and clear relationship 
between MPs and voters, yet such a relationship is expected to be fully realised 
through political parties dominated by authoritarian leaders keeping parties apart 
from society.   
 
Definition of the issue and research proceedings   
The integration function of parties has been conceptualised differently by various 
scholars such as Helms (1995). In this regard, Schmitter (1999, 477) defines the 
integration function of parties as providing most citizens with a stable and 
distinctive set of ideas and goals (symbols) which anchor their expectations of 
democracy, and orient them in a general way towards policy options and make 
them feel part of the process of collective choice. The study of the integration 
function of parties and their role on consolidation of democracy in Kosovo is 
structured based on Schmitter’s definition of the integration function. Therefore, 
the evaluation of the party integration function in Kosovo starts initially by 
exploring the party organisational and inner power structure determining the level 
and scope of society integration into the political system through parties. The 
further away parties are from society, the less integrated society is in the political 
process. Based on this we can say that mass appealing parties, in terms of 
organisational structural, perform better the integration function than the 
electoralist or an elite-based party. By looking at the type of parties in Kosovo, 
particularly in terms of organisational structure, the level of citizens’ integration 
through political parties can be assessed. In this way the opportunity that parties 
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offer to society for integration is measured, regardless of the will and readiness of 
citizens to participate.  
 
Shedding light on parties’ typology highlights the chances parties offer to citizens 
to anchor them in the decision-making process. Furthermore, individual party 
linkage is measured, as one of the main indicators of the level and type of 
anchoring of society in the political process. Mass appealing parties perform 
better in integration than parties of the elite. In addition, movement of the elite 
from one party to another is very much common to Kosovo parties. Such a shift 
is a demonstration that even the closest inner circle of parties is not stable and 
well consolidated, in terms of recruiting or maintaining the loyalty of the elite that 
constitute the brainpower of the party. How far can it be expected for parties to 
anchor sympathizers, if they cannot anchor even the closest persons within the 
party structure? Moreover, as other indicators measured, there is electoral 
volatility illustrating the stability of the linkage between parties and their voters, 
representing the outer circle of party structure.  
Nevertheless, the measurement also involves another indicator - the extent of 
orientation of citizens by political parties through policy options. Such a level of 
integration is manifested through the relation of parties to their social structures. 
Finally, the extent to which parties make citizens feel part of the process is the 
final indicator of the integration function. Normally, such a feeling develops as a 
result of good performance by parties of the above mentioned indicators of 
integration function. If citizens are healthily anchored by parties, and well 
oriented in policy options, the feeling among citizens that their says matters 
should naturally follow. It develops a sense of belonging and being part of a 
collective decision making process. However, it remains questionable how far 
integration and the roots of parties are developed in society, since electoral 
turnout has been constantly diminishing, and is likely to come down to about 
30%?  
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The proceeding research and data are based on interviews and document 
analysis methods, analysing the data by content analysis. The data are taken 
from party programmes and electoral platforms48, preferences of their supporters, 
analysis of electoral results, party statutes, election and volatility data, media 
reports, various reports, and others. 
6.2. Anchoring citizens by ideas and goals (symbols) 
Party Typology 
Political parties in Kosovo, in terms of their organisation structure, find 
themselves between two models. On one side, there is an ideal model of party 
organisation with inner structure power, like the one in western European 
consolidated democracies49. Such an organisation model is found in papers in 
party documents, party leaders’ declarations, speeches and interviews, as well 
as conferences and round tables. In other words, parties try to sell a fictitious 
model to the public. One of the reasons for such a fake appearance is the broad 
support of the democratisation process in Kosovo by countries that have 
consolidated democracies already. Democracy and democratisation in the region 
is widely considered as the Zeit Geist. There is wide public perception that 
western European democracy is the right model. Yet, in reality it remains just a 
wishful model and to some extent has a cosmetic party outlook. In fact, it 
represents, with exceptions, only the formal structure of decidedly informal 
functioning parties. Some parties have yet started to formalise personalistic 
features, but it is possible to suggest, they still try to elaborate these features as 
being within the democratic space (role of parties’ presidents, form AAK and AKR 
statute). As a matter of fact, the actual model of party organisation does not 
match the formal one. To a large extent, the rules of the inner party game differ 
tremendously from those proclaimed to the public. Most parties in Kosovo prove 
to be exceedingly personalistic in nature, according to the Diamond and Gunther 
(2001) models of parties. In some cases, the party leaders tend to share some 
                                                 
48 I use also a study done by the Institute in Kosovo (KDI) on do the compatibility between electoral programmes of 
parties and voters preferences.  
49 Of course they are not of a unified model, but in general at least do share more power with other organs of parties. 
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power with a few due to the impossibility of a monopoly, dictating the oligarchic 
party structure. This comes about mainly in PDK and LDK. The circumstances of 
the creation of PDK and the power relation among the PDK founders necessitate 
such relationship. In the case of LDK it happened after the death of Rugova. In 
such type of party structures there is less space for integration, since there is 
less possibility for a say from society level. The more centralised the decision-
making power, the more restricted the range of collective decisions would be, 
and in turn the smaller the prospects for integration.  
 
Referring to party typology developed by Diamond and Gunther (2001) based on 
three dimensions: ideological, organisational, and party stand toward the regime, 
it is obvious that in terms of ideology, excluding nationalism - found more or less 
in each party, parties in Kosovo are not ideologically driven in the sense of the 
left/right ideologies common in western Europe. Of course, almost every political 
action is within a particular ideology, but the fact remains that parties’ actions are 
not ideologically shaped, or most of them appear not to be aware of such 
required guiding principles at all (see chap. 5). Parties actions are not oriented on 
particular ideology. Regarding the party stand towards the regime, no party 
publicly denounces a democratic regime, though their behaviours hardly match 
democratic principles. A democratic regime rhetorically is considered as the Zeit 
Geist, although what is proclaimed has a different direction to the actual practice. 
The behaviour of parties is scarcely equivalent to democratic values. Among the 
main species of parties, identified50 by the authors, in the case of Kosovo 
elements of elitist parties are present, electoralist parties, and in a formal sense 
also elements of massive parties currently in decline. Before and immediately 
after the war major parties were massive in nature, due to the nationalist 
                                                 
50 I consider just three of them, because the major parties in the Kosovo party system I deal with have elements of the 
three species. However, there are also ethnicity-based parties as well, but I have dealt briefly with them in the historical 
development of parties chapter, they are small parties in terms of the number of people they represent, and my study is 
mainly focused on five major parties dominating the Kosovo party system. Regarding the movement parties variety 
identified with left libertarians and post industrial extreme rightist parties that mainly are based on post-materialist values, 
Kosovo lack behind in terms of such value developments. Extreme rightist parties in Kosovo are considered just a few 
small parties that I have mentioned briefly at chapter on historical development of parties.  
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ideology, mobilising the masses and the electorate in general. As the settlement 
for the status of Kosovo grew closer, the nationalist ideology began to vanish, 
consequently making the mass support for said parties less reasonable.  
 
Elitist Parties 
This is one of the main species of party models identified at the early stages of 
party development in Western Europe, characterised with a thin organisational 
structure and a low level of accountability. Its major types are known the party of 
notables, and later with socio-economic transformation, the clientelist party also 
emerged. Elements of elitist parties are instituted on the actual inner decision 
making of parties and modern clientelist structures. Certainly, modern clientelism 
(see chap. 9) differs from the old one, being more horizontal and is not merely at 
the individual linkages level.  
 
Massive Parties  
Massive parties are considered the most successful parties in terms of social 
integration and the revolutionary changes they brought. Their wide organisation 
structure mobilised massive support and is categorised as the type of parties with 
a high level of social integration in the political process. LDK before and 
immediately after the war, and to some extent PDK in its beginning, can be 
considered the massive parties in Kosovo. Astonishingly, parties in Kosovo at 
their formal organisational structure also have branches and sub-branches at the 
local level. Yet, they differ from traditional ‘mass’ parties due to the autonomy of 
these institutions within the power structure. As Grzymala-Busse (2008) added, 
they are kept more or less to identify with clienteles rather than to widen the 
range of the decision-makers and to augment the say of party members.  
 
Electoralist Parties 
The major party types within this specie of parties are the programmatic, catch 
all, and personalistic parties. They are usually active at election campaign and 
have no thick organisational structure as massive parties have. The elements of 
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the last two types of electoralist parties are widespread in Kosovo parties. Parties 
are highly personalistic since everything is predominantly centred around a single 
leader. The name of leader and party are interchangeable, and the rest of the 
inner party institutions are more or less a technical support to the will of the party 
leader. Such parties are also prone to serve very particularistic interests. 
Whatever the leader says is incontestable. In this regard, Kosovo parties are 
principally dependent on their leaders. The unassailable authority of the leader is 
exemplified also in the law for the general election, whereby the first on the 
electoral list gets the votes of party automatically (Law on the general election, 
Law Nr. 03/L-073, Article 110), not having to enter into intra party competition. 
Past experiences prove that always the first on the electoral list is the name of 
Kosovo parties’ leaders. Furthermore, parties tempt to justify such authoritarian 
values referring to society tradition, in this way contesting the very compatibility 
of democracy with Kosovo society. For example in a TV Debate (RTK, Forumi, 
06.04.2009) the Organizative Secretary of AAK, Blerim Kuqi, among others 
claimed that it is a tradition of Kosovo society, to follow the leader, and to have a 
powerful authoritarian leader. The iron law of oligarchy (Michels 1908) – “Te l’est 
mon bon plaisir - One commands, all others obey” is highly embodied in Kosovo 
parties. 
 
LDK  
Since the death of its leader Ibrahim Rugova, The party is experiencing 
apparently unsolvable inner crises. Rugova enjoyed uncontested authority within 
the party, his charisma broadly penetrating the hearts of the masses. The 
absolute decision-making power within the party rested in his hands. 
Subsequently, other party institutions remained powerless and underdeveloped, 
particularly the mechanism of inner decision-making power transformation. The 
death of the LDK leader produced (among other crises) a leadership crisis within 
the party, ensuing the split of the party into two in 2007. At present the position of 
party chairperson is frozen.  
 
  Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo          
 
178 
 
In terms of a model massive party, LDK before and immediately after the war 
used to be a good example of a massive party, attributed to its wide social 
support. Therefore, for a certain period of time LDK might be counted as a 
massive party, and from Janda’s (1980, 14) perspective on party 
institutionalisation, in view of the reification as an outer party institutionalisation, 
LDK enjoyed a very high level of party institutionalisation. The mass support was 
also merely fed by the nationalist ideology, mobilising the masses based on 
emotional sentiment common to nationalism. In recent developments since 
nationalism does not count for the major society priority anymore, the party is 
shifting toward an elitist model developing its clientelist structure. 
 
PDK 
PDK is also highly personalistic in nature, but different from other parties, 
because its leader finds itself in not such a relaxed position, since few others at 
the top of the party might challenge their authority. This is mainly owed to the 
way the party was founded.  A few oligarchs of the KLA founded the party, 
bringing along the oligarchy to the party. However, PDK leader Thaqi remains the 
highest personality of party, as most of its supporters identify PDK with him.  
 
Immediately after the war, PDK was largely a massive party. It mobilised mostly 
those directly linked with participation in the war and the region of Drenica, where 
most of the war took place and where the majority of the party chairmanship 
comes from. It has branches and sub-branches in most parts of Kosovo. 
Recently they are cultivating an elitist model of parties through developing a 
modern clientelist structure.  
 
AAK  
AAK also is very much a personalistic party led by former KLA commander 
Ramush Haradinaj in the region of Dukagjini. Although AAK was founded in 2001 
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as an alliance of some parties51 its leader managed to bear down the voices of 
other party leaders that joined AAK, dominating the party as an unchallenged 
absolute authority within the party. Such dominance is formalised by the party 
statute, turning the party into what they call a presidential party, not a known 
party model before, emphasising the uninfringeable power of the party  leader. 
The authoritarian values of decision-making within the party among others are 
also made public by the former member of AAK, Bujar Dugolli. According to him, 
he was ousted from the party with a totalitarian decision akin to a decision from 
the communist era, asserting the lack of debate within the party of anything 
worthy (Epoka e Re 31.08.2009).  
 
At the beginning, the party was mainly based on a provincial level in the 
Dukagjini region, but later it spread its formal organisational structure of branches 
and sub-branches to other parts of Kosovo. However, it still remains a largely 
region based party. Apart from provincialism, the party has managed to establish 
its own modern clientelist structure, reimbursed previously from state resources 
while being in power, and now from businesses supporting the party financially 
with the intention of getting this back if the party comes to power.   
 
LDD 
It was founded as a result of the way its leader being treated unfairly when a 
member of LDK, after the death of Ibrahim Rugova. The party leader Nexhat 
Daci’s followers at the LDK, left LDK and established LDD with Daci as the 
ultimate leader. The party is identified with him and people use the name of the 
party and its leader interchangeably.  
 
Until 2007 it was part of LDK. It has spread its branches to most parts of Kosovo, 
many of them split from LDK. While in opposition and lacking the possibility to 
pressure businesses into work for them, and having no personal capacity for 
business activity of its own to pay for a clientelist structure, it seems to be 
                                                 
51 See chapter on historical development of parties in Kosovo. 
  Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo          
 
180 
 
gradually losing its ground and influence as a party. Some of LDD’s members 
might go back to LDK.  
 
AKR 
The same personalistic nature applies to AKR, with its leader Behgjet Pacolli a 
widely known multimillionaire. He derives his authority from being the founder 
and sponsor of the party. His absolute authority inside the party is 
unchallengeable. Some consider AKR as a private organisation, not a political 
party due to the way it was established, is financed, functions, and organised. 
The absolute authority is formalised by the party statute by a formal power aside 
the actual one. For instance, the party leader (AKR Statute 2007, Article 14) 
appoints one third of the directing council of the party. Most of the organisational 
competences and exclusively party finances are competences of the 
organisational secretary and according to Article 15, is nominated and ousted by 
the party chairman (AKR Statute 2007). It illustrates best the uncontested power 
of the leader since he has direct and sole control of party finances. Furthermore, 
the way party organs function highlights also the personalistic nature of the party. 
The Directing Council on paper is the highest body between Congresses, but it is 
very seldom commenced, neutralising its prescribed formal power. The party is 
highly identified with its leader, often when referring to AKR people say Pacolli’s 
party.   
AKR has branches and sub-branches all over Kosovo, giving it elements of 
massive parties, but the decision-making power they have refutes this. In terms 
of elements of an elitist party, it has a widespread clientelist structure funded 
mainly by private business activities in and outside Kosovo by the party leader, 
through employment and humanitarian activities. The authoritarian values of AKR 
decision-making powers are also highlighted by the AKR electoral platform of 
2007, part of which was published by a daily newspaper: “the core of success is 
the new model of leadership, with the Leviathan in the centre; the state’s 
president elected through direct citizen’s votes. We offer a president that 
guaranties citizens’ respect, and a president that guaranties a healthy synergy of 
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public institutions. The president, elected through people’s vote will be endowed 
with different mechanisms enabling him to supervise the performance of other 
pillars of government including legislative, executive and judiciary as well as the 
prevention of eventual abuses of their functions”  (Lajm 3.11.2007).  
 
Catch all parties 
Despite the above mentioned models of parties, catch all (Kirchheimer 1966) 
type of parties also belong to electoralist type of parties. It is emphasised here 
because there is a tendency by Kosovo parties to go even further. In Kosovo, 
such a type of party can be complemented as a catch all power type of party. 
The former are concerned with catching all issues regardless of the ideology they 
belong to, the latter is an attitude to catch all power and makes use of it for 
particularistic interests. Parties have no concern at all with ideological 
compromises stipulated by catch allism, since they are not ideology driven 
parties. Yet, their main concern is to catch all power possible. Such party 
behaviour is very much linked with party survival as well, because of the 
desperate need for finances by partied in order to reimburse their clienteles’ 
support, implying direct exchanges, and to ensure the possible way of doing 
business through politics. Those in power have more chances to extend the 
clienteles because they can reward them directly through using state resources. 
This leads us to the concept of unstable clientelism52 as well.  
6.2.1. Individual-party linkages 
As long as parties float above society, have no deep roots in society, and are 
merely created top down, they are prone to teething-troubles in terms of their 
capability to provide symbols that Schmitter (1999) calls ideas and goals. 
Citizens find it easier to identify themselves with a particular party through 
symbols, facilitating participation and integration into the political process. 
                                                 
52 By unstable clientelism is meant the only way to secure the clients is by being in power, because such a relationship 
is very costly, and the only way to afford it is through using state resources. State resources can be used by being in 
power. If you lose power your clientele is more vulnerable to shift to others coming to power. This is what we mean by 
unstable clientelism.    
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Independence was the main idea and goal offered by parties before and 
immediately after the war. However, it does not mean that Kosovo was free and 
not in need of other priorities, around which ideas and goals could be 
established. Nationalism was used as a workable tool to mobilise the masses, 
and later also to detract the attention of society from other societal needs 
emerging at the top of society agenda, as parties could not and did not offer any 
solution to them. Recently, they have mentioned also poverty and economic 
development, but none of them has so far offered a vision and a workable 
programme on how to achieve it.    
 
The only symbols parties in Kosovo can actually provide to society are the party 
leaders. LDK, even in 2009, was largely referring to their former leader Rugova, 
who died in 2006. This is an indicator that parties in Kosovo are not dominated 
just by leaders that are still alive, but also by those already dead. The ideal and 
goals of nationalism that up to the declaration of independence was offered by 
parties alongside their leaders, seems not to be relevant anymore, and the only 
symbols prevailing are party leaders, structuring personalistic linkages between 
parties and voters. Citizens identify themselves with parties through party 
leaders. If a certain leader of a party is mentioned, it is meant to refer to the party 
itself, or the other way around. The name of the party leader and the name of the 
party are used interchangeably. The point is that, parties are very poor in terms 
of importance and the value of symbols they offer to society, especially in terms 
of the ability to anchor their expectations about democracy and to integrate them 
into the decision making political process.   
 
Programmatic, personalistic, or clientelist linkages  
Dealing with a party - individual linkages, Kitschelt (2000) identifies three types of 
such linkages in different socio - political contexts: programmatic (ideological), 
personalistic, and clientelist linkages.  
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The first type of linkage is dominant mostly in developed industrial consolidated 
democracies. It is the best linkage in terms of democratisation prospects; the 
actions of parties and citizens become very clear. The programme based on a 
particular ideology arises from the citizens’ values being clearly represented by 
parties, including solutions to citizens’ concerns in adhering to such an ideology. 
Citizens are highly integrated producing a stable and predictable democratic 
governance. In addition, it involves a high level of accountability based on 
carrying forward what is spelt out in the programme. Usually, programmatic 
linkages endure longer compared to other linkages, since ideologies live longer 
than leaders. It ensures a high level of integration and active participation, and is 
fertile ground for development of civic culture – cultural consolidation. No 
asymmetric relationship is viable and citizens have an advanced position 
compared to the other two types of linkages. In the case of Kosovo parties, the 
programmatic linkage was partly present through nationalism and the 
independence issue, though it was more an ideology transferred into emotional 
linkages rather than into a practical programme. The programme was mainly a 
single issue and one dimensional, overwhelmed by the independence issue. As 
independence became nigh, and with declaration of independence, the 
nationalist ideology waned, and no other programmatic linkage is obvious on the 
surface of the Kosovo party system. The theory points out, that parties find it very 
thorny to integrate citizens into the political process through the poor 
programmes53 they actually offer. Parties contain less and less militants, since 
they lack ideology to mobilise them. Having poor programmatic linkages, parties 
impede the development of democratic accountability institutions, making the 
emergence of civic culture unexpected in the near future. In general terms, it also 
means less prospects for democracy consolidation.  
  
Personalistic linkages usually prevail in party systems that have a weak tradition 
of democracy. Despite the other two possible linkages, personalistic linkages in 
the short term might still offer pluralism, but in terms of other democratic 
                                                 
53 Refer to the chapter on representation function.  
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institutions required for democracy consolidation, such as accountability 
institutions, it is not wise to rely on them. The promising issue of personalistic 
linkages is that it maintains the parties’ existence and to an extent party survival, 
as everything about the party is structured around the leader. In terms of citizen 
and civic culture developments – cultural consolidation, personalistic parties are 
not to be valued as anchors of a society with democratic values. Just as 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes provide an enforced system of stability and 
continuity, also some sort of stability and endurance within parties is afforded 
based on personalistic, authoritarian inner party structure. They provide 
steadiness within the party structure, keeping alive their parties, at least as long 
as they live. Likewise, most authoritarian regimes rely wholly on the leader 
around whom the power is structured, but once gone, it results in the downturn of 
the regime as well. The same happens to these type of parties, if they find it 
impossible to find a replacement (virtually impossible) leader, parties decline 
together with them.  
 
Nevertheless, with personalistic linkages the relationship between parties and 
individuals is an asymmetric one. There is no accountability of leaders to their 
followers, since parties get their support because of their leader, from where also 
the personalistic linkages arise and are maintained. Usually, the party leader has 
“blanco support”, with parties not needing to bother to offer solutions to their 
supporters’ priorities. Such a level of integration is a poor performance in terms 
of democracy developments.  
 
In the Kosovo party system, personalistic linkages are extremely well developed, 
structuring the relationship between parties and individuals. As stated earlier, 
parties in Kosovo mostly be classified as personalistic parties (Maliqi 2009). The 
unchallengeable power of parties’ leaders conceded even by the party 
representatives interviewed (Kelmendi 2009, Buja 2009, Luma 2010, Rugova 
2010, etc). With the exception of LDK, that after the death of its unmatched 
leader, found it impossible to choose its functioning leader, and have  frozen the 
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position of party leader and the decision-making structure in general, all other 
parties have accepted the supremacy of their respective leaders. In LDK this has 
also mainly been done due to the inner battle of a few oligarchs not allowing to 
pass over each other. The main reason from the parties’ side for personalistic 
parties prevailing in Kosovo is the unrivalled decision-making power that parties’ 
leaders have. Such parties derivate personalistic linkages, integrate citizens into 
the political process through parties due to their leaders. Consequently, the 
asymmetric relationship determined by personalistic linkages, does not require 
parties to be responsible and accountable to their followers. The personalistic 
arrangement in Kosovo offers fewer prospects for democracy consolidation. 
Moreover, it leads to the personalisation of politics, standing counter to 
democracy consolidation anticipations. In addition, the prevalence of 
personalisitic linkage is due also to the historical experience of Kosovo society 
under Tito’s authoritarian  regime, and the level of social development in terms of 
the low stage of education. Reliance of voters in party leaders inculcates more 
authoritarian values than democratic values. For an unconsolidated Kosovo 
democracy, personalistic linkages are thrusting democracy maturity backwards, 
sustaining patronage, clientelism, clan and regional bases of party support. 
Kosovo parties are known for relying profoundly on such support (ICG Europe 
Report Nr. 163, 26.05.2005). Patronage and clans have their roots in society 
tradition, while regionalism in historical experience.  
 
An additional negative impact of personalistic linkages on the process of 
democracy consolidation is the personalisation of politics, considered as a 
cancer of institutions and the institutional structure of new states and new 
democracies. Individuals or persons personalising politics exceed the institutions 
and diminish their breathing space. Such individuals perceive institutions as 
challenging their unlimited power. Instead of allowing institutions to take the role 
they are supposed to have, they prevent them, enabling faster and better 
consolidation of informal institutions than formal ones. Authoritarian individuals 
consider an institution’s empowerment as a direct threat to the absolute power 
  Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo          
 
186 
 
they enjoy. Personalisation of politics is a norm in Kosovo, above all, parties in 
Kosovo are fully identified with the names of their leaders. Likewise, the first level 
of consolidation is challenged – the constitutional consolidation, particularly in 
polities where such consolidation is mainly carried out and supported by 
outsiders, as in Kosovo, a democracy in need to be habituated by the elite and 
then at society level. Personalisation of politics impedes democracy 
consolidation, as is actually the case in the Kosovo democracy consolidation 
process. Essentially, the offspring of the personalisation of politics in Kosovo are 
Kosovo parties, recognised as personalistic parties, generating and upholding 
authoritarian rather than democratic values.  
 
The third type of party – individual linkages is the clientelist linkage. Such linkage 
is found in early parties at the end of the 19th century as the first parties emerged. 
In modern times, it has taken the form of a modern clientelism widely spread in 
underdeveloped countries. Elements of clientelism are present even in 
consolidated democracies, but not as a dominant linkage, but rather as a 
substituting one. Moreover, the clientelist linkage develops direct accountability. 
Yet, such accountability is substantially very narrow, covering only the clientele, 
usually a small part of society. Furthermore, clientelist accountability is not 
directed to citizens but rather to clients, an important distinction to be made while 
dealing with democratic accountability. The clientele is integrated through an 
exchange of political support to parties, or political rights, with the direct 
reimbursement they receive. In modern times, such a transaction is translated as 
votes-for-jobs, government contracts, tenders, employment in the public and 
possibly private sector - in cases where the party leaders have their own 
businesses, other various direct benefits, or often even cash. The problem with 
such a direct exchange is that once clients are reimbursed they have no right to 
speak-out anymore, and lose their political rights. Such individual party linkages 
produce clients rather than citizens, not matching democratic expectations.  
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In addition to personalistic linkages, parties in Kosovo are consistently cultivating 
clientelist linkages (G. Krasniqi 2009, Matoshi 2009, Tahiri 2009). Parties 
themselves openly recognise that they are developing their clienteles as a 
reliable structure of support (Buja 2009, Kelmendi 2009, Luma 2009). This is also 
because the country is not prospering in terms of economic development, and 
poverty is rising day by day. People have started to get fed up of leaders, as their 
desperate needs and demands are not being prioritised and brought onto the 
agenda by parties. The political class is getting richer within a night, as an AKK 
representative stated54. Party leaders have somehow started to lose their 
influence, compared to their previous position. It should also be mentioned that 
most Kosovo party leaders are not very convincing charismatic leaders, 
apparently lacking the adequate education to be leaders. Such behaviour is often 
proved in their speeches, frequently being confused and not convincing at all. 
Since such underdevelopment has happened consistently for many years, it is 
the time factor facing off the real values of party leaders. With time, the 
importance of party chiefs is declining. Kosovo democracy is experiencing poor 
economic performance, in this way society starvation is consistently discrediting 
party leaders. Consequently, it is deleterious to personalistic linkages. Therefore, 
clientelistic linkages are gradually substituting such linkages. As a reflection of 
citizens’ disappointment with the performance of parties, the majority of them 
recently are not showing up even at the polling stations. Within such a process, 
parties are trying to create their clienteles and establish a clientelistic structure, 
on whose votes they can rely on most. However, a clientelistic linkage has its 
high cost in economic and particularly political terms, an unhealthy linkage for 
democracy consolidation. Nonetheless, this does not mean that personalistic or 
clientelist linkages are not also found in consolidated democracies. The 
distinction is that in Kosovo, the individual and clientelistic party linkages are 
dominating the party system. 
                                                 
54 Jetullah Aliu, high representative of the Kosovo Agency Against Corruption, interviewed on December 2009. 
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6.2.2. Integration, modernization, and provincial-leader based parties 
The integration function of parties also helps political development, transforming 
society from a traditional to a modern one, directly linked to the democratization 
prospects of traditional societies. For new states, with features of a traditional 
society, political modernisation process is of vital interest, since new institutions 
lack the necessary legitimacy to function properly. Usually, legitimation takes 
time. In such cases, most legitimacy relies on the previous institutions people 
used to identify with. Political parties through the integration function can anchor 
society to new state institutions, making citizens shift their loyalty from provincial 
to central state bases. Huntington (1968, 32-39) links such developments with 
the role of parties as political institutions empowering and developing a modern 
political system with modern institutions, over waning traditional institutions such 
as political organisation at the village or provincial level. Political parties link 
society to the political system in general, creating the loyalties to the system itself 
in general, not just to the province. Linkages of such type have a direct impact on 
democracy and democratic consolidation as a process, making society willingly55 
integrated into the political process, enabling the legitimation of democracy itself 
(our concern in the coming chapter), as a necessary requirement for 
consolidation.  
 
Based on that, Kosovo political parties are distinguished for their provincialism, 
largely relying on the regional level for mobilising their supporters, and integrating 
society based on provincial bases. Kosovo society is a traditional one, with 
delightful blood relationships, clans, and provincialism. For a long time 
throughout history, most political activities were organised at tribal level, and later 
at village and provincial level. There the chief of village was the main authority 
within the village structure. In addition, most of the people identified mainly with 
the region. Within such a structure, the clan relationship substituted the regional 
identification. 
                                                 
55 It should be highlighted that in democratic system differing form the former socialist system there is a willingly 
integration not enforced integration as it was in a totalitarian socialist states.  
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Now Kosovo is a newly independent state, expected to transform the loyalty from 
such traditional structures of political organisation to modern state institutions. 
Yet, political parties in Kosovo remain largely based on their provinces. Excluding 
the mass movement for independence led by LDK before the war, that had more 
nationwide character after the war, most parties, including LDK, were and 
continue to be largely provincial based. LDK has major support in Podujeva and 
in the Pristina region in general. Since the death of Rugova, LDK has started to 
lose influence in some regions, limiting itself around the capital city and the 
region of Llap (Ismet Beqiri 2010). It also provided the way to widen and deepen 
the influence of AAK in Dukagjini, and to extend the number of municipalities it 
won in Dukagjini in the 2007 elections. The LDK leader himself came from 
Dukagjini, and his death made many from this region alter their loyalty to another 
Dukagjini leader, the respective AAK leader. On the other side, PDK is mostly 
based and identified with its bastion of support in the Drenica region, and 
recently in some other parts of Kosovo, due to clientelist developments while 
being in power (Buja 2009, Stavileci 2010). AAK is vastly provincially spread in 
the Dukagjini region where its leader comes from (Luma 2010, Ramadani 2010). 
AKR is based in Gollak and the surrounding area, because its leader is from the 
same region (Kelmendi 2009, Hajzeraj 2009). LDD relies mainly on Kamenica 
and Gjilan – as its leader comes from Anamorava. It is important to say that this 
relationship is due also to the origin of the party leaders. In this case, there 
appears a mix up of personalistic and provincial features of parties. Parties 
identified with provincialism, started to break such boundaries looking for support 
in other parts of Kosovo as well, because sole reliance on regional support is not 
considered sufficient. As a substitution, parties are trying to expand their 
clientelist structure as a mechanism to penetrate into other parts as well. Thus, it 
can be concluded that gradually provincialism also, despite personalistic 
linkages, is opening the way to clientelism as the major structured anchor of 
society in the political process.  
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Such provincialism offers difficulties in the state-building process that Kosovo is 
currently undergoing, consequently affecting the democratisation process itself. 
Therefore, parties in Kosovo are to some extent integrating society based on 
regions, more at a regional level rather than making society feel part of the 
political process at the national level. Further, parties are cultivating regional 
rather than modern national identities and state national institutions, essential for 
democracy consolidation.  
6.2.3. Movement of party elites from one party to another 
The party elite are considered the closest circle in the party organisational 
structure. Usually, people at the top of the party are those considered loyal to the 
party. In programmatic parties those more loyal to the ideology of the party are at 
the top. Yet, in personalistic parties those at the top are usually the more trusted 
to the leader, since party organs are usually meant to be the technical support to 
the party leader. 
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Fig. 2. The formal structure of political parties in Kosovo 
 
Fig. 3. The actual structure of political parties in Kosovo 
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Since the closest linked with the party are supposed to be the party elites, their 
loyalty to the party is an indicator of the performance of the party integration 
function. Party elites widely known to be unstable and not loyal to the party, 
illustrates the thinness of anchoring the individuals to Kosovo parties, as holders 
of high positions in parties keep shifting, from one party to another. This is an 
indicator for a low level of social integration through political parties. If people at 
the top of the party hierarchy are not well integrated within the party, keep 
shifting from one party to another, how integrated are party members at lower 
structures, or even supporters and voters from the outer circles of the party 
structure (Fig. 2)? 
 
Among Kosovo parties, the movement of party elites from one party to another is 
a frequent thing. In relation to that, there are three types of elite movements from 
one party to another. Firstly, shifting as a group to form other parties; secondly, 
the departure of individuals to establish their own parties, and thirdly, a recent 
one, is the movement of individuals or groups from a party to other parties on a 
provincial basis or on individual arrangements for individual direct profits. 
 
The first type of elite movement was more common previous, during, or 
immediately after the war 1998-99, as a clash between two concepts on the way 
the resistance against Serbia should take place. Many left LDK, unhappy with its 
peaceful way to independence, and joined KLA or even formed new parties such 
as LBSH, LBD, PBD, PDK, AAK, and so on. There are suggestions that some 
members of the PDK elite, having more leftist values, due to inner divisions are 
expected to later join Socialist Party of Kosovo (small party), currently 
transformed from LPK or possibly any other(see chap. 4). This is not likely to 
happen as long as they are in power and have a good opportunity to systemise 
them in a different governing position. The problem might arise when they have 
nothing to share, once out of power. 
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The second type of elite movement is a characteristic of the Kosovo party system 
after the war up to the November 2007 election as the electoral threshold of 5% 
was put in place. Some individuals, unhappy with the inner party climate, decided 
to depart from the parties they belonged to, and establish their own parties. One 
of the main driving forces behind them was the opportunity to be a leader of a 
new party. Most of the parties formed from such shifts were usually small parties 
in terms of membership and votes polled. At the beginning of pluralism they were 
welcomed, but later when the number of parties in Kosovo raised to more than 
50, in a population of approximately two million, the electoral threshold made it 
tricky for such new parties to emerge. Many calculated it to be better to stay 
inside a larger party lower in the chairmanship hierarchy, than to establish new 
parties having no chance to get any parliamentary seat, especially now with the 
consistent decrease in voter turnout. An illustration of such movement was the 
departure of Edita Tahiri from LDK in 2004, unhappy with LDK leadership, joined 
by a few other people, she established ADK. Furthermore, Bujar Bukoshi 
accused of mismanagement of Funds of Kosovo Albanians, known as “three 
percent found” raised during the peaceful resistance and the war, ran away from 
LDK and formed PReK in 2002, adding to the Kosovo party system another small 
party. 
 
The other type of elite movements has broadened recently and is mainly 
provincial or individual, direct benefit oriented. Such party behaviour is better 
explained by the individual rational choice approach. Individuals within the party 
elite calculates his/her private benefits when deciding to shift to another party. 
Some from the Dukagjini province including MPs form LDK and AKR, as well as 
the CEO from LDK moved to AAK, the Dukagjini province based party. Their 
cases are also individual direct profit oriented, since most of them received 
positions in the AAK Chairmanship hierarchy. Haki Shatri an MP and a member 
of the LDK chairmanship moved to AAK in 2008 as a member of the 
Chairmanship also. Shkumbin Demaliaj an MP as well as a Deputy Chairman for 
party organisational issues at AKR, moved to AAK in 2009 as a member of the 
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Chairmanship. Blerim Kuçi, nominated as CEO at LDK to lead the reforms within 
LDK, moved to AAK as Organisational Secretary, in charge of organising the 
party.  
 
There are other movements of elites from party to party, taking place also as a 
result of dwindling party members, forcing parties to be more elite-concentrated. 
The current MPs are attracted to circuit within the parliament from one side to 
another. In this regard, parties increase the number of parliamentary seats, or 
enlargement of the number of votes from MPs having a direct link with certain 
voters – normally at localities level. They can also boost their material support 
from MPs having successful businesses, as party financing is one of the big 
challenges for Kosovo parties, as is the case with Blerim Kuçi56 for instance. 
Recently, one of the LDD deputy chairman Berim Ramosaj deserted LDD and 
returned to the party he came from – LDK. There is actually currently no such 
movement from PDK – the coalition leader, because it offers great possibilities 
for individuals and personal benefits through capturing the state, facilitated to 
comfort them while being in power. 
 
Such a movement of elites from a party to another is one of the best indicators of 
how weakly consolidated the parties are, the low extent to which they have 
developed their own labels, brands, or symbols sufficient for people to identify 
themselves with the party, and integrate them into the political process – 
democracy. The larger the number of citizens integrated into the system, the 
more likely there would be stability of democracy. If the party elites, constituting 
the top and most integrated circle within the party, demonstrate a high level of 
distrust and deficiency in loyalty with their parties, maundering from a party to 
another, then what is to be expected from members, supporters, or voters 
constituting the peripheral structure of the party (Fig. 2). 
 
                                                 
56 At the local level three AKR directors of the local government in Prizren moved to PDK.  
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It should be pointed out, that elite movements of the second and third, and to 
some extent the first type, are not ideologically driven, but merely personal, 
individual, and provincial based. Such flow is also straightforward due to no 
ideological identities and differences existing among parties, and the prevailing 
leader and provincial determinants, wherever you depart ideologically it is the 
same.  
6.2.4. Electoral volatility 
Party systems with a high level of electoral volatility are prone to instability, 
generating democracy unsteadiness as well. Electoral volatility is one of the main 
indicators of the degree of citizens’ integration into the political system, anchored 
by political parties. It illustrates society integration into the political process; in 
other words, how well parties keep their electorate loyal to them through 
integration. Electoral volatility is widely defined as the level of voters shift within a 
party system, from one party to the other, from one election to another. While 
mathematically the net volatility is calculated as the sum of the percentage of 
shift of voters of all parties from elections to another, divided by two.  
 
In the Kosovo party system there has been a steady increase in the electoral 
volatility from the 2001 elections up to the last national elections in 2007 (table 
6). It is common for parties to seize members from other parties, and use it as a 
boosted medial effect, distributing the party IDs publicly at the TV. As an 
illustration, among others, as daily newspaper Kosova Sot (30.03.2009) reports, 
an AAK sub-branch in Gjilan moved to PDK branch, and many members of LDD, 
PDK, and AAK fled to LDK in Viti. 
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Name of the 
Party  
Election 
Results in 
2001 (Voter 
Turn out 
84.8%) 
Election 
Results in 
2004(Voter 
Turn out 
53.57%) 
Election 
Results in 
2007(Voter 
Turn out 
40.10%) 
Percentage of 
volatility 
2001-2004 
Percentage 
of volatility 
2004 - 2007 
LDK 45.65% 
(359 851) 
votes 
45.42% 
(313 437) 
votes 
22.6% 
(129 410) 
votes 
0.23% 49.6 % 
PDK 25.70% 
(202 622) 
votes 
28.85% 
(199 112) 
votes 
34.3% 
(196 207) 
3.15% 5.45% 
AAK 7.83% 
(61 688) votes 
8.39% 
(57 931) votes 
9.6% 
(54 611) votes 
0.56 1.21% 
AKR -----
57 ----- 12.3% 
(70 165) votes 
___ 12.3% 
LDD -----
58 ----- 10.0% 
(57 002) votes 
___ 10.0% 
 
Table 6. Electoral volatility in the Kosovo party system between 2001 and 2007 elections 59 
 
As it demonstrates, electoral volatility has increased especially in recent years; 
while a bit lower from the 2001 to 2004 elections, it jumped in the 2007 elections. 
Many indicators suggest a further boost of volatility in the near future. The 
direction of party developments, transforming toward a clientelist structure of 
organisation, and fierce competition from parties for clients’ votes, turns clients 
into being less trustful and less loyal, available for a shift to whoever pays or 
rewards them better. Those more capable to reimburse clients are those in 
power (see chap. 9). 
 
Such a high level of volatility proves the low level of binding citizens into the 
political process via political parties, implying a poor integration into the political 
system as well. The failure of parties to perform the integration function produces 
an unstable party system, setting Kosovo democracy as more vulnerable and 
                                                 
57 AKR for the first time contested election in 2007. 
58 LDD was inside LDK, it was found in 2007 and for the first time contested 2007 elections. 
59 Based on OSCE mission in Kosovo, www.osce.org  
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democracy consolidation prospects as unpredictable. Moreover, the high level of 
electoral volatility proves that parties perform poorly in integrating most citizens 
through symbols actually offered by parties. Parties with undemocratic objectives 
might appear, and attempt to capture the majority of undecided voters, and 
change the course of politics in general, firstly limiting and later even banning 
completely democracy, making Kosovo an officially authoritarian regime. Such a 
development is very much likely if the current social movement known as 
“Vetvendosja” (“Selfdetermination”) decides to transform into a political party and 
contest elections. As a movement, it is mainly joined by idealist young men, 
heavily influenced by leftist literature, supplemented by nationalist symbols, and 
standing against the presence of the international community in Kosovo. If they 
are to join politics, they might be fairly successful in terms of the number of votes 
they are able to achieve. This is attributable to the existing high level of electoral 
volatility, low electoral turn out, steady increase in poverty, high level of 
dissatisfaction with the current politics, the populist appeals used, and the fact 
that no viable alternative from other parties is apparent. Vetvendosja is perceived 
as an alternative, seeing as no other alternative is on the horizon. Moreover, 
current authoritarian attitudes are consistently decreasing the space for 
democracy in Kosovo, despite the international community’s persistence on 
democratic values.  
6.3. Orienting citizens toward policy options  
6.3.1. Relation of parties to their social structure 
The second element of integration definition is orienting most citizens in a 
general way towards policy options - a very important element in the relationship 
of parties with their social structure, normally performed better by parties of a 
programmatic type. The parties offering policies to solve the public problems of 
their followers and citizens in general integrate them directly through addressing 
their concerns. Ideological orientation of parties makes it easier for citizens to 
orient themselves on their decisions in pluralist system. Usually, citizens often 
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lack information needed to decide on the policy options offered. Therefore, it is 
the job of parties to orient and embrace them into the decision-making process.  
 
“You ask too much of us. We produce just MPs”. This is the answer of one of the 
top party leaders as he was criticised by others that parties should also sell 
policies as products (ICG Europe Report Nr. 163, 26.05.2005). Such an attitude 
does not only manifest the dearth of Kosovo parties in terms of policies they 
offer, but also the parties’ attitudes and values, not being concerned with 
providing solutions to citizens’ public problems. Likewise, parties do not orient 
citizens in policy options, since they do not demonstrate awareness of the 
responsibility to provide policies.  
 
Policy orientation is not greatly expected in personalistic and clientelist models of 
parties prevailing in Kosovo. However, it does not mean they make no politics or 
no policies at all, but what is clear is that it does constitute the heart of parties. 
Leaders and clients take priority over policies. Parties in the Kosovo party system 
offered merely the policy of independence to citizens. As stated above, such a 
policy is not valid anymore and currently parties in Kosovo seem incapable in 
putting forward viable and practical solutions to citizens’ public problems, 
articulated in policy formats. Since February 2008 with the declaration of 
independence, parties have to look for other policies through which they can 
anchor society into politics. Despite the many problems that Kosovo society has, 
parties do not provide creativity in offering policies to solve these problems, and 
consequently to integrate citizens into the political process60. The chapter on the 
representation function of parties also confirms the disenchantment of parties to 
their social structure, merely floating above society with their consistently 
depleting roots in society.  
 
                                                 
60 See party promises at election campaigns 2001, 2004, and 2007 (chap.8). The electoral platforms are more wishful 
thoughts to attract voters’ attention, rather than real solutions to society’s problems. For example, PDK electoral platform 
of 2007 election, among others stated “we will make Kosovo a silicon valley” (chap.5).  
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6.4. Making citizens feel part of the process of collective choice  
Another dimension of integration definition is that parties endow citizens with a 
feeling of belonging in the process of collective choice. After exploring party 
models in Kosovo, individual – party linkages, and policy orientation of citizens by 
parties, it can be asserted that if parties were convincingly successful in these 
elements of integration, the development of citizens’ feeling a part of the 
collective process of decision-making comes automatically. Yet, the performance 
of parties on the above-mentioned indicators confirms the opposite. The high 
level of electoral volatility, low level of voter turnout, personalistic and clientelistic 
linkages and a low level of policy orientation makes it hard for citizens to have a 
sense of a feeling of belonging to the collective decision-making process.       
 
Such a feeling is attained through widening the scope of the collective decision-
making process, at each level of the party organisational structure, enhancing the 
possibility of participation as much as possible. Hitherto, actual closed 
personalistic parties are not expected to afford such luxury – according to parties’ 
mentality, to broaden the range of collective choice. For most citizens it makes 
no sense to perceive themselves part of a collective choice, as long as decisions 
for almost each and every issue are decided far away from them, inside the 
closed circles of a few, or by a single person, frequently even outside party 
institutions. Therefore, the rise and maintenance of citizens’ feeling of belonging 
is not to be expected, given that citizens are ignored and neglected by the major 
institutions meant to generate and further expand such feelings. Moreover, such 
party behaviour has a worse impact for new democracies with no tradition of 
democracy at all. They are unable to deliver democratic values and socialise 
society with them. Such party behaviour is consistently drying out the party 
members’ enthusiasm, and gradually feeding the indifferent attitudes among 
them leading to apathy and alienation. Normally, apathy is not considered 
healthy for new democracies. This attitude is best illustrated by the current rate of 
voter turnout.  
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6.4.1. Voter turnout 
Voters constitute the last outer circle of the party structure. Despite clients, 
members, supporters and militants, some voters might be from those undecided 
as well. If the number of people who go to vote is low, it points out the low level 
of participation and integration. Low voter turnout has recently also been a 
concern for consolidated western democracies as well (Dalton 2002). The 
decline has taken place also in many post-communist countries despite highly 
enthusiastic participation at the beginning. However, the reasons for low voter 
turnout in post-communist countries differ from western democracies (Mason 
2003/2004). If there is a political monotony and less to be changed in 
consolidated democracies, the same does not apply for countries with poor 
performance in the economy, welfare, education, a high level of corruption, a 
weak rule of law, and so on, as is the case in Kosovo.  
 
Low level turnout among other things is an upshot of disenchantment - citizens 
are dissatisfied, they feel quite apart from the collective decision-making process 
and see their vote as meaningless, therefore potential voters find no reason to 
vote. Voter turnout in Kosovo has been constantly dwindling from 84.8% in 2001 
to 53.57% in 2004 and then 40.10% in 2007 (table 7).  There is a possibility in 
coming elections for participation to be even lower. It is an alarming issue for 
Kosovo democracy, and a frightening signal for democracy consolidation. 
Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether the electorate are 
disenchanted only from parties and elections, or from the political process, the 
political system and regime in general?  
 
The most responsible for such a low turnout are the parties themselves. They are 
not capable to mobilize the electorate to cast their votes and be part of the 
collective choice. Parties have closed up their structures for citizens giving 
priority to clients’ concerns. If one counts the number of clients in the Kosovo 
political system, it becomes clear that they largely dominate the number of 
voters. This is so also due to the large number of parties in a small country like 
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Kosovo with approximately61 little more than 2 million people. In Kosovo, clients 
go to vote because they benefit directly from it. The rest that do not get anything 
directly see less reason to do that. Nevertheless, clans and nepotism, coming 
from society tradition, complement the number of clients into the overall structure 
of voters. 
 
Election Year  2001 2004 2007 
Percentage of voter 
turnout62 
84.8% 53.57% 40.10% 
 
Table 7. Voter turnout in Kosovo from 2001 to 2007 
 
It is important to mention the drastic decrease in voter turnout, from enthusiastic 
participation of 84% in 2000 to 40% in the 2007 election. The recent trends show 
a further downturn in coming elections. Hence, the low level of citizens’ 
integration by political parties is indicated by citizens’ apathy and a large 
percentage of non-voters, 60% do not even vote and are not a member of any 
party. Consequently, they do not see and feel themselves as part of the process, 
and believe less in this process called democracy. The worst problem here is not 
just the current trend, but lack of signs of any positive change in this regard. 
Regardless, of the readiness of citizens to participate, parties should offer 
practical space and opportunity for better integration of society in the political 
process. Parties are actually finding it difficult to mobilise citizens, at least to vote 
once in three or four years. Moreover, the complementing institutions of 
integration such as associations or movements are very poorly organised, and 
largely manipulated by existing parties. Parties are not only failing to integrate the 
majority of society into the political process, but are also preventing other 
institutions, supposed to perform the integration function as well. Hence, parties 
are not fulfilling their fundamental functions, but also averting others that could 
otherwise supplement them in such a function.  
                                                 
61 Approximation is a result of the issue that after 1989, no official registration of population has taken place. 
62 Based on data taken from OSCE mission in Kosovo. 
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6.5. Conclusion 
After exploring the performance of political parties in Kosovo in the integration 
function, based on measuring its indicators, it can be concluded that the stumpy 
level of citizens’ integration into the political system is not a promising sign for 
democracy consolidation. Unlike other regimes, democracy is highly reliant on 
the willing integration of society into the political process. Otherwise, democracy, 
without citizens, no longer makes sense. As long as major anchors of society in 
the political process, political parties, fail to perform the integration function, it 
further obscures the process of democracy consolidation.  
 
The current type of Kosovo political parties makes them supremely capable in 
offering citizens only skinny and crude ideas and goals, and not long-term 
convincing to most of them. The supremacy of party leaders as the main symbols 
to anchor society in the political process is short-term in nature and not sufficient 
for integration. Moreover, it does not imply a stable anchoring of democracy 
expectations. The principal linkages between individuals and parties remain 
personalistic linkages, with the current trend of Kosovo parties structural 
development (Fig. 3), actually leaving the way to more clientelistic linkages.. 
Such linkages generate more authoritarian rather than democratic values. In 
addition, the traditional institutions such as clans, provinces, and blood 
relationships, common in Kosovo social structures, are substituting these 
linkages. Furthermore, the movement of parties’ elites, as a top organisation 
hierarchy, from one party to another, brings to the surface a weak integrated 
structure of parties. What’s more, a high level of electoral volatility with its 
growing trend deteriorating society integration prospects. 
 
On the other hand, Kosovo parties puzzle citizens as they fall short to orient them 
on the policy options. It would be unreasonable to expect such orientation to be 
provided by parties, as long as they continue to have an ideological identity 
crisis. Their ideological confusion and mishmash is transmitted to major parts of 
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society, usually those having a lack of necessary information about politics milieu 
and political decisions.  
 
At the top of such development is the expected development of the feelings 
among citizens, coming out of their experience with democracy merely through 
political parties. A low level of integration is less likely to produce the feelings of 
belonging to the system. Participation is a prerequisite to construct a feeling of 
belonging. This is also illustrated by the low voter turnout coming out of citizens’ 
disappointment with the performance of parties, and correspondingly democracy 
in general, reflected by the low level of opportunity that Kosovo political parties 
offer to citizens to be part of the system.  
 
The integration function pinches directly on the other functions as well, especially 
the legitimation function that is our concern in the next chapter. In addition, it is 
directly reflected on the other three levels of the consolidation structure, 
particularly at the fourth level, the cultural consolidation where citizens are 
expected to socialise themselves with democracy through being part of the 
political process, anchored by political parties. The integration level is less 
promising, since the complimentary institutions of integration are 
underdeveloped. In this regard, Matoshi (2009) adds that most of these 
organisations are largely government controlled.  
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Chapter 7 
7.0. Discrediting Democracy - The Legitimation Function 
of Parties in Kosovo 
7.1. Introduction 
For every regime capable to function, it should primarily be recognised either 
willingly by the ruled themselves, as in the case of democracy, or forced as in 
authoritarian regimes, or of a mixed type in between. It is an outcome of an 
agreement based on which the system is run. Democracy has no guarantee of 
legitimacy; on the contrary it is directly reliant on broader legitimacy compared to 
non-democratic regimes. Moreover, a fundamental requirement for a 
consolidated democracy is the attainment of legitimacy. In order for democracy to 
be consolidated, it should first and foremost be perceived as legitimate by 
citizens. The legitimation is best achieved through transparency and a decision-
making process offering the opportunity for citizens to participate in such a 
process (Rosenau 1973, 50), acknowledged as legitimation through participation.  
 
Democracy consolidation makes no sense if in the hearts and minds of the 
population democracy is viewed with suspicion, or if the mainstream intermediary 
ways for citizens to participate in the political system are closed or monopolised 
by gatekeepers - the ruling elites of parties, or whoever might play that role. 
Doubt, impedes democracy from giving effect – in terms of citizens benefits, 
particularly new democracies where citizens do not distinguish the ruling elite 
from institutions and the regime as a whole (Dalton 2002), people identify the 
attitudes of leaders with the values of democracy itself.  
 
The performance of the legitimation function, as for every democracy, is also a 
necessity for the consolidated of democracy in Kosovo, currently characterised 
by a towering level of personalisation of politics and the scarcity of inner party 
democracy. As a party function, legitimation has a fundamental and determining 
effect on the democracy consolidation prospects. Legitimation ensures stability of 
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democracy since the majority of citizens are convinced by political parties to 
consider a democratic regime as legitimate and to believe in democracy as well.  
 
Legitimacy as a structure of the political system is a necessary requirement for a 
regime to function. Different regimes have different structures of legitimacy, but 
none of them can be sustainable without it. As a concept, legitimacy is one of the 
basic concepts in political science, widely and variously defined and 
conceptualised by many scholars. Most of the definitions given deal with the 
relationship between the rulers and the ruled, illustrating that legitimacy is an 
open ended dynamic process, imperative for a system to function, always 
requiring attention, and a liquid phenomenon in need of constant cultivation.  
 
Max Weber (1968) is among the first who gave his conception of legitimacy while 
speaking about the right of the ruler to issue commands and the obligation of the 
ruled to obey. Such a relationship according to Weber is principally based on the 
belief and legality compiling the legitimate order. Yet, his conception has been 
criticised on many grounds, like equating legitimacy with belief and perception, 
able to continuously lead to misinterpretation and misconception, measuring 
legitimacy through public opinion, and so on.   
 
On the other side, legitimacy is also conceptualised as “the popular acceptance 
of a governing regime or a system of governance” (Encyclopaedia of 
Governance 2006). However, this is a very generalised definition and not 
practical to be operationalised for the measurement of the legitimation function. 
As a definition, it is very broad and needs more focus. Nonetheless, Rousseau 
(1762) conceptualizes the ruled - rulers relationship as  “anyone who believes 
himself the master of his fellow men, is…more of a slave … unless he transforms 
force into right and obedience into duty - is never strong enough to have his way 
all the time”. He offers a luminous explanation emphasizing the necessary 
requirements of popular belief in order to extend authority, omitting the force as a 
long-term solution to it.     
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However, the concept of legitimacy is widely considered as a dynamic one, 
needing constant definition, often on a contextual bases. Another 
conceptualisation of legitimacy is offered by Alagappa (1995, 15) an all-
encompassing and measurable definition useful for our case study. To him “a 
command-obedience relationship might be defined as legitimate if the political 
order in which it is rooted is based on shared norms and values, if the 
government in concern acquired power in conformity with established rules, if 
that power is exercised within prescribed limits for the promotion of the 
community’s collective interest, and if the governed have given their consent to 
the incumbent government”. Such a conceptualisation includes four elements in 
four dimensions. The normative dimension relies on shared norms and values. 
The procedural dimension includes the acquisition of power while conforming to 
the established rules. On the other side, the dimension of performance is 
identified as the exercising power within the limits for the promotion of collective 
interests. Then, the last dimension is the resulting consent of the governed to 
those governing (Alagappa, 24). Such a definition is all encompassing, 
describing the overall structure and functioning of the system and the regime’s 
legitimacy, its bases, procedures, performance and the consent. 
 
Norms and values refer to the general basis of a belief system or ideology, 
determining how things are supposed to be. Values specify the goals to be 
achieved - what ought to be attained. The normative dimension constitutes the 
basis and the overall structure of the power relationship in different regimes: 
authoritarian, totalitarian, or a democratic regime. In the case of democracy, it 
refers to widely known norms and values of democracy, with a bottom-up 
structure for the power relationship. Norms and values are in general more 
abstract in nature.  
 
The procedural dimension made up of the acquisition of power in conformity with 
the established rules is another main element of the legitimacy structure. This 
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element includes the procedures to be followed when aiming to achieve the 
‘what’ and ‘how’ norms and values specified, normally embodied in the 
constitution and law. It reflects the extent to which shared norms and vales are 
respected, highlighting the degree of legitimacy. Its failure to comply with this, 
has an impact on the reduction of the acceptance of shared norms and values, 
lowering the number of those sharing values of democracy and believing in the 
same general norms, diminishing the legitimacy of the system as such, or even 
eradicating the democracy legitimacy. If the procedural dimension falls short, it 
promotes the acquisition of alternative norms and values because of a change of 
power structure, opening the way for other structures of legitimacy.  
 
Performance of those who govern is another key dimension in the 
conceptualisation of legitimacy manifested through the exercising of power within 
the prescribed limits for the promotion of collective interests. It is related more to 
the output level of government, and has a direct impact on the other elements of 
legitimacy, especially in new, not yet consolidated, regimes and if bad 
governance is expected to last longer.  
 
Shared norms and values held by the majority of society, respecting procedures 
extracted from them, and a good governing performance based on the collective 
interest, develops and triggers the fourth element of the legitimacy structure 
known as the consent of the governed, a prerequisite for any system’s survival 
and sustenance.   
 
The position and importance of the elements of legitimacy in the structure of a 
system’s legitimacy vary from regime to regime and from the degree of regime 
consolidation. They are interrelated and overlap into each other. Yet, the norms 
and values constitute the basis of the structure of legitimacy, determining the 
direction of the other three elements, with these elements in turn upholding the 
structure of legitimacy, which otherwise may endanger and necessitate its 
change. 
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The Kosovo political system is still fragile and not yet a consolidated democracy. 
Relating the actual definition of legitimacy to the case of Kosovo, normally a new 
regime has legitimacy crises when in search of legitimation - to obtain the 
consent of the majority of the governed. The whole legitimacy structure, with its 
included four elements, also applies in the case of Kosovo democracy, but of 
course as mentioned earlier, the definition of legitimacy often has to be 
contextualised. 
 
The legitimation function of parties in our study is explored based on Alagappa’s 
definition of legitimacy, because it is considered very practical.  Party behaviour 
is the major part of the legitimation structure, influenced by and influencing the 
legitimation process. The party behaviour reflects society’s attitude towards the 
regime run by parties on a pluralist basis. The measurement will include inner 
party democracy and inter party competition, through exploring party organization 
in terms of: inclusiveness, centralisation, inner institutionalization (Panebianco, 
1988) – systemness, participation and the decision making process within the 
party, analysis of programme formulation, analysis of electoral campaign and 
selectorates (Rahat and Hazan 2001). In addition, policymaking will be 
considered as an important mechanism dependent on inner party democracy and 
having a direct impact on citizens’ expectations. The data will be collected from 
party statutes and regulations, qualitative interviews and media reports, etc..    
7.2. The dilemma of block transition and the legitimacy structure 
of Kosovo democracy 
The shared norms and values constituting the belief system of democracy in 
Kosovo are not exclusively or necessarily grown at all from within society. 
Kosovo belongs to a block transition of former socialist Europe, experiencing 
what I would call a dilemma of block transition. Not all members of the block were 
in the same trend of development of democratic norms or wider shared values of 
society, ready to experience transition and directly embrace democracy. The 
snowball effect of system transformation, confining the region as a block with no 
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choice but to transform to democracy, has its cost, extending the life of the 
remnants of high level non-democratic values (among the elite) coloured with 
democracy. In this regard, Offe (1991) referring to the post – communist 
transition, points out what he calls the dilemma of simultaneity, the problem of 
experiencing political and economic transition at the same time. Kosovo, despite 
the dilemma of simultaneity of political and economic transformation, has also 
experienced at the same time the state and nation building process, a highly 
emotionally driven transformation able to override the vertical and horizontal 
development of democratic norms and values. This is further complicated due to 
the historical experience of Kosovo society, having a lack of democratic tradition, 
and a long-term socialisation with authoritarian, or to some extent even 
totalitarian, norms and values. Actually, there are tendencies for an authoritarian 
governing structure in Kosovo, as further governing competences are 
transformed from the international community, such tendencies are 
demonstrated more and more63. 
 
Moreover, the advancement of democratic norms and values in Kosovo are also 
internationally sponsored and supported. Therefore, in order for such norms and 
values to take effect, it is essential for these to first be inculcated and 
domesticated into and through the legitimacy structure of the Kosovo political 
system. If democratic norms and values are to be developed vertically - in terms 
of quality, and horizontally – in terms of broadness, they have to be taught to 
society and socialise society with such norms and values. Shared norms and 
values forming the basis of the belief system, and being highly abstract in nature, 
                                                 
63 European Broadcasting Union (EBU) send a direct letter to the Kosovo Prime minister accusing him of making the only 
public television channel of Kosovo (RTK) as a tool of his party, and trying to transform it from a public to a state 
television  channel (26.10.2009). In response to that, the Prime minister on 05.11.2009 at the regular government meeting 
stated that there are journalists, editors, media owners who approach politics, but not politicians themselves (KTV 
Interaktiv, 23.00, 05.11.2009). It does not mean that the media earlier was free of political interference, but I just cited it as 
a fresh example. The last report of the EU Commission on the Progress of Kosovo in 2009, has found many weaknesses 
in terms of democratic governing. Journalists without borders, ranked Kosovo in 2009 amongst the worst in the region in 
terms of media freedom. Many other examples not listed here, happen on daily basis.      
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involves the necessity of the other three elements of the legitimacy structure, 
required to lay the basis of a consolidated democratic regime in Kosovo.  
7.3. Political parties as legitimation actors 
Among the most suitable institutions to teach, inculcate and entrench the routine 
of democratic norms and values in society are political parties. One of their main 
functions is legitimation – developing, inculcating, domesticating, and habituating 
democratic norms and values in society. Though, mainly democratic norms and 
values came out of block transition, parties as the main (amongst other) 
intermediary institutions, have to adapt and make them acceptable for the 
majority of society. This is one way parties can legitimise the democratic regime 
in Kosovo, and further develop horizontally and vertically, the basic element of 
the legitimacy structure – democratic shared norms and values. Nonetheless, 
parties should firstly establish such norms and values as routine for themselves, 
respect decided procedures, govern based on collective interest, and develop the 
consent of the governed. Subsequently, in this way they improve their capability 
to teach values across society.  
 
The legitimation function of parties in this case is fulfilled through development 
and consistent maintenance of elements of the legitimacy structure. Since, in 
Kosovo, initial development of democratic norms and values was very much 
triggered by international pressure, their further development and maintenance 
has to take place from inner institutions, in our case political parties. By its 
definition, even a highly stable legitimacy structure is a liquid thing in need of 
consistent maintenance.  
 
The elements of legitimacy are interrelated and overlap into each other. Shared 
values and norms are dependent on the other three elements, respecting 
procedures arising from norms and values, performance in terms of achieving 
objectives set by norms and values – governing to achieve collective rather than 
narrow, private, clientele, or clan interests, followed by  flourishing consent, 
which in turn means also further development of the shared norms and values. In 
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a cyclical way, political parties may legitimise a democratic regime in Kosovo and 
as a result, offer better prospects for Kosovo democracy to be consolidated.  
 
Political parties also legitimise the second element of legitimacy, which are the 
procedures, in our case democratic procedures. Parties are very fertile ground 
for society to be socialised with democratic procedures. Developing and 
respecting such procedures within the party structure, widening the participation 
of decision making within the party structure, offers citizens the chance to learn 
and familiarise themselves with democratic procedures. The higher the 
participation opportunities, the higher the chances of developing and respecting 
democratic procedures, which constitutes the second element of the legitimacy 
structure.    
 
One of the best ways of measuring the development and respect of democratic 
procedures, is by looking at the level of inner party democracy, relying also on 
the procedure of candidate selection. Therefore, we will enter into the intra party 
organisation – exploring the extent to which it is institutionalised, decision-making 
within the party – where the decision-making power within a party lies, and so on. 
In addition, party competition affects the procedures and extent to which they are 
followed.  
7.4. Neither members nor voters, rather clients - inner party 
democracy 
Not all theorists of democracy and political parties agree with the necessity of 
party inner-democracy. Some refute the importance of party inner-democracy as 
needless, inefficient, and an obstacle to protecting the interests of the voters, 
narrowing it just to party members (Schumpeter 1942, Downs 1957, …). In the 
case of Kosovo, party leaders may see the shortage of such inner-democracy for 
models of parties in Kosovo as a very easy way for them to function freely and be 
left undisturbed. In such circumstances they would be free to pursue what they 
as individuals deemed important, take whatever decisions they want, make 
coalitions on their own, govern and use public resources without any constraints, 
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and so on. The claim that, inter party competition for voters is a sufficient 
constraint for parties to protect citizens’ interests (Schumpeter 1942), is for the 
case of Kosovo not feasible. Usually, it applies for societies with a large 
percentage of citizens ready and able to participate. At present in the Kosovo 
party system, each party tries to establish its own clientele, and finance it through 
public resources. It pushes parties into primarily competing for clients as reliable 
voters. Their strive for clients, structures the competition not based on 
programmes and platforms, as Schumpeter asserts, through which citizens 
would benefit, but rather parties struggle to extend the number of clients - as 
more reliable and less demanding on parties than the general public. Parties 
simply reimburse using public budget, contracts, and other illegal means.  As an 
illustration, an EU Commission Report (2009) on the Progress of Kosovo towards 
the EU, criticised public procurement, for a tremendous misuse of public funds, 
public contracts, tenders, and so on. It is here, where most of the reimbursement 
for the clienteles of parties in power takes place. Parties find it less costly, 
according to their logic, to compete for clients rather than citizens’ votes, in 
particular with a substantive increase of voters’ rationality, manifested in the voter 
turnout rate declining continuously. With poor policy on offer, it is not easy to 
attract unreliable voters. The clientele, as long as they are reimbursed, are more 
loyal, and do not require policy solutions. Usually, parties more prepared to pay 
back clients are these in power. It is affordable for them, as they use government 
resources, such as public sector jobs, contracts, and so on. Such an 
arrangement in turn implies exploitation of the state by parties.  On the other 
hand, competition for clients brings direct benefit, but only to a part of society, on 
particularistic interests’ arrangements, and not to citizens and society as a whole.  
 
Therefore, inter party competition, as a replacement to party inner-democracy, is 
not adequate or workable in the case of the Kosovo party system. Such a 
mechanism is not sufficient to fulfil the democratic criteria, even a minimalist one, 
as offered by Schumpeter, Dawns, and other minimalists alike. Schumpeter’s 
theory is not applicable in a new state, with a not yet consolidated democracy, 
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poor economic performance, and young fragile institutions. Inner party 
democracy is essential for development and ensuring democratic procedures, 
appearing from democratic norms and values. In this regard parties are expected 
to socialise society with democracy, through adapting democratic norms and 
values primarily within themselves and then spreading them widely within and 
among society.     
 
As mentioned earlier, democracy in Kosovo has yet to be widely taught among 
society. Parties can afford that, through deliberation by using inner democracy as 
a mechanism. Such deliberation helps in socialising society with democratic 
norms, values, and procedures, generating and developing the legitimacy 
structure within Kosovo democracy, and serving the other levels of consolidation, 
especially cultural consolidation, according to Merkel’s model of consolidation. 
Democratic values and norms at the level of inner party structure are brought 
along to governing institutions once the party is, in one way or another, in power. 
Moreover, they also distribute such norms and values even while out of power, in 
the course of their organisational structure and political activity. The same goes 
with non-democratic values, if applied at the inner party structure.  
  
In this regard, Teorrel (1999) emphasizes the crucial role of parties through 
opened channels of communication within the party structure, putting into effect 
deliberation from civil society to public office. On the other side, Lawson (1988) 
defines parties in terms of their role in deliberation as “ the agencies that can 
claim to have as its raison d’ètre the creation of entire linkage chain, a chain of 
connections that run from the voters through the candidates and the electoral 
process to the officials of the government” (Teorrel 1999, 373). Likewise, inner 
party democracy is a necessary requirement for the growth and expansion of the 
legitimacy structure, especially at the procedural dimension, but also upholding 
the collective interests to attain the wide consensus.   
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As stated in the introduction of the chapter, the measurement of the legitimation 
function of parties, among others, is based on the level of inner party democracy 
of Kosovo political parties. In this case, the conception of inner part democracy 
offered by Scarrow (2005, 7) is used, comprised of three elements: 
inclusiveness, centralisation, and institutionalisation. Inclusiveness is defined as 
the breadth of the cycle of the party decision maker(s). The centralisation is 
conceptualised as the extent to which decisions are made by a single group or 
decision-making body. The third element is Institutionalisation, based on 
Panebianco’s conception – systemness.   
7.4.1. Inclusiveness 
Inclusiveness is one of the main indicators of democracy, not just at the level 
within parties. The level of democracy can be measured through inclusiveness, 
the higher the level of inclusiveness in decision making, the higher the level of 
democracy. The larger the percentage of people included on issues decided, the 
greater the chances for better and wider protection of the interests of the people. 
Contrary to this, the fewer number of people taking part in decision making, the 
less democratic the decisions taken. However, the distinction between 
inclusiveness in a totalitarian and democratic regime should be pointed out. The 
former is organised in a monist way, not upraised from the will of the people. 
Such inclusiveness takes place mostly on following and implementation, rather 
than on decision-making. The citizens are integrated just as followers, but not as 
decision-makers. In other words it is an inclusiveness without contestation, as 
van Biezen (2003, 20) calls it, the inclusive hegemony. The latter, on the other 
side, in a democratic regime it is known as inclusiveness through contestation, 
embracing citizens as decision makers. The same applies in the case of parties, 
regarding decisions within party structures, from inside the framework of 
representative democracy, up to inclusiveness from the perspective of 
participatory democracy. Hereby, the measurement of inclusiveness is for 
decisions taken within the levels of the party structure. Through the element of 
inclusiveness the level of inner party democracy necessary for parties to perform 
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their legitimation function is measured, highlighting the consequences for 
facilitating the development of prospects for consolidation of democracy.  
 
The model of parties in Kosovo offers little space for inclusiveness in the 
decision-making process. As concluded in a previous chapter (chap. 6) the 
Kosovo party system is dominated by the model of personalistic parties. Such 
parties are characterised by authoritarian values, whereby decisions are taken by 
one or few. The term personalistic parties itself implies the opposite to a 
possibility of inclusiveness, and one of the reasons for such a conceptualisation, 
is the narrow scope of participation in decision making. Personalistic comes from 
the word person, meaning a personality is the main attribute that the party is 
identified with. Moreover, such a type of party has its own model of organisation 
structured relying on a personalistic basis. The organisation structure of 
personalistic parties is principally an extension of the hand of the party leader/s, 
or it can be said it is just a technical support of the party leadership. Party 
organs, after the leader, are not there to take political decisions, but just to 
implement the leader’s wishes transformed into his decisions. Matoshi (2009) is 
of the opinion that party leaders in Kosovo have unchallengeable and absolute 
power. Furthermore, G. Krasniqi (2009) believes that leaders of Kosovo parties 
are everything within their own parties. Nevertheless, Selaci (2010) in this regard, 
points to the parties’ leaders as the main obstacle to the development of inner 
party democracy. Tahiri (2009) shares this perception. According to him Kosovo 
parties are led totally by their leaders and their mechanisms on their 
possessions. On the other hand, a Kosovo sociologist, Zhinipotoku (2009) 
softens the view of the solitary iron hand of party leaders, attributing the 
ownership of the party to oligarchs, not only to the single leader.    
 
Nonetheless, it should be highlighted that Kosovo parties are featured with two 
faces. The first one is the formal face, spelt out in party documents such as 
statutes, in party declarations, as well as interviews with the elite of the parties. 
The formal model is mainly based on democratic values, with a few exceptions 
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such as the role of party leader in statutes of AAK and AKR. In general, it takes 
as a model of reference, parties in consolidated democracies. All party organs 
and their specified power are spelt out in the statute. The party congress is the 
most powerful authority, followed by the directing council, then the party 
chairmanship as executive body. Aside from these bodies, parties specify the 
party leader as a powerful organ. Moreover, parties always proclaim in public that 
they base their activities on, and always follow strictly, the written rules.  
 
However, in practice this does not constitute the real face of parties in Kosovo. 
Most party statutes are simply copied from each other, or from statutes of several 
parties abroad. In other words, they are not meant to organise, regulate, and 
constrain the inner decision-making power of parties. The application of other 
statutes built to construct the structure and functioning of parties or organisation 
operating in other political and socio-economic environments, implies using 
documents not matching the actual party organisation structure, objectives, 
interests, priorities, and overall functioning. To Kosovo parties it is common not to 
respect their statues, normatively considered as the highest legal and political act 
within the parties. In reality, parties do not function as statutes and other party 
documents specify. Moreover, some parties even in their statutes have 
dispositions that stand in contradiction with the current laws in power. For 
example, according to Regulation 01/2008 the parties are obliged to hold party 
congresses every 36 months (Art. 11). Yet, LDK on its statue (Art. 19) specify 
that a party congress be convened every four years.  
 
The party leaders, except in the case of LDK party leaders (since the death of 
Rugova), and to some extent PDK as well (due to factions within it), are the 
absolute powerful and unchallengeable leaders. They are most of time chosen 
without opposition candidates, or rarely there might be a superficial challenge by 
an opposing candidate for cosmetic purposes. In the case of PDK, at both first 
party congresses there was a counter candidate. Pluerat Sejdiu was one of them, 
known to be incomparable to the actual leader Hashim Thaqi, unable to pose any 
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possible challenge to him. In the last congress, Thaqi was elected without a 
single counter candidate (Buja 2009). On the other side, at the last LDK 
congress, which resulted in the party being split into LDK and LDD, the party 
leader position was contested with highly comparable candidates challenging 
each other, though the scene was to end up with delegates beating each other 
with chairs. In other parties so far, it has never happened that the position of the 
party leader even formally to be challenged by anyone. The other institutions 
inside the parties might sometimes be consulted, but they do not count towards 
the ultimate decision making bodies, though party documents prescribe it (the 
within-party power structure to be discussed in the institutionalisation dimension).  
 
The breadth of scope of inclusiveness of party organs is written in party statues 
and regulations. It is mostly respected, since it is to do more with numbers rather 
than the real power to take decisions on their own. This disposition of the statute 
is to a large extent respected by leaders, since it does not threaten the position 
and power they enjoy. Likewise, the inclusiveness of party organs is specified in 
party statues. If such institutions within the party have the power they are 
formally entitled to, as statutes specify the level of inclusiveness of party organs, 
that would constitute a high level of inner party democracy. Nonetheless, the 
level of inclusiveness in party organs in this case, does not manifest a high level 
of inner party democracy, because it is more related to a quantitative rather than 
qualitative inclusiveness, and such organs have no real decision-making power. 
The absolute power still relies in the hands of party leaders. Therefore, such a 
decision-making structure within parties damages the level of inner party 
democracy. The level of inclusiveness for the bodies possessing the real power 
to take decisions is very small, mostly counting only one - the party leader. In 
other words, it can be concluded that inner party democracy formally exists as 
written on paper, yet in reality, it is barely found. It is purely an authoritarian way 
of party organisation and functioning.  
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Such a dualism of faces featuring in Kosovo parties is a compromise of two 
forces making their way through. On the one hand, there is a regional trend of 
democratisation, coupled with European integration – largely bringing forward 
democratisation. The values promoted and uplifted by this force are spelt out in 
written party documents, theoretically meant to set up the type of party structures 
and ways of functioning. Yet, on the other hand, at present, the absolute and 
unchallengeable powers of party leaders believing and behaving based on 
authoritarian values, have established parties of a personalistic type, having a 
shortage of inner party democracy, and in general being structured and 
functioning in contradiction to what their documents normatively specify.  
 
The low level of inclusiveness within Kosovo parties is mentioned also by the 
ICG Report (September 2008), illustrating the large discrepancy between what is 
declared and what really takes place in parties, describing the decision-making 
by actual governing parties as:  “centralisation of decision making in a very 
narrow circle around the prime minister… . The government has trumpeted 
transparency as a virtue, but its decision-making is opaque”. Furthermore, after 
the 2004 elections, one of the PDK chairmanship members declared regarding 
the distribution of government positions after the elections, that the party leader 
will decide on that (Kosova Sot 24.09.2004). The issue of leaderism as a social 
value, available and powerful everywhere, even among the NGOs, seems to 
have its roots in the culture of Kosovo society. 
 
To illustrate the level of inclusiveness and the dual faces of identity of Kosovo 
parties, the level of inclusiveness is measured through the selectorate – the 
candidate selection body of parties. The measurement relies on the model of 
selectorate measurement given by Rahat and Hazan (2001).   
   
Candidate selection 
The model developed by Rahat and Hazan (2001) to evaluate the level of 
inclusiveness in the body that selects the party candidates is very practical to 
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measure the inclusiveness within a party, as a direct indicator of the inner party 
democracy. Candidate selection within the party is among the core sensitive 
issues in the decision making process within the party. It has a significant effect 
on the party role in the governing function, in parliament and in government. 
Therefore, it is considered as a vital decision of parties, having direct 
consequences at the governing level, inner party democracy, as well as society 
wide. In the case of Kosovo, as mentioned above, parties have two faces, the 
formal one and the real one. Hence, both contradictory features are presented, 
the formal one, as it is regulated by the statutes and regulations, and the real one 
mirroring the actual party structure and functioning. Referring to the statutes of 
parties in Kosovo, the selectorate is a party agency, or a body known as the 
Directing Council of parties (party statutes). The directing council is formally 
empowered to approve the list of candidates. It is noteworthy that party 
representatives interviewed affirmed that the lists of candidates is also decided 
by the chairmanship (Kelmendi from AKR, Buja from PDK, Beqiri from LDK). The 
AAK secretary general Burim Ramadani goes even further, placing the 
chairmanship as the highest decision-making body in the party, in charge of 
deciding the candidates’ list, although formally it stands counter to what is written 
in the party statute.  
 
Nevertheless, the real selectorate in Kosovo parties are party leaders, or 
selected party leaders. Matoshi (2009) believes that the party leader is the 
ultimate decision-maker, with his intelligence service comprised of his closest 
circle helping him in decision-making. His closest circle might include starting 
from family up to members of the clan. It is important to point out that the election 
of leaders is mostly without counter candidates, using acclamation as a voting 
mechanism, which in cases of an incomparable power relationship within a party 
structure, is often not the expression of the will of those who vote. Moreover, the 
selectorate in Kosovo parties goes even further in the exclusiveness scale, 
coming close to non-selected leaders. The model itself does not include other 
possible bodies outside the party structure that might have a heavy influence or 
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even sometimes embody the selectorate itself. It often happens that candidates’ 
lists are drawn in the hushed, dark, cafeterias, entirely outside party offices and 
structures. The list might be brought to the directing councils to be formally 
legalised, but rarely, or ever,  a name that the leaders want to be on the list 
removed by the directing council. One of the party members64 was thrown off a 
list, a night after it was formally approved, as the list was altered outside of the 
party he used to belong, from someone who never became known to him. This is 
another example of powerful informal bodies playing the role of selectorate. It 
should be added that other party organs could exercise their formal rights on the 
candidate selection process, as long as they do not act in contradiction with the 
interest and objectives of the party leader.  
 
Electorate Party                 Selected Non-Selected Selected    Non- Selected    
         Members          Party Party  Party      Party 
                                                   Agency Agency  Leader       Leader 
 Inclusiveness               Exclusiveness  
Selectorate  
 Fig.4 Formal level of inclusiveness   
 
 
 
Electorate Party                 Selected Non-Selected   Selected     Non- Selected    
        Members          Party Party             Party    Party 
                                                   Agency Agency             Leader        Leader 
 Inclusiveness               Exclusiveness  
Selectorate 
Fig. 5 Actual level of inclusiveness  
 
The figures illustrate the low level of inclusiveness in party decision-making 
organs, holding back inner party democracy development. As a party attitude and 
                                                 
64 Due to security reasons he was declared just on conditions of anonymity. 
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behaviour, and as a way Kosovo parties are organised, it does not offer sufficient 
opportunity for participation to be labelled as democratic. They possess an 
extremely closed structure of decision making, producing decisions largely and 
primarily taking into account the interests of the small circle of decision makers. 
Likewise, parties with closed doors for citizens, generate distrust from citizens 
initially towards parties and consequently towards democracy itself, straining the 
democracy consolidation process. In such a case, democracy legitimation can 
hardly be expected, as long as parties continue to be closer to a model of 
authoritarian rather than democratic decision making. Parties generate and 
spread authoritarian rather than democratic values, primarily at the organisation 
level, but also at the level of society and governing since candidates chosen by 
such a type of selectorate, should be elected to take governing power. Most of 
the candidates selected, must in one way or another be loyal and have servile 
attitudes to the leader, they in turn empower him and enroot further the 
authoritarian values and norms, contrary to democratic ones, as required in the 
legitimacy structure. Since parties are expected to inculcate democratic values in 
Kosovo through socialising citizens with practices of such values and behaviour, 
the high level of exclusiveness provides no opportunity or hopes for democratic 
socialisation. Kosovo parties so far have not proved to be the fertile ground for 
development and the inculcation of democratic values in society. This is an 
indication of the legitimation function not being performed, because parties do 
not generate and spread democratic norms and values, on the contrary, through 
their practices they do just the opposite, cultivating authoritarian values within 
themselves, and providing awful examples to identify with democracy. It leads to 
citizens creating their perceptions about democracy based on the undemocratic 
behaviour of parties. Kosovo democracy needs to deepen its democratic norms 
and values horizontally in terms of numbers, and vertically in terms of quality. 
The democratic transition in Kosovo did not develop entirely from within society. 
It was largely internationally driven and supported. Therefore, democracy 
consolidation in Kosovo requires the development of democratic norms and 
values, expected to take place mainly through party behaviour. The closed 
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structure of Kosovo parties means there is no capability to produce and expand 
democratic behaviour. The squat level of inclusiveness implies less opportunity 
for citizens for participation in decision making, and even less prospect that 
decisions will take into account their interests. Consequently, citizens have less 
reason to trust in parties, because their behaviour is not in accordance with 
citizens’ interests, as democratic norms and values require, which in turn means 
less people are integrated into the political process, less people trust the system, 
there is less legitimacy for democracy, and more unpredictable democracy 
consolidation developments. On the other side, such a legitimacy structure is 
expected to be grown up and developed by political parties through performing 
their legitimation function.  
 
The failure of parties to respect the democratic procedures within themselves has 
an impact on the structure of legitimacy. The impertinence of democratic 
procedures within political parties themselves affects the first element of the 
legitimacy structure, avoiding the inculcation of democratic norms and values 
within parties, to be spread broadly among society. Furthermore, it impacts on 
the general performance that is a result of the closed small rooms decisions. 
Lastly, the overall structure of legitimacy is vulnerable, as the dimension of 
consent shrinks due to the failure of the other three elements of the legitimacy 
structure.  
 
Referring to Merkel’s model of democracy consolidation on which the study is 
based, the low performance of parties in the legitimation function has an impact 
on the other three levels of consolidation. It impedes functioning of constitutional 
consolidation, and verhaeltnisse consolidation, further empowering individuals, 
instead of institutions. Lastly, civic consolidation is less likely and has less 
opportunity due to the exclusiveness of party behaviour, standing contrary to 
norms and values normatively expected to be developed and inculcated into 
society by political parties.  
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7.4.2. Centralisation 
Centralisation is another dimension of inner party democracy indicating the 
willingness and readiness of parties to legitimise democratic norms and values. 
The lower the level of centralisation, the closer the decision making would be to 
citizens, or party members in the case of parties. The level of centralisation is 
measured by looking at the power party organs have under both the vertical and 
horizontal hierarchy. The more decentralised power is to party branches and sub-
branches, the nearer party members are to the decision making. Among the 
issues that party organs at horizontal hierarchy are supposed to have the power 
to decide on, are the selection of candidates, policy issues, coalitions at a local 
level of government, and so on, depending on the level of decentralised power.   
Obviously, decentralisation of power to organs of parties has its costs, and would 
not ensure inner democracy if it does not reach at least party members. Often, 
some sort of power is decentralised to one level, but becomes congested there 
and can go no further. A branch might centralise such power on its own and 
avoid such empowerment to continue to have an effect at sub-branches for 
example. However, there is no doubt that centralisation stands contrary to inner 
party democracy, but also with decentralisation, in order to ensure the inner 
democracy of the entire party structure, it should be implemented with caution, 
not allowing any other possible types of centralisation to be developed along the 
way. In other words, decentralisation should be introduced to citizens as the last 
circle of the party organisation structure, and not come before this, at branch or 
sub-branch level, setting up just another oligarchy at another level of party 
structure. By definition, centralisation of power pushes autocrats to take whatever 
decisions and follow whatever course of politics perceived by them as boosting 
their power, be it even at the great expense of citizens.   
Kosovo political parties have their horizontal structure based on a territorial basis, 
organised in the centre, branches, sub –branches, and some of them have also 
the active as the first cell of party structure. Parties’ statutes spell out such a 
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formal organisational structure, resembling an organisational structure of mass-
supported parties. LDK, LDD, and AAK (if necessary) have the actives at the first 
political cell of organisation, followed by sub-branches mainly organised at 
village, district or city level. Through delegation procedures, on a communal 
administrative basis, are organised branches, which through delegation at the 
central party congress, they choose organs of the party centre. Different from 
other parties, PDK calls the first cell of organisation a section, and AKR does not 
have activities but goes directly to sub-branches, then branches and then the 
centre. This constitutes the formal structure of parties in Kosovo. Yet, the 
question now arises as to what power these levels of party organisation have? 
What type of decisions and for what can they decide? What is their relationship 
to the centre?   
As mentioned earlier Kosovo parties are widely known for their dual faces of 
identity, which is extended also to the organisational structure. There is a huge 
gap between how they are supposed to function and how they actually function. 
The candidate selection procedure in all Kosovo parties is centralised. Branches 
and sub-branches may propose, but in the end it is the party selected body that 
decides on candidate lists, which is also true for local elections (Parties’  
Statutes). In this regard, AAK goes even further, as the list should first go to the 
party leader, then he proposes it to the directing council of the party (AAK 
statute, Art. 18). In this case, the tendency for centralisation is even formalised, 
since a formal centralised filter is set up to scan the proposed list from the lower 
levels.   
Looking at the political parties in Kosovo in practical terms, and how they actually 
function, they are organised in a very personalistic way, with authoritarian models 
of inner decision-making. Party leaders have absolute power within the party with 
a mostly centralised system of decision-making. Even the power that branches 
and sub-branches have is always shakeable due to the absolute power of party 
leaders. They can interfere at any time, for anything important according to their 
views. For instance, Rugova (2010) talking about such relationships and the 
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inner decision-making of the party he belongs to – LDD, confirms the 
uncontested power of Nexhat Daci, the LDD leader, on making a coalition with 
AKR in the local elections of 2009, , deciding terms largely on his own without 
even consulting the party organs. The same happened in AKR, the decision was 
imposed unilaterally to most of the branches that were part of the coalition.   
Referring to party statutes, the branches and sub-branches elect their leadership 
structure. However, in practice it does not mean that the party leaders cannot 
override such a decision. On the other hand, in the case of sub-branches, the 
branch elite often override decisions of sub-branches. The behaviour of 
personalistic parties with a centralised decision-making system, makes party 
members at the lower end of the hierarchy feel less important, discouraging them 
from political activity, shaking the legitimacy of party decisions in the eyes of 
party members, and also reflecting an impression of lowly legitimated political 
activity by parties also at the governing level. With time, such scepticism might in 
turn be shifted to democratic institutions as well. Besides, centralisation by 
definition implies a concentration of power to a few people, meaning less power 
to the lower party structure, and even less to party members. Such a power 
relationship within a party makes party members initially feel not worthy of being 
a part of the party at the and later on of the democracy process in general.  
In addition, centralisation limits the ability of parties to function properly, because 
the number of people dealing with issues being handled by parties is very small 
compared to required duties, leading to a scarcity of resources. A centralised 
way of organising political life, according to system theories, is meant to fail, as 
was the case with the former socialist system distinguished by a high level of 
centralisation. It is incompatible with the availability of resources to control, plan, 
and make decisions for everything. What makes centralisation even more 
ineffective in our case is that it reflects an attitude and behaviour that runs 
counter to democratic values and norms. The way of inner party organisation 
stands contrary to the expectations of a consolidated democracy. The socialist 
system failed due to oversized demands for resources from the central office, but 
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the whole system was functioning in that way for a certain period of time until it 
collapsed, and no alternative way of functioning within the system, that could 
delegitimise the centralised system was viable. Yet, the current parties’ practices 
run counter to democracy, regionally considered as a Zeit Geist. Therefore, an 
authoritarian and centralised manner of functioning for political parties in Kosovo 
have constraints outside parties, making them reluctant to open up, forcing 
parties to instead close up further, as the only way to prevent the inner-
unchallenged absolute power of their leaders.   
The authoritarian attitude and behaviour of parties disassociates citizens from the 
process, causing the disenchantment of citizens from democracy itself, and 
consequently in this manner, delegitimises democracy as a whole in the Kosovo 
political system. Thus, instead of parties presenting democracy through 
democratic behaviour and attitudes, they generate, stand for, and legitimise the 
authoritarian values and system.   
It should be pointed out that democracy is a process that is teachable to citizens, 
particularly in our case with international monitoring.  The question then, is what 
do Kosovo parties teach citizens, democratic or authoritarian values? From their 
practice, the answer is obviously a negative one. Hence, political parties in 
Kosovo thwart consolidation of democracy as long as they inculcate and cultivate 
authoritarian and not democratic values.   
Party leaders, uncompromisingly trying to preserve their absolute power within 
the party, do not take into consideration the possibility of losing votes because of 
such party behaviour. Therefore, they have to look for other means to win 
elections through clienteles, clans, or other province based mobilisation of voters. 
All these may harm democracy prospects, because Kosovo democracy instead 
of producing citizens and citizens’ attitudes and behaviours that feed democracy, 
they produce instead clients and subordinates to the ruling authoritarians in the 
electoral democracy. This is among the reasons for the development of 
corruption and the misuse of public resources for private particularistic ends, 
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because authoritarians have to reimburse directly those endorsing votes to them. 
  
In other words, they do not use legitimate ways to obtain and exercise power but 
other informal means, because in this way they might still preserve their absolute 
power within the parties. Otherwise, if they wish to get power through democratic 
channels, they have to modify their behaviour, attitudes, and values, meaning 
they have to decentralise power and reform parties, among other things. 
However, leaders of Kosovo parties are not yet ready or even interested to do 
that (Matoshi 2009, G. Krasniqi 2009, Selaci 2010, Tahiri 2009, Maliqi 2009).  
Likewise, they prevent democracy consolidation, and perceive it as a direct threat 
to their uncontested power. Their personal interests might be threatened, as they 
have to compromise their absolute power with democratic norms and values 
currently incompatible with such a power relationship.  
On the other side, van Biezen (2000) while talking about the power of the central 
party office argues that power in new democracies is in the hands of the central 
office of the party and those in public office. Along these lines, it facilitates the 
preservation of the party’s cohesion, in the face of a low level of public support 
and a small number of party members. However, that seems an effort to  make 
the way even when devoid of citizens (voters) that normally constitutes the depth 
of democracy. In other words, it means taking drugs not to feel the disease, 
though not to cure it. If citizens are ignored, it impacts the political process, 
leading to politics without citizens, broadly considered as unhealthy for 
democracy. Moreover, if that persists for a considerable period, citizens might be 
pushed to look for other possible alternatives to participation in the decision-
making process, including even undemocratic alternatives, since democratic 
ways happen to be monopolised by absolute power holders, the party oligarchs. 
It might be arguable that due to the presence of international actors in Kosovo, 
the contestation in elections, as a democratic institution, might still be preserved, 
in spite of many irregularities and manipulations noticed in the election process in 
Kosovo, as was the case with the 2007 and recent 2009 local elections. The 
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election committee for appeals proposed the election be repeated in almost 10% 
of municipalities due to the high level of irregularities. Yet, it does not mean that 
no other manipulations of the election were present elsewhere. Parties are now 
considering the possibility of sending physically trained election commissioners 
due to the need to use force, especially at night and in the evening when dark, 
mainly with blackouts that are common in Kosovo offering space to veil any 
fraud. Such practice  by parties is principally a result of the prisoners’ dilemma. 
The international election observers, concerned more with short term stability, 
close their eyes in front of such undemocratic behaviour. The election fraud 
blemishes possible fair contestation, avoids meaningful participation in decision 
making, and can be used as a justified reason for taking into account other, even 
non democratic, ways to come to power. Such a process means the killing of 
democracy itself; it is senseless to talk about consolidation prospects. Parties 
should be worried about their lost supporters and citizens, and find ways to bring 
them back. Authoritarian measures even trigger people to move away from the 
political process, bringing along the question of whom and what are parties 
standing for? Are they a means of democracy, are they serving democracy or a 
few party leaders with their clans, are they cultivating non-democratic values 
challenging the very being of democracy itself?   
Moreover, such party behaviour and attitudes carries forward the personalisation 
of politics, perceived as harmful for a democratic system, not yet consolidated 
and having fragile institutions. Kosovo democracy has weak and not yet 
consolidated democratic institutions. Constitutional consolidation is still at the 
formal level of development, not fully set into place in terms of implementation. 
The distrust of leaders and associated persons, persisting for too long, turns into 
distrust of democratic institutions and democracy as a whole.  
To sum up, Kosovo parties have a very centralised and often disordered and 
inconsistent structure, implying bad prospects for the ability of parties to 
legitimise democratic norms and values, since within themselves they primarily 
do not respect democratic procedures that stand counter to their centralisation 
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behaviours and attitudes. Consequently, parties offer less than expected in terms 
of legitimising democracy in general and in the process of consolidation. Such a 
high level of centralised procedures within parties is incompatible with democratic 
norms and values, making parties incapable to inculcate democracy into society, 
as legitimation of democracy requires, to make it trusted in the hearts and minds 
of citizens, as democracy consolidation requires.    
7.4.3. Institutionalisation 
Party institutionalisation is another element of inner party democracy, 
conceptualised differently by various authors, depending on their focuses on 
political parties. Mainwaring & Scully (1995) deal with party system 
institutionalisation, Panebianco (1988) focuses on inner party organisation, while 
Janda (1980) highlights the outer party institutionalisation. Among the first to deal 
with the concept of party institutionalisation was Huntington (1968), putting 
across inner and outer party institutionalisation. However, the concept of party 
institutionalisation is vague and has no clear-cut one dimensional meaning. Since 
in our case the concern is inner party democracy, the Panebianco’s (1988) 
concept is applied to find out the level of inner party institutionalisation, or 
systemness as he calls it. The power relationship among the inner party 
institutions has a direct impact on the level of inner party democracy. The 
systemness is conceptualised as the extent to which within-party institutions 
perceive each other as interrelated and unable to override each other’s 
decisions.   
 
The fact that Kosovo parties are highly personalistic impinges consistently on 
everything related to them. Their identity is developed and sustained around 
such interests, values, norms, attitudes, and behaviours. Personalistic identity of 
parties automatically implies an imbalanced power relationship among a party’s 
inner institutions, not considering themselves as interrelated. The absolute power 
within a party is largely vested in the party leader or leaders. In the case of 
institutionalisation, the dual faces of Kosovo parties, the formal and the real one, 
should be recalled back. The formal organisational structure is specified in the 
  Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo          
 
230 
 
parties’ statues, whereby the inner power structure of parties is defined. Hereby, 
AAK, AKR, and LDD to some extent, even on their own status point out the 
asymmetrical relationship of party organs, empowering party leaders compared 
to other party organs. In practice, they actually have uncontested power, though 
party documents formally provide otherwise (Statutes of three other parties).  
 
According to what is written in the parties’ statutes (AAK Statute Art. 13; PDK 
Statute Art. 13; LDK Statute Art. 17; LDD Statute Art. 17; AKR Statute Art. 11) 
the party congress is considered the highest authority of a party. The organ 
represents the horizontal structure of the party, elects the party bodies, and holds 
accountable all other institutions within the party. From a representative 
democracy point of view, it reflects the high level of inner party democracy. 
Nevertheless, in reality such an organ amounts more or less to a ceremonial 
procedure, rubber stamped by party leaders. The party congress is valued more 
on a visual basis, rather than as a body to represent the wide interests of party 
members through their delegates, or to hold accountable other party organs. It is 
more a ceremonial rather than a policy and decision-making activity. Other 
organs’ elections are merely formally approved at a party congress. The main 
reason for a powerless party congress is its inferior position in relation to the 
party leader. Often parties even surpass the legally specified dateline to hold 
regular congress meetings. PDK chairmanship member Buja (2009) recognised 
that although legally [they] were supposed to assemble the party congress every 
two years, there has been more than three years that [they] have not done this. 
Moreover, the LDK Congress of 2006, trying to follow democratic procedures, 
was ended by beating each other with chairs, and the split into LDK and LDD. 
One of the main reasons of such an ending was the absence of the LDK leader 
who died in 2006. The delays in holding the party congress sessions are contrary 
to the law in power, particularly CEC Regulation 01/2008 defining that party 
congresses should be commenced at least every 36 months. The costs of 
quashing a decision of congress by the party leader is almost zero, all they have 
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to do is to put a facade on it;  the difficulty to do that is non-existent, since party 
leaders have uncontested power within their parties.  
 
Following the party congress, the highest institution within the party is the 
directing council, sustaining  congress in between congress meetings (AAK 
Statute Art. 17; PDK Statute Art. 21; LDK Statute Art. 23; LDD Statute Art. 23 - 
calls it the National Council; AKR Statute Art.14). The Directing Council organ is 
formally above other party institutions after congress. Usually, the directing 
council overall guides the party, the chairmanship reports on a periodical basis to 
it, and it approves the candidate lists after receiving them from the party 
chairman that collects proposals from the party branches, as in case of  AAK and 
AKR, or from the chairmanship in case of other parties. The power of the 
directing council is challenged and minimised by the absolute power of party 
leaders. If looking at how often the directing council assembles, impeding and 
postponing of directing council meetings is a useful mechanism to minimise the 
formal power of the directing council. The directing council of AAK, according to 
statute, should sit on a monthly basis, whereby the chairmanship reports on its 
activities. However, according to Ramadani – secretary general of AAK, and the 
AAK spokesman Luma, the directing council is not assembled on a monthly 
basis. It shows very clearly the inconsistency between the formal rules and actual 
rules of the game. Moreover, often, even members of the party chairmanship are 
not even aware that such a thing is regulated by the party statute. Nonetheless, it 
brings to the surface the actual powerlessness of the directing council. In PDK, 
LDK, LDD, and AKR the council sits every three months, though in reality it does 
not happen as often as it is formally regulated. In AKR for example, the directing 
council after its first meeting, following the first congress, was not assembled for 
more than a year. The same applies to other parties as well. In general, party 
leaders ignore the directing council as a vehicle to override their formal power 
and preserve their own actual absolute power that should otherwise be shared 
with the directing council.  
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Furthermore, Kosovo parties in their organisation structure have the 
chairmanship, chaired by party leader. It is an executive body beneath the 
directing council in the party hierarchy. Practically, it is under the shadow of the 
leader. In the case of AAK, they proclaim to have built up a so-called presidential 
party. The party leader (AAK Statute Art. 23) proposes the complete 
chairmanship to the directing council for approval. While in AKR the party leader 
nominates one third of the directing council members. In the other three parties, 
the chairmanship is not proposed exclusively by the party leader. Nevertheless, 
in reality, whatever the way of its organisation, it is entirely under the control and 
domination of the party leader.  
 
Another means used to ensure the unmatched power of the party leader within 
the party is the control of party finances. In the case of AKR the full responsibility 
for party finances belongs to the organisational secretary of the party (AKR 
Statute Art. 23), selected and dismissed directly by the party leader himself. 
Although, he is supposed to report to the directing council on finances, such a 
thing has so far never happened. It is widely known that one of the main 
instruments to hold uncontested power within the party is through controlling its 
finances. In the case of other parties, the issue of finances is not very clear, yet it 
is still used as an instrument to keep control within the party. Furthermore, up to 
now the Kosovo party system has no law to regulate party finances  
 
Thus, Kosovo parties have a low level of systemness, and consequently a low 
level of institutionalisation. Party organs do not see each other as interrelated 
and interdependent, but merely as dominated by the party leader, and the costs 
of turning down decisions by the party leader of formally higher organs is almost 
zero. G. Krasniqi (2009) ironically stated that there is no need to override such 
decisions, since no decision is taken against the will of the leader/s. Such a low 
level of institutionalisation means also a low level of inner party democracy, and 
a pathetic capability of parties to legitimise democracy among society. The poor 
performance of parties in legitimation is impeding democracy consolidation in 
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Kosovo. The shortage of inner party democracy indicates the failure of parties to 
develop the second dimension of the legitimacy structure, in other words the 
failure to develop and respect democratic procedures, constraining party 
performance as well.         
7.5. Policy making 
Political parties are the key filters in the policy-making process, playing the role of 
policy gatekeepers. Parties decide on policy priority - which policies should be 
dealt with, postponed, or even ignored totally. Policy making as an output level is 
handled in the following two chapters, dealing with the innovation and governing 
function. The focus here is on performance as the third element of legitimacy 
structure. Policy making is directly related to the performance dimension in the 
legitimacy structure, whether it takes place based on collective or personal 
interests. Personalistic parties are more likely to make and follow policies based 
on their own rather than collective interests. The above mentioned indicators 
point out that the collective interests are hardly taken into account, with the low 
level of pursuance of democratic procedures, obvious by the shortage of inner 
party democracy, facilitated through a low level of inclusiveness, and a high level 
of centralisation and minor institutionalisation.  
 
Political parties, as the major gatekeepers between society requirements, and its 
transformation into inputs, decisions, and policies, have the leading role in the 
process of legitimation of democracy to citizens. The more and better articulated 
and transformed these needs are into inputs and outputs, the better the 
performance of parties would be and the higher the support of citizens for the 
regime in question, the democracy. Political parties, as gatekeepers are in a 
position to determine the fate of citizens’ wants and needs, expected to be 
transformed into inputs and further processed into policies. The best way to 
smoothen such a transformation is parties’ inner democracy, as an organisation 
including into decision making, as many people as possible. The balanced 
distribution of the power structure within the party, limits the ability for 
gatekeepers to act on individual interest, and to decide easily against the wants 
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and needs of the majority, as is actually the case. The larger the number of 
citizens involved, the more interests are likely to be taken into account when 
deciding and acting. The more society requirements are processed and 
transformed into policies, the more likely support for democracy will grow, and 
the easier it would be for the development  of the consolidation of democracy.  
 
The best performance of parties in policy making, requires a high level of 
inclusiveness, a low level of centralisation, and a high level of institutionalisation. 
The high level of inclusiveness, means that gate keepers, or parties, include a 
large number of people, the best result would be all citizens, where filtering is 
made by taking into account the interests of all participants. In the case of 
Kosovo parties, they are highly personalistic parties with leaders holding absolute 
power. The gatekeepers here include mostly the party leader with the rest being 
more or less technical support for him. Therefore, such exclusiveness is less 
likely to take into account collective interests since the filter is monopolised by 
party leaders. Parties make policies based on their narrow interest, because of 
the low level of people included in the gatekeeping filter. The low performance 
has an impact on the legitimacy structure, as parties with such performance have 
difficulty in legitimising democracy. Political parties fail to fulfil the legitimation 
function required for democracy consolidation development.  
 
Kosovo parties are known for their high level of centralisation, that stands 
counter to the possibilities of making policies based on collective interest. Most of 
the decisions are taken by a small and highly centralised structure. Furthermore, 
the low level of institutionalisation is also an impediment for the party to act 
based upon collective interests. This is because decisions taken even at lower 
levels are always in danger of being turned down, by those at the core circle of 
the party leadership. The bad performance of parties in Kosovo, related to policy 
options, is proved in practice as well (see the following chapter). The policy 
formulation as one of the steps in the policy making process, takes place mainly 
in centralised circles, with low inclusiveness and institutionalisation, making the 
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process very unpredictable. In all interviews conducted with party 
representatives, the mentioning of the problems in Kosovo was most common, 
though no one was able to offer any written policy on paper, as an alternative. 
Naser Rugova from LDD affirmed that they have established within their 
structure, the commissioning of experts in different fields, but nothing written was 
able to be provided regarding policies. While PDK was in opposition from 2005 – 
2008, they formed a shadow government as an opposition. The major part of 
their activity was limited to criticising the government and highlighting the 
problems Kosovo has, without offering any policy solution to that. Other parties, 
as well, mostly criticise, but lack actual policies. Except electoral platforms, 
parties have no policies formulated for many of the problems that Kosovo society 
faces. In this regard, usually they have a passive approach, reacting after 
something happens, even though it includes merely declarations, no formulated 
policy is found in Kosovo parties, except those in government doing it through 
government positions. In addition, Kosovo for many years has been governed 
without a medium term and long term framework of development. On the study 
conducted by KDI65 a poor relationship between policies offered by parties and 
citizens’ expectations is found.  Kosovo parties have used the independence 
issue as a roof to cover themselves from the failure to offer policy options. The 
only thing they dealt with as a policy option, though very general and often 
through populist rhetoric, was independence. Later, after the declaration of 
independence, parties have started to talk about other needy issues for society, 
such as economic development. However, none offer a clear spelt out policy on 
how to achieve this. In general, it can be concluded that Kosovo parties perform 
poorly in the policy option, not facilitating democracy consolidation to develop a 
legitimacy structure through the legitimation function.   
 
The failure of parties to consider citizens’ desires into at least inputs, increases 
their dissatisfaction with parties and the people in charge of the relevant 
                                                 
65 Kosovo Democratic Institute (2008), there is no match between the electoral party offers with voters’ expectations, as 
spelt out at the electoral platforms in the 2007 elections.   
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institutions. It makes citizens perceive such a way of functioning as not beneficial 
to them, raising suspicions of democracy as a workable regime. Some studies 
done for this part of Europe have found that for many citizens, democracy is 
perceived as economic development and prosperity. Therefore, it is the duty of 
parties, among others, to teach democracy to citizens in a way of making it give 
effect to society. The performance at the output level effects directly the citizens’ 
consent, and the level of shared norms and values, especially in newly 
established and still fragile democracies, where no distinction between 
personalities and the regime is made, and democracies facing economic and 
political reform simultaneously, where many associate democracy with welfare 
and economic prosperity as well (Dalton, et. al. 2007).  
 
The citizens’ consent that constitutes the fourth element of the legitimacy 
structure is cultivated as a result of good performance and pursuance of 
democratic procedures, directly influencing the spread and routinisation of 
democratic norms and values in society. Through the legitimation function, 
parties socialise citizens with democratic norms and values by firstly respecting 
democratic procedures themselves. The best way parties can teach democracy 
to citizens is through deliberative democracy, enabled through inner democracy 
and this in turn increases the support of citizens for the regime in question - a 
democratic regime. In a new democracy like Kosovo, with no tradition on 
democracy at all, and mostly an internationally sponsored democracy, society 
expects to taste the fruits of a democratic regime. The best way they benefit from 
democracy is through good governing, since it is directly tangible for society. 
 
The independence issue consistently shadowed system transformation in 
Kosovo. After the independence issue is settled, democracy needs to be 
accepted and recognised as the only game in town, firstly by the political elite, 
constituting primarily party leaders, currently having more authoritarian rather 
than democratic values. After that, it is to be expected that these values need to 
be recognised by society as well. Parties should serve as cultivators, producers, 
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and even advocates of democracy, and not of something else standing contrary 
to democracy. In other words, if society is to trust democracy, it primarily needs 
to learn it. Such a process is facilitated through political parties as they stand in 
between state and society, commanding both directions of communication.  
Using mechanisms of deliberative democracy, political parties in Kosovo might 
teach democratic values to society, making democracy more endurable and 
consolidated, and increasing its legitimacy among society. In this way the 
consent of people with democracy can be increased. 
7.6. Party Competition 
Party competition has a direct effect on the legitimation function of parties. It is 
related to the fourth level of the legitimacy structure. Party competition can be 
based on democratic norms and values, and democratic procedures, having an 
impact on performance and consent as well. Different from the inner functioning 
of a party, party competition covers more the parties’ behaviours at their outer 
level, their interrelationship. The way they compete reflects directly on the 
democratization prospects through the performance that parties manifest in their 
competition behaviours. Norden (1998) identifies three modes of competition 
between parties influencing democracy consolidation prospects: combative, 
moderate, and collusive. The moderate mode is the best for democracy, while 
the first can send the country into civil war, and the last one can transform the 
country into a tyranny by excluding the pluralist way of participation. The three 
modes comprise the performance of parties touching directly the legitimating 
function of parties. Parties’ competition behaviour that legitimate democracy best, 
is moderate competition.  
 
Political parties in Kosovo are known for using the three ways of competition. 
Immediately after the war there was high tension in party competition, especially 
between LDK and PDK leading the country close to civil war, which was mainly 
prevented by the presence of international community. This is best pointed out  
by the declaration of, at that time the deputy chairman of LDK, and currently LDD 
leader Nexhat Daci (Zeri 11.10.2004). According to him, the ground coalition 
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among the largest parties in Kosovo LDK-PDK-AAK was arranged for the simple, 
core reason to avoid civil war and the killing of each other. It reveals best the 
combative attitude of party competition among political parties in Kosovo. 
Furthermore, such an attitude was harmfully transmitted to society level, creating 
an enmity essentially based on regional bases, where parties mostly relied. 
Moreover, threats and violence were often present, especially during electoral 
campaigns. The daily newspapers reported among other things, that LDK 
candidates have received threatening letters (Kosova Sot 02.11.2001). In 
Skenderaj the office of LDK was attacked by fire arms (Bota Sot 05.11.2001), 
and so on. It should be highlighted that for many years after the war, some of the 
LDK chairmanship members and activists were assassinated, such as: Xhemajl 
Mustafa, Enver Maloku, Uke Bytyci, as well as many others. Up to now, the 
Kosovo and UNMIK justice present in Kosovo could not find and bring to justice 
those who assassinated them. However, one thing that is clear and is widely 
believed is that most of the assassinations were politically motivated.     
 
Such party behaviour was a bad signal and example of democracy to society, 
especially at the beginning of democracy in Kosovo, immediately after the war. 
People started to correlate democracy with this combative behaviour between 
the parties. These party behaviours are not a safe mode for legitimating 
democracy, to make people believe in democracy, or in spreading and 
deepening democratic values and norms, as was the need in Kosovo’s new 
democracy. In addition, such party behaviours reveal bad prospects for 
democracy consolidation and are irritating for society. The political tension has 
actually been decreased, though potentially it is still there, always ready to be 
actualised. Currently, most of the violence used by parties is on the day of 
elections, with many physical and armed skirmishes registered. The main reason 
for such behaviour is the party reliance on clienteles, and the only way to afford 
the support of the clientelist structure is through the means of being in power 
(see chap. 6 & 9). Such behaviour is known to persist between AAK and PDK, 
largely as a result of enmity between leaders of both parties. In the case of LDK 
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and PDK it is found also among the electorate, though with decreasing 
consistency. An excellent illustration of such party behaviour, still viable among 
Kosovo parties, is illustrated by the declaration of AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj, 
a day after the second round of local elections in 2009: “there was a need for just 
a very small thing, and then the worst would happen”, meaning a civil war was 
likely to happen (KTV 19.30 Lajmet, 26.12.2009). He declared so while 
commenting on the election process that took place a day before. Again, the 
inner party democracy should be recalled, that the absolute power of leaders is 
one of the main reasons for such combative behaviour, as long as they bring 
political competition to a personal level.  
 
On the other side, in the Kosovo party system, a collusive way of competition is 
found whereby parties collude with each other, even those in opposition to those 
in power. Such was the case between PDK and AKR, and LDD to some extent. 
The collusion in this case could not have the impact of murdering pluralism, 
because of the multi-party system in Kosovo, but it weakened democracy 
through reducing the opposition and horizontal accountability of Kosovo 
democracy. Kosovo currently has a ground coalition between the two largest 
parties, while remaining in opposition are three other smaller parties.. These 
parties in opposition could not join forces to make a strong voice. Moreover, 
when the largest opposition party, AKR collided with the largest party in power, 
PDK, the damage to democracy was immediately felt in terms of democratic 
backwardness, such as freedom of speech, politicisation of the media, and so on 
(Reporters Without Borders Report 2009; Letter of EBU to Prime Minister 
26.10.2009; EU Commission Report 2009, etc.). Nevertheless, such collusive 
behaviour was perceived as an opportunity by parties to benefit directly from the 
state through party collusion at the cost of citizens. The roots of such party 
behaviour are personalistic types of parties, trading-off on a personal  basis. In 
the eyes of citizens, it was considered as a weakness of democracy itself, a 
behaviour that did not help to legitimise democracy, as long as it benefited the 
party elite, but not citizens.   
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Lastly, Kosovo parties’ ways of competition does not offer a good performance 
based on democratic procedures. Likewise, they hinder the deepening of roots of 
democratic norms and values, impeding the achievement of the consent of 
society needed to push forward the prospects of democracy consolidation.  
7.7. Conclusion 
Democratic consolidation requires primarily the legitimation of democracy in the 
eyes, minds, and hearts, of the majority of society. The wider and deeper 
democracy is legitimised, the better the prospects for democracy to be 
consolidated. The main institutions having a key role in the legitimation process 
are political parties, constituting almost entirely the second level of the 
consolidation structure, and having an impact, in one way or another, at all three 
other levels. As such, their role in legitimation is irreplaceable. The legitimacy 
structure offered by Alagappa (1995) made up of four levels, can be developed 
and cultivated by political parties. Although democratic norms and values might 
be brought and sponsored by international actors, they still have to be adapted, 
domesticated, and further developed, by following the procedures specified by 
democracy, behaving based on collective interest and consequently generating 
society wide consent for democracy. Parties in practice can develop such a 
structure through their inner and outer behaviours and attitudes, having an 
impact on each other. With their behaviours relying on democratic norms and 
values, and developing inner democracy, parties find it indispensable to perform 
based on collective interests. Otherwise, if they have a shortage of inner 
democracy demonstrated through a low level of inclusiveness, a high level of 
centralisation, and a low level of institutionalisation, parties fail to use democratic 
norms for themselves, and are not expected to spread them widely among 
society. Kosovo parties so far have proved a lack of inner democracy, and to be 
highly personalistic. The failure to respect democratic procedures renders 
meaningless an expectation for parties’ performance based on collective 
interests, expressed in policy options offered by parties. There is still a lot to be 
done, in order to develop society consent about democracy, as the process of 
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democracy inculcation and legitimation dictates, required by the democracy 
consolidation process.  
 
Nonetheless, the type of party competition dominating the Kosovo party system 
has also reflected vastly undemocratic values to society, often jeopardizing 
democracy itself, which would have likely brought the country close to civil war, if 
no international community has been present to prevent it.  
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Chapter 8 
8. Politics without Policies - The Innovation Function of 
Parties in Kosovo 
“You ask too much of us. We produce just MPs”. 
Party Representative, cited from ICG Europe Report (Nr. 163, 26.05.2005) 
8.1. Introduction 
Along with the other functions that political parties have, parties offer innovations 
within their scope of ideological orientation and activity. They innovate in the way 
of fulfilling their own objectives, in terms of promoting the interests of citizens, or 
at least the interests of their supporters. In this regard, parties innovate best 
policies to solve citizens’ public problems, or the best means to tackle such 
issues. More often than not, citizens themselves have lack of time, resources, 
information, or often even interest to deal with the public problems they 
encounter. Therefore, parties are more responsible, have instruments, and are 
better prepared to do this, and to guide citizens in that direction, obviously 
through citizens’ participation. Party innovation function has a direct impact on 
citizens, by means of guiding them, offering solutions to their problems, triggering 
development, and enhancing creativity in society. Innovation in general is 
associated with creativity. Unlike individual creativity, party creativity involves the 
creativity of the community. Operating within the environment of the democracy 
consolidation process, parties’ creativity is crucial in this process with an impact 
on such environment, in terms of innovating policies and ways possibly to speed 
up the process, and deal with problems currently impeding democratic 
consolidation. 
 
This innovation function of parties is very much useful in the case of Kosovo. As 
stated earlier, the process of democratization in Kosovo has experienced block, 
simultaneous and a quadruple transition, coupled with the process of state and 
nation building. The democracy consolidation prospects are directly dependent 
on such developments (Berg-Schlosser 2004).  Kosovo parties have often been 
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the object of criticism for having deficiency in vision and creativity as to how to 
solve numerous extensive issues still pending for Kosovo society. As an 
illustration, most parties are consistently declaring on the stateness of Kosovo, 
and recently also on the need for UNMIK to leave as soon as possible, because 
Kosovo is sustainable itself. However, none of the parties has offered a plan on 
UNIMK’s withdrawal from Kosovo (Koha Ditore 25.03.2009).  
 
In order to measure this party function, the creativity and innovation capacity of 
parties to deal with current national problems is explored, including the planning 
ability of governing parties. These indicators are measured through analysing 
party programmes and electoral platforms, finding out the positions of parties on 
pending national issues, and the quality of governing programmes (including  
long-term strategies). The data are collected from party programmes, electoral 
platforms, media and other reports, through the document analysis method. 
While additional primary data are collected by the method of interview, 
particularly through expert interview. Political parties spell out and articulate their 
innovations and creativity on their visions on issues to be handed, in their 
programmes, electoral platforms, declarations, interviews, or any other policy 
papers. The extent of the development of such vision, including practical terms, 
illustrates the level of performance of the innovation function. The pending issues 
in Kosovo, requiring the approach of parties in one way or another are many, and 
are in need of prioritisation. At the centre of the research are the issues 
considered most important at the national level, looking to what extent parties 
offer solutions to them. The current pending issues in Kosovo are considered to 
be the increase in the number of state recognitions (of Kosovo), the extension of 
state authority over all territory and the integration of the Serb community, solving 
the Mitrovica problem, economic development, reducing poverty and 
unemployment, ensuring the rule of law, fighting corruption, improving energy 
supply, education and healthcare system, EU - NATO integration, and so the 
endless list continues. Though, there might be other issues as well, the study is 
concerned only with those considered more important and requiring immediate 
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solutions for a well-functioning state, pertaining to democracy consolidation, 
making democracy give effect, as well as the economy. In order to grasp the 
clear picture of the party innovation function, policy sectors are explored to 
understand the capability of parties to offer solutions on specific policy sectors. 
8.2. Emptiness, vagueness, and the populist approach of parties 
vs. their innovation 
The solutions to some of the issues mentioned do not depend entirely on the role 
parties have, since the international community was and is still an important actor 
in Kosovo politics, though its influence differs from one policy to another. 
Hitherto, it does not leave parties free of responsibility, taking a just wait and see 
approach. If in some areas it is not possible to act through government policies, 
without the approval of the international community66, they should at least have 
the vision of how to tackle and solve problems, offer alternatives, and take 
initiative, which could count as pressure and an impulsive force for the 
international community to act as well. Most of the time, especially on issues 
involving the Serbian community, the international community used to handle it 
by standing in between, playing the role of fire-fighter, due to required neutrality, 
to calm the objections of both sides, without offering any durable and sustainable 
way out of problems. Moreover, in some areas, political parties have free hands, 
as in the case of healthcare and education, but despite that, both sectors are left 
far behind and highly corrupted.  
 
Political parties of Kosovo are very poor in innovation and creativity. Zhinipotoku 
(2009) believes that Kosovo parties act on an ad hoc bases, are passive and 
always react without any prior plan. In addition, Matoshi (2009) considers that 
parties have no policies at all and usually make them up on a daily basis. G. 
Krasniqi (2009) goes even further, whereby according to him Kosovo parties are 
not only unable and not-creative to solve Kosovo problems, but in fact add to the 
problems and cause many of the problems that Kosovo has. In this way, parties 
                                                 
66 By international community it is meant all international actors involved in Kosovo, especially these more powerful and 
directly linked, such as KFOR, UNMIK, EULEX, EU, USA, UN, …. 
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are not perceived as capable actors to tackle Kosovo’s problems. Moreover, they 
are perceived more as a problem and as trouble makers. This is best proved, 
among other things, on the quality of party programmes, their electoral platforms, 
declarations, and their policy shortages. The programmes of parties in Kosovo on 
a broad-spectrum are very generalised, coloured with populism, rarely stating the 
commitments of parties to solve issues, just highlighting them – often targeting 
the emotional social support. For instance, the vagueness, populist nature, and 
emptiness of the LDK program was portrayed by the words used by Ibrahim 
Rugova in an election campaign: “the LDK programme is the programme of 
dreams and sacrifices of generations of Albanians” (Bota Sot 08.11.2001). The 
dominant issue on all party programmes, opening and closing programmes with, 
is the independence issue. Other problems less frequently mentioned are: 
fighting corruption, raising the number of jobs, fighting poverty, EU integration, 
and so on. However, all of them are merely proclaimed, devoid of any concrete 
policy or measure (Programmes of LDK, PDK, AAK, AKR, LDD; see also the 
chap. on the representation function). One of the reasons for that might be the 
usually generalised nature of party programmes. Following the pervasiveness of 
the independence and stateness issues, some parties later on started to 
transform their programmes, adding some commitments to economic issues as 
well.  
 
Regarding the electoral platforms, they are very empty, and vague. Most of them 
cite the current problems, but none offers a practical policy on how to handle 
them. It is pointed out what should be done in certain sectors, without explaining 
how to achieve it, or the related budget implications. Moreover, they sound more 
like populist rhetoric, rather than constituting an innovation to policy approaches. 
The main reason behind the presence of such populism is the endeavour to fill 
up the emptiness of their policy platforms. From the interviews conducted with 
party representatives (Buja - PDK 2009, Rugova - LDD 2010, Hajzeraj – AKR 
2009, Beqiri - LDK 2010, Ramadani - AAK 2010), all of them stated only some of 
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the problems Kosovo has, but none could provide any solution from the party 
he/she belongs to. In addition, they could not offer any written policy.  
 
The party leaders’ declarations on the other side try to mobilise the support of the 
masses by attracting citizens’ attention as much as possible by just bringing into 
sight the problems Kosovo has, often in an emotional and populist way, 
sometimes also extending wordy commitments to solve them.  
 
To illustrate the current state of affairs, looking at the promises of parties at the 
electoral campaign, they are obviously dominated by the populist approach. 
Moreover, in Kosovo parties also contend demagogy and irresponsible 
declarations as an effort to substitute the absence of clear policies. Such 
examples are very common, among them the following: PDK leader declares 
“positive change is coming” (Infopress 16 November 2007); LDK leader states 
“LDK knows to govern further” (Koha Ditore 28 October 2007); Hamiti asserts 
“LDK can make dreams reality” (Koha Ditore 29 October 2007); or “it has snowed 
to show that LDK has a white soul”; and so on. The same applies to AAK, AKR, 
and LDD on the other side. By looking at parties’ declarations since the 2001 
election, it became obvious that most of them are highly populist. The most 
influential leader in Kosovo, the LDK former leader Ibrahim Rugova (died in 
2006), finding the right moment to chair the Kosovo Albanian mass movement for 
independence, since 1989, became famous also due to his use of a populist 
approach. The majority of society was following him blindly due to the authority 
he created among the masses, particularly during the pre-war period. He often 
used the opportunity and found it a very useful vehicle to make populist appeals 
on electoral campaigns. For instance in the 2001 election campaign he declared 
“the people of Kosovo are a fantastic one, they make miracles with the few things 
they have” (Bota Sot 07.11.2001). The appeal and words used were entirely 
populist, representing no practical solution, despite the fact that at that time 
Kosovo was a society that had recently experienced the war, in desperate need 
for essential things for life. Furthermore, on another electoral meeting (Bota Sot 
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15.11.2001) Rugova stated “the independence is the objective and the holy word 
to Kosovo citizens”.  While another member of the LDK chairmanship Eqrem 
Kryeziu, appealing to the electorate, praised highly the LDK leader “Dr. Ibrahim 
Rugova is the miracle of Kosovo” (Bota Sot 16.11.2001). Instead of offering 
practical policies for the youth of Kosovo, Rugova directed at them “for you youth 
we will create jobs so that you remain young, and inherit your life with your kids” 
(Koha Ditore 02.11.2001); “man feels good when he is together with the youth” 
(Zeri 02.11.2001). As a statement it implies a lack of seriousness such as, 
mentioning kids to the youth. Another appeal used by LDK was “with us you have 
a more secured future” (Kosova Sot 06.11.2001).  
 
Three years later, no changes in the party’s approaches to society’s problems 
and innovation developments seem viable. The party preferences and priorities 
apparently have not changed. In the 2004 election campaign Rugova’s 
declaration almost had the same composition as the message delivered to the 
electorate in 2001: “the grass of the football field of Gjilan is bringing the victory 
to LDK” (Koha Ditore 19.10.2004). Fatmir Rexhepi and Sabit Rrustemi, LDK 
chairmanship members added “LDK is offering everything Kosovo needs” (Koha 
Ditore 12.10.2004). However, they failed to demonstrate, for at least a single 
issue, how LDK would concretely tackle it. On the other side, Rugova making a 
purely populist appeal to citizens among others, declared “LDK will serve all 
citizens” (Kosova Sot 15.10.2004); “LDK is for Kosovo and for the whole of 
Kosovo” (Bota Sot 01.10.2004).  
 
Nonetheless, the expected positive developments in terms of the innovation and 
creativity of parties, even in the 2007 elections seem to be absent. LDK carried 
on with old populist and empty promises. Since they had to go without their 
leader, who died in 2006, and having no vision to cover other issues, they tried to 
use the name of Rugova as an appeal for votes. Another reason they 
emphasised the name of Rugova, was the competition with LDD, coming out of 
LDK in 2007, trying to present that it is them, on their own, that inherit the name 
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of Rugova. In this regard, in the election campaign, LDK proclaimed “LDK has 
the key of Rugova” (Lajm 14.11.2007). It is more or less an attempt to create a 
myth about Rugova. Lutfi Haziri, one of the LDK deputy chairmen declared “the 
vision of Rugova is inside the people of Kosovo”. In this way, the LDK electoral 
campaign was shadowed largely by the name of Rugova. However, the populist 
approach was not absent even in the 2007 elections, on the electoral meeting, 
LDK among others declared “the LDK victory, is the victory of citizens” (Epoka e 
Re 01.11.2007).  
 
On the other side, social development took place faster and on a different level 
from political parties. Eight years after the war, the majority of society is fed up of 
empty promises, missing tangible changes and offers. Therefore, the name of 
Rugova did not work as it previously had done; LDK lost almost 50% of their 
votes and seats. Even today, the name of their leader, Ibrahim Rugova who died 
in 2006, is still used as the main vehicle to mobilise society’s support. There is no 
doubt, that he enjoyed great support as a leader on the organisation of peaceful 
resistance on the way to independence, but other issues were not part of his 
agenda or priorities. Nowadays, Kosovo no longer has the problem of 
independence, but needs to address other problems to sustain their 
independence. One of the deputy LDK chairmen Eqrem Kryeziu states that the 
“LDK programme is based on the programme of Ibrahim Rugova” (Infopress 28 
October 2007). Relying utterly on Rugova’s programme in 2007, means offering 
nothing of what society needs. LDK stresses mainly the leader Ibrahim Rugova 
and does not actually offer creativity to innovate policies, or ways of how to 
handle current pending social or economic problems. Furthermore, an LDK 
deputy chairmen Fadil Ferati (Infopress 9 November 2007) proclaims “on the 
Rugova’s way”. In addition, the LDK programme as such was more or less a 
collection of slogans and commitments. It is understandable that LDK tries to use 
the authority of Rugova enjoying broad support in society, but as a programme 
and as an innovation offer, it is poor and has nothing to endow the party with 
apart from symbolic remembering of a charismatic leader. What seems more 
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worrying, is that they still refer to the past and ignore the reality, as LDK deputy 
chairman Sabri Hamiti declared “LDK has nothing to change on its programme” 
(Koha Ditore 27 October 2007). In the absence of vision and creativity to 
innovate policies and mechanisms, LDK in this way tries to fill up that gap with 
the charismatic figure of Rugova, though dead. 
 
On the other hand, PDK has so far in general not proved that they perform better 
in terms of creativity and innovation. Its electoral campaign appears not to differ 
much in terms of the substantial meaning offered to the electorate. PDK 
declarations are full of populism and emptiness, and offer no meaningful policy 
for pressing issues. Limaj, one of the PDK founders and deputy chairman asserts 
“If PDK wins, Kosovo and all its citizens are going to win ” (Koha Ditore 
06.11.2001). It sounds very populist and says nothing particular or different from 
what other competing parties offer. Even more populist appeal comes from PDK 
leader Hashim Thaqi “we will not do anything without asking the people” (Koha 
Ditore 10.11.2001). Some of the parties’ statements during the election campaign 
also sound funny, such as the Thaqi’s declaration “the victory for PDK will make 
the whole world happy” (Koha Ditore 16.11.2001). Later on, following the 
subsequent election and the 2007 elections, not much change was recognised. 
In the 2007 elections, no creativity was apparent, PDK continued with the old 
populist and empty messages in their electoral approach. At an electoral meeting 
Thaqi asserted that “the address of success is PDK” (Lajm 04.11.2007). PDK 
tried to make use of the war of the KLA as a vehicle to mobilise the electorate. In 
this regard, for example Thaqi states “a vote for PDK shows respect for the 
commander Adem Jashari” (Koha Ditore 09.11.2001). While talking about the 
lack of healthcare as a problem, instead of opening up the party’s policy for the 
healthcare system, he declares “health to all” (Express 10.11.1007). PDK leader 
Hashim Thaqi in the 2007 electoral campaign pronounced: “I will serve all 
citizens” (Infopress 27.11. 2007). Furthermore, it is common for party leaders to 
use “I” instead of “We”, indicating the absolute power leaders have within the 
party. Such expression is awfully blurred, general, and pure demagogy. On the 
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other side, it shows the inability of parties in innovating to handle the problems 
society has, instead trying to fill the gap by using very general and vague appeals 
and calls to citizens. 
 
The same applies to AAK, featured with a high level of populism and poor 
performance in innovation. Looking at the electoral promises of AAK at the three 
periodic elections, one finds no difference at all from other parties; in other 
words, no creativity, no innovation, and no policies available. Party statements in 
elections support such an argument. AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj, in the 2001 
elections, , while trying to appeal to voters by praising his party declared “the 
alliance sleeps late, and wakes up early” (Koha Ditore 08.11.2001). The esteem 
held for the party leader is also used as a tool to attract voters. Mahmut Bakalli, 
one of the chief advisers of Haradinaj, and a widely known politician during the 
socialist period, affirmed at an electoral meeting “Haradinaj is the future of 
Kosovo politics” (Koha Ditore 05.11.2001). Besides this, Haradinaj assured that 
“there is no one that can do more for Kosovo than we have done” (Koha Ditore 
16.11.2001), referring to his and his family’s contribution during the war. 
Moreover, a doubtful assertion “we will do more than we promise” (Kosova Sot 
02.11.2001) was given by AAK. Haradinaj himself continued making another 
populist claim “state, welfare, and democracy are in the hands of people” (Zeri 
02.11.2001). Yet, in the following elections in 2004, nothing changed for the 
positive. Talking about the AAK 2004 electoral programme, Haradinaj 
commented that the electoral programme of AAK is a public signature for 
successful governing” (Koha Ditore 20.10.2004). The 2007 elections found 
Haradinaj accused in the Hague, at an International tribunal on former 
Yugoslavia. His absence was reflected in the AAK electoral campaign as well.  
 
LDD as an independent party took part in elections for the first time in 2007, as it 
had split away from LDK. Despite the split, and the adding of a new party to the 
numerous parties in the Kosovo party system, no further creativity appeared. 
Divided from LDK, they tried to promote themselves as inheriting and following 
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the Rugova tradition. Based on that, most of its campaign was pitched against its 
main rival LDK, both trying to sell themselves to the electorate as being in line 
with Rugova’s spirit. Yet, this represents more the emptiness of both parties, in 
terms of their offer to the electorate, having nothing else to offer. One of the 
chairmanship members of LDD, Adem Salihaj claims that “LDD is the pursuer of 
the breath and vision of Rugova” (Lajm 01.11.2007). The LDD leader also 
promised very generally without concrete policies “we guarantee a life with 
prosperity” (Kosova Sot 05.11.2007). In addition, they could not escape the 
populist approach either, “we are the only solution” (Kosova Sot 08.11.2007). 
 
The 2007 election welcomed the newly formed party AKR, founded by an 
Albanian multimillionaire. Although they tried to promote and raise awareness of 
economic more than other issues, the populist approach of its leader Behgjet 
Pacolli, proved inescapable. Despite, talking about and trying to offer some 
solutions to economic issues, AKR failed to translate them into policies, and to 
explain to what extent they were achievable. The populist spirit of AKR is 
manifested in the party declarations during the 2007 elections. For example, 
Pacolli believes that “AKR is the last chance for resurgence” (Lajm 01.11.2007). 
Moreover, demonstrating his strong authority, he declares that “now it is my time” 
(Lajm 04.11.2007). Additionally, he proclaims that: “enough with all negative 
phenomena lying above the backbone of this population” (Express 12.11.2007); 
“the concerns of citizens are also the concerns of myself” (Bota Sot 07.11.2007); 
“the coming government is going to work like a Swiss watch” (Epoka e Re 
01.11.2007). AKR leader Behgjet Pacolli, at the first founding Congress in 2006 
declared that “we will return to society its lost dignity” (AKR first Congress 2006). 
Usually the notion of dignity is part of a populist vocabulary, employed to mobilise 
the masses. 
8.3. Policy sectors and innovation function of parties 
However, to shed more light on the creativity and performance of parties on the 
innovation function, the major national pending issues are going to be explored, 
issue by issue, in a specific way, to see what parties make concrete offers to 
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solve the issues in question. The issues included are those most important and 
having an immediate need to be settled. 
 
The Independence issue 
The independence issue has been one the main concerns of Kosovo parties, 
dominating their agendas, programmes, platform, and speeches. It is also one of 
the key elements of nationalist ideology, considered one of the driving forces in 
the development of pluralism in Kosovo. The independence issue has largely 
overshadowed and often surpassed democracy and democratisation. Parties 
have mobilised the masses vastly around the independence issue. Due to the 
nature of the issue, parties repeatedly used populist words to articulate their 
concern about independence, and mobilise the masses in turn. It was 
independence, especially the way to independence, as a leading issue, that 
marked the major cleavage among the largest parties in Kosovo after the war. 
Almost all other issues were overshadowed by the independence.  
 
From the interview conducted by the daily newspaper Kosova Sot (09.11.2001) 
with party representatives in the 2001 election campaign, most of them declared 
independence as their priority. The secretary general of LDK laid out their 
priorities for the 2001 elections as follows: independence, economic 
development, integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and a special relationship 
with the USA. Rame Buja, a member of the PDK chairmanship, identified PDK 
priorities as follows: transforming the constitutional framework into a constitution, 
inclusion of a referendum on the constitution, independence based on the blood 
that was shed. While the AAK deputy chairman declared party priorities as: 
creation of a stable government, legislating laws to protect the local producers, 
and general reforms.  
 
Yet, as independence was getting closer, its relevance was decreasing and 
pressure from society about other concerns was growing. Failure of parties to 
respond to such forces shows the asymmetric developments in the society and 
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party system level, leaving parties behind, in terms of demanding development at 
the society level, with less actual development at the parties’ level, increasing 
tremendously the scale of citizens’ alienation and political apathy in Kosovo. 
Parties are still referring to independence, even since Kosovo declared its 
independence in 2008. Before that, parties tried to make use of it, calling the day 
of independence close. The PDK leader among others stated that “independence 
is very near” (Infopress 25 October 2007). PDK also declared “it is the time of 
PDK and we will declare independence” (Infopress 30 October 2007). LDK 
assured that “independence is a matter of days” (Infopress 31 October 2007). 
The AAK leader referring to independence, said that “we will achieve 
independence”. LDD praised its leader Nexhat Daci, as one of the main actors in 
the struggle for independence. AKR as a new party did not concentrate on the 
independence issue, but since its leader was of a business background, they 
focused more on economics, though not offering practical policies except several 
irresponsible promises such as 170000 jobs, without explaining how that was to 
be achieved. Many uneducated, uninformed, and needy (counting a huge 
number) citizens rested their hopes on such promises, yet it is not considered as 
an innovative policy on economic development, due to its impracticability and 
lack of translation into workable and achievable policies.     
 
Kosovo parties in general, perform poorly in the innovation function, and as such 
do not lend a hand in democracy consolidation process, which they could 
otherwise be more convincing with, and give good examples in terms of offering 
solutions to society’s problems. During the 2001 and 2004 elections, the 
independence issue dominated almost 90% of electoral meetings of parties, each 
one of them making similar commitments. Other issues were often not even 
mentioned. In this regard, Ibrahim Rugova declared “LDK strives for an 
independence and democracy for all” (Bota Sot 02.11.2001); “the years of 
international recognition of independence have come” (Bota Sot 03.11.2001). On 
another meeting, it is also asserted that “LDK will strive for a formal 
independence” (Kosova Sot 01.11.2001). From the PDK side the same 
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commitments could be heard, focusing totally on the independence issue. PDK 
leader Thaqi declared “this election will open the way for the referendum for 
independence” (Kosova Sot 01.11.2001). The AAK leader not differing from their 
rival parties in terms of offers made to citizens claimed “independence first” 
(Kosova Sot 01.11.2001). After the war, parties tried to create a perception 
among the masses that Kosovo was already independent, and needed just 
formal recognition. However, most statements regarding independence were also 
clothed with populist and demagogy appeal, for example Melihate Termkolli, one 
of the LDK chairmanship members asserted “a vote for Rugova and LDK is a 
vote for Kosovo independence” (Bota Sot 04.11.2001). Rugova, on the other 
side, describing the party programme, claimed that “the electoral programme of 
LDK is a national programme for Kosovo independence” (Zeri 15.10.2004). Most 
of the LDK support among the masses was a result of the party being the leader 
of peaceful resistance for almost a decade before the war. Therefore, LDK tried 
to mobilise its support by reminding the citizens that LDK led the independence 
mass movement. Likewise, Kole Berisha at an electoral meeting reminded, “LDK 
is a party that knows how to finalise the process of independence” (Zeri 
04.10.2004). In this regard also, PDK claimed about themselves “the PDK victory 
is a guarantee for the Kosovo state” (Koha Ditore 22.10.2004). As the 
independence issue was coming close to settlement, parties started to compete 
on who was going to declare it faster. Fatmir Sejdiu, the LDK leader after 
Rugova, stated that “just a few days after the 10th of December we will have 
independence” (Lajm 03.11.2007). Even in 2004, the AAK leader exceedingly 
convincingly promised “independence in one year” (Kosova Sot 01.10.2004). 
PDK also claimed that “within six months we will have a Kosovo constitution” 
(Zeri 04.10.2004). One of the AAK deputy chairman Ahmet Isufi, among others 
asserted “if you vote for the alliance (AAK), in January together with Ramush 
Haradinaj we will make Kosovo a state” (Express 12.11.2007). 
 
Not surprisingly, even the most burning issue - independence, was not clearly 
presented to the electorate. None of the parties offered any practical strategy on 
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how to achieve such an objective. Most of what they actually did was to keep it 
alive as an issue and utilize it as a workable tool to mobilise the emotional 
support of society. The worst thing was that independence left many other 
important and acute issues under its shadow. Somehow, it also prevented the 
growth of society’s other needs and requirements, including democracy 
developments, keeping society under the fever of independence.  
   
Recognition and extension of sovereignty  
After the declaration of independence, the most important issue related directly to 
state building, and influencing the democratization process, was recognition of 
Kosovo by as many states as possible. So far, just more than one fourth of UN 
member states have extended their recognition to the Kosovo state. Parties in 
Kosovo have not offered any strategy and policy on how to handle the issue on 
the best way to increase the number of recognitions. Parties in power seem to 
have approached the matter negligently, manifested by the small budget 
allocated to the ministry of foreign affairs, compared that of many other 
ministries. AKR leader Pacolli, tried personally to use his private business 
connections to lobby for the recognition of Kosovo independence in some states, 
but as a party did not offer any workable policy on that. In this regard, parties did 
not prove creative in innovating policies to increase the number of recognising 
nations. From the interviews conducted with party representatives, more or less 
the same answers were given. They mentioned the importance of international 
recognition and the failure of Kosovo policy in this direction. Yet, none of them 
presented any formulated policy about the issue in question. The opposition 
parties (Naser Rugova - LDD, Ramadani - AAK, Hajzeraj - AKR) accused the 
government of policy failure. On the other hand, coalition parties (Buja - PDK, 
Beqiri - LDK) mentioned different reasons trying to justify it. 
 
Kosovo as a new state still has problems of extending sovereignty over all its 
territory, especially in enclaves populated with Serb minorities, covering one third 
of Kosovo territory. Political parties use such a malfunction as a rhetorical 
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mechanism to criticise each other, but none of them have yet innovated any 
feasible policy on how to tackle it (Interviews with PDK, AAK, LDK, AKR, LDD 
representatives). Even parties in government have no vision and have no policies 
on paper on how to solve it. Most parties try to escape from dealing with it.  
 
The number of states recognising Kosovo as a state is still low, and as such 
makes the Kosovo state vulnerable, impacting directly on democracy 
consolidation prospects. Limited sovereignty and an inability to extend state 
authority over all its territory prevents the development of cohesion, making 
Kosovo democracy easily breakable and unable to give effect, consequently 
making democracy consolidation prospects highly unforeseeable. On the other 
side, political parties manifest the just wait and see attitude of such 
developments. 
 
Integrating the Serb minority 
Since the withdrawal of Serb troops from Kosovo in 1999, most Serbs did not 
recognise the new reality. They did not accept being under Kosovo authority and 
consider themselves and the enclaves where they live as being part of Serbia. 
Some of those that later recognised the UNMIK administration, boycotted Kosovo 
institutions after the declaration of independence, though constitutionally they 
have reserved seats in parliament and the government (Kosovo Constitution 
2008). Nevertheless, the majority continue to ignore Kosovo institutions and do 
not consider themselves as a part of Kosovo, in particular those living on the 
other side of the Iber river, in the north of Kosovo.  
 
Inclusion of the Serbian minority into Kosovo institutions, and society as well, is a 
great challenge for the Kosovo government and Kosovo democracy consolidation 
developments. Until now, parties have failed to offer any viable and workable 
plan and strategy on how to integrate them. Of course, as such it is a wider 
problem and involves a number of actors as well, but government parties should 
at least have plans on how to deal with it, and opposition parties should have 
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policy papers. In the interviews with parties’ representatives, none of them was 
able to offer any solution on how the Serb minority could best be integrated. 
Moreover, they did not show any policy options in the paper on that. In 
interviews, they tried to accuse each other on such failure but offered no 
alternative. They also accused Serbia directly as it has politicised the process of 
integrating the Serb community in Kosovo. Kosovo authorities are not able to 
extend their authority in Serbian enclaves; as a result, such a relationship 
maintains the vulnerability of the security situation and keeps Kosovo democracy 
fragile. What also endangers Kosovo democracy consolidation is that a 
significant part of society (on a constitutional basis, they have the power of veto 
on all legislation related to minorities and on constitutional changes) of Serb 
ethnicity boycotts Kosovo democracy.  
 
Unification of Mitrovica 
The Mitrovica problem has persisted since the end of war and the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo. The bridge above the Iber river is used as a point to stand 
in between two parts of Mitrovica city. The northern part and beyond populated 
by a majority of Serbs and the south by a majority of Albanians. Since then the 
issue has not been settled and political parties offer no practical plan on that. The 
problem of Mitrovica includes other actors as well, but parties should at least 
offer policies on paper of how to integrate the city, and have a clear stand on the 
issue. Instead, parties have used it merely as a burning issue to develop their 
populist declarations. In the interviews conducted with political parties, no policy 
paper on the issue was provided from them. They have no idea even on how to 
approach the problem. On their electoral platforms no innovation on the issue is 
found. However, during electoral campaigns it has often been mentioned as an 
issue, starting from the 2001 election up to the present day, without a vision of 
how to integrate it. Flora Brovina, a member of the PDK chairmanship declared 
“Mitrovica will not remain a hostage of Serbia” (Epoka e Re 01.11.2001). The 
approach is highly patriotic, but the issue remains unsettled up to now. Bajram 
Rexhepi too, claimed “we can guarantee that there will be no partition of 
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Mitrovica” (Zeri 01.10.2004). PDK also tries to get votes by mentioning Mitrovica 
on the electoral campaign, among other things they declared that “independence 
is nowhere better celebrated than in Mitrovica” (Koha Ditore 29 October 2007). 
Moreover, Thaqi added “we will build roads up to Leposavic” (Kosova Sot 
03.11.2007). It sounds a very populist and vague declaration, and does not 
constitute an innovation on the policy of the issue. Such populism is not absent 
from LDK either, trying to mobilise the electorate by suggesting the unification of 
Mitrovica is conditional to LDK coming to power “if LDK wins, Mitrovica will be 
united” (Koha Ditore 30 October 2007). Fatmir Sejdiu from LDK also shows their 
commitment on the issue “we are committed to continue for integration in 
Mitrovica” (Koha Ditore 12.11.2007). However, AAK tried to personalise the 
issue, relying on their leader’s personality. High-profile party officials declared “it 
is only Ramush Haradinaj that can guarantee integration of Mitrovica” (Express 
10.11.2007); “the guarantee for territorial integration of Mitrovica belongs only to 
Ramush” (Koha Ditore 10.11.2007). Furthermore, AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj 
himself, used his version of empty declarations “if I come to power we will have 
coffee together in Leposavic” (Koha Ditore 29.11.2009) meaning the unification 
of Mitrovica.   
 
Parties have so far failed to perform their innovation function on solving the 
Mitrovica issue. The problem goes on and no vision for its solution seems on the 
horizon.  
 
Economic development, fighting poverty and unemployment 
Kosovo remains one of the poorest and most un-developed states in Europe. It is 
the country with the highest rate of poverty in the region, with 40% of the 
population living in poverty and 17% in extreme poverty, a high level of economic 
stagnation, and an unemployment rate of more than 45% (World Bank report on 
Kosovo 2007). Kosovo parties not so far have demonstrated a clear vision or an 
innovative way on how to deal with these issues. Most of Kosovo’s neighbours 
pursuing development policies have performed better. Kosovo seems to lack the 
  Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo          
 
259 
 
vision on how to pursue and achieve economic development. The government 
programmes, party programmes and platforms consist more or less of wishful 
thinking. On the other side, parties make use of that, in a populist way to accuse 
rivals from other parties for not doing anything on that. 
 
Most of Kosovo’s governments after the war governed Kosovo without a plan at 
all, having no middle or long-term economic development strategy. Opposition 
parties are not faring better, possessing no methods on how to develop the 
Kosovo economy. Even today, they do not show capability in innovation to 
develop Kosovo. However, LDD has inside its structure, committees responsible 
in dealing with different policies, but they do not function as expected (Naser 
Rugova – LDD, 2010). They have not offered policies or alternatives to current 
policies on how to develop the Kosovo economy, or to fight poverty and 
unemployment. Moreover, the high level of poverty is employed as a populist tool 
to improve the rhetoric of rival parties. All parties promise jobs, but no concrete 
policies on how to create these jobs. The lack of such creativity of parties makes 
the government take a passive approach, often following but not initiating issues. 
During electoral campaigns, parties do not hesitate to make promises without 
any responsibility, or electoral platforms not representing workable solutions. The 
PDK leader promises “roads of European quality” (Infopress 26 October 2007). 
The AKR leader promised employment for a large number of people, yet not 
clarifying how this was to be attained. The other parties as well promise anything 
that comes to their mind. During the electoral campaigns, parties also refer to 
economic development, though less than independence. One of the PDK 
chairmanship members stated “without economic development we will not have 
independence” (Epoka e Re 01.11.2001). Often parties have tried to refer to 
developed countries, while talking about economic development, “PDK considers 
economic development according to standards of European civilisation” (Koha 
Ditore 06.10.2004). Other parties as well try to maximise votes by rhetorically 
highlighting economic development. Ibrahim Rugova in one electoral meeting 
stated: “one of the realities is the buffalo of this region tracing back to ancient 
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Dardania” (Kosova Sot 14.11.2001). On another occasion, LDK proclaimed that 
“if LDK wins all investors will invest in Kosovo” (Koha Ditore 02.10.2004). AAK 
referring to economic development stated “on the first days of governing we will 
make the state and economic development” (Koha Ditore 19.20.2004). An article 
in Zeri (01.20.2004) ensured that AAK mentioned agricultural problems, but 
without any details on them.  
 
Another party that tried to switch the political priority in Kosovo to economic 
issues was AKR. All they did was give high promises, devoid of empirical support 
for their possible implementation, and often coloured with the populist attitude of 
its leader.  In some electoral meetings he asserted that: “I did not come here to 
touch the pockets of the citizens of Kosovo” (Zeri 05.11.2007); “I will also make 
Kosovo independent of poverty within six months” (Koha Ditore 12.11.2007); 
“within two years we will generate 70000 jobs” (Lajm 04.11.2007); “citizens do 
believe in the AKR programme to lessen poverty” (Bota Sot 06.11.2007). 
 
All above mentioned promises on economic development and fighting poverty 
are short of the support of clear policies. Kosovo even today, has the same trend 
of economic development that it used to. Democracy prospects are decidedly 
dependent on economic prosperity. The increasing level of poverty makes 
Kosovo democracy shakeable, causing a high level of electoral volatility and an 
unstable party system. In Kosovo, new parties are still emerging able to use the 
level of poverty to change Kosovo from a democracy into an authoritarian 
regime. Last but not the least, the high level of poverty makes Kosovo 
democracy more prone to clientelism.  
 
Rule of Law  
One of Kosovo’s current democracy defects is the lack of a rule of law. All EU 
Commission Reports (from 2005 – 2009) on the progress of Kosovo in fulfilling 
the standards for EU integration, have made objections on the failure of Kosovo 
to functionalise the backbone of a democracy, the rule of law. One of the main 
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reasons that Kosovo, even after 10 years of paternalist overseeing, still needs 
further international monitoring, as EULEX or ICO are mandated to do in Kosovo, 
is the failure of Kosovo institutions to functionalise the rule of law. There is a high 
level of politicization of courts, lawyers, judges, and prosecutors as well. The 
judicial system is suffocated and has no space to breath due to politics - 
government control of judiciary, informal pressures from parties’ leaders, and 
“invisible” hands as well. The politicisation is also criticized in the above-
mentioned reports of the EU Commission.  
 
Parties do not offer any plan to functionalise the judicial system and the rule of 
law, some of them still strive to control them, especially through government 
control. Party platforms embrace no reasonable and workable solution on 
functionalising the rule of law, except empty commitments. Furthermore, in this 
policy field, most work done by parties is only criticising each other, devoid of any 
offers of a policy solution. Contrary, parties compete on who is going to extend 
quicker and deeper control on the judiciary, being closed into the so called 
prisoners’ dilemma. Likewise, parties are identified more as problem generators 
rather than problem solvers. The shortage of a rule of law makes democracy 
senseless, diminishing democracy consolidation prospects.  
 
Fighting Corruption and Organised Crime 
Corruption and organised crime are among the main vices of Kosovo democracy. 
Kosovo is acknowledged as the source, transit, and destination of organised 
crime (EU Commission Report 2008). Up to now, Kosovo has not yet adapted a 
functional strategy on how to fight organised crime and corruption. Surprisingly, 
parties do not address such a problem seriously. From the interviews conducted, 
no party has written policy on fighting corruption and organised crime; they talk 
about the problem, confirm that it exists and that there should be a solution to it, 
but no one was concrete in showing what their party was doing in this regard.    
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On the other hand, in terms of corruption, Kosovo is placed alongside many sub-
Saharan African countries. Political parties in power or in opposition are not 
doing anything to fight corruption, on the contrary they encourage it. The law on 
fighting corruption is not sufficient to fight corruption (Aliu 2009). Parties have 
shown no interest so far to undertake such an initiative. This is supported by the 
fact that up to now no law on party finances has been legislated.  
 
Furthermore, parties continue to be among the driving forces of corruption. 
Moreover, they lack the will and readiness to fight corruption. Most development 
of corruption  takes place directly from the parties in government. All parties do in 
this regard is rhetorically put dust in the eyes of voters without doing anything 
practical. Party leaders often portray words such as “zero tolerance to 
corruption”, though it stands in contradiction with party activities on that issue. 
They would be more sincere if they were to proclaim just the opposite. On 
parties’ programmes and electoral platforms there is no such policy to be found, 
except wordy commitments. For instance, in the 2007 electoral campaign LDK 
declared “we are committed to fight corruption with non-corrupted people” (Koha 
Ditore 8 November 2007). AKR is this respect affirmed “we will lead the war 
against corruption” (Epoka e Re 09.11.2007). From LDD as well, Shefki Gashi 
raised its party commitment to fight corruption “we promise to fight corruption” 
(Zeri 09.11.2007). However, after the dust of the election campaign rests, up to 
now no one has taken any steps in that direction.   
 
The high level of corruption affects democracy consolidation developments, 
limiting the space for democracy to give effect in terms of citizens’ benefit. 
Despite the high level of corruption, the anxiety remains with the lack of fight 
against corruption, and the shortage of vision and political will from parties to 
fight corruption.   
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Healthcare 
Since the collapse of socialism where the healthcare system was publicly owned 
and run, the Kosovo healthcare system has been in chaos, and is not yet 
established. It is neither public nor private. Kosovo remains the only country in 
Europe without a healthcare insurance policy. Parties in government tried just to 
meddle with the chaos of healthcare without providing a policy on how to 
functionalise the system. It should be pointed out that the pharmaceutical 
industry is among the most corrupted sectors in Kosovo. Some high level 
decision makers have illegal profits from it in the hundreds of millions, preventing 
any possible arrangement for the healthcare system. Parties in opposition often 
assert as well that there is a collapse of the healthcare system, without 
innovating any policy to fix it. During electoral campaigns, in order to maximise 
votes, unrealisable and populist promises are found. PDK for example in the 
2007 electoral campaign declared “health for all” (Infopress 10.11.2007), and 
promised “80 million for healthcare in 2008” (Koha Ditore 10.11.2007). In 
addition, LDK promised “we will invest in education and healthcare” (Kosova Sot 
29.09.2004). 
 
Such promises are very empty, irresponsible, and never followed through. Party 
programmes and platforms do not offer any innovation in policy on how to tackle 
the problem. In the interviews conducted with party representatives, they 
confirmed that they still have no policy options on healthcare.  
 
Energy policy 
The energy sector since the end of war has been one of the greatest black holes 
in the Kosovo economy. It swallowed huge funds from the Kosovo budget and 
international donations, but still constitutes as one of the biggest problems in 
Kosovo. Electricity supply is a concern of every Kosovo citizen, because very 
often it is in short supply. Yet, also in this sector Kosovo parties have not offered 
any policy on how to solve it. Economic development is highly dependent on 
energy supply; though they promised a lot, so far they have not offered any 
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workable solution to it. The PDK leader promised “24 hours electricity supply” 
(Infopress 31.10.2007). In another electoral campaign Thaqi also pledged that 
“we will provide energy to the entire region” (Koha Ditore 31.10.2007), which 
sounds funny, since actually often people in Kosovo have no electricity for up to 
12 hours a day.  
 
Education 
The Kosovo education system is not better-off than the other sectors. Less than 
half passed the Matura State exam in 2009, there is high percentage of 
schoolchildren leaving schools, and a very low quality of education in general. 
Parties instead of trying to find ways on how to functionalise the education 
system, they are competing on who is going to extend political control of it. As in 
other policy sectors, in education policy also, parties have not provided any 
policy on how to get out of such chaos. One of the greatest problems of the 
education system in Kosovo at all levels is the politicisation of education. There is 
an eager competition among parties on who is going to extend their control over 
the education system. The major contribution of parties in the education system 
remains their empty words and promises during electoral campaigns. 
 
EU and NATO Integration 
EU and NATO integration is considered one of the main priorities for all Balkan 
countries. The standards required for integration do not seem to have been on 
the practical agenda of workable policy offers by parties in power or in 
opposition. In the interviews conducted with party representatives, no such 
policy, as to the best way to push forward the reforms needed, was provided. A 
few of them lack even information on how the process of integration takes place. 
Yet, in Kosovo, the rhetoric on integration is not missing. European integration 
also means better prospects for democracy consolidation, since the EU is among 
the main guardians of democracy in Kosovo, and all the required reforms for 
integration add to democracy consolidation. Nevertheless, the commitments of 
parties for integration are not absent, but in practice they present little, frequently 
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hindering many reforms required by the EU, delaying the process of integration. 
Some parties even formulate promises that cannot be taken seriously. The AAK 
leader promised that “with AAK Kosovo will be a member of the EU by 2005” 
(Koha Ditore 05.10.2004). Such promises do not take into account the 
complexities of the process of integration and the challenges Kosovo has in that 
process. Another laughable promise came from AKR by “promising the 
movement of Kosovo people in Europe without visa restriction” (Koha Ditore 
11.11.2007).   
8.4. Conclusion 
From the exploration done on the innovation function of parties, through looking 
at party programmes, electoral platforms, declarations, interviews, various 
reports, and particularly the media during the electoral campaigns of the three 
national elections, it can be concluded that Kosovo political parties perform very 
poorly in their innovation function, with good performance required to facilitate 
democracy consolidation. Particular attention was paid to the party promises on 
the election campaigns of the three national elections: 2001, 2004, and 2007. 
What became obvious were the pie-in-the-sky, irresponsible promises made by 
parties. The deficiency of parties on creativity, vision, and the political will to 
innovate solutions in line with policies to the public problems of society is not a 
promising signal for the consolidation of Kosovo democracy prospects. The 
inexperience of Kosovo with democracy and pluralism might be to some extent a 
justification, as a shortage of expertise for innovation needed by parties. 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the majority of well-educated people 
are not in parties and politics at all. However, the dilemma remains with the 
absence of the will among parties to innovate solutions to such problems. Why 
have parties closed the doors to educated people, and not mobilising the 
expertise Kosovo has? Is it that the party leader and the party elite are not 
interested in offering such innovation? Solutions to such problems would be a 
strong reason for a young democracy like Kosovo to be widely legitimated. Yet, 
Kosovo parties have built iron doors to creativity that might be included within the 
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policy making process of parties. All this has only one reason, in no way can the 
absolute power of the parties’ leaders be challenged.  
 
Thus, parties have no capacity or creativity to innovate policies as solutions to 
the public problems of society. There is no single policy sector covered by the 
policy solutions of parties. Likewise, parties’ failure in the innovation function 
means also the blight on democratic institutions and democracy as a whole to 
offer to citizens what they otherwise expect from them. The innovation function 
should not be taken as being separated from other functions, but rather to rally 
around them and is supplemented by other functions as well.  
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Chapter 9 
9. Exploiting the State - The Governing Function of 
Parties in Kosovo 
9.1. Introduction 
Governing is one of the most important functions of parties in a representative 
democracy. In recent times, parties have experienced a decline (Dalton 2006) in 
terms of the public trust they used to enjoy at society level, including party 
functions performed at this level. The integration, representation, legitimation, 
and to some extent innovation functions are being performed less by parties, 
compared to the first half and the beginning of the second part of the 20th 
century. However, in a different way, particularly since the cartelisation (chap. on 
integration function) of parties, the governing function of parties has been 
intensified, empowered and enlarged. Such a development has been coupled 
with the decline of the two faces of parties. Katz & Mair (1994) emphasise that 
even in consolidated democracies, despite the decline in the two faces of the 
parties, at the organisation and electorate level, there has been a significant 
increase in the role played by parties at the governing level. In addition, it is not 
counted as a decline but rather as a transformation of parties. Yet, if such a 
transformation is taking place in consolidated democracies with a highly 
developed complementary structure of intermediary institutions, what would then 
be the case with fragile democracies, with a pitiable level of development of such 
institutions? Though a crucial issue for the democratization process, it is out of 
the coverage of the topic we are dealing with. 
 
Such a transformation of parties means that through the governing function 
parties compensate for their dwindled role in other functions at society level. 
Putting it through Lincoln’s definition of democracy, it is a governing for the 
people, but less by the people, and even lesser with the people, as the level of 
participation and integration from the masses is depleted. The question arises 
whether in the long-term, parties can govern for the people, since lesser by, and 
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even without people. It is barely anticipated - a democratic governing for the 
people without people, since they are not part of the decision making process, 
implying lesser protection of majorities’ interests, and lesser democracy in turn. 
Such scepticism is manifested through the consistent decrease of participation 
indicated by low voter turnout, among other things. 
 
Nevertheless, the only function that parties in a representative democracy do not 
share with any other intermediary institution is the governing function. Since 
other intermediary institutions, NGOs, social movements, interest groups, or any 
other organisation, might to some extent complement and sustain other party 
functions, the governing function is in turn an exclusively party function. Yet, 
within the policy process, in particular, the level of agenda setting and policy 
formulation issues can be raised by others as well, aside from political parties. 
However, the issue here referring to the governing function has to do merely with 
decision making of government and parliament, consisting mainly of governing 
and opposition parties. The party role and responsibility at this level amplifies the 
importance of parties at the governing level compared to other functions. The 
governing function includes the decision-making and the output level of a 
democratic system. It touches the citizens directly through government 
performance in terms of policies and decisions, and as a result has a direct 
impact on the democratization prospects that are our concern here.  
 
Therefore, since the focus is the reflection of the governing function of parties in 
the democracy consolidation process, several widespread characteristics of the 
way the governing is taking place, impacting directly the consolidation prospects, 
are considered here. The operationalisability of measurement of this function 
confines the scope of indicators that have a damaging effect on the 
democratization process. The focus will not be on some routine procedures such 
as elections for example, since there is no way to question the very existence of 
such institutions due to the presence of the international community in Kosovo, , 
despite many cases of violations where darkness enabled such activity – election 
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fraud67. Political parties in the Kosovo democratization process are identified with 
developing party patronage, clientele, corruption, nepotism, clans and fraud, 
socio-political relationships conceptualised in various ways, among others by 
Kopecky, Scherlis, Spirova (2008); Müller (2006); Marcus & Ratsimbaharison 
(2005); Fox (1994); etc.. Likewise, such government (made up of parties) 
behaviours and attitudes are perceived by citizens as a model of democratic 
governing, and as an opportunity for political elites to exploit the state (Grzymala-
Busse 2003 & 2007) for private ends and particularistic benefits, at the expense 
of citizens. Yet, the parties’ behaviours and attitudes in the governing function 
are reflected in the ability of parties to perform other functions, such as 
legitimation, representation, innovation, and integration.  
 
Nonetheless, the opposition parties also have their role in the governing process, 
in terms of offering alternatives to governing practices, holding the government 
accountable – horizontal accountability, taking initiatives, and offering policy 
alternatives. Opposition parties have a great role, particularly in preventing, if not 
in triggering, the exploitative government behaviour. Grzymala-Busse (2008) 
discovered that in countries with a strong opposition there was less space for 
state exploitation, in reverse, a high level of such exploitation took place.  
 
In the case of an internationally monitored process of democracy consolidation, 
to which Kosovo belongs as well, the failure of parties to perform other functions 
is compensated in the short and medium term at the governing level, repaying 
citizens through good performance at the governing function, in terms of a high 
level of socio-economic development in general68. In Kosovo, the opposite 
happened; parties hid themselves and their failures at governing level behind the 
international presence, throwing the ball of failure to the international community.  
 
                                                 
67 The weekly TV programme “Life in Kosovo” organised by BIRN, showed on RTK cases on election fraud in 2007, 
captured by phone cams.  
68 See for example the case of Germany and Japan after WWII, where they achieved the leading economies of the world. 
People could feel that benefit through employment opportunities and better standards of living.  
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Therefore, the governing function of parties is of vital importance in the process 
of democracy consolidation, in terms of enabling or preventing democracy to give 
effect, of citizen’s interests. If parties perform other functions poorly, they can 
make and implement the best policies and inculcate democratic values by 
increasing the level of performance at the governing function. It amplifies the 
citizens’ trust in democracy institutions, and consequently makes democracy 
more stable and enduring, at the level that Scharpf (1998) calls it output 
democracy. On the other side, if parties perceive the governing power only as a 
means to fulfil their particularistic interests through public goods, they fuel distrust 
and create a legitimacy crisis not only for them to be ousted from power, but also 
for democratic institutions in the eyes, minds and hearts of citizens. What makes 
things worse, is the absence of a better alternative to such behaviour, as parties 
find themselves closed into the prisoner’s dilemma, striving to defeat each other 
with similar games and consequently for the same purpose, to exploit the state. 
In such a case, Kosovo democracy would became more vulnerable and 
shakeable, with lesser prospects for consolidation. Most of the legitimacy for 
democratic institutions in Kosovo emerged as enthusiasm against the previous 
regime. If the current regime fails to perform better than the previous one, the 
enthusiasm might dwindle with time and later on even disappear altogether.   
 
Kosovo political parties through good governing (economic development, 
transparency, better education, rule of law, better chances for employment, 
accountability, responsibility, and so on) can enhance the chances of democracy 
consolidation. In this way, they can compensate for the low level of people’s 
participation in the political process. However, if parties fail also at the governing 
level then it is hard to wait for democracy to give effect, or be optimistic on the 
prospects for democracy consolidation. In Kosovo, there are many indicators of 
the failure of parties also at the governing function, restraining and even freezing 
the hopes for good prospects of democracy consolidation. As such, parties also 
fail to develop democracy through the output level. In this regard, Pieter Faith the 
head of ICO, on a debate at the European Parliament, criticised the Kosovo 
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government and parliament, composed of parties, as failing to act in an 
accountable and transparent way, failing to fight corruption and organised crime, 
despite their proclamation at a declarative level (conforming the dual faces of 
parties in Kosovo, see chap. 7). Moreover, The Kosovo parliament has failed to 
develop the culture of political debate in parliament, and to control the executive 
as one of the primary duties of the parliament. The government often takes many 
decisions without any prior consultation with parliament as it is required(Express 
12.02.2009). 
 
Kosovo has experienced a quadruple transition, whereby the governing role of 
Kosovo parties to manage the democratisation process has been of crucial 
importance, despite other simultaneous transitions taking place and having an 
impact on democratization. Due to their position in the social and institutional 
structure of the Kosovo political system, parties are the key carriers of the 
democracy deepening process in Kosovo. The system transformation in Kosovo 
was and is still characterised by the so-called dilemma of Simultaneity (Elster 
1990), a transition that political transformation is also associated with the 
transformation of the economic system. (Mis)Management of such a 
transformation, aside from the role of the international community, was primarily 
a responsibility of political parties in power and those in opposition. Yet, their 
performance up to now has not shown promising results. Kosovo is placed 
among the most corrupted and poorest places in Europe, with a very high level of 
corruption, organised crime and trafficking (World Bank report on Kosovo 2007; 
Annual EU Commission Reports 2003 to 2009; Annual Reports of Transparency 
International, ICG Reports on Kosovo; etc.). Mismanagement of the complex 
transition affects directly the consolidation possibilities.  
 
This is one of the reasons why, in the governing function of parties in Kosovo, the 
focus of measurement is in the extent to which they make use of public goods, or 
state resources for their private and particularistic interests. Therefore, the multi 
transformation process in Kosovo is brought up, because transformation from 
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centrally planned, to a free market economy has given a great opportunity to 
parties in power, and to some extent to those in opposition, to (mis)use these 
resources. Previously such resources were state centralised. Transforming into 
the free market economy has sent ownership and management into a state of 
flux, in a non-functional institutional structure meant to manage such a transition. 
This  state of affairs was and is still very practical and easy useable for their 
particularistic interests, thus making the overall Kosovo democracy and system 
entirely vulnerable, tremendously increasing the opportunity, ambitions, and the 
degree, of politicisation at almost every level. Instead of looking for the best 
policies to manage the dilemma of simultaneity, Kosovo parties found it to be a 
very useful opportunity to make use of it for their particularistic interests. The 
political transition was completed by weak institutions, incapable of managing the 
transition in a proper way. The transformation of property from state owned to 
private ownership is often used for the benefit of a few individuals, thus making 
such exploitation a norm in itself.  
 
Such exploitative behaviour by parties has a spill over effect on the process of 
democracy consolidation in Kosovo, primarily preventing the empowerment of 
institutions. Weak institutions have no capacity to push forward the consolidation 
of democracy. On the other side, exploitation gives power to those benefiting 
from it in one way or another. Subsequently, they strive consistently to increase 
their power, which in turn means less and less power for institutions in general, 
and democratic institutions in particular. The state-exploiting behaviour of parties, 
at the third and fourth level of the democratisation structure, maintains and 
develops institutions that consistently interrogate democracy and democracy 
consolidation developments. Most exploitation takes place in arrangements with 
veto actors to democracy, constituting the third level of the consolidation 
structure. Moreover, it encourages the criminalisation of politics, increasing 
authoritarian tendencies of the political elite in alliance with organised crime, and 
enables contracting state property through the economic and social clientele of 
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parties. Likewise, political parties empower and habituate informal institutions, 
behaving contrary to democracy and the democracy consolidation process.  
 
In addition, such party behaviour influences the fourth level of the consolidation 
structure, spreading and inculcating exploitative behaviour widely among society, 
instead of civic culture. It makes state exploitation and informal institutions the 
norm among society. Yet, it leads to the prioritisation of other rules of the game, 
different and challenging to democracy. On the other side, such developments 
among society, are more likely to create a safe bed for parties having more 
exploitative behaviour. As a result, the current trend of developments is not on 
the same track with democratic norms and values, determining the pursuance of 
objectives other than those democratic. The tendency within the process offers 
fewer prospects for democracy consolidation. Furthermore, it means the delay 
and overextension of the process, with unpredictable results in terms of time and 
content. This spill over effect occurs, as long as such a development is currently 
going on in Kosovo.  
 
However, it should be pointed out that in the case of Kosovo, the governing 
function was shared with the international community, though today not as much 
as it used to be. Governing competencies of inner actors are increased 
continuously and gradually. After the war up to independence, it was shared with 
UNMIK, currently there is ICO and EULEX with lesser and lower competences 
compared to UNMIK.  
 
The focus of the research here are the party tendencies to politicise and then 
exploit the state for their particular ends, largely related with party finances, 
through the governing function. Such party behaviours generate clientelism, 
patrimonialism, clans and nepotism, considered unhealthy for democracy. The 
procedure of measurement takes place merely through collecting data by 
interviews and document analysis methods. The data are taken from civil service 
employment, procurement procedures (government contracts, tenders, etc. – 
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used for particularistic benefits, the privatization process, and so on), party policy 
formulation, media and other prestigious organisations reports on corruption, 
governance, and so on.   
9.2. Power as a “Cake” - Governing to exploit the state   
The decision-making and the policy process at the output level of the governing 
function of parties, so far proves to be different from that normally expected. 
States having weak institutions, in terms of capacity and functionality, serve as 
safe havens for parties to grab state resources. System transformation in Kosovo 
led to a break-up of the monopoly held by the former communist party, but failed 
to decrease the level of politicisation69 – common in monist regimes like the 
former socialism. In this way, it created a very fertile environment for parties to 
exploit the state. Transformation was an inevitable and indispensable part of the 
democratic transition at the region level. However, it could have been managed 
better if parties were organised differently and better, having and pursuing 
democratic objectives, cultivating democratic values within themselves first, and 
then expand them society wide, representing citizens’ interests. The break of the 
monopoly characterising the former communist system, offers the possibility for 
parties (in a sense oligarchs) to struggle and compete to capture the state at 
each election. As proved in earlier chapters, the way Kosovo parties are 
organised, their identities, and the objectives they pursue, present features of 
state capturing parties. New states, such as Kosovo, provides enormous space 
and opportunity for parties to make use of a weak institutional structure, and 
utilize public resources for private, narrow, and particularistic interests.  
 
Nevertheless, the transformation process from an economic point of view meant 
transforming also the state owned property into private hands. Such a process 
offered fertile ground for corruption and state exploitation, since it put into play 
                                                 
69 Politicization is defined as the ability of the state to directly influence the behaviours of the socio-economic activity of 
society (McMenamin 2004, 2). He focuses just on the influence on individual enterprises, because of his case of study. I 
rather added influence on socio-economic activity, because of the wide and deep range of issues and fields at many 
levels where the state, and parties through state and other informal institutions as vehicles try to influence their 
behaviours. 
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most state property, which was meant to be privatised, and managed by very 
weak institutions easily ignorable by informal rules of the game. Transformation 
takes place, mainly through government institutions, the international community 
– fourth pillar of UNMIK, and the privatisation agency – KAP, headed by 
internationals and by local authorities as well. The privatisation process, is 
believed mathematically to be the largest sector where state exploitation took 
place, due to the largest transformation of resources from state to private 
property. 
 
Nonetheless, such party behaviour is closely related with the very existence of 
parties, being financially dependent on such exploitation. Actually, Kosovo 
parties barely rely on finances from their membership fees or other legal means. 
The high level of poverty and parties’ detachment form society drives parties to 
look for other sources of finances in order to survive and afford their organisation 
structure, based largely on clientele, usually more expensive than other types of 
organisation structures employing mainly the will of the people. Therefore, party 
finances are briefly explored in order to have a clear picture of them, as they are 
one of the main driving forces for the development of state exploitative party 
behaviour in the Kosovo party system, having a negative impact on the 
consolidation prospects.   
9.2.1. Party finances 
Among the current developments in party transformations, even in consolidated 
democracies, is the way parties are financed. Party cartelisation in Western 
Europe was mostly the result of the public finance of parties that brought parties 
closer to the state. One of the main reasons for such a transformation was to 
prevent parties from being bribed by those keen to corrupt decision-makers. 
However, it does not mean that party corruption has been prevented successfully 
and completely, but reduced to a somewhat controllable scale. This constitutes 
one of the ways parties have interpenetrated with the state, to some extent 
leading to further state control of parties. Nonetheless, the problem augments in 
the case of failed and new states, featured with weak institutions not able to hold 
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the state above the parties’ influence and domination - parties find it easy to 
colonise the state and use it by trading their support with state resources. Parties 
have to rely on various financial resources in order to survive, therefore 
corruption is found to them to be a very suitable means to rely on financially, 
without taking into account the political costs it has. On the other side, corruption 
of parties means also the corruption of democracy and the process of 
democratisation itself. The heavy dependence of parties on alternative and even 
black funds, make them prone to corruption.   
 
Nevertheless, not surprisingly, up to now there is no law (KTV News at 19.00, on 
25.03.2009) on party finances. This is merely due to the vicious cycle closed by 
Kosovo political parties. They keep most of their finances in the black box, not 
being public and not enabling the public to understand their sources. The high 
level of poverty and the increasing gap between parties and society posed 
obscurity for parties to rely solely on finances from party membership. 
Parliamentary parties get part of their finances from the democratisation found in 
the Kosovo budget of 15000 Euros per MP on a yearly basis, part of the budget 
allocated for democratisation. This is known as public finance of parties. Yet, it is 
not sufficient for their activities and the type of organisational structure they have. 
Parties have to look at other possibilities, for cash, or other arrangements for 
exchanges by state resources once in power. Despite the funding from the 
Kosovo budget, parties declaratively explain some of the sources of finances. All 
of them, except AKR, declare that part of their finances come from membership 
fees. Yet, looking at the poverty rate of Kosovo society and the actual structure of 
parties, that is hardly reliable. AKR members, by statute, are not asked to pay 
membership fees. Regarding AKR finances, deputy chairman Ibrahim Makolli 
declares (Zeri 20.06.2009) that despite the funding it gets from the Kosovo 
budget, its main financer remains the party leader Behgjet Pacolli. The party 
finances in that way stand contrary to the CEC Regulation (Nr.1/2008, Art. 17) 
specifying that a party can get annually not more than 20 000 Euros from a single 
person, and only if that is compatible with the UNMIK Regulation 2004/2 on 
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preventing money laundering (Art. 5). Moreover, AAK, PDK, LDK, LDD declare 
that they are dependent on donations, mostly not made public, implying a lack of 
transparency and the danger of being pushed into taking decisions in favour of 
the donors (legal and illegal), not excluding that, though that might be at the cost 
of the Kosovo state and society. The non-transparency of financing parties is 
contrary to the dispositions of UNMIK Regulation 2004/2 on preventing money 
laundering. The aim of the regulation was to prevent party financing from money 
laundering activities, highly common in Kosovo (there is no law on preventing the 
money laundering). If party financing does not conform to this regulation (Art 5), 
then there is  plenty of room to doubt that money laundering is taking place in 
Kosovo party finances, because Kosovo is widely known as a safe place for 
money laundering at all levels. Party finances are also based on suspicious 
funding, not excluding criminal activities as well (Krasniqi 2009), which in turn 
strengthens the politician-criminal interpenetrations, ensuring criminalisation of 
politics, and making democracy consolidation at the third level of consolidation 
less likely. In other words, the veto actors are further empowered.  
 
This is the main grounds, why legislatures made up of parties, have not yet 
legislated on party finances. The lack of a law on party finances stimulates party 
corruption. They have free reign to enter into various arrangements of exchanges 
not sanctioned by the law. Consequently, corrupted parties are given a good 
reason not to legislate for the regulation of their finances. As they become more 
corrupted, less and less space and incentives are provided for the legal 
regulation of party finances, and so continues the spill over effect. In this way a 
vicious cycle of corruption is created at different levels of society including the 
governing structure, forcing parties to trade state resources for financial support. 
Such party corruption also leads to the development of corruption and institutions 
enabling corruption, which is a challenge to the democratic institutional structure. 
 
It is no wonder Kosovo is among the most corrupted democracies in Europe 
(Transparency International Reports 2008, 2009). The governing function of 
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parties in Kosovo is expected to be performed by already corrupted parties, 
despite their denial, corruption is reflected in their governing activity at all levels. 
Decisions taken are affected by the bribes and support, often illegal, provided to 
decision-makers. Therefore, parties are forced to exploit the state in order to pay 
back the financial support they get from those corrupting parties. Consequently, it 
can be concluded that party financing is strongly correlated with party corruption, 
and corruption of politics, mirrored in corruption of democracy and democracy 
consolidation prospects. This constitutes one of the explanations why there is no 
real fight against corruption in Kosovo democracy, merely at the declaration 
level. The spill over effect in the case of corruption is transmitted to the whole 
system and jeopardises the existence of democracy.  
 
Accordingly, the major role of such party behaviour is their striving for existence. 
The ideals of parties such as LDK before the war and PDK and AAK immediately 
after the war are vanishing. The closer the achievement of their ideals, though 
quite similar - the independence issue, the smaller the parties’ support would be. 
For example, LDK before the war was a massive party, with some considering it 
a mass movement. It relied merely on wide society support. However, later on as 
the independence issue was coming closer to being achieved on the one side, 
and with the socio-economic needs of society deteriorating on the other side, the 
symbolic issue of independence no longer worked in feeding the expectations of 
society. Therefore, parties were pushed to look for alternative support, 
substituting the shrinking reliance on broad social support. A reduced number of 
party members, from where parties collect the money and other support they 
needed, enforced by the high level of poverty in society, strained parties to rely 
on the clientele – having high costs, and normally affordable only by parties in 
control of state resources, or those coming into that position. The governing 
taking place in such way affects directly democracy development prospects, as 
well as the state capacity developments. 
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9.3. First Politicisation, then State Capture 
The state capture is a common phenomenon, particularly in cases where parties 
capture the state for their narrow ends. This happens merely through widening 
the scope of politicisation, extending and deepening the fertile ground for the 
state capture. Hereby, to measure such a role of parties through government 
behaviour, which have a direct impact on the democratisation process, the 
concept developed by Grzymala-Busse (2008) is used. It measures to what 
extent parties capture the state to use its resources for particularistic goals.  In 
the case of Kosovo parties, whereby most of them are personalistic and 
oligarchic in their way of organisation, these state resources are employed 
primarily for individual interests, different from what Grzymala-Busse claimed - 
using them just for their clienteles. The actual high level of poverty reduces the 
costs of clientele, as the higher the level of poverty, the cheaper the clientele 
would be. It is obvious, that such poverty implies a very low level of redistribution, 
as most of the means ends up in a few pockets of the parties’ top elites, or 
leaders, usually while in power.   
 
Grzymala-Busse (2008) defines state capture as “the extraction of private 
benefits by incumbent officeholders from the state” (p. 638). Among the four 
regimes she identified in terms of two indicators, redistribution and competition 
(p. 640), the case of Kosovo seems to be in between clientelism and exploitation. 
There is competition (though some might consider it as internationally and 
paternalistically monitored), and in some sectors there is no redistribution at all, 
while in some others such as public administration – civil servants, government 
contracts, tenders, privatisation, and remaining public companies, there is a 
distribution for their clienteles. Parties reimburse their clientele’s support through 
state resources.  
 
State exploitation is directly linked with democratization as a process. It causes 
alienation, apathy, and the disenchantment of people, considering themselves 
not a part of the system – democracy, since they do not benefit from that, 
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excluding a minority of them – constituting the clienteles of parties. Citizens 
perceive democracy as a system that facilitates the political elite to get rich within 
a night, and leave society poorer day by day. This is a very bad image of 
democracy demonstrated through party behaviours in the governing function. 
Such practice creates the worldviews of citizens about democracy, raising 
suspicion, scepticism, and distrust in democracy, firstly in the public’s minds and 
later in their hearts as well; furthermore, citizens pay a heavy price for it. The 
perception and worldview created about democracy, conceptualises democracy 
as a system that enables parties smooth state exploitation. State exploitation in 
other words means exploiting people because they make up the public goods, 
citizens pay for them, and do not get them back as they are supposed to be, 
because such goods are utilised for the private or particularistic interests of the 
few. As an exploitative behaviour, it narrows the space and ground for 
strengthening the first level of the consolidation structure, preventing the 
constitutional arrangements and institutions from functioning as legally 
prescribed, since if the constitutional order functions, exploitation would be more 
troublesome. 
 
In addition, the same author defines the state “as the set of formal institutions 
that administers citizen’s obligations, enforces legal sanctions, and regulates 
public provisions”. The political parties at the governing level fill up the political 
positions of these institutions. Moreover, political parties’ clienteles hold positions 
even at the lower levels – including civil servants, aside from political positions, 
due to a high level of politicisation. What citizen’s obligations are supposed to be 
is also largely decided by political parties. Legal sanctions are specified by the 
law legislated from parliament, filled by political parties. Additionally, public 
provisions are regulated by legislation coming out from representative institutions 
– political parties, and implemented by government agencies or companies 
contracted and supervised by the government and parliament made up of parties 
as well. Therefore, parties’ governing function is crucial in governing the 
behaviours and outcomes of institutions. State exploitation impedes democracy 
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consolidation prospects, therefore in order to alleviate and ensure a smooth 
consolidation process, parties should be brought to accuracy.  
 
Wide and deep state capture and exploitation by parties is enabled merely 
through politicisation. For that reason, the first thing parties do in order to use 
state resources for particularistic interests, is to extend and deepen as much as 
possible the level of politicisation. Politicization here is conceptualised as the 
ability of the state to influence directly the behaviours of the socio-economic 
activity of society (McMenamin 2004, 2). He focuses just on the influence on 
individual enterprises, because of his case of study. I added influence on socio-
economic activity, because of the wide and deep range of issues and fields at 
many levels where parties through the state as a vehicle and other informal 
institutions, try to influence their behaviour. In a state with a non-consolidated 
structure, as happens within states experiencing a transition of structuring power 
in the institutional state structure, the institutional structure of the state with all 
accompanying institutions is very easy to be politicised. In the case of Kosovo, 
most of the state institutions were just established or still being created. One of 
the major requirements from the EU Council (EU Council Decision 18.02.2008, 
2008/213/EC) was for Kosovo to stop political control over many supposedly  
independent institutions, among them the judiciary, public administration, and so 
on. Moreover, the independent overseeing bodies created and managed by the 
parliament have not been safe from politicisation. However, their level of 
politicisation makes such bodies irresponsible to parliament since they rely on 
political support in turn. Most of them often do not appear in parliament at all, as 
required, simply just ignoring parliament (Koha Ditore, 03.04.2009). Recently, the 
high level of politicisation was manifested directly also in the decision of the 
Kosovo Prime minister to oust all temporary secretary generals of eight ministries 
(Ditari 19.30, RTK, 25.03. 2009), which is a competence of the Independent 
Council for Higher Nomination. Secretary Generals of ministries are civil staff, but 
such a decision shows among other things the politicisation of this level of civil 
servants as well. Moreover, after the declaration of independence, since OSCE 
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passed the competences to the Kosovo institution, political parties have tried to 
extend their influence to the Central Election Committee (CEC) - an independent 
body in charge of election and parties, . They competed for the position of 
secretary of the CEC (Zeri 24.02.2009; Lajm 20.03.2009), though legally such a 
position is not allowed to be filled by a political person. Political parties consider 
their control in the electoral process as of crucial importance, therefore they try to 
politicise such a sensitive institution, in charge of administering elections.   
 
As mentioned earlier, though the monopoly known in the former communist 
regime in Kosovo was broken down, the second element of such a totalitarian 
regime - the politicisation, is still present and actual, with no signs of decline on 
the horizon. In the following several fields are touched upon, shadowed by 
political parties for politicisation and then exploitation. 
9.3.1. Public administration and public companies 
One of the main concerns of society after the war, due to the high level of 
poverty, was jobs. Lacking the vision to trigger economic development, that could 
offer many jobs among other things, parties found it easier to buy the political 
support from clienteles, reimbursing many of them through employment in public 
administration, raising the number of civil servants to 73000, from the 30000 
required by the EU Commission. Each and every party PDK, LDK, AAK, being in 
government in one time or another after the war, found the public service sector 
a fertile ground for paying back the political support of their clients, relatives, clan 
relatives, and so on. Despite many requests from the IMF, EU Commission, and 
other international bodies to depoliticise and reduce the number employed in the 
public administration, the government (Koha Ditore 30.03.2009), and parties in 
opposition as well, did not give an indication, or present a plan and will to do so. 
Public administration remains highly politicised, and it would be better to call it 
the state (captured by parties) administration and not a public one.   
 
Public companies suffered the same from the identical fortune. Their employees 
are made up of parties’ clienteles. The PTK, Airport, KEK, and so on, are floated 
  Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo          
 
283 
 
by party clients, party elites’ relatives, etc.. Referring to such politicisation, an 
ICG Report among other things (February 2006) states: “cronyism seems to 
inform government choices of candidates for the new boards of the public utilities 
and regulatory bodies”. Consequently, in the course of politicised boards, they 
extend their control over them, and among other exploitations overemploy as it 
suits them.   
 
It is widely known that unproductive employment harms public institutions and 
public companies in many ways. Civil servants have no loyalty towards the state, 
as they should, as clients are loyal to their bosses, parties. As such, they are 
always putting in danger the state, as parties keep coming in and out of power. 
Secondly, clienteles are employed without professional criteria, they are not 
qualified to do their expected job. They are not effective and efficient, producing 
weak and unprofessional public administration. Moreover, it costs a lot of the 
budget and cannot be considered anything else than a use of public goods for 
particularistic ends. In addition, the EU has consistently required the 
depoliticisation of the public administration as one of the criteria to join the EU.  
 
In the case of public companies, such governing party behaviour is not a recent 
one, it is found immediately after the war and still persists even today, with 
increasing linearly. An ICG Balkan Report (December 2001) states that “Political 
interference in the former state companies and even public institutions by the 
main Kosovo Albanian parties is endemic”. Such politicization harms companies 
in a way that makes them unproductive and very wasteful, decreasing the 
companies’ efficiency. On the other side, the boards of directors of those 
companies are highly politicised, as a result, international bodies are needed to 
intervene to prevent the political appointments on boards of public companies, 
trying to minimise it though not alleviating it entirely. Peter Faith the Head of ICO 
has been highly fretful of political appointments at the directing boards of public 
companies (KEK, PTK, Airport) and government civil servant positions, by parties 
in power (Koha Ditore 24.02.2009; Zeri 20.03.2009). Officials of ICO have 
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declared that 15 out of 85 members of boards of public companies will be ousted, 
since they are political persons (Express 02.03.2009). Political appointments are 
in contradiction with the law on public companies, as they should be composed 
of professionals and non-party people. Yet, the reality has proved to be the 
opposite, most of them come from parties, people loyal to parties, or serving 
parties. Those people are there actually to protect their respective parties’ 
interest. In this way, public companies are transformed into vehicles of parties, of 
merely parties in power, whereby parties use them for their own interests and the 
reimbursement of clients, but at the cost of public interest, since public 
companies belong to and are the property of the public in general. Nonetheless, 
parties establish politicisation as a mechanism to exploit the state, purposely to 
utilize public companies for their interest. Likewise, they exploit at any cost to the 
company, bringing companies close to bankrupt, and often later privatising them 
for themselves or their clients at very low costs. For example, KEK is among the 
largest consumer of the Kosovo budget (Kosovo Budget Allocations), after the 
war, it could never sustain itself, but it was a useful way to get at the Kosovo 
budget. Regarding PTK, among overemployment, which is common to it, there 
was also no transparent decision to extend its business in Albania, arranged in 
quite a closed book manner. It is believed that the decision resulted mainly due 
to political pressures and decisions (Koha Ditore 23.02.2009). 
 
The examples of politicisation and state exploitation are many, but here some are 
presented, illustrating the issue sufficiently. In such a way, political parties 
through the governing function, politicise, among others, public companies in 
order to use them for their particularistic interest. 
9.3.2. Public procurement and government contracts 
Public procurement is another sector with a very attractive and smooth way to 
misuse public money, therefore hunted for politicisation by parties. The 
procurement procedures are not properly regulated by the law legislated in 2003. 
It needs modification according to EU directives. The Kosovo Progress Report in 
2009 by the EU Commission stated explicitly that the largest sector of corruption 
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is found in public procurement, suggesting an urgent amendment of the law on 
procurement according to EU Directives. As such, it highlights a very high level of 
state exploitation taking place by parties in power, in terms of utilising public 
money for their narrow ends. The initiative for amendment of the law has not yet 
taken place by any party, be they in government or in opposition. Therefore, such 
procurement procedures fuel corruption, weakens the state institutions, omits the 
democratic accountability of institutions, and consequently weakens the 
democracy and democracy consolidation prospects in general. On the other 
hand, Faith the head of ICO, at the European Parliament, stated that the highest 
abuses of public money are happening in public procurement and public tenders. 
Arllaki, an EMP from Italy, in this regard adds that in Kosovo there is an 
interconnection between politics and organised crime, posing a danger not just 
for Kosovo, but for the entirety of Europe (Koha Ditore 02.10.2009).  
 
The breaches of public procurement were characteristics of all governments after 
the war. The General Auditors for 2007 found many misuses of public money at 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry  (Koha Ditore 05.03.2009). Such misuses and 
exploitative behaviour of governing parties have produced the broad spread 
phenomena of Tenderomania, turning Kosovo democracy somehow into a 
tenderocracy. The government contracts given to companies, or as it is widely 
known tenderomania, is a very useful tool to compensate for the political support 
companies give to parties. Usually, companies support parties in two ways. It 
employs clients, and with Kosovo being a  very much traditional society still with 
strong blood relationships, their relatives are also forced to vote for the party the 
company in question supports. In addition, the company supports the party 
financially. Yet, as parties come to power they have to pay this support back to 
companies. Therefore, these companies are privileged in terms of getting 
government contracts for various projects. Such favouritism is linked with public 
procurement as well. The process itself lacks transparency and stands contrary 
to democratic norms, values, and procedures. Usually, each party coming to 
power favours the companies supporting them and fights as much as possible 
  Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo          
 
286 
 
against companies supporting other parties. As the governing parties’ behaviour, 
they produce values and norms of favouritism, increase the level of corruption, 
and impede the foundation of a democratic system based on openness, equal 
opportunity to all, and values of open competition.     
 
Such behaviour, at the representation level of democracy consolidation also 
damages the constitutional level, since it does not allow the constitutional 
structure to take effect due to the state exploiting behaviour of parties. 
9.3.3. Privatisation 
Transition from a central commanded to free market economy necessitated 
privatisation. During the socialist system the medium and  largest sectors of the 
economy were publicly owned. With system transformation, both sectors were to 
be privatised under the model of a shock therapy transition in general, 
coordinated with the international community in Kosovo. Privatisation as a 
process and as an output failed.  The majority of producing factories privatised 
ended up as cafeterias, bars, and so on. Parties used such a flux in the state of 
affairs and institutional arrangements, in which privatisation took place, to try to 
benefit from it as much possible. Naser Rugova from LDD (2010) believes that 
privatisation could be more successful if it was not politicised by political parties. 
It should be made clear also, that many international staff in this sector were 
highly corrupted as well. On the other side, privatisation as a process generated 
and supported corruption, non-transparency, favouritism, clientelism, clanism, 
and so on. The use of privatisation for the benefit of parties is affirmed by 
Zhinipotoku (2009), too. While according to Matoshi (2009) the privatisation 
process, has indeed established a class in itself, constituting a network of 
politicians (from parties) and businesses, abusing public property. On the other 
hand, Gezim Krasniqi (2009) is of the opinion that parties have done whatever 
possible to prevent enterprises from being privatised by people outside their 
parties and their interest groups. It means they endeavoured to reimburse their 
clienteles through the privatisation process. However, party representatives, in 
particular those actually in power, tried to blame the international community for 
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the failure of the privatisation process, as the PDK spokesman did (Stavileci – 
PDK spokesman 2010). While those in opposition believe that from the 
privatisation process, political parties and individuals have benefited mostly 
(Ramadani – secretary general of AAK 2010).    
 
The transformation of responsibility of the agency from the international 
community to the locals from AKM to AKP best proves the misuse since all the 
documents and archives were burned, raising doubts of the process.  
9.3.4. Budget allocation 
The budget allocation is highly influenced on a party basis. Despite the allocation 
of the budget based on certain ministries and municipalities governed by the 
powerful parties, there is a tendency to extend the control of the composition of 
the department of the budget that should usually be made up of civil servants. 
The government has changed the structure of the budget department as often as 
the ministers of finances were changed (Koha Ditore 09.03.2009). Most of the 
budget is allocated to the municipalities headed by the parties in power (Kosovo 
budget allocation being on a yearly basis). On the other side, the strategy for 
communes led by opposition parties, was for less resources to be allocated from 
the budget, in order to make them fail and lose at the coming election, despite 
the fact that the citizens of the communes in question were directly harmed. Yet, 
that is to be considered as mismanagement of public money, or referring to the 
Grzymala definition of the state, it is known as awful administration of public 
resources.  
 
Furthermore, parties in the coalition, having more power, tried to allocate more 
money to the ministries run by them (Kosovo budget allocation being on a yearly 
basis). In this way, they tried to highlight their success compared to the ministries 
run by the other partner of the coalition. In addition, through a bigger budget they 
could more easily reimburse their clients from state resources.   
  Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo          
 
288 
 
9.3.5. Rule of law  
All above-mentioned cases of politicisation are less likely to occur if the rule of 
law is functional. Favouritism, corruption, and so on can be fought if there is an 
implementable law on that. Therefore, parties were first and foremost forced to 
politicise the rule of law sector including: judges, lawyers, prosecutors, and the 
police as well. However, such politicisation does not endanger only the 
functioning of democracy, but also makes the backbone of the state easily 
breakable. The level of politicisation is mentioned in the Kosovo Progress 
Reports by the EU Commission on a yearly basis, and they recommend for 
politics to be far away from the rule of law (EU Council Decision 18.02.2008, 
2008/213/EC).  Maria Guilian Civinini, the president of EULEX judges in Kosovo, 
has openly admitted that local judges in Kosovo are under political pressures, 
and EULEX judges often have to take over, due to the danger of political 
pressure (Koha Ditore 04.06.2009). Moreover, the Director of the Judicial Council 
of Kosovo, Halit Muharremi talking about the difficulties to functionalise the rule 
of law in Kosovo, also confirmed that the Kosovo judiciary is in the hands of the 
government and parliament (Kosova Sot 12.11.2007). 
 
9.4. Establishing, maintaining and expanding clientele, 
patronage, corruption, clans, nepotism 
The irreplaceable governing role of parties is obvious even in consolidated 
democracies, but for these parties in consolidated democracies the very being in 
power = is not necessary for their survival. However, for parties in Kosovo’s 
fragile democracy, the importance of such a function goes even further. It 
determines also the existence and prospects of parties. The parties doing better 
are those in power. Normally, political parties strive to come to power to achieve 
ideological objectives – those more ideologically oriented, or fulfilling electoral 
promises – those electorally oriented. How about parties having none of the 
above-mentioned objectives as incentives for coming to power? Political parties, 
especially those known as personalistic–clientelist in nature, relying less on 
members and more on clientele support, perceive power from a different point of 
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view. The very existence and prospect of such parties depends heavily on being 
in power. Clientelism is very costly to democracy. A democracy whose main 
parties rely mainly on clienteles has a lot to pay, with unbearable bills. Perceiving 
the government power in such a way, makes parties generate and maintain 
tremendously the party patronage, corruption, and nepotism. The development of 
such socio-economic and political power relationships costs a lot to democracy 
or democracy development, and in particular democracy consolidation. Such 
power relationship structures stand counter to and challenge persistently 
democracy consolidation  
 
There is no doubt that parties’ behaviours shape the attitudes of citizens in one 
way or another. This is more obvious in a less educated society, as citizens are 
easily manipulated through manipulation of information, enabled through 
government control of the media. Exploitative behaviour of parties at the 
governing level brings into sight values signalling the only actual workable way of 
doing things. In this way, it encourages citizens to try their best to place and find 
themselves somewhere in the structure of state exploitation, founded and 
developed by political parties. Such power relationship structures produced by 
political parties at the governing level through state exploitative behaviours 
include the following informal institutions:  patronage, clientelism, corruption, 
clanism, and nepotism. All of them represent informal, but actually very powerful 
institutions, most of the time challenging firstly the functioning of formal 
institutions, and later their very existence. Subsequently, it directly spoils the 
constitutional consolidation, overriding and avoiding them from being functional.  
 
The aforementioned ways of exploitative behaviour by Kosovo parties at the 
governing function include the party rent-seeking approach, obviously producing 
political pathology by a clientelist, patronage, clan, nepotistic, and corruptive 
attitude. Such party behaviour distorts democratic standards and institutions, 
since it includes the trading of political support with state resources, or using 
state resources for particularistic and not collective (citizens) purposes. Political 
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parties having no other ways to attract support expect on the personality of the 
leader, are forced to narrow such a gap of support using the clientele as a 
substitution. The clientele relationship is very costly economically and 
institutionally (there is no accountability of rulers to the ruled, because after they 
get the cash (a direct benefit), no political accountability is required or expected). 
Clients require immediate pay back in order for them to offer political support, in 
the case of parties, to offer votes. Not all parties can afford such a relationship. 
9.4.1. Party Patronage 
Party patronage (van Biezen & Kopecky 2007) involves the allocation of jobs in 
public and semi-public positions such as the civil service, public sector 
companies, universities, and so on. As mentioned earlier, the high level of 
politicisation of the state by political parties has enabled political parties to 
perceive public administration as a fertile field in which to employ their 
supporters, as a direct exchange for the votes they got from them. Such 
employment has taken place in other sectors as well, including public companies, 
universities, hospitals, public schools, the police, and wherever possible. A study 
on the public opinion of employment opportunities in Kosovo, conducted by the 
Kosovo Institute for Media and Politics (Koha Ditore 1.12.2008), found that 
91.4% of respondents believe that in order to find a job in Kosovo, one needs to 
have political support – party support, and just 8.6% believe that education is 
important to get a job. Examples illustrating party patronage according to the 
definition in question are countless, here are provided only a few of them. 
Regarding the politicisation and exploitation of the institutions of education, 
Gezim Krasniqi in an article at Koha Ditore (20.10.2004) with the title “the noticed 
death of the Public University”, explains the “war” between PDK and LDK to 
“conquer” (politicize) the only public university in Kosovo. The lower level of 
educational institutions are also not immune from politicisation by parties. Losing 
a job as teaching staff, or as a school director, together with the change of, 
mostly local governments, often happens. For example, despite the still valid 
contracts of school directors in the municipality of Prizren, the ruling party PDK, 
after taking power, advertised job opportunities for directors of schools (Lajmet, 
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KTV 19.00, 24. 04.2009). Although, such advertising is just a formality, as people 
are appointed on political preference.  Furthermore, institutions of arts and 
culture are not safe from politicisation. The director of the National theatre of 
Kosovo, Arianit Krasniqi was forced to resign from the position, due to political 
pressure (Lajmet, RTK 19.30, 14.08.2009).  
 
Patronage helps party leaders to build up, maintain party organisation, and 
increase the loyalty through the distribution of selected incentives to certain 
groups of people within society. In this way, parties pay their support through 
state resources, meaning the use of collective resources for their particularistic 
purpose, and provide competition among parties on unequal terms, those in 
power have the means to pay their support, while those in opposition lack such 
advantages. Moreover, such control of the state by parties does not allow the 
state to function according to the prescribed constitution and its formal structure. 
Comparing to the previous non-democratic regime, the Kosovo democracy also 
involves deep political state control at society level (through parties in power), 
and the only difference between both regimes is contestation outside 
government. Once in power the distribution of state resources means deepening 
the control of society by the state, which stands contrary to democratic values 
and resembles the previous authoritarian regime.  
9.4.2. Clientelism 
Clientelism is an old phenomena that remains present even today, but in different 
ways and with different subjects. Clientelism is conceptualised differently. One of 
its definitions is that “clientelism is a relationship between individuals with 
unequal economic and social status (“the boss” and his or her “clients”) that 
entails the reciprocal exchange of goods and services based on a personal link 
that is generally perceived in terms of moral obligation”70. On the other side (van 
Biezen & Kopecky 2007) party clientelism is defined  as a form of representation 
based on the selective release of public (material) resources – contracts, 
                                                 
70 Clientelism - Encyclopedia of Governance. 2006. SAGE Publications. 9 Sep. 2009 
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housing, subsidies, pork – barrel legislation, etc., in order to secure electoral 
support from individuals or selected sectors of society. 
 
Compared to old forms of clientelism, the modern one is more horizontal and at 
the group level rather than the individual level as it used to be. Such a clientelist 
network is considered, by some, as a substitution, since informal institutions may 
sometimes substitute the formal ones. If this is the case, clientelism still by 
definition includes the distribution of benefits to some, or for particularistic 
interests. Nevertheless, such particularistic interests are fulfilled at the cost of the 
collective interest. The clients, in exchange of their votes, have to be paid 
ranging from cash to government employment, public contracts, privatisation, 
and so on. Though some might consider it as direct accountability of parties to 
their clients, such accountability is very narrow in scope and is not accountability 
to citizens or the public in general, but to clients. Moreover, the public in general 
have to pay the bill of parties’ clienteles. 
 
Therefore, the fierce competition between parties comes due to clientelism. In 
order to form, keep, and expand the clientele network, the best way is for parties 
to get into power. Being in power, parties can pay back the votes they received 
from clientele through jobs in the government sector, public contracts, tenders, 
and privatisation. Besides, such party values and behaviours ties parties in 
Kosovo to the prisoners’ dilemma. Instead of competing with policies as their 
products, they see clientelism as a more direct, and in the short-term, also a 
more secure way of coming to power, even though in the long-term it might bring 
the collapse of institutions and the economy, as well as suicide for themselves. 
Clientelism is more affordable for economies relying heavily on raw materials, 
especially oil exporting countries. Kosovo does not belong to such economies, 
and has to rely mostly on investments. Normally, investors are more interested to 
invest in stable environments with stable institutions.   
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Clientelism damages democracy in two ways. One is at the government 
institutional level, and the second is at society level. The governing activity is at 
the service of the party/parties taking power, because they use it for their own 
clientele. In order to do that, they have to increase the level of informalities in the 
institutional structure, bypassing many procedures, rules and regulations. In this 
way, it also harms the constitutional level of democracy consolidation, because if 
governing takes place in the legal way, they cannot make the exploitation in 
question. Likewise, parties automatically and directly develop corruption.  
 
At society level, they do not create and develop citizens and civic culture – 
constituting the fourth level of the consolidation structure, but rather clients and 
directly or indirectly subordinated people to their party bosses, because the 
clientelistic relationship includes a necessary unequal and asymmetric power 
relationship.  
9.4.3. Corruption 
Corruption, on the other hand is considered as the exchange of money for public 
decisions, and the most common form of corruption in the case of parties is 
through financial donations to parties and politicians in exchange for favourable 
public decisions. Based on this, the most likely to be corrupted are parties closer 
and more influential to decision making. Since parties in power or governing 
parties are most influential in decision-making, they are the most likely to be 
corrupted. According to Ismet Beqiri (LDK chairmanship member 2010) most of 
the corruption at the government level is taking place through government 
contracts - tenderomania. In a system where there is a change of government 
composition, the more parties that take part at different times in the governing 
process, the more likely they are to be corrupted. However, it does not mean that 
parties not in executive power, and not directly linked to decision-making, are 
immune to corruption. In relation to that, Mazreku (2010) considers also the 
possibilities of parties corrupting each other. It might happen in cases of 
opposition parties being bought by governing parties to prevent criticism and the 
performance of their oversight function of government. This is usually attained by 
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offering a piece of the cake to opposition parties as well. Some allude to such a 
recent relationship between PDK and AKR, and not excluding other parties 
either. According to the report of Transparency International (2007), political 
parties are among the most corrupted institutions in Kosovo . 
 
The report of the Anti-corruption Agency in Kosovo has shown a high level of 
corruption especially at the government level, with no improvements so far to 
reduce the corruption. What is worse, in the process of fighting corruption is a 
high degree of politicisation of the institutions involved. The report states that 
many cases of corruption end up here, and are not pursued further at the 
prosecutions or courts levels (Report of Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency 1 
January – 31 December 2008). Moreover, the report states that during 2008 
there was information of 37 cases of corruption taking place in the government, 
15 of them stalled on the lack of proof, 16 proceeded to prosecutors and six are 
still to be proved. However, even the independence of the agency itself is 
questionable, often seen more as a cosmetic gesture to international pressure, to 
try to show their commitment to fight corruption. However, up to now there has 
been no high level politician captured for corruption. It should be taken into 
account the political pressure exercised on the agency, and that the number of 
cases reported are just a few among wide spread cases of corruption at all 
levels. The reason why cases of corruption are not processed further are stated 
clearly in the EU Commission’s annual Reports of the Progress, asserting that 
there is a high level of politicisation of the courts, prosecutors, and the police as 
well. Such politicisation is mainly produced and developed by political parties, 
mostly those in power. 
 
Nevertheless, the draft strategy against the corruption, offered by the 
government, is apparently considered in being concerned just with the outlook - 
as showing that something is being done, rather than offering a workable way to 
tackle the corruption problem. Objections were made by some NGOs as well, 
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levelling it as an impracticable and non-implemental strategy, not really meant to 
fight corruption (Koha Ditore 25.02.2009).   
9.4.4. Clans and Nepotism 
Despite patronage, clientelism, and corruption, parties in Kosovo are influenced 
by, and at the governing level reflect, and help develop, clan institutions as a way 
of thinking. Kosovo society is widely known for having clans as one of the 
workable ways of functioning. Most clans in Kosovo are also organised by blood 
relationship. On the way, politicisation was widely sustained by traditional 
attitudes of Kosovo society. Despite clients, parties also get support from clans 
and blood relatives, likewise triggering the development of nepotism. Parties in 
Kosovo, as widely in traditional society, supplement their clienteles’ network with 
clans and tribal identification, spreading nepotism, as a common phenomenon 
across Kosovo.  
9.5. Conclusion 
Looking at the importance that the governing level of parties in a democracy 
normatively has, and the governing practice of parties in Kosovo, one comes to 
the apprehension raised by Mazreku (2010), that political parties in Kosovo are 
governing or ruling in an authoritarian sense. Different from the previous 
authoritarian regime only in terms of contestation, and not depoliticisation, 
Kosovo parties through the governing function, are able first to capture the state, 
and then to use its resources for their narrow ends.  
 
Likewise, they consider the state as their own private and personal property, 
preventing the implementation of the constitutional structure in terms of it giving 
practical effects. Their organisational structure is one of the main reasons that 
drives parties to pursue such objectives. Being forced to pay the clientele, as the 
backbone of their political support, they have to use public resources to 
reimburse them for their votes. In order to this, they have to weaken the formal 
institutions standing counter to such practices. This is achieved merely through 
politicisation. Likewise, it also obstructs consolidation at the constitutional level. 
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Furthermore, they use purely public resources for their clientele and for their 
personal benefit as well, in public administration, public procurement, public 
companies, educational institutions, the rule of law, and so on.  
 
As such, they produce, maintain, and expand informal institutions considered 
challengers to democracy consolidation: clientelism, patronage, corruption, clans, 
nepotism. These informal institutions ail the democratisation structure at all of its 
four levels.  
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Chapter 10 
10. Unpredictable Developments - Future Prospects  
Kosovo democracy is still institutionally weak with democracy consolidation 
prospects vastly unpredictable. International oversight of the democratisation 
process in Kosovo is not matching the objectives of political parties, expected to 
be the main driving force of the democratisation process. The completion of 
system transformation in Kosovo is taking longer than expected. Hitherto, the 
international community operating in Kosovo is still considered as the major 
guarantee of the stability of the status quo in the democratic system in Kosovo. 
Yet, the inner functioning of the system, largely run by political parties, is 
essentially in contradiction with the overall formal regime expectations. In other 
words, the international community preventing, for the time being, any significant 
alternative regime to democracy ensures the visual negative consolidation . It is 
said for the time being, because if the current state of affairs lasts for long, it is 
very likely to ail even the negative consolidation, producing a viable alternative to 
democracy, and even triggering the reverse of the process. Yet, the deficiency in 
the trend towards positive consolidation might bring into question the process in 
general. No international presence, regardless of its power and influence, is able 
to ensure democracy consolidation, if institutions of the inner structure of 
democracy, in this case political parties, have no political will to push the 
democratisation process forward. The political will of Kosovo political parties to 
move along democracy consolidation is best illustrated through their performance 
of functions, which up to now has not been satisfactory. The worrying issue is the 
contradiction between the objectives, norms, and values of democracy with 
objectives, norms, and values of political parties, normatively supposed to 
sustain and develop a representative democracy. Poor performance of parties in 
a representative democracy challenges democracy itself.  
 
As observed from the previous chapters, Kosovo political parties perform very 
badly on the functions they are expected to fulfil. Likewise, due to their crucial 
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and irreplaceable position within the democracy structure, parties make the 
future of Kosovo democracy and its consolidation prospects extremely uncertain. 
Despite developments in formal constitutional consolidation, constituting the first 
level of the consolidation structure, the representation level is still a distance from 
consolidation. Its actual level of development affects and, in a way, also impedes 
the consolidation at all three levels. The term ‘formal constitutional structure’ 
implies the vast gap between the constitution and implementation of written 
laws..  
 
One of the core obstacles delaying the consolidation of democracy in Kosovo is 
that there is no better alternative offered by any of the existing parties. They are 
almost the same, have an undefined and blurred ideological profile, an equivalent 
organisational structure, pursue identical objectives, have matching governing 
behaviour, and so on. Furthermore, they are closed into the prisoners’ dilemma, 
unable to break up the current non-democratic behaviours and attitudes within 
and among themselves. An available alternative, could apparently serve as an 
impulsive force to acquaint competition with issues healthy to democracy. In the 
near future, better alternatives to stimulate democratisation are hardly to be 
expected, be it from existing parties transforming themselves or new, emerging 
parties. Often, new parties do not necessarily mean to be new alternatives. For 
instance, when AKR was established as a new party, many perceived it as an 
alternative, but soon its failure to be an alternative was proved. Recently on 
05.01.2010, the Party of Pensioners PPK was established – the Party of 
Pensioners of Kosovo, meant to look after the interests of retired people, as after 
the war they were among the most discriminated class within society. However, 
not much is expected from PPK. At the first instance, the 5% electoral threshold, 
poses an issue to get a seat in parliament. Moreover, being a single-issue party 
does not promise a lot, other than raising issues and creating opinions about the 
interests of the retirees’ class.    
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If the current conditions are going to last for long, they will also shape the type of 
democracy taking place in Kosovo very much featured with authoritarian norms 
and values. Therefore, one of the possible scenarios is the blocking of the 
consolidation process, halting it at the current level, into a sort of halfway house 
democracy, an authoritarian system coloured with democratic colours, whereby 
people go to the election to choose among a few authoritarians. Another possible 
scenario is the prolongation of the democracy consolidation process into the 
unforeseeable future, making the reversibility of the process more likely.  
 
Usually, the process of system transformation is an on-going one, consisting of 
competing democratic and non-democratic forces, of various degrees and at 
various stages. The consolidation comes closer the more democratic forces 
prevail over those being non-democratic. However, as long as democratic forces 
are unable to defeat non-democratic forces in the process, consolidation will be 
prolonged and become less likely. The longer the process goes on, the more 
authoritarian will be surfaced and to some extent will even become enrooted, no 
longer remaining underground as they used to. Such opposition to 
democratisation developments are currently increasing at various levels of 
governing, including essential institutions of democracy, such as freedom of 
speech and the press, among others. Cases of journalists being fired as a result 
of political pressure on the media are widely reported. The TV reports made by 
BIRN “Life in Kosovo” aired by RTK (27.05.2009), has shown many cases of 
journalists losing their jobs because of politics interfering in the media. Jeton 
Llapashtica, a journalist working for TV Besa, was fired because while 
interviewing the government spokesman Memli Krasniqi, he posed a question 
about a song (Amaneti i Clonit) dedicated to the class of politicians, blaming 
them as the main actors of the underdevelopment taking place in Kosovo.  
Furthermore, regarding the freedom of press, many cases of the government 
exercising pressure on the media through advertisement opportunities for 
newspapers and other media are observed. 
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Turning back to the representation function of parties, its improvement at least in 
the foreseeable future is not promising. The current chaotic, undefined 
representation structure of political parties, presents no signs of change. Actually, 
most of the time parties declare themselves as being rightist or centre-rightist, 
sounding as though there is no need or viability for leftist parties. Though, in 
practical terms that is not the case, parties themselves are not aware of what 
they ideologically stand for, or what makes them leftist or rightist. The ideological 
mishmash of the party system in Kosovo will remain for the time being, 
increasing the confusion and puzzlement of society on political orientations. 
Citizens cast their votes without it being clear to them what they really get in 
terms of policies, from the parties they support, since parties are not guided by 
any ideology that could serve as a guiding framework for both parties and voters. 
The policies followed out of any ideological constraints, makes party politics very 
unpredictable. One of the main driving forces pushing parties towards ideological 
orientation developments are international organisations operating in Kosovo, 
such as OSCE, NDI, and so on. Moreover, political parties at the EU level are 
utilising their influence as well, enabling parties to join the EU parties’ families, 
and then from within such a family, pressuring them to purify their ideological 
identity. The international pressure exercised on the political parties to create 
their own distinguishable identity and well defined profiles, might lead to just an 
artificial, cosmetic, and easily removed profile of parties, manifested in the written 
programmes and declarations, not matched by their behaviours and attitudes. 
Such ideological profiling will not give effect in terms of constraining party 
objectives, activities, and the interests they pursue. Currently, there is no 
consistency between the ideological belonging proclaimed by parties, with their 
conscience, activity, and objectives.  Therefore, the international pressure, 
lacking the inner forces for such an ideological crystallisation of parties, is an 
endeavour that does not constitute a sustainable solution.    
 
Another issue hampering party profile and party system crystallisation is the lack 
of a clear social structure, whose establishment takes time and is dependent on 
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economic and social developments. The clear social structure would be the best 
solution to thrust the party label among the party system ideological spectre. 
Then either parties will transform themselves, which is hardly expected, or it will 
lead the way for parties to come out of social structures divided by the long-term 
socio-political cleavages. At present, both possibilities are barely able to take 
place. Firstly, political parties by their actual organisation structure, of a 
personalistic and authoritarian nature, find ideological crystallisation in its true 
meaning, as a direct challenge to them, confining somehow their absolute power. 
Therefore, their incontestable and unchallengeable authority within the party 
prevents any possible move in that direction. The most they can do in this regard 
is to make a visual change, in terms of public relations. The first possible setting 
also defies the second option. In desperation for votes, the only way for the party 
authoritarians to preserve their power, is the politicisation of society as much as 
possible, and the extension of the clientelist social structure. The high level of 
politicisation, in turn leaves dwindling the space and opportunity for possible 
successful new political parties. The chaos in the still undefined party system in 
Kosovo will continue, and is very likely to be iced over, in the short-term, as it 
currently is.   
 
On the other hand, the existing inclination of society’s apathy is growing day by 
day, depleting the level of social integration in the political process and enlarging 
society’s alienation from democracy. The parties’ organisation structure is a 
powerful incentive for clientele structure development, since it boosts party 
reliance on their votes. However, one of the positive things about personalistic 
parties is that their leaders maintain the party cohesion. A parties’ life is closely 
dependent on the life of their leaders, and all of them lack the mechanism to 
transform the inner decision-making power. Moreover, most Kosovo party 
leaders are quite young, for parties to be transformed it means waiting for a long 
time until they die. Yet, as time passes, they inculcate and spread their own 
values, standing contrary to democracy and questioning democratisation. Such 
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an organisation structure, shrinks participation opportunities, necessary to ensure 
and maintain society’s collective interests.  
 
Parties will carry on with their concern merely to integrate and expand their 
clienteles into the political process. The only viable symbol through which parties 
anchor society into politics remains their leaders. The personalistic – clientelist 
relationship dominating the integration structure through parties, lessens the 
potential for democratic consolidation. It generates clients rather than citizens, 
not entailing the institutionalisation of institutions of accountability, essential to 
make certain the protection of society’s interests in a representative democracy. 
Along these lines, indicators of a low level of integration will develop further. 
Parties will rely less and less on their members, and electoral volatility amplified 
including the clientele volatility, as all competing parties chase after them. Parties 
will continue to have no capacity to orient citizens on the policies they pursue, 
known to be highly unpredictable. Subsequently, less integration of society into 
the political process means less trust in democracy and an uneasy consolidation. 
The trend is very likely to be the same, leading to a state of development where 
all those considered a part of the process will be confined within the clientele, 
though the majority of society are excluded.  
 
Internationally sponsored positive consolidation of democracy can scarcely take 
place, if the inner institutional structure does not hold up to it. Kosovo parties are 
normatively expected to teach democracy (that is internationally sponsored) to 
citizens. Likewise, they socialise society with democracy norms and values, 
convincing the majority of them to hold trust and believe in democracy, 
subsequently enabling legitimation, a prerequisite for consolidation. Hitherto, 
parties have proved themselves to perform very poorly in this function. Parties’ 
inner and outer behaviour has a direct impact on legitimation prospects. The best 
way parties can teach and then legitimise democracy is by primarily generating, 
respecting, and inculcating democratic values themselves. This is attainable 
principally by functionalising inner party democracy, extending the existing low 
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level of inclusiveness, decentralising the decision-making power, and increasing 
the level of systemness. This in turn means to reduce, limit, and control the 
actual absolute power that party leaders have, standing as the major obstacle to 
inner party democracy developments. Party leaders having absolute power, are 
able to prevent any tendency for democratisation, perceived as a challenge to 
them. Therefore, it can barely be expected from parties, being not democratic 
themselves, to legitimise democracy among society, considered vital to 
democracy consolidation.  
 
At the outer level, parties through their bare-faced behaviour during inter party 
competition  lower democracy legitimation prospects. The combative way of 
competition among them might bring society to civil war. Such behaviour is going 
to be amplified as competition to get clientele gets fiercer and with parties’ 
objectives not seeming to change in the near future. For instance, as stated 
earlier, in the recent 2009 election, AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj, was not alone 
in declaring that “there was a need for just a very small thing to happen, and we 
were about to reach the unexpected…” (KTV Lajmet 19.00, 14.12.2009), 
meaning a civil war  was about to start. Parties will use whatever means 
possible, legal and illegal, to get to power through votes, to colonise the state, 
and use its resources to extend their support. Being in power enables parties to 
reimburse their clientele’s support, from whom they get votes. Therefore, among 
parties a harsh combative competitiveness is to be expected. Such a trend has 
also been demonstrated in the recent local elections in 2009, whereby the 
election committee for appeals asked for three municipalities to repeat elections 
due to a high number of irregularities and election fraud. A large number of 
election irregularities were noted in other places as well, but the international 
community, due to stability concerns, seem to have looked the other way. The 
peak of such development was the declaration of Kosovo prime minister Hashim 
Thaqi (PDK), while talking about the elections in Prizren (the third round of 
elections due to irregularities) declared that “Prizren is Jerusalem for us”. It 
illustrates best the party’s combative, competitive behaviour and the 
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unpredictable future of the democracy consolidation process, always endangered 
by such party behaviour.  
 
Within the innovation function of parties, no change is not to be expected. Parties 
are lacking the knowledge to improve their creativity and find solutions for the 
current problems society has. A large portion of educated people, who could be 
used by political parties as a human resources potential to improve the capacity 
of creativity, do not find themselves to be within existing parties. The low level of 
inner democracy, automatically excludes them from the policy-making process. 
Parties will go on with following, instead of initiating, issues. This is directly linked 
with democracy consolidation prospects, whereby parties are not just unable to 
deal with issues, but instead constitute the problems themselves.    
 
Furthermore, at the governing level less positive change is also to be expected. 
This might get even worse. Kosovo has a very poor and underdeveloped 
economy. The state exploitation by parties cannot last forever, in particular a 
poor state like Kosovo may not afford it for long, as its resources may perish. 
Nevertheless, state exploitation will go on as the best opportunity for parties to 
enlarge their support and even enable them to exist. Despite international 
requirements, such as EU membership criteria fulfilment,  such as  to stop 
politicisation among other things, parties continue with their behaviours and 
activities, hiding them whenever possible; state exploitation will occur as much as 
possible. The privatisation process will continue with the few remaining public 
companies, always taking into account the particularistic benefits. Recently the 
KAP announced that it is going to give “as a gift” 39 “Kosovo Petrol”, petrol 
stations that after the war were owned by a member of the PDK directing council, 
seized by him immediately after the war. During socialist time and before the war 
they used to be public property. The KAP announced that they will not be under 
the privatisation procedures, illustrating that this is nothing else other than 
exploiting state resources for particularistic party clientele needs. It does not 
resemble anything else except state exploitation (Koha Ditore 11.12.2009). The 
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exploitation will continue to take place in all sectors possible. Tenderomania will 
remain as one the main rules of the game, with the largest exploitation taking 
place in sectors using more public funds. The road building industry is currently 
the largest sector of exploitation. The price of road building, surprisingly, is 
incomparably higher than in industrialised countries such as in Germany or the 
USA. A square metre of asphalt in Kosovo costs 25 Euros while in the EU it is 
about 16 Euros, and in the USA just 6 Euros (BIRN “Jeta ne Kosove”, RTK, 
12.01.2010). The quality of roads is also not comparable. Roads that survive a 
single year without being damaged are considered to be of high quality, though 
hardly found. New roads are repaired after a few months, usually in the spring 
season instead of planting flowers.  
 
Moreover, the high level of politicisation of public servants was also shown 
recently by statistics. In the 2009 local elections, out of 6000 candidates on the 
lists for local elections, 1300 of them were civil servants (KTV, 17.00; 
06.12.2009). Although they are free to choose either public administration or 
political positions, it shows the current high level of politicisation in public 
administration. The trend of politicisation of public administration and the hunt for 
clientele was also recently reconfirmed by LDD leader Nexhat Daci, where 
employees being members of LDD were threatened, either to change their party 
or lose their jobs (Express 27.01.2010). 
 
The chase for clientele will remain as the major incentive of party competition, 
choosing a variety of means to reimburse them, starting at the village level for 
instance by distributing flour in the village of Varigoc, in the municipality of Lipjan 
(Koha Ditore 27.01.2010), up to cash and other possible direct exchanges. Both 
parties, LDK and PDK, distributed 50 to 100 kg per family in exchange of votes a 
few days before the third round of the election was to take place, as a result of 
high irregularities and election fraud. Such party behaviour expands further the 
informal institutions that obstruct the democratisation process, such as 
clientelism, patronage, corruption, clans, nepotism, and so on, resulting in 
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institutional structures challenging the formal institutional structure essential for 
democracy consolidation.   
 
Overall, political parties will continue to be and behave as they currently are, 
since they lack capability, will, and mechanisms to transform themselves. No 
performance improvement on their normative functions is expected, behaving 
principally in contradiction with democracy standards. Their behaviour and 
attitude, despite international sponsoring of democracy in Kosovo, is going to 
affect the three other levels of the consolidation structure. In the short and 
medium term, the most that can be achieved is democratisation at the level of 
forced negative consolidation, due to international pressures. However, if the 
trend does not change, in the long run it might also place in peril that level of 
negative consolidation.    
 
Nonetheless, another development that has been covered and has operated 
underground for a considerable time, affecting party behaviour, attitude, and the 
democracy consolidation process in general, is the issue that most parties 
possess within their structure, invisible and shadowy security and intelligence 
service structures. They support their parties and are even considered the most 
powerful organs, often in the service of the party leader, empowering him and 
making him unchallengeable within parties. On the other hand, it drives parties 
and then politics towards criminalisation. One of the civil society activists Veton 
Surroi (koha.net / 12.12.2009), referring to this, stated that politics in Kosovo 
should firstly be decriminalised. The power and operation of such shadow 
structures has been emphasised by an ICG Report as well: “problems that will 
come back to haunt Kosovo like toleration of widespread corruption and of 
powerful, unaccountable partisan political intelligence agencies are being swept 
under the carpet rather than addressed” (Kosovo after Haradinaj, Crisis Group 
Europe Report N°163, 26 May 2005, i). Such structures persist and have a great 
impact on the parties itself in general.  
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In conclusion, a possible scenario that might directly challenge the democracy 
consolidation process in Kosovo might come out, because of the absence of 
alternatives, despite so many existing parties. In this regard, a social movement 
known as “Vetvendosja” (“Selfdetermination”) is developing, and has already 
declared to join politics. Vetvendosja, as a social movement has recruited within 
its ranks many young, educated, committed people, disappointed with the current 
state of affairs. Moreover, its leader Albain Kurti, is known for dissidence. 
Ideologically they are very much influenced by leftist literature, motivated by the 
Che Guevara resistance, and often echoing even nationalisation of the economy. 
Furthermore, they stand against the presence of the international community 
here, Ahtisaari’s proposal, and lately openly proclaiming the unification of 
Albanians within a single state. Such attitudes are incompatible with the 
democracy consolidation prospects in Kosovo, constituting other than democratic 
rules of the game. 
 
Vetvendosja has a great potential, at least to be a determining factor in governing 
power, favoured by the existing conditions in Kosovo. The high level of poverty, 
the state exploitation taking place (among others) through the privatisation 
process, the high level of unemployment, the economic downturn, are handled by 
Vetvendosja through their own worldviews. On the other side, the high level of 
corruption, the high level of dissatisfaction of society with the political class, is 
addressed through the populist behaviour of the movement, which is easy to 
penetrate into society. Their nationalist attitude might be used to mobilise a large 
part of society, not happy with the compromise made on status issues, such as 
Ahtisaari’s proposal, decentralisation, reserved and privileged rights for the Serb 
community, the presence of the international community, and so on. Many 
perceive Vetvendosja as the only hope for the issue of the settlement of all 
Albanians. Moreover, what ensures wide social support for Kurti’s movement is 
that actual parties, as mentioned earlier, though many in number, do not offer an 
alternative to each other, being almost the same, and do not serve as promoters 
of democracy consolidation. Vetvendosja compared to current political parties 
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can offer an alternative, but the alternative they offer seems apparently not fully 
compatible with democracy in general and democracy consolidation. In the 
current state of affairs in Kosovo, Vetvendosja affects negatively the democracy 
consolidation process. Therefore, it is mentioned despite the fact that it is not a 
political party and a subject of our study here. Since, we are dealing with future 
prospects of democracy consolidation in Kosovo, it is worth taking them into 
account, due to the direction they might give to the currently envisaged negative 
consolidated democracy in Kosovo.  
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Chapter 11 
11. Conclusion 
“Kosovo parties should serve democracy and not anarchy” 
Jakup Krasniqi – Kosovo Parliament Spekaker, Radio Free Europe (in Albanian), 
20.07.2009  
 
The Kosovo political system has not yet achieved to consolidate the 
represäntative consolidation in the democracy consolidation structure. There is 
demonstrated progress in terms of formal constitutional consolidation, 
possessing a democratic written constitution (with exception, it shares power with 
international institutions). A large number of laws has been legislated in this 
regard, though failing in implementation. A considerable part of constitutional 
consolidation is also directly dependent on the level of representative 
consolidation. 
 
Political parties in Kosovo have proved they perform very poorly in fulfilling their 
functions, therefore impeding rather than ensuring the smooth consolidation of 
democracy in Kosovo. Different from many countries of the region, Kosovo 
system transformation has been overextended and prolonged, making the 
process exhausted, and providing very little light at the end of an unusually long 
tunnel.  
 
Political parties in Kosovo, though many in number fall short in representing 
society in the political process. They are considered more as agents to exploit 
the state rather than as socio-political actors meant to organise society politically 
and anchor them into the political process. The long-term social divisions are not 
reflected in their programmes or platforms. Most programmes of the parties 
considered - major parties, are almost the same and often copy each other, 
generating and maintaining a blurred ideological mishmash in the Kosovo party 
system. In other words, parties are not programme or ideology based. As a 
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result, the interests of society are not projected into the policy-making and 
decision-making process. All of them stand for a free market economy, but none 
define the level of it. Practically, in terms of cultural values they are merely 
conservatives, often sounding like populists. What is more important, parties 
themselves are not conscious of their ideological profile, have an identity crisis, 
which consequently confuses society further , the majority being highly 
uninformed and having difficulties in orienting themselves into the party system 
while casting their votes. 
 
The low level of representation is in turn accompanied with a low level of 
integration. The dual faces of parties, the formal democratic one as it is 
described in party documents, does not correspond with the actual one known as 
more authoritarian. It offers less opportunity for parties to bind society into the 
political process. Political parties possess insufficient symbols and ideas capable 
to anchor citizens into the political process. Most of what parties provide are their 
leaders, and the direct benefit to clientele, usually not constituting a large part of 
society. This is in turn manifested through a low level of electoral turn out, a high 
level of volatility, a depleting number of party sympathisers, and the shift of party 
politics towards establishing the clientelist structure. Often at election campaign 
meetings primary school children are seen filling up the halls of meetings, as 
parties day by day are being dried out of party supporters. The fate of a 
democracy, particularly a not yet consolidated democracy, is unforeseen if such 
a huge number of citizens turn their back to the main channels of political 
communication and the political process as a whole. Excluding the independence 
issue around whom a large part of society was organised for a considerable time, 
parties in general have failed to orient citizens on the policy options, and to make 
them feel part of the collective process. The recent developments of party-
society-government relations are proving it. Moreover, parties are contributing in 
preserving the traditional institutions of authority, and preventing the 
modernisation process of the Kosovo political system to take place. Parties are 
upholding and still cultivating provincial identification and loyalty within Kosovo, 
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trying to ensure their support in the regional bases from where party leaders 
come from. Likewise, they hinder the transformation of loyalty to the state 
institution as a modern political organisation, needed for a new state. On the 
other hand, the modernisation process is closely linked with democratisation 
prospects.  
 
Hence, parties are performing very pitiably in the legitimation function. The inner 
and outer practice of Kosovo parties brings to the surface parties’ behaviour, 
hardly compatible with democracy norms, standards, values, and expectations. 
The lack of inner democracy in Kosovo parties is directly linked with the ailed 
legitimation scenario, as a result of infeasibility of society to learn democracy 
through the institutions meant to teach it to them. Yet, parties have a deficiency 
of democracy themselves, and do not consider democratic inner rules of the 
game to be important to them. In this way, parties offer no opportunity to citizens 
to learn democracy, diminishing their loyalty to democracy, and consequently 
ruin democracy legitimation that is an essential prerequisite for the consolidation 
process to move forward.  
 
Furthermore, the combative competitive attitude among parties is not a promising 
signal to the wider society, it irritates citizens from participation in the process, 
and later might even bring the country to civil war, especially in a country having 
organised parties based on leaders’ regional camps. For a young unconsolidated 
democracy, such as Kosovo, a legitimacy crisis constitutes anxious prospects. 
Such illegitimacy easily breaks through into democracy institutions as well, and 
the regime in general, particularly for states having still young institutions.  
 
In terms of the innovation function, parties have so far proved uncreative in 
presenting solutions even to the acute problems that Kosovo has. Kosovo 
continues to be the only state in Europe with a collapsed health care system, for 
instance. There is still a low quality of education, a high level of poverty, a high 
level of politicisation of the judiciary preventing the rule of law, and so on. 
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Hitherto, no party has a vision or a concrete platform on how to tackle them. Most 
of their platforms merely state the problems Kosovo has, without providing 
policies on that. Their declarations are coloured with populism, and vague 
promises. 
  
As an apex of all that was earlier stated, parties continue to exploit the state and 
its resources for their own narrow, personal, clan, and clientelist purposes. The 
governing function of parties is the secured place where parties utilise state 
resources for their interests. In this manner, the governing function does not take 
place based on citizens’ interests. The governing does not take into account 
collective interests, neither at the input nor at the output level. Instead, they use 
the taxes of citizens and all other state resources to fulfil their own interest. 
Therefore, the governing function of parties in Kosovo is equated with state 
exploitation, taking place at all levels, and wherever possible.   
 
The exploitation is enabled through politicisation. The high level of politicisation 
initiated, developed, and maintained by the political parties – the main institutions 
of a representative level of consolidation structure, has a negative impact on the 
three other levels of the consolidation structure. It prevents the proper functioning 
of the constitutional level of consolidation. Moreover, the third level, embracing 
the veto players, as Merkel (2007) names, the mafia, organised crime, and 
authoritative tendencies of the executive in Balkans are hardly likely to shrink, 
due to the interconnection between politics and crime. On the other side, civic 
consolidation is hardly likely to take place in the near future due to the high level 
and deep politicisation at the society level and personalisation of politics through 
party leaders, producing no fertile ground for democracy, but institutions hardly 
compatible with democracy, such as clientelism, clanism, nepotism, patronage, 
etc.. 
 
Therefore, the high and deep level of politicisation taking place at the second 
level increases the role and influence of parties in the democracy consolidation 
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structure, since all levels are interrelated with the representation level capable of 
exercising more influence on the others, rather than being influenced by them. As 
Schmitter (1999, 478) argues, if parties fail to perform or perform very poorly their 
functions, they are not anymore to be considered as indispensable institutions for 
the consolidation of democracy.  
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13. Annex 
Interview questions were used for political parties’ representative, political 
analysts, political scientists, sociologists, and Kosovo Agency against Corruption.    
 
 
Interview Questions for Political Parties   
Representation function  
 
1. What is the ideology of your party? Why? 
2. What is the profile of your party: left, right, centre? 
3. What you think makes your party to be on that position and not on the others? 
4. Does ideology guides the activity of your party? How much? Example? 
5. Which part of the society do you represent? Is any specific class or group that you represent? Are 
they aware that they are represented by your party? Is any other party in Kosovo representing the same 
strata you do? 
6. What is your stand on economic policies, role of government in economic activities? 
7. How about your stand in politics? 
8. How your party values cultural transformation?  
9. Do you think your party change the profile? 
10. Do you involve any organisation of the part of society you represent to consult for electoral platform 
formulation or for the drawing up of the party programme, or any other policy? 
11. Who formulates the party programme? Who approves it? 
12. Who formulates the electoral platforms? Who approves them? 
13. What is your stand on the following fields?  
 
 
About party – profile  National Issue Decentralisation Multiculturalism 
    
 
Economy Labour policy Welfare policy Fiscal Policy 
   . 
 
Security policy Agriculture  Education Gender Policy 
    
 
Environment Energy Policy  Corruption Rule of law 
    
 
Human Rights 
Protection 
Culture, Youth, Sports Healthcare Policy Integration Policy 
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Development Poverty Investment Regional Cooperation 
    
 
 
Integration function 
1. How many members do you have now? 
2. How many members did you have at the beginning? 
3. Is your party membership increasing or decreasing? 
4. Does your party have stable membership? 
5. How many supports approximately do you have? 
6. How many supporters did you have earlier? 
7. Where do u rely more in terms of the support? 
8. Do they support because of your programme (if yes, which group for which part), or because of 
your leader, or because that they get direct benefit from your party (jobs, contracts, tenders, and so on)? 
9. Are party members well informed by party policies and position of parties in different policies? 
10. Do you think that your party have deep roots in society? 
11. Do you have many militants and supporters? 
12. From which part of Kosovo are most of your supporters? 
13. How stable is your electorate?  
14. What makes citizens to support you? 
15. Do you think that in some regions of Kosovo you have more support? 
16. Do you compensate your supporters by anything? 
17. Does your party have clientele also? Can other parties take your clientele? 
18. Do you rely also on blood relationship support as a party? 
19. How stable is your party elite? 
20. Did they come from other parties? 
21. Has any of party elites leave the party and moved to other parties? Why do they usually do it? 
 
Legitimation function 
1. How is structured power within your party? 
2. Where relies the ultimate decision making power? 
3. What is the hierarchy of the decision making bodies, how wide are those bodies? 
4. Is it clear for each organ within the party what is their scope of competences? 
5. How powerful is the party leader? 
6. Does it happen that he might be challenged by any inside it? What happens in such cases?  
7. Does it happen that the leader comes into contradiction with other party organs? Which one 
prevails over the other?  
8. Is the party leader ready to decentralise power to other party organs? 
9. How decisions are taken? What system of voting? 
10. Is the vote of leader weighted equal to the vote of others?  
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11. What if any organ within the party steps over the decision of other organs, what measures are 
taken on that case? 
12. How is the leader chosen, is any other candidate competing for that position? 
13. Is any important issue that can be decided without the prior knowledge of the leader? 
14. Does the leader deal with everything? 
15. Which organ is more important after the leader? 
16. Who is eligible to offer the candidature on the list of your party? 
17. Who is part of the selectorate, who selects candidates on the list, who decides for the list? 
18. How is the procedure of drawing the lists? 
19. Do you consult ordinary party members for the list of candidates? 
20. How often the party organs hold meetings and who draw the agenda of the meetings? 
21. Are the meetings open to other members or not? 
22. Are the decisions taken from these organs respected and implemented? What if not? 
23. How do you formulate your party programmes and electoral platforms? Do you consult the ordinary 
members for that? 
24. Is any dialogue or debate on that? 
25. What is the power of party branches and sub-branches? 
26. What do they decide for? 
27. Can their decisions be turned down by the central office or the leader? 
 
Innovation 
1. Does your party  has a governing programme?  
2. What are your solutions for the current national problems? 
3. Does your party have formulated policies for the current public programmes? If yes, which one? 
4. What is the solution of the northern part of Kosovo? 
5. How do you plan to reduce poverty? 
6. What is policy on fighting corruption, organised crime, …? 
7. What is the strategy of your party to develop the country?  
8. What is the strategy of your party how to increase the recognition of the state in international 
community? 
9. What is the strategy of your party how to improve the rule of law and fight organised crime? 
10. What is your energy policy, to make regular energy supply? 
 
Governing function 
1. How does your party perceive the power?  
2. What are the motives behind your struggle for power? 
3. Do you think that by being in power you can protect better citizens’ interests? How? In what way? 
4. Are you concern that power might corrupt you as a party? What would you do on that case?  
5. What do you think about such large corruption at the government? 
6. What has your party done to fight corruption? 
7. Do you have any written policy on how to fight corruption? 
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8. What are the concrete measures that your party has undertaken or will undertake since you came 
in power, or once you were in power, or if you come to power? 
9. What do you think about existing legal infrastructure in fighting corruption? 
10. How do you see the role of Kosovo Agency against corruption, its power, functioning, and 
objectives that such agency has? 
11. Do you think such agency is politicised and manipulated by political parties? 
12. Do you think that there is a wide and deep state and society politicisation by political parties? 
13. Why is happening such fierce competition among parties to control everything? 
14. What parties are exploiting the state? 
15. Are they reimbursing their clienteles, or their relatives through state resources?  
16. Is that taking place through government contracts, employment opportunities, privatizations, etc.?  
17. How do you over employment at public administration in Kosovo? Why parties do that? 
18. Do you believe that such behaviour is against collective interest of society? 
19. Why such high level of politicisation is taking place? What pushes parties into such undemocratic 
game? 
20. Do you believe that politicisation is not healthy and might endanger democracy in Kosovo? 
21. Does your party offer any strategy how to decrease the level of politicisation? What would you do in 
this respect if you were in power?  
22. Can it be considered as a struggle of parties for financial means? Why up to now there is no law on 
party finances?  
23. Do you believe that parties do right thing by reimbursing their supporters through being in power? 
24. How do you think can public administration be depoliticised? Does your party has any written policy 
on that? 
25. Do you believe that parties through politicisation are exploiting the state, by using state resources 
for narrow and party ends? Can we say in this regard that parties in Kosovo have colonised the state? 
26. How do you see the misuses at public procurement, meaning misuses of public money? How 
would you correct that being in opposition or in power? Do you plan to initiate amendments on the law of 
public procurement as it was suggested by European Commission 
27. How is your party financed?  
28. Do you believe it would better, if Kosovo parties rely also on membership fees and other legal 
funds, and not to cover the financial shortages by misusing state resources while being in power?  
29. How do you think can be depoliticised the judiciary, education, healthcare, police, and other 
spheres politicised? How would your party do that?  
30. Is depoliticisation achievable and how long would it take as a process? If you were in power how 
long would you need to achieve it?  
31. Do you that if privatisation process was not politicised by political parties, could it be more 
successful then it is today?  
32. How far could parties benefit for their narrow interest from the privatisation process?  
33. While being in power how far have you make pressure on government for better governing? 
34. What have you offered as an alternative? 
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35. As an opposition party, how far have you developed the accountability of government to the 
parliament, increasing the level democratic governing?  
36. Do you believe there is a way of this? How? 
37. Do such party behaviour help or prevent development of democracy in Kosovo? 
38. What should parties do in order to change their behaviour to democratic one?  
 
 
Interview Questions for Political Analysts, Political Scientists, Sociologists, 
Kosovo Agency against Corruption  
 
Representation function 
1. How far do think political parties in Kosovo (always in those questions we are referred to five actual 
major parties) are based on any ideology? Why? 
2. How far are their activities based on any ideology? Why? 
3. What ideological profile do they have: left, right, centre? Why? 
4. How can be identified their ideological profile: programme, electoral platforms, policies they pursue, 
declarations, etc.? 
5. Do parties represent any specific part of Kosovo society, such class or any other groups? 
6. Are social groups aware that they are represented from which party? Why? 
7. Are interests of those social groups founded on programmes and the activities of political parties? 
Do parties protect the interests of groups, classes they represent? 
8. If yes, why? If not, why? 
9. Is the ideological profile of political parties going to be clarified? When and how?  
10. How is it reflected in general into the development of democracy in Kosovo? 
 
Integration  
1. How far do you think that Kosovo society is integrated into political process through political 
parties? 
2. Do parties in Kosovo have large number of members? 
3. Is it the number of party members in decline? Why?  
4. On what do parties rely if not on the support of their members? 
5. Are parties in Kosovo developing their clientele? How? 
6. What makes citizens of Kosovo to support a political party: programme, leader, or being part of 
clientele? 
7. How far it can be considered that there is a trend that party members are being replaced by 
clientele structure of parties? 
8. Why recently there has been a tremendous increase of volatility compared with time after the war? 
How is that going to be in the future? Does it have impact on the stability of democracy in Kosovo? 
9. How do you see the movement of members of party elites from a party to another? 
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10. Can we say that the degree of integration of society through political parties is deepening or being 
depleted? Why? How far do citizens in Kosovo have opportunity to be integrated into decision-making 
through other organisation outside political parties?   
11. How does it impacts on Kosovo democracy? 
 
Legitimation 
1. How far do parties have inner-party democracy? 
2. How far are included party structures and members into decision-making within the party? Why? 
3. Where does it relies the absolute decision-making power within parties? Why? 
4. How fan the party leaders be challenged within the parties? Why leaders dominate in Kosovo 
parties?  
5. Would it be a problem for a leader to step down a decision of higher party organs? How much 
costly is that? 
6. How far centralised is decision-making within the party? 
7. Who constitutes the filters of policies within the parties? 
8. How far do Kosovo parties offer alternatives in terms of offering policies to citizens? 
9. Does Kosovo democracy needs parties with high level of inner-party democracy? Why? 
 
Innovation 
1. How much creative are Kosovo parties? 
2. Do they offer solutions for actual problems Kosovo has? If not, why? If yes, why, which one? 
3. How far did they innovate solutions for the acute problems that Kosovo has: unification of Mitrovica, 
economic development, increasing the number of state recognition, extending the sovereignty all over 
territory, etc.?  
 
Governing  
1. What is the role of Kosovo parties in governing? 
2. Kosovo is among the most corrupted countries, what is the role of parties in this case? 
3. Why parties have not proven successful in fighting corruption? 
4. How and how far are the parties making use of state resources? 
5. How do they manage the public money? 
6. Are they exploiting the state, in terms of making use of state resources for particularistic parties’ 
needs? 
7. How far do u think that the Kosovo society and the Kosovo state is politicised from political parties?  
8. Why such politicisation? How does it serve to political parties? 
9. Do you think that public administration and public companies are over employed by parties’ clients? 
Why?  
10. Is that good for parties? How? 
11. How that can be stopped and changed? 
12. Does this level of politicisation damages democracy, how and how far? 
13. How do you see the future, can such trend be changed? 
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14. Are parties corrupted? 
15. Why do they not initiate the legislation of law on party financing? 
16. Do the parties have made use of privatisation process for narrow parties’ needs? 
17. Why parties in Kosovo are so thirsty to get power? Can that be related to their very existence as 
parties with impact on society? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
